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Summary of Thesis submitted forrh. D. degree 
by David Norman Samuel, ý. A. , 
(,, ales) , M. A. 
on 
Theology 
The Argument from Design 
,,: pith special reference to Paley and Darwin 
end its significance for contemporary Christian apologetic 
The purpose of this thesis is to exa~. ine the nature of the iesign Argument both 
historically and philosophically, to compare ýnd contrast it with the Darwinian 
theory of evolution which resulted in the demise of the Argument in the nine- 
teenth century, and to assess the significance it can still conceivably have 
for Christian apologetic today. 
The thesis begins with an exaiiination of Paley's presentation of the nrgument 
in his Natural Theology, -nd an assessment of its strengths and weaknesses in 
the light of later developments of thought. This is followed by a statement 
and appraisal of the philosophical criticism to which the Argument was subjected 
by Kant and Hume. It is argued that the popular view that these critiques 
inflicted irreparable damage on the Argument appears to be mistaken. 
The continuing role of the Argument in natural theology in the nineteenth 
century is traced through the Lridgewrwcter Treatises and the contribution the 
writers of these treatises made to the elabor.. tion of Paley's central thesis. 
The changes that began to come about in the 1830s and 1840s with regard to the 
view of the development of life on earth and the significance this had for the 
Argument from Lesign Lre discussed in rele'ion to the advent of Lyell's 
uniformitarianism and the Vestiges of Creation. 
The special bearing that Larvin's theory of organic evolution had upon the 
;, rgument from Design is considered at length. Ii particular the affinities, 
both psychological and philosophical, which are deemed to exist between the 
structure and the character of the two arguments are brought out. The role of 
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the imagination in the development and presentation of Darwin's metaphysical 
ideas is seen to be of primary importance, and as something which links his 
theory closely in character and structure with the Design hrgument. This also 
suggests that the two arguments function in a similar way. However ; Larvd nism, 
it is argued, is fundamentally incompatible with teleology and this is seen in 
the failure of apologists on both sides to unite them. 
The final chapters are concerned with showing, in the light of the foregoing 
analysis, how a teleological view of the world and man may still be regarded 
as valid, , -nd the place this fresh appraisal of the Design Argument might 
afford it in Christian apologetic today. 
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"... It is by frequent or continued meditation upon a subject, by placing 
a subject in different points of view, by induction of particulars, by 
variety of examples, by applying principles to the solution of phenomena, 
by dwelling upon proofs and consequences, that mental exercise is drawn 
into any particular channel. It is by these means, at least, that we have 
any power over it. The train of spontaneous thought, and the choice of 
that train, may be directed to different ends ... 
... 
if one train of thinking be more desirable than another, it is that which 
regards the phenomena of nature with a constant reference to a supreme, 
intelligent Author. To have made this the ruling, the habitual sentiment 
of our minds, is to have laid the founaation of everything which is religious. " 
(b, illiani Faleý,, Natural Theology, Ed. F. Ferre, p. 84. ) 
11 ... 1 feel pretty sure, from my own experience, that if you are led by your 
studies to keep the subject of the origin of species before your mind you 
will go further and further in your belief". 
(Charles Darwin in a letter to Asa Gray, Ist February, 1860, 
Life and Letters of Charles )arwir., II, p. 273, Ed. F. Darwin) 
"No one ... will deny that it is at the level of the imagination that 
contemporary Christianity is most ýý; eak. 1 en find it herd to believe in 
God because they do not have available to them any lively imaginative 
picture of the way God and the world as they know it are related". 
(Dennis Nineham in The Myth of God Incarnate, Ed. John Hick, p. 201 
INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of reasons why the design argument should be reconsidered at 
present. In the first place there is the comparative neglect from which it has 
suffered in recent times, by which I mean that during the greater part of this 
century it has received little attention. This is probably due to the fact that 
there is a general feeling abroad that the argument no longer carries conviction 
and that since Darwin such a position has become untenable and irrelevant. 
This is all in strange contrast to the popularity and prominence the argument once 
enjoyed, and the resilience it proved to possess in the face of doubts and criticism, 
for though it was at times suppressed by opposing views, yet it was never wholly 
eclipsed. It is also strange that the ar. unent should be so little employed today 
by those of a religious persuasion when there is such a wealth of illustrative 
material available through the advance of science into the realms of microscopy 
and molecular biology. Modern science seems to be bringing us back to design and 
confronting us with it as an ultimate, unexplained datum. On the face of it there 
would appear to be abundant material for popular exposition of the argument. 
Programmes about nature and science on television are generally well received, but 
almost invariably they evoke an understanding of the complex harmony and design 
exhibited in nature as having been brought about in an accidental way. 
Here is a great opportunity for an opposite view of nature to be expounded, but it 
cannot be done until, and unless, there is the conviction that such a view of nature, 
as rationally ordered and intelligently designed, is both permissible and 
legitimate. This is where an examination of the presuppositions and principles 
underlying the design argument, and the alternative view of the world which stems 
from Darwinism, is needed and may serve to remedy the neglect of recent years. 
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The history of the robust nature of the argument would suggest that its role 
is not relegated to the past. It is awaiting reinstatement at the hands of those 
who are convinced of the relevance and force of the argument. 
A reappraisal is at present taking place of Darwin's theory of evolution by 
natural selection and its implications. The adequacy of the theory is being 
seriously questioned from within the scientific establishment itself. There is 
growing uncertainty and agnosticism about the mechanism of descent. ; Jhile there 
is no doubt that natural selection does take place, it is being questioned 
whether it is capable of producing new species and can explain the order and 
form of the whole organic world, as Darwin claimed. This, of course, reopens 
the question that Darwin was deemed to have settled. It casts doubt upon the 
comprehensive world view that his theory evoked of aLl life having derived from 
some single form, or at most some few forms. If natural selection is not 
competent to explain the order and purpose we perceive in nature, what is ? 
The significant thing about the current debate is that the consensus about 
evolution which has prevailed very largely since Darwin's time is being broken up. 
Where this happens there is always the possibility of a new way of looking at 
things emerging, even if that new way proves in the end, like most changes of a 
philosophical nature, to be the reintroduction of ideas which were common in a 
previous age. 
But not only has the argument from design been neglected in recent years, it 
has also been the subject of misunderstanding, which has no doubt contributed 
to its neglect. It has been laid aside because it was thought to conflict with 
science. This is not the case. It conflicts not with science but with scientism, 
with a metaphysic which is adopted, sometimes by scientific men but equally 
by those who are not scientists, which attributes the world and human existence 
to chance, to the blind operation of natural forces. This is the elevation of 
a principle which we find at the heart of Darwinism - natural selection acting 
upon random variation - into a philosophical world view. It is not itself 
scientific, but in the popular mind it is often regarded as being a scientific 
position. It is this world view 
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which conflicts with the design argument representing, as it does, a wholly 
different understanding of the universe and human existence. It is the author's 
opinion that a proper examination of Darwin's views, scientific and metaphysical, 
and a recognition of the distinction between them, will help to resolve the 
confusion and rehabilitate the design argument as a legitimate and even necessary 
position, since it can be argued that certain psychological and philosophical 
constraints require us to view the world and its parts as designed. It is important 
also that this examination should be seen against the broad background of the history 
of the argument, particularly in the period which immediately preceded Darwin, so that 
it may be related to the contribution of other great minds to the subject. In this 
way the distinctions and judgments which we need to make can more readily be 
discerned and drawn out. 
Lastly, there is the question of the importance of the design argument for 
contemporary Christian apologetic. The communication of religious concepts, such as 
those contained in the Christian Gospel, presuppose some kind of theistic 
consciousness on the part of those to whom they are communicated. This is lacking 
in a broadly secular a-theistic society such as we encounter in Western civilization 
today. Modern man lacks an understanding of God and, more particularly, how such 
a God is related to the world and human existence. This is the road along which 
religious ideas must travel. If it has become impassable because of neglect and 
obstruction, the way must be cleared and communication restored. A hundred years 
ago Charles Kingsley wrote, "If in any age or country the God who seems to be 
revealed in nature seems different from the God who is revealed by the then popular 
religion, then that God, and the religion that tells of that God, will gradually 
cease to be believed in. " 
I Kingsley was challenging many of the theological 
assumptions of his day which were unfavourable to science, and calling for 
adjustment on the religious side if the nemesis he predicted was to be averted. 
1. Charles Kingsley, Scientific Lectures and Essays (1885), 314 
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Today, in order to redress the balance, we may legitimately question some of the 
so-called scientific assumptions of our age, which hold nature and religion apart, 
and call for an adjustment which will restore communication between a view of the 
world as divinely created and a popular scientific understanding of it. The 
argument from design is uniquely fitted to fulfil t`: is role and this makes its 
study and exposition a matter of great importance and relevance at the present time. 
I 
WILLIAMP ALE YANDTHEDESIGNARGUMENT 
We begin our consideration of the design argument with the work of William Paley, 
the great Anglican divine of the eighteenth century, for several reasons. The 
first is that the argument was given classical and memorable expression in his 
writings. Whenever the question of this 'proof of God's existence' is mentioned 
it is Paley's name which springs to mind, together with the analogy of the watch 
with which he begins the argument in his Natural Theolo y, though he was indebted 
to the Dutch philosopher Bernard Nieuwentyt (1654-1718) for this idea. 1 It is 
true that there is very little that is original in Paley's work, but this does 
not appear to have detracted from its importance. His great vittue was clarity 
of thought and the telling use he made of many of the familiar and commonplace 
ideas of eighteenth century Christian apologetic. He conceived of this apologetic 
as a whole - as a system both of natural theology and of revelation - and laboured 
to complete it, which he did, finishing strangely enough with his work on natural 
theology shortly before his death. From the mass of popular argument and apologetic 
to which the argument from design gave rise in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries Paley was able to abstract what was best, and concentrate it in a 
relatively small compass. Hence his great importance. Standing as he did at the 
zenith of this period, Paley gave the fullest expression to the design argument, 
and, although it ran on into the nineteenth century until it was checked by Darwin 
and the doctrine of natural selection, very little of significance was added by 
later expositors. 
Objection has been made that Paley borrowed the general plan and argument 
of his Natural Theology without acknowledgment. This allegation was first 
made in the Athenaeum for 1848 by a writer who pointed out that a work by 
Bernard Nieuwentyt, a Dutch physician and mathematician, who lived from 1654 
to 1718, had served as the basis for Paley's Natural Theology. Nieuwentyt's 
work entitled The True Uses of the Contemplation of the Universe was 
written in Dutch and first published in Amsterdam in 1715. It was translated 
into English by J. T. Desaguliers and published under the title 
The Religiuos Philosopher (2 Vols. Third Ed. 1724). The famous watch analogy 
begins thus in Nieuwentyt's work, "Let us suppose, that in the middle of a 
sandy down, or desart (sic) and solitary place, where few people are used to 
pass, any one should find a watch ... " 
(p. xxv). 
While the objection against Paley can clearly be sustained, it appears that 
Nieuwentyt himself borrowed ideas and arguments without acknowledgment from 
an earlier work by Robert Boyle on the subject entifled A Disquisition about 
the Final Causes of Natural Thin, published in London in 1688. 
-b 
Beginning as we do, however, with Paley we must not forget that the design 
argument is very ancient. Perhaps its earliest form is found in Stoic philosophy, 
which described the strongest ground of theistic belief as one which is drawn 
from the regularity of the motion and revolution of the heavens, the distinctive- 
ness, variety, beauty, and order of the sun, moon, and all the stars, the 
appearance only of which is sufficient to convince us they are not the effects 
of chance. 
When we see some example of a mechanism, such as a globe or a clock or some 
such device, do we doubt that it is the work of a conscious intelligence ? 
So when we see the movement of the heavenly bodies, the speed of their 
revolution, and the way in which they regularly run their annual course, 
so that all that depends upon them is preserved and prospers, how can we 
doubt that these too are not only the works of reason but of a reason which 
is perfect and divine. 1 
But the Stoics not only appealed to the heavens as evidence of design. They 
also pointed to organic nature. 
When we Stoics say that the universe is formed and governed by nature, 
we do not mean that it is just stuck together mechanically, like a lump 
of earth or a piece of stone or something of that sort, but organically, 
like a tree or an animal, in which there is nothing haphazard but an 
appearance of order which is akin to art. Z 
The design argument also occurs in the fifth of Aquinas' 'Five mays', but its 
greatest flourishing was undoubtedly ih the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Robert Boyle's book A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688) 
was the precursor of a genre. He considered that the prejudice which existed 
against final causes on the part of Descartes was due to the excesses of 
medieval School philosophy which regarded everything in the world as serving the 
benefit of man. We may not pretend to know all the ends of God in creation for 
that is presumption, but we may know some of those ends for that is legitimate. 
I Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, Book II, 163 
2 Ibid. 156 
I 
"The rejection of Final Causes from the consideration of Naturalists, tends 
much to weaken ... if not quite to deprive us of, one of the best and most 
successful Arguments, to convince Men, that there is a God". 
1 
His book embraced 
an account of both inorganic and organic nature, but particularly the latter ... 
"There is incomparably more Art express'd in the structure of a Doggs (sic) 
foot than in that of the famous Clock of Strasburg". 
2 
John Ray published in 1691 his book entitled The Wisdom of God Manifested in 
the Works of the Creation. Ray also attacked Descartes' insistence upon 
excluding final causes from the study of nature. Without the proof of design in 
creation i,, e are left only with the proof of the innate Idea, which is but a very 
obscure demonstration of the existence of God. 
3 
He recognised the place of 
secondary causes in the Divine plan, and termed it Plastic nature, a principle 
or medium that God uses for the creation of things, so that he is not immediately 
involved. Vhile there is analogy between Art and the works of nature there is 
also a contrast, for the microscope shows up the greatest perfection of nature 
the deeper we delve, whereas the same examination exposes the crudeness of 
human art. 
William Derham's Physico-Theology or a demonstration of the Being and Attributes 
God from His Works of Creation appeared in 1713 and followed the now emerging 
pattern of a survey of the phenomena of nature and the current state of science 
in relation to them, concluding with an appeal for the acknowledgment of the 
Creator in his works. 
I Robert Boyle A Disquisition, 32 
2 Ibid., 1+7 
John Ray, The Wisdom of God, 22 
1ý Ibid., 41 
Paley begins his argument with the comparison of the watch and the stone: 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone and were 
asked how the stone came to be there. I might possibly answer, that, 
for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor 
would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But 
suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired 
how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the 
answer which I had before given - that, for anything I knew, the watch 
might always have been there. 
And the reason)he remarks for this difference is that with the watch "we perceive 
(what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and 
put together for a purpose". 
1 It is clear from the context that Paley is not 
merely interested in order in nature, but in order which expresses purpose, or, 
to put the matter another way, he is concerned not with mere design, but teleological 
design. It is for this reason that he declares very much later in his work that 
the order of the solar system is not the best constitued for the argument for the 
existence of an intelligent creator: 
We deduce design from relation, aptitude and correspondence of parts. 
Some degree of complexity is necessary to render a subject fit for 
this species of argument. But the heavenly bodies do not .. 2 present themselves to our observation as compounded of parts at all. 
paley's examples and illustrations were, therefore, drawn primarily from organic 
nature, because here he discerned what he regarded as being the necessary 
complexity, relation and correspondence of parts which were indicative of 
teleological design and conformed best to the analogy of the watch and its parts 
which was the basis of his argument. 
3 
1 William Paley, Works (1838), 25 
2 Ibid., 145 
3 "Tho' the Heavens do show wonderful symmetry and order, yet I cannot but 
think, that the Situations of the Coelestial Bodies do not afford by far 
so clear and cogent Arguments, of the Wisdom and Design of the Author 
of the World, as do the bodies of Animals and Plants. " Robert Boyle, 
A Disquisition (1688), 43 
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Returning then to the watch, the inference is inevitable that it must have had a 
maker. He now anticipates and answers certain objections to this conclusion which 
he knew were current at the time, and, although he never once mentions David Hume 
by name, yet it is clear that some of the sceptical arguments employed by him in 
his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion are being countered here. First, the 
fact that the workman or process is unknown to us does not invalidate the conclusion. 
The artifacts of previous civilizations, which have now disappeared, convey the idea 
of design even if we are not familiar with the author or the process by which they 
came into being. Secondly, even poor workmanship is evidence of a worker; if the 
watch sometimes went wrong, or only occasionally went exactly right, it would not 
destroy the argument for a designer. Nor would the existence of parts which we 
did not recognise as contributing to the general effect. Next he comes to the 
criticism thet we find in Hume's Dialogues, that randomness can be made to 
account for such design. It may not, of course, be excluded logically, but the 
appeal to it is arbitrary when another explanation altogether more familiar, 
reasonable and compatible with the facts to be explained is available: 
Would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch ... accounted for by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material 
forms, that whatever he had found in that place where he found the watch, 
must have contained some internal configuration or other ... ? 
Nor would it give him any satisfaction to be told that there exists in things a 
principle of order: 
He never knew a watch made by a principle of order; nor can he even form 
to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order distinct from 
the intelligence of the watchmaker. 
"He would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of 
contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so. "1 It would also 
surprise him to be told that the watch was the product of "the laws of metallic nature" 
I William Paley, Works, 27 
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It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient 
operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only 
the mode according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for 
it is the order according to which that power acts. lithout this agent, 
without this power, which are both distinct from itself the law does 
nothing, is nothing. The expression 'the law of metallic nature' may 
sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear, but it seems quite as 
justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as 'the 
law of vegetable nature', 'the law of animal nature', or, indeed, 'the 
law of nature' in general when assigned as the cause of phenomena in 
exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these. 
Here we meet with a trenchant criticism of Hume's 'generation' hypothesis, which he 
put forward as an alternative to the design argument in his Dialogues, and to this 
we shall return later. But it is worth remarking here that this criticism is 
equally effective in exposing a confusion that was to arise later in Darwin's 
thought. Darwin introduced into the theory of evolution the idea of 'natural 
selection'. It was, he asserted, a law of nature; but it is clear from the use 
he makes of it that it meant much more than this in his system. The 'law' was 
unconsciously transformed into the operating agency or power. 
We must suppose that there is a power, represented by natural selection or 
the survival of the fittest, always intently watching each slight 
alteration in the transparent layers [of the eye]; and carefully 
preserving each which, under varied circumstances, in any way or in any 
degree, tends to produce a distincter image ... natural selection will 
pick out with unerring skill each improvement. Let this process go on 
for millions of years; ... and may we not believe that a living optical 
instrument might thus be formed as superior to one of glass, as the works 
of the Creator are to those of man ? 
Darwin confuses the two ideas which Paley rightly insists must be kept logically 
distinct - law and agency or power. 
Finally, says Paley, the man who finds the watch on the heath and concludes that 
it has an intelligent maker will not be driven from his conclusion by being told 
that he knows "nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument" 
and "the consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which 
he does know". 
3 
1 Ibid., 27,28 
2 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 137 
3 William Paley, Works (1838), 28 
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II 
Next Paley deals with the problem that is raised by the power of natural 
reproduction in living organisms. If the designed object were capable of 
reproducing itself, it might be supposed that a designer was no longer necessary, 
but that an 'infinite regress' of reproductions could account for the marks of 
contrivance. However, as Paley points out, increasing the number to infinity so 
that you dispense with the necessity for a first in the series does not dispose of 
the problem, viz., how do we account for design or purpose in what we see ? 
It may be conceded that Paley's analogy of a chain whether with a finite or 
infinite number of links equally requiring support is not very apt. "Does the 
whole", as Frederick Ferre points out, 
if infinite even constitute something that needs support ? ... would it 
make sense to ask whether a really infinite chain (per impossibile) were 
supported or falling ? Would there be any difference between a "supported" 
and a "uniformly falling" infinite chain, if that chain constituted all reality ?ý 
The ineptness, however, of his analogy does not destroy the fcrce of the argument. 
" The resort to infinite regress is not an explanation of design, but rather an 
evasion or rejection of such an explanation, and indeed of every explanation. 
The mind cannot remain content with this, and it poses a threat both to scientific 
and metaphysical enquiry. Allowing that there is evidence of design in the object 
before us, it is no answer to the question of how that design came about to assert 
that a preceding object, which was similar to it in all respects, produced it, for 
then the question simply recurs. Taking the problem further and further back does 
not lead to a solution, except where, as Paley himself acknowledged, there is an 
approach to a limit, for then by extending back far enough the limit is reached. 
But where there is no such tendency nothing is achieved by lengthening the series. 
1 Ibid... 30 
2 Frederick Ferre, Introduction to Paley's Natural Theology (1963), xxiii 
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It might appear, at first, as if the Darwinian hypothesis overcame this difficulty. 
Paley shared with most of his contemporaries a belief in the immutability of 
species, that none had changed since they viere created, indeed, that none had become 
extinct and disappeared. Darwin's evolutionary theory, however, introduced a 
plasticity into organic nature, and traced a development from the simple to the 
more complex forms of life. It might, therefore, be assumed that the theory of 
evolution introduced a "tendency to a limit", that as we trace the matter further 
and further back so the problem of design in nature should tend to vanish until one 
is confronted with primitive 'simples', or elements that reveal little or no design. 
It is far from clear that the problem can be resolved as easily as that. It was no 
doubt the case that in the state of biological science which prevailed in the last 
century some such scheme as this appeared plausible. But more recent 
investigation of the structure of living cells has revolutionized this understanding 
of things. "Above the level of the virus", wrote G. G. Simpson in the 1940s, 
if that be granted status as an organism, the simplest living unit is 
almost incredibly complex. It has become commonplace to speak of 
evolution from ameba (sic) to man, as if the ameba were a natural and 
simple beginning of the process. On the contrary, if ... life arose as 
a living molecule or protogene, the progression from this stage to that of the 
ameba is at least as great as from ameba to man. All the essential problems 
of living organism are already solved in the one-celled (or as many now 
prefer to say, noncellular) protozoan I and these are only elaborated 
in man 
or the other multicellular animals. 
All that has happened since then has only served to increase our wonder and 
surprise at the complexity and intricacy of design of even the 'simplest' form of life. 
Now with the aid of the electron-microscope, which can enlarge a penny to the size 
of a city, scientists can see that every cell and every organism is more 
complicated than the most complex machine ever built by man. 
I G. G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution, 16 
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All the cells that we know are of fantastic complexity. I believe that 
no biologist or physicist has yet been able to propose even the outlines 
of a theory as to how such a cell might have been 'evolved'. 1 
There was, then, something defective in the mythology of early evolution which 
led its exponents to assume that the history of living matter could be traced 
back, at least in theory, to the primitive and simple single cell which revealed 
little or no evidence of design and disposed of the question raised by more 
complex organisms. Even here, it now appears, the ubiquity of design is 
encountered, and on no less a scale in the microcosm than the macrocosm. Paley's 
criticism would still seem to have force. Taking the problem further and 
further back does not tend to a solution. Only where there is an approach to a 
limit can this be of assistance. But just when it was believed that such a limit 
was attainable it was found to be illusory, and the question is posed afresh. 
How do we account for the design in what we see ?2 
Paley's application of the design argument begins with the example of the eye, 
perhaps the most wonderful of all the organs of the animal body, and which has 
held a central place in the discussion of this subject both before and since 
Paley's time. Darwin offered a tentative evolutionary account of the development 
of this organ, but not without many and deep misgivings. He acknowledged that, 
"the belief that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by 
natural selection is enough to stagger any one", although it is no "logical 
impossibility". 
3 
1 W. H. Thorpe, Purpose in a World of Chance (1978), 21 
2 In fact Darwin left open the question of the creation of one or a few 
original forms of life ... 'life having been originally breathed into a few 
forms or into one', which he expanded further in the later editions of 
The Origin by saying, 'breathed by the Creator'. The argument of his 
critics was that if the first form had to be created, then the design 
involved in that creation included the whole subsequent development. This 
argument was expressed very clearly by a writer in the Quarterly Review. 
'Design', he said, 'would be no more than a legitimate consequence of an 
admission which [Darwin] makes upon the threshold of his theory. He admits 
that the first life germ was a creation ... the universal result must be 
included in the act' (Q. R., 1869, p. 175). And again, 'There is the 
original fact of collocation, and design cleaves to that fact ... 
if a 
systematic production is the result we must infer systematic forces in 
the cause'. (. R. , 1869 pp. 159-160) 
5 Charles Darwin, The Origin of species (-i:, th Edition, 1897), 103 
-14- 
J. S. Mill in his essay on theism drew attention to the eye as a superior 
example of the argument from design. The combination of different parts, 
he argued, makes sight possible; if things were arranged only slightly 
differently there would be no sight at all, or perhaps very impaired sight. 
The number of instances is considerably greater than is required by inductive 
logic to eliminate chance. Therefore, we are warranted by the canons of 
inductive logic in concluding that what brought all these elements together 
was some cause common to them all. 
The natural sequel of the argument would be this: 
Sight, being a fact not precedent but subsequent to the putting 
together of the organic structure of the eye, can only be connected 
with that structure in the character of a final, not an efficient 
cause; that is, it is not sight itself, but an antecedent Idea of 
it, that must be the efficient cause. But this at once makes the 
origin as proceeding from an intelligent will. 
Mill acknowledges that the argument of "natural selection" is not without its 
force, but considers that "the adaptations of nature afford a large balance of 
probability in favour of creation by intelligence". 
1 
H. J. Jordan argued that Darwin's attempt to explain the emergence of the eye and 
other useful organs by the addition of accidental variations fails to take into 
account the differences between properties and parts of an organism. The mere 
addition of properties does not account for the complex relation and interaction 
of parts in an. organism. The introduction of a new factor must relate not only 
to the existing harmony of the parts, but also create a wholly new harmony, and 
this excludes Darwin's notion of accidental variation. The failure, however, of 
Darwin's attempt to explain the complexity of the organism in terms of the sum 
of simple properties has served to sharpen the significance of the systematic 
and harmonious relations of the parts of living organisms. 
2 
I J. S. Mill, Essays on Religion, "Theism", 171 , 172,174 
2 H. J. Jordan, Allgemeine Vergleichende Physiologie Der Tiere, (1929) Berlin 
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If the subject of design in organic nature is admissible at all then Paley 
showed a sure instinct in beginning with the strongest and best example. 
Here he believed the analogy between human contrivance and divine production 
is most clearly seen. The eye and the telescope are constructed on the same 
principle despite the fact that the one is a perceiving organ and the other an 
unperceiving instrument. If contrivance is proved in the case of the one, he 
argued, it is proved in the case of the other. Paley enlarged upon the 
adaptations observed in the eye, the way it copes with refraction, excessive 
light and different distances, and exclaimed, 
Can anything be more decisive of contrivance than this is ? The most 
secret laws of optics must have been known to the author of a structure 
endowed with such a capacity for change. 
Why, however, should there be contrivance of this kind at all suggesting the 
limitation of power ? Why, where there is omnipotence, cannot there be 
absence of contrivance ? Paley's answer to this is: 
Whatever is done, God could have done without the intervention of 
instruments or means; but it is in the construction of instruments, 
in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence 
is seen. It is this that constitutes the beauty of the universe. 
God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power, 
and to work his ends within those limits. I 
1 William Paley Works (1838), 38 & 39 
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Design has a particular place in the plan and providence of God for his 
creature - man. Without it man is bereft of the knowledge of God through 
creation. It is the language by which God communicates to him his power and 
Godhead. There is, in Paley's view, a similar condescension of the Deity in 
general revelation as in special revelation, a stooping and accommodation to 
the needs of man. There is no necessity for design in creation. God freely 
chooses to employ contrivance where he need not have done so, in order to 
communicate with man and convey to him the notion of a creative Intelligence 
behind the world (cf. Romans I: 20). 1 
Paley's doctrine of analogy is different from that of Aquinas and closer to 
the classical Protestant understanding of it: 
Aquinas' justification of theological language rests on his interpretation 
of the God-creature relationship. According to his interpretation of 
this relationship, finite reality (creatures) points to God, since it 
is caused by God. Being caused by God, finite reality bears some 
similarity to Him because every effect resembles its cause. This 
interpretation of the God-creature relationship authorizes the use of 
human language, because finite reality itself points to God. 2 
The terms of this argument presuppose a certain necessary correlation between 
the character of the finite creation and God who is its cause. But Paley 
regards the creation as endowed with particular characteristics, such as 
contrivance, not because they are essential to God, but because they are 
significant for man and have been freely adopted by the Deity with a view to 
communicating to him the existence of an intelligent Creator. 
Cui Bono ? To what purpose such Engines, such pains, such expence ? (sic) 
The answer is easy, it is to answer the ends for which GOD bestowed so 
much art, wisdom and power about them; and an understanding and 
curiosity to search into them; it is to follow and trace him, when and 
whither he leads us, that we may see and admire his handywork ourselves, 
and set it forth to others that they may see, admire and praise it also. 
William Derham, Physico-Theology, p. 466 
2 H. Bouillard, The Knowledge of God (1969), 85 
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Calvin, speaking of the limits of a natural knowledge of God, asserts that 
this comes to us through the opus Dei, by which he means all the creative and 
providential activity of God. "We know God, who is invisible, only through 
his works"; God reveals Himself in nature, in the course of the natural 
processes and in the history of humanity. 
Thus he has revealed Himself in the design of the universe, allowing 
Himself to be recognized every day, so that men cannot open their eyes 
without seeing the traces of His presence. I 
There is no part of the universe so small but it bears some marks of the power 
and wisdom of God. The world is the theatre of God's glory and man, the crown 
of creation, in his original purity and rectitude was capable of the 
knowledge of God. 
But the knowledge that he could acquire of God from the contemplation of 
nature and of himself did not go beyond the analogy of extrinsic 
attribution. For in nature and man God reveals not His essentia, which 
no man can see, but His virtutes ... By these virtutes we know not what 
God is in Himself, but what he is like towards us i. e., we obtain an 
analogy of extrinsic attribution; we say that God is wise, good, 
omnipotent because his works are wise, good, omnipotent). God gives us 
'a description not of what He is in Himself, but of what He is towards 
us that our knowledge of Him may consist rather of a lively perception 
than in vain and aery speculation*. 2 
This is similar to the point that Paley is making. Analogy is not traced in 
a straight line, as it were, from the essential nature of the Deity to the 
finite creation or vice versa, but is better represented by a broken line so 
that in natural theology, as, indeed, in revelation, we are not dealing with 
the essential attributes of God, but only with his power, wisdom and goodness 
as they relate to us. Paley puts the distinction in this way. 'Ne must 
be careful to imitate the documents of our religion (i. e., the Scriptures 
and therefore revelation) by confining our explanations to what concerns 
ourselves and not ... affect more precision in our ideas than the 
subject allows of ... 3 
I Ibid. , 107 
2 Ibid., 108 
3 William Paley, Works (038), 164 
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And again, speaking of the omnipresence of God, 
This is called a virtual presence. There is also what metaphysicians 
denominate an essential ubiquity; and which idea the language of 
Scripture seems to favour; but the former I think goes as far as 
natural theology carries us. I 
This qualification safeguards Paley's argument from a crude anthropomorphism 
which Hume makes the target of his ridicule in the Dialogues. 
Paley, then begins his argument with the supreme example of design, or 
contrivance, as he is pleased to call it, in organic nature. He multiplies 
his examples endlessly from plants, animals and human physiology, although 
there is no need logically for him to do this, as he acknowledges. The purpose 
of producing so many examples is to make the weight of the argument felt 
cumulatively. Each example of design, however, stands in its own right and, 
if established, proves the argument. It does not depend upon a multitude 
of others. 
Were there no example in the world of contrivance, except that of the 
eye, it would be alone sufficient to support the conclusion which we 
draw from it, as to the necessity of an intelligent Creator ... 
If the other parts of nature were inaccessible to our inquiries, or 
even if the other parts of nature presented nothing to our examination 
but disorder and confusion, the validity of this example would remain 
the same. If there were but one watch in all the world it would not 
be less certain that it had a maker. 2 
This, of course, is what Paley meant earlier by saying that a man cannot be 
driven from this argument by being told the extent of his ignorance. He knows 
enough for his purpose if he can produce one example of design. 
1 William Paley, Works (1838), 166 
2 Ibid., 49 & 50 
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It is worth noting here the contrast between Paley's position and that of 
Darwin. Darwin was always afraid that some irrefutable example of design 
might be produced and expressed his apprehension about it in such terms 
as "it would be absolutely fatal to my theory", it would be "subversive of 
my whole theory", and "it would annihilate my theory". 
I The reason for 
this uneasiness was that Darwin recognised the truth of Paley's contention. 
One example of design was sufficient both to overthrow the theory of 
evolution by natural selection and to establish the argument from design. 
Darwin's position was the antithesis of Paley's. 
I Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 149,150,1 52 
-20- 
III 
We turn now to consider Paley's response to the suggestion that the 
appearance of design in the world may be explained by chance. David Hume 
states this argument in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion thus: 
For instance, what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis ? 
This is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd 
system that has yet been proposed, yet I know not whether with a 
few alterations it might not be brought to bear a faint appearance 
of probability. Instead of supposing matter infinite, as the 
Epicureans did, let us suppose it finite. A finite number of 
particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions, and it 
must happen in an eternal duration, that every possible order or 
position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, 
therefore, with all its events, even the most minute, has before 
been produced and destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, 
without any bounds and limitations. No one who has a conception of 
the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever scruple 
this determination. 1 
In the end these perpetual revolutions will settle down to some kind of form, 
order and stability with the motion and active force maintained so as to keep 
it in equilibrium. 
It is vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals 
or vegetation, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would 
fain know how an animal would subsist unless its parts were so adjusted ? 
Do we not find that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment 
ceases and, that its matter corrupting, tries some new form. 2 
John Hick, in his discussion of this subject, sees the Darwinian theory of 
evolution by natural selection as spelling out this earlier speculative 
'Epicurean hypothesis' of Hume: 
Since Hume's day the hypothesis of self-regulating development of order 
has been strongly confirmed in the biological sphere. For some time 
before the publication of Charles Darwin's epoch-making 'Origin of 
Species' in 1859 a number of biologists had surmised that the various 
species inhabiting the globe were descended from one or only a few 
original kinds of simpler organism. But until Darwin showed the 
detailed stages of this development the theory of evolution seemed 
speculative. Darwin turned speculation into a concrete and convincing 
model of the history of life on our planet. He showed that the 
mechanism of e, ýolution was a process of natural selection operating on 
the stream of descent by inheritance with variations provided by mutations. 3 
1 D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. Nelson Pike; 1970), 69ff 
2 Ibid., 72 
3 John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God (1970), 11 
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Perhaps the supposed affinity between Hume and Darwin is overstated by Hick. 
First, there is no concept of progressive development present in Hume's 
statement of the 'Epicurean hypothesis'. The idea is simply that of random 
rearrangement of the particles of the universe by successive changes and 
revolutions, until a point is reached when they fall into some kind of order 
which resembles the world we know and experience. It could, therefore, with 
equal cogency be argued that Hume's hypothesis anticipates and resembles more 
closely the pre-Darwinian catastrophists such as Cuvier and Buckland, who 
insisted that the geological record required a series of worlds each of which 
had been swept away by revolutions and succeeded by others. With this point 
of view, of course, Darwin found himself in complete disagreement. Hume's 
exhumation and restatement of the 'Epicurean hypothesis', therefore, has no 
real relationship with Darwinism in the sense that the latter can be traced 
from it, but is simply a speculative attempt to attribute all phenomena 
bearing the appearance of deliberate design to the working of chance. 
Paley was familiar with such arguments, and considers two expressions of such 
a view. 
One atheistic way of replying (to the argument from design) is to 
tell us that all which we see must necessarily have had some form, 
and that it might as well be its present form as some other. 
He applies this to the eye, "that whatever was there must have had some form 
or other", and concludes that the opinion is "too absurd to be made more so 
by any argumentation". 
Nor does it mend the answer to add, with respect to the singularity of 
the conformation, that after the event, it is no longer to be computed 
what chances were against it. This is always to be computed when the 
question is, whether a useful or imitative conformation be the product 
of chance or not. I desire no greater certainty in reasoning, than 
that by which chance is excluded from the present disposition of the 
natural world. Universal experience is against it. What does chance 
ever do for us ? In the human body, for instance, chance, i. e., the 
operation of causes without design may produce a wen or wart, a mole 
or pimple, but never an eye ... In no assignable instance has such 
a thing existed without intention somewhere. 1 
I William Paley, Works (1038), 45 
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Paley's answer to this first statement of the argument from chance is an 
interesting one. In a recent attempt to reconstruct the design argument, 
the French physicist Pierre Lecomte du Noüy calculated that the probability 
of the simplest molecule forming by chance was quite impossible without the 
hypothesis of God. 
The volume of substance necessary for such a probability to take 
place is beyond a--Il imagination. It would3 e that of a sphere with 
a radius so great that light would take 10 years to cover this distance. 
Also the time required to form such a molecule from a material the size of our 
terrestrial globe would be 10242 billions of years (1 followed by 243 zeros); 
But we must not forget that the earth has only existed for 2 billion 
years and that life appeared about one billion years ago, as soon as 
the earth had cooled ... We thus find ourselves in the case of the 
player who does not have at his disposal the time necessary to throw 
his dice often enough-to have one single chance of obtaining his series ... 
ý 
Nallace I. Matson in his book The Existence of God, has criticized 
du Noüy's argument by saying that the situation is not exactly as du Noy has 
stated it: 
The evolutionary concept is that just as man is the last stage reached 
to date in an immensely slow and complicated process of successive 
modification in less complex creatures, so also the protein molecule 
itself is the resultant of a very large number of successive stages of 
synthesis, beginning with quite simple compounds. 
The probability therefore of protein coming into existence in nature is not, 
Matson argues, the probability (improbability) defined by du Noiy's 
calculation, but "the product of possibilities of conditions permitting the 
steps of the synthesis to be realized in succession: 
2 
411 1 Pierre Lecomte du Noüy, Human Destiny (19)+7), 34,35 
2 W. I. Matson, The Existence of God (1965), 106,107. 
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The distinction which Matson makes is in theory perfectly clear and 
legitimate. The calculation of the chances against a complex entity 
coming into existence de novo, and that of a similar body emerging from a 
process with many anterior stages leading up to it, are quite different from 
a statistical point of view. But what evidence is there to show that that in 
fact was the case, that this process took place 'in nature', as Matson 
asserts ? The only possible evidence that could be adduced would be that 
from palaeontology, but here the record is silent. It stops far short of 
this point. So here we are moving not in the realm of fact, but of pure 
hypothesis. The theory of evolution, in order to circumvent the design 
argument, requires that all complex bodies in which there is the appearance 
of design be accounted for by development from simpler entities. 'We have 
already seen the weakness of this hypothesis and how the assumptions of the 
Victorian evolutionists about the emergence of more complex creatures from 
'simple' single cells have been upset by more recent discoveries. This 
suggests that such a theory is hardly to be trusted here. Simply to say, 
whenever a complex entity is encountered, that it 'must' have developed from 
prior and more simple stages is merely to make arbitrary use of a favoured 
theory, but not to explain anything at all. So we find ourselves back with 
complex entities which seem to manifest design, and for the existence of 
which it is otherwise difficult to account. 
Here then, as Paley rightly pointed out, the probabilities against such an 
entity being the product of chance must be taken into account. 
It does not mend the answer (from chance) to add, with respect to 
the singularity of the conformation, that after the event, it is no 
longer to be computed what the chances were against it. This is 
always to be computed when the question is, whether a useful or 
imitative conformation be the product of chance or not. I 
1 William Paley, Works (1838), 1+5 
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"A useful conformation" for Paley was something like a watch in which the 
different parts worked together and served a particular end. Where such a 
thing existed the chances against its coming into existence by accident, as 
it were, were always to be computed and the probability against it was very 
great indeed. Though the knowledge was not available to Paley he would have 
recognised in this contemporary description for the layman of a 'simple' 
living cell "a useful conformation", and with his proclivity for mechanical 
analogies it would have appealed to him: 
Each cell has been likened to a highly automated factory. This cell 
factory is controlled by a 'tape' with instructions called the DNA code - 
it is similar to a computer tape and it is fed into the dell's production 
machinery. On the shop floor of the cell there are more than 2,000 of 
these machines called 'Ribosomes'. They are attended by robots called 
enzymes and their mates (co-enzymes) and are divided into 200 specialist 
operations each with its own tool to start its machine. Professor Francis 
Crick says they must all have come into being together, otherwise even the 
first form of life would not work. I 
Here all the parts work together to serve a particular end; here we have "a 
useful conformation" and the probability against it being the product of 
chance is always to be computed. The question cannot be side-stepped by an 
arbitrary appeal to theory unsupported by fact. 
The second form of the argument from chance which Paley dealt with is much 
closer to Hume's 'Epicurean hypothesis', and Paley himself expressed it in 
this way: 
There is another answer (to the Design Argument) which has the same 
effect of resolving things into chance; which answer would persuade us 
to believe, that the eye, the animal to which it belongs, every other 
animal, every plant, indeed every organized body which we see, are only 
so many out of the possible varieties and combinations of being, which 
the lapse of infinite ages has brought into existence; that the 
present world is the relic of that variety, millions of other bodily forms 
and other species having perished, being by the defect of their 
constitution incapable of preservation, or of continuance by generation. 
I Victor Pearce, The Problem of Origin 
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Paley's reply to this is along two lines. 
First he remarks that 
There is no foundation whatever for this conjecture in anything which 
we observe in the works of nature; no such experiments are going on 
at present; no such energy operates as that which is here supposed, 
and whichshould be constantly pushing into existence new varieties and 
beings. 1 
Paley adopted the same argument that Hume employed elsewhere for rejecting 
miracles, viz., universal experience is against it, no such experiments are 
going on at the present time. There is, however, this important difference, 
that Paley had merely to oppose this fact of experience to a hypothesis, 
i. e. that there have been changes, revolutions, and transpositions of the 
order and structure of physical life and phenomena in this world in a remote 
prehistoric past, from which no testimony is available, whereas Hume in 
opposing 'present experience' to miracles had to confront historical testimony 
which made his claim to have 'universal experience' on his side gratuitous. 
Professor Hooykaas, in commenting on the essential difference between history 
and palaeontological sciences, (i. e., those sciences that deal primarily with 
prehistory) affirms that they are under a distinct disadvantage in relation to 
historiography for there is no testimony of any kind. They can never wholly 
satisfy the criteria of truth accepted by the historian. 
2 Paley's argument, 
therefore, is more destructive of Hume's hypothesis than is the same argument 
employed by Hume against the apologetic position adopted by Paley 
in his 
Evidences of Christianity. 
1 William Paley, Works (1838), 46 
2R Hooykaas, The Principle of Uniformity, page xi 
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The extraordinary stability of species through time was a fact to which 
Cuvier, the leading anatomist of his day, drew attention shortly after Paley. 
In his Essay on the Theory of the Earth he declared that he had examined all 
the records of ancient Egypt and saw no dissimilarity between the animals 
there depicted and described and present day specimens. 
1 Over the whole 
historical period there was no change of any significance to be noted in 
the species of animals that at present inhabit the earth. This objection was 
one which Darwin felt it was necessary to answer in The Origin. He did so 
by arguing that the law of natural selection was different from belief in an 
innate and necessary law of development. Animals may remain unchanged for 
long periods of time owing to the absence of chance variations, since there 
was no necessary or inner compulsion that these should arise. Therefore, the 
criticism that plants and animals had not changed during the historical period, 
or even if it were true that they had remained unchanged from the glacial 
period, could have no force against his argument. 
The invoking of these vast periods of time during which there might be little 
or no evolutionary development at all, while it eased the burden of proof in 
one direction, proceeded to remove it altogether in another. Darwin himself 
had to recognise that the transmutation of species could not be directly proved. 
The geologist F. W. Hutton was one of the very few who saw this, and argued in 
his review of The Origin of Species that the book did not demonstrate the 
origin of species but the origin of varieties. In reply Darwin himself wrote: 
I do not pretend to adduce direct evidence of one species changing 
into another, but I believe that this view in the main is correct, 
because so many phenomena can be thus grouped together and explained. 2 
I G. Cuvier, Essay on the Theory of the Earth (tr. Robert Kerr; 1813), 123 
2 More Letters of Charles Darwin (ed. Francis Darwin and A. C. Seward), 
I (1903), 1 &+ 
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Darwin's evolutionary theory is not built upon experiment and immediate 
observation, but upon analogy. Paley's criticism, therefore, of Hume's 
argument ascribing the present order to a succession of changes and 
transpositions in the arrangement of matter in the past, is not without 
force when applied also to the theory of evolution through chance mutation 
and natural selection, since it draws attention to a basic weakness of that 
theory, viz., that universal experience is against it for no such experiments, 
i. e. changes of one species into another, are going on at present. 
Secondly, Paley opposes to the 'chance hypothesis' the remarkable order of 
genera and species which he regards as not an order imposed simply by the 
human mind upon nature, but as residing in nature itself. 
The division of organised substances into animals and vegetables, 
and the distribution and sub-distribution of each into genera and 
species, which distribution is not an arbitrary act of the mind, 
but founded in the order which prevails in external nature, appear 
to me to contradict the suppositions of the present world being the 
remains of an indefinite variety of existences, of a variety which 
rejects all plan ... How or why those which survive should be cast ... into regular classes the hypothesis does not explain, or rather the 
hypothesis is inconsistent with this phenomenon. 
A significant point is raised here by Paley which even now presents a 
difficulty to the Darwinian theory of evolution. "On that theory" wrote 
Professor W. R. Thompson 
evolution is essentially under control, being the result of natural 
undirected selection acting on small fortuitous variations. The 
argument specifically implies that nothing is exempt from this 
evolutionary process. Therefore, the last thing we should expect on 
Darwinian principles is the persistence of a few common fundamental 
structural plans. Yet this is what we find. The animal world, for 
example, can be divided into some ten groups of phyla ... all 
identifiable animals that have ever existed can be placed in these 
groups. Generally speaking, the subordinate groups are equally well 
defined ... These groups or divisions Darwin explained by the 
hypothesis that the intermediates are constantly eliminated by natural 
selection. I do not think we can be expected to accept this unproved 
supposition as an argument for Darwinism. But in any case it has no 
bearing on the persistence throughout geological time, in spite of 
fortuitous variations and natural selection, of the fundamental 
anatomical plans exhibited by the great groups ... 'Without introducing 
considerations quite foreign to his system we cannot explain why the 
anatomical type of the Echinoderm or the Insect continued to be inherited. 1 
I J. R. Thompson, Introduction to The Origin of Species (Everyman Edition, 
No. 811 ; 1956) 
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Paley was interested in purposive order and design not only where it 
manifested itself in the useful arrangement of parts in a physical organism, 
but in other aspects of nature also. It is true, as we have already noticed, 
that he was specially drawn to mechanical analogies because they afforded "the 
most obvious proof" but there were also "other satisfactory evidences of design" 
in for example the chemistry of the body - the gastric juices, "the chemical 
wonder of animal nature". There were also the mysteries of instinct and 
beauty which are included in his system of natural theology: 
An instinct is a propensity prior to experience and independent of 
instruction. We contend that it is by instinct that the sexes of 
animals seek each other, that animals cherish their offspring, that 
the young quadruped is directed to the teat of its dam, that birds 
build their nests. I 
Paley's main point here is that instinct, as it is witnessed in the behaviour 
of animals, appears to indicate forethought or prescience of particular 
situations and needs, which it would be quite impossible to attribute to the 
animal itself. This being so, how are we to account for it ? Does not this 
point to the existence of an intelligent Creator every bit as much as does the 
evidence of design in a physical organism ? Instincts may, of course, be 
changed and adapted very considerably according to the circumstances and 
conditions under which the animal lives, but, says Paley, 
this makes nothing against the doctrine of instincts. The propensity 
being there it is probable enough that it may put the animal upon 
different actions, according to different exigencies. And this 
adaptation of resources may look like the effect of art and consideration 
rather than instinct: but still the propensity is instinctive .2 
For example, the woodpecker in Europe is supposed to lay her eggs in holes 
which she scoops out of decayed trees, but in the forests of Guinea in nests 
hanging from twigs of tall trees so that they are out of reach of snakes and 
monkeys. "Still the question returns, whence the propensity to build at all ? 
ýý 
1 William Paley, Works (1838), 119 
2 Ibid., 122 
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The subject of instinct is one that greatly taxed Darwin. He devoted a whole 
chapter to it in The Origin of Species, and it is doubtful if he has explained 
the matter satisfactorily in terms of natural selection. What he appears to 
have done is to give some account, according to his theory, of the changes and 
adaptations that can arise in the natural instincts, but none at all of the 
origin of the instinct itself which was the fundamental question from Paley's 
point of view. 
Instincts in Darwin's opinion are built up, like limbs and organs, by the slow 
accumulation of that which is useful, and the discarding of that which is not. 
"No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural selection, except 
by the slow and gradual accumulation of numerous slight yet profitable 
variations". 
2 
First a particular tendency is displayed, and then is developed 
by selection either natural or domestic. "Domestic instincts are sometimes 
spoken of as actions which have become initiated solely from long-continued and 
compulsory habit, but this is not so". 
3 
-Darwin's account of the 
instincts is not unlike that famous recipe for jugged 
hare which begins with the words, "First catch your hare". For natural 
selection, or domestic selection, to begin to work at all it must first have 
acquired its propensity, and this "we must in our ignorance", said Darwin, 
"call an accident". 
4 
This, of course, is in keeping with the whole tenor of 
the doctrine of natural selection. It does not explain the phenomenon of life, 
or even the variations that natural selection is supposed to operate upon, but 
simply accepts them as facts. V here Darwin assigns the matter to accident, or, 
what is the same thing, chance, Paley continues to inquire, "Whence this 
propensity at all? " and to seek a rational explanation, i. e., one which is 
more in keeping with our experience of objects manifesting design, rather than 
resort arbitrarily to chance which is in essence a refusal to seek an 
explanation. It is perverse, he maintained, to ascribe to chance what may 
reasonably be explained by purpose. 
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species 
(Sixth edition), 192 
2 ibid., 193 3 Ibid., 196 if Ibid., 197 
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Paley was also interested in the significance of beauty for the design 
argument: 
A general property of animal forms is beauty. I do not mean relative 
beauty, or that of one individual above another of the same species; 
but I mean generally the provision that is made in the body of almost 
every animal, to adapt its appearance to the perception of the animals 
with which it converses. 1 
We see this in the symmetry of the human body, i. e., the correspondence between 
the parts of the two sides of the body, but this is not repeated in the 
individual limbs; the hand, for example, may not be divided into two equal 
parts. 
2 Or, again, the contents of the body are not equally distributed in 
the way that the outward appearance would suggest. 
It is evident, therefore, that the external proportion does not arise 
from any equality in the shape or pressure of the internal contents. 
What is it indeed but a correction of inequalities; an adjustment, by 
mutual compensation of anomalous forms into regular congeries ? The 
effect, in a word, of artful and, if we might be permitted so to speak, 
of studied collocation ?3 
The symmetry and smoothness of the external appearance of the human body would 
appear to serve two purposes. One is the concealment of what would otherwise 
be repulsive to us. 
Were it possible to view through the skin the mechanism of our bodies, 
the sight would frighten us out of our wits. 'Durst we make a single 
movement', asks a lively French writer, 'or stir a step from the place 
we were in, if we saw our blood circulating, the tendons pulling, the 
lungs blowing, the humours filtrating, and all the incomprehensible 
assemblage of fibres, tubes, pumps, valves, currents, pivots, which 
sustain an existence at once so frail and presumptuous ?'4 
The other is to present us with an agreeable and pleasing appearance. All of 
which seems strongly suggestive of purpose and design. And, if it is allowed 
that such a purpose exists in any part of nature, then we may conclude that it 
exists in other parts, too, such as the tints of flowers, the plumage of birds, 
the furs of animals, the bright scales of fish and the painted wings of 
butterflies. 5 
I William Plaey, works (1838), 88 
2 Ibid.,, 85 
3 Ibid. , 86 
4 Ibid" , 90 
5 Ibid. , 88 
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Paley acknowledges that some have dismissed the whole subject by saying that 
beauty is simply what we derive pleasure from, and that it is something that 
can be changed and adapted according to habit and fashion. He counters this, 
however, by arguing that the senses of taste and smell seem to indicate that 
there is a distinction of agreeable and disagreeable in the sense itself. 
While it is capable of being modified by habit and circumstance, it is not 
capable of being absolutely extended in its range or completely overthrown. 
There are always some tastes and smells that will remain disagreeable, however 
much we are subjected to them. 
I This would suggest that there is what he 
calls "a determination" in the sense itself, "a native capacity of perceiving" 
certain qualities. The whole is not resolvable into mere habit or association. 
And, by analogy with the other senses, the same can be said of sight, "that there 
belongs to it an original constitution, fitted to receive pleasure from some 
impressions and pain from others. " 
2 
Paley's appeal to man's innate awareness and sense of beauty and its rapport 
with the appearance of animal and vegetable bodies, to say nothing of inorganic 
nature, constituted an important part of his argument. Darwin sensed a threat 
from this quarter to his own theory and was anxious to ward it off. 
With respect to the belief that organic beings have been created 
beautiful for the delight of man -a belief which it has been 
pronounced is subversive of my whole theory -I may first remark 
that the sense of beauty obviously depends upon the nature of the 
mind irrespective of any real beauty in the admired object, and the 
idea of what is beautiful is not innate or unalterable. 3 
But Paley's point was that the capacity to appreciate beauty is both innate and 
alterable. These are not incompatible, or contradictory, as Darwin supposes 
them to be. Darwin appears to believe that because it can be shown th=t habit 
and fashion can influence man's appreciation of beauty, therefore, there is no 
'innate sense', or 'native capacity', by which it is apprehended. But we have 
1 "their ripped-up carcases (some mules which had died at the roadside at 
Ypres) were already adding vigorously to that stench of disintegration 
to which we never got used". Norman Gladden, Ypres 1917,163 
2 William Paley, iN orks (1838) , 
89 
3 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 150 
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just seen how Paley carefully argued this point, and while acknowledging the 
power of habit and custom, yet contended with reason that man is naturally 
endowed with a sense of beauty, and that his determination of this matter is 
not merely arbitrary. It is the congruity between this innate sense and the 
objects of nature which are presented to it, which becomes the ground for 
believing that there is design in the universe. 
From the point of view of the theory of evolution by natural selection it is 
essential to insist that no organism produces that which is useless to itself 
in the struggle for existence and only of profit to another species such as 
man. Beauty, of course, if produced solely for the delight of man, but not 
for the advantage of the creature concerned would fall into this category. 
It was vital to Darwin's theory that he should be able to explain all such 
phenomena in terms of natural selection and the struggle for existence, even 
one instance to the contrary would be disastrous. "Natural selection", he 
wrote, "cannot possibly produce any modification in a species exclusively for 
the good of another species ... If this were so it would annihilate my theory. " 
He therefore felt obliged to 
say a few words on the protest lately made by some naturalists against 
the utilitarian doctrine that every detail of structure has been 
produced for the good of its possessor. They believe that many structures 
have been created for the sake of beauty, to delight man or the Creator 
(but this latter point is beyond the scope of scientific discussion) or 
for the sake of mere variety ... Such doctrines if true would be 
absolutely fatal to my theory. I fully admit that many structures are 
now of no direct use to their possessors and many never have been of any 
use to their progenitors, but this does not prove they were formed solely 
for beauty or variety. To doubt the definite action of changed conditions 
and the various causes of modifications lately specified have all produced 
an effect, probably a great effect independently of any advantage thus 
gained. They have been produced by inheritance and at some point if we 
trace it back far enough we find it was of utility, direct or indirect, 
to its possessor. 2 
1 Charles Darwin, op, cit., 152 
2 Ibid., 149 & 150 
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This is not a clear answer to the objection that there are to be found in 
animals, plants and human beings, many examples of beauty which it is difficult, 
or even impossible, to explain satisfactorily in terms of natural selection. 
Darwin's reply seems to be that since any such instance would be fatal to his 
theory there must be an explanation in terms of utility. If that is not 
apparent now then it must have been the case once, and if we were able to 
trace it back far enough we should find this to be the case. He thus invokes 
a hypothesis to prove a hypothesis. 
F. R. Tennant, in his discussion of the place of beauty in the design argument, 
also makes the point that there is a rapport between nature and the mind of man. 
The mind does not create beauty out of nothing. How we apportion aesthetic 
value between the human mind and external reality, he considers, is not important 
If we minimize phenomenal nature's gift by denying that her beauty is 
intrinsic ... we must allow to ontal nature an intrinsic constitution 
such that minds can make beauty as well as nomic order out of it. And 
the more we magnify man's part in this making, phenomenalising and 
appreciating, the more motivation we have to believe that Nature comes 
to herself in man, has significance for man, that she exists not for 
herself, and without man is a broken circle. I 
I F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II (1930), 90 
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V 
Before considering the implications of the design argument for Paley's 
understanding of the personality of the Deity, we must notice the state of 
biological and botanical science in the eighteenth century which fashioned 
Paley's outlook and made inevitable a clash between his views and those of 
Darwin in the next century. 
Linnaeus has generally come to be regarded as the founder of botanical and 
zoological studies; it is important, as C. E. Raven points out, for us to 
understand his precise place in the development of science. He was in no 
doubt himself as to what this place was. "For him classification, the 
arrangement and naming of species, is science and he is the great classifier. " 1 
Linneaus' flair for classification led to the adoption universally both in 
botany and zoology of the system of 
binary nomenclature whereby every species is known by a generic name, 
which it shares with its cognates and a specific, usually a descriptive 
adjective or (if a noun) its Latin name or the name of a classical 
personage - Linnaea borealis, Felis leo or Papilio machaon. 2 
His skill in noting, and clearness in defining, differences, combined with his 
fertility in inventing names to describe and classify them led to a 
considerable growth in the definition of species. Because attention was being 
drawn to the differences rather than the similarities between animals and 
plants of the same genera scientists were becoming increasingly impressed by 
the enormous multiplicity of species. 
I C. E. Raven, Natural Religion, I, 152 
2 Ibid. 
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When this system was placed within the context of belief in the constancy of 
nature, to which Linnaeus himself subscribed, the whole took on an extraordinary 
rigidity. In his day the simple definition of species was "that which proceeded 
at the creation from the hand of God". 
1 Therefore, God had personally super- 
intended all the minute distinctions and differences between species, none of 
which had changed since the beginning of creation. There was one doubt about 
this at the back of Linnaeus' mind, which he entered only as a suggestion in his 
diary, but found no place in his system, and that was that it may have been the 
case 
that in the genera only one species had originally been created, and 
that this accidentally impregnated by others of different genera, gave 
rise to further cross-bred species. 2 
It was, however, the doctrine of immutability of species, and of a world of 
organic nature absolutely and essentially unchanged since the creation, that 
prevailed generally in orthodox scientific circles in the eighteenth century, 
and this was the view that was shared by Paley himself. The conception of 
nature which he entertained was that in which all the different phyla of plants 
and animals which we now observe had descended in unbroken and unvaried 
succession from the time when they were first called into existence, and this 
extended even to the most insignificant details. For example, in considering 
the many thousands of different species of insects and their various methods 
of breathing, etc., he remarks: 
The consideration of these appearances might induce us to believe that 
variety itself, distinct from every other reason, was a motive in the 
mind of the Creator, or with the agents of his will. 3 
Or again, when he mentions the different methods of propagation and protection 
of plants, he concludes: 
The result is that out of the many thousand different plants which 
cover the earth, not a single species perhaps has been lost since 
the creation. 1ý 
I C. E. Raven, Natural Religion, I, 152 
2 Ibid.., 155 
3 üilliam Paley, Works (1838), 132 
14. Ibid. , 136 
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Thus, the doctrine of the immutability of species when allied with a highly 
artificial system of classification, such as Linnaeus' - and Linnaeus himself 
acknowledged its artificiality 
1- 
resulted in a concept of the natural order 
which was both arbitrary and inflexible, and was bound sooner or later to break 
up when it came into contact with reality and began to be examined by more 
observant naturalists in the nineteenth century. The link between classification 
of 'new species' and special creation was in the eighteenth century carried to 
an extreme pitch. Every new naming carried with it the implication that that 
particular species had been created in that precise form by the Deity at the 
beginning. 
It was against this view that Darwin protested in The Origin. One or two 
examples will illustrate this. First, he refers us to the vegetable kingdom 
where there is a case analogous to that of the development of varieties in 
the domestic pigeon, viz., 
in the enlarged stems, or as commonly called, roots of the Swedish turnip, 
and Ruta bags ... and to these a third may be added, namely, the common 
turnip. According to the ordinary view of each species having been 
independently created, we should have to attribute this similarity in 
the enlarged stems of those three plants, not to the vera causa, of the 
community of descent, and a consequent tendency to vary in like manner, 
but to three separate yet closely related acts of creation. 2 
The second example he refers to is that of the horse family, and the 
appearance of stripes in horses, asses, donkeys, etc. This is parallel to the 
case of variation in pigeons, says Darwin. 
For myself, I venture confidently to look back thousands on thousands 
of generations, and see an animal striped like a zebra, but perhaps 
otherwise very differently constructed, the common parent of our 
domestic horse (whether or not it be descended from one or more wild 
stocks) of the ass, the hemionus and zebra. He that believes that each 
equine species was independently created, will I presume, assert that 
each species has been created with a tendency to vary, both under nature 
and under domestication, in this particular manner, so as often to become 
striped like other species of the genus; and that each has been created 
with a strong tendency, when crossed with species inhabiting distant 
quarters of the world, to produce hybrids resembling in their stripes 
not their parents, but other species of the genus. To admit this view 
is, as it seems to me, to reject a real for an unreal, or, at least, for 
an unknown, cause. It makes the works of God a mockery and deception 3 
1 C. E. Raven, op. cit., Is 155 
2 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 122 
3 Ibid. 
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There was in Darwin a deistic tendency which led him to consider that it was 
unworthy of the deity to conceive of him as being involved in innumerable 
special acts of creation, which the existence of thousands of separate species 
would require, according to the eighteenth-century doctrine. The world of 
organic nature must be as much under the rule of law as the universe as a whole. 
He could 
no more admit that planets move in their courses, and that a stone falls 
to the ground not through the intervention of the secondary and appointed 
law of gravity, but from the direct volition of the Creator 
than the "special creation of different species of rhinoceros ... " According to 
him, 
It accords with what we know of the laws impressed by the Creator on 
matter that the production and extinction of forms should, like the 
birth and death of individuals, be the result of secondary means. It 
is derogatory that the Creator of countless universes should have made 
by individual acts of His will the myriads of creeping parasites and worms. I 
There was, then, a metaphysical element present in Darwin's thinking which 
made the extreme eighteenth-century statement of the doctrine of special 
creation and the immutability of species unacceptable to him. But also in the 
light of his study of variation under domestication he wLs questioning the 
structure of the classification and definition of species as it had been 
commonly accepted by science generally until that time, and by Paley in 
particular. In his chapter on "Variation under Nature" in The Origin he draws 
attention to the problem attending definition of species and its underlying 
link with special creation in the minds of scientists generally. 
"No one (definition)", he writes, 
has satisfied all naturalists; yet every naturalist knows vaguely 
what he means when he speaks of a species. Generally the term includes 
the unknown element of a distinct act of creation. 2 
1 The Foundations of the Origin of Species (ed. F. Darwin; 1909), 
253 & 254 
2 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 30 
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What we see in nature, Darwin insists, are many individual differences and 
varieties, sometimes merging by fine intermediate gradations. Where the 
intermediate gradation between species is not found, it must be assumed to 
exist somewhere, or to have existed in the past. The inadequacy of the old 
system to deal with these facts is seen in the eccentricity of the theories 
adopted to keep it intact. 
Some few naturalists maintain that animals never present varieties; 
but then these same naturalists rank the slightest differences as of 
specific value; and when the same identical form is met with in two 
distinct countries, or in two geological formations, they believe that 
distinct species are hidden under the same dress. The term species thus 
comes to be a mere useless abstraction, implying and assuming a separate 
act of creation. 1 
What Darwin was faced with here was as much a logical as a biological problem, 
2 
created by the confused state in which eighteenth-century science had left the 
subject of the definition and denotation of the term species. Wittgenstein 
once said, "What is or is not a cow is for the public to decide. " By which he 
meant that the denotation of the term is determined by popular or customary 
usage rather than arbitrary definition. In the period of eighteenth-century 
classification it was not the public which was consulted, but the minute and 
often highly artificial judgement of the philosophicl mind, backed by the 
understanding that the slightest difference presupposed a totally distinct and 
separate act of creation. The smallest differences were regarded as specific; 
and even if the forms were identical, encountered in different parts of the 
world they were considered to be distinct species. 
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 36 
2 In a letter to Asa Gray, November 29th (1859), Darwin wrote: 
You speak of species not having a material base to rest on, but is this 
any greater hardship than deciding what deserved to be called a variety ... 
What a jump it is from a well-marked variety, produced by a natural 
cause, to a species produced by a separate act of the hand of God! But I 
am running on foolishly. By the way, I met the other day Phillips the 
palaeontologist, and he asked me, '; pow do you define a species ?'I 
answered, 'I cannot'. Whereupon he said, 'At last I have found out the 
only true description, - any form which has ever had a specific name! ' 
More Letters of Charles Darwin (ed. Francis Darwin and A. C. Seward; 1903), 
1,127 
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The first thing Darwin sought to do was to break down these artificial and 
arbitrary distinctions. "Certainly no clear line of demarcation has yet been 
drawn between species and sub-species, " he wrote in The Origin, 
that is the forms which in the opinion of some naturalists come very 
near to, but do not quite arrive at, the rank of species, or again 
between sub-species and well marked varieties, or between lesser 
varieties and individual differences. Those differences blend into 
each other by an insensible s-ries; and a series impresses the mind 
with the idea of an actual passage I 
Darwin looked upon individual differences as being steps towards slight varieties 
and slight varieties as being steps towards more strongly marked varieties. 
The well marked varieties may -r. ell be incipient species and so on. "From these 
remarks", he wrote, 
it will be seen that I look at the tern; species as arbitrarily given for 
the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each 
other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, 
which is given to the less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The 
term variety again in comparison with mere individual differences, is 
also applied arbitrarily for convenience's sake. 2 
There was, therefore, nothing sacrosanct in Darwin's view of the term species. 
It differed not at all logically from the term variety. But formerly the term 
had been surrounded by a mystique which gave the naturalist the impression 
that when he named a species he was actually isolating and denoting a piece of 
the essential furniture of creation. Linnaeus looked upon his task as similar 
to that of Adam's naming the animals in Paradise and found a sacred calling in 
this conception of his work. His students, in bad taste, but with a similar 
understanding, printed under his portrait the motto Deus creavit, Linnaeus 
disposuit. 
The effect of Darwin's argument was (a) to deny the term species to what were 
really varieties, but which had been exalted to the rank of species on the 
grounds of slight differences, and (b) to sever the term from its mystical 
associations which linked it with a special act of creation. 
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 38 
2 Ibid., 39 
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All this was bound to have an adverse effect on Paley's argument since he had 
entered into the minutiae of design in organic creation showing, for example, 
how the beaks of different species of birds were perfectly adapted to their 
needs, and maintaining that they had been specially created thus for the purpose. 
If, however, they had become such through variation and natural selection the 
ground for such reasoning was removed. le must remember, nevertheless, exactly 
what Paley had claimed for his argument. He might have been disconcerted to 
learn that many of the intricate and beautiful adaptations of animals might be 
attributed to secon, ary causes, but he would not necessarily have felt defeated, 
for the many examples he gives are but illustrations of his argument. They are 
not every one essential to it. The force of them he regarded as cumulative. 
It was sufficient for his purpose if only one such example of design could be 
found. If, for instance, we will allow Paley the eye, which caused Darwin such 
uneasiness, he will readily concede all the rest. It would be sufficient for 
his purpose. 
We must likewise remember the limitations of Darwin's argument. It has been said 
that what he proved was not the origin of species but the origin of varieties. 
He began with the many different species of domestic pigeon and showed, with 
some conjecture, how they must all have descended from the rock pigeon. What 
Darwin observed going on under domestic cultivation and selection was the 
development of varieties of pigeons, which, as he said, if shown to a naturalist 
as wild birds he would class as different species. Since, he contended, these 
'species' were not the productions of special acts of creation he wished to 
extend this argument by analogy to the many different species of finches, and 
other groups of birds in nature, and arrive at a similar conclusion. Natural 
selection brought about in nature the same, or similar, results to those which 
we see being produced by domestic selection. If it is granted that the argument 
is sound, and supported by sufficient evidence, what does it prove ? 
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It proves that different varieties of certain classes of animals, which have 
been arbitrarily called species, have been produced by variation and natural 
selection, and not by special creation, but it does not prove that all the 
different classes of animals themselves have been produced in this way. That, 
of course, was the conclusion to which Darwin wished to come, but it remained a 
leap that he had tc make without the support of clear or conclusive evidence. I 
It is popularly assumed that the chief evidence for Darwin's theory derived 
from palaeontology, but Darwin was himself quite open about the embarrassment 
that the poverty of the geological record in this respect caused him. 
I do not pretend that I should ever have suspected how poor was the 
record in the best preserved geological sections, had not the absence 
of innumerable transitional links between the species, which lived at 
the commencement and close of each formation, pressed so hardly on my 
theory ... The abrupt manner in which whole groups of species suddenly 
appear in certain formations has been urged by several palaeontologists - 
for instance by Agassiz, Pictet and Sedgwick - as a fatal objection to the 
belief in the transmutation of species. If numerous species, belonging to 
the same genera or families, have really started into life at once, the 
fact would be fatal to the theory of evolution through natural selection. 
For the development by this means of a group of forms ... must have been 
an extremely slow process 2 
Darwin looked to the future to vindicate him in this, and to fill up the many 
gaps by fresh discoveries of the intermediate links - but this has not happened. 
Because of this difficulty it appears sometimes as if Darwin is in two minds 
about the extent of what he should claim for his theory, and in The Origin he 
certainly leaves open the possibility that the present variety of animals and 
plants may have descended from a few forms or one. 
"... the attempt to explain all living forms in terms of evolution from a 
unique source ... is one that is premature and not satisfactorily supported 
by present-day evidence. ... we can, if we like, believe that such an 
evolutionary system has taken place, but I for one do not think that 'it 
has been proved beyond all doubt'. ... I shall present evidence for the 
point of view that there are many discrete groups of animals and. that we do 
not know how they have evolved nor how they are interrelated. " G. A. Kerkut, 
Implications of Evolution (1960), vii-viii. 
"That owing to the existence of different genotypes within a species and the 
somewhat different adaptive characters of these genotypes, samples of a 
widespread population taken at different points may be recognisably different 
in various ways, or a population of this kind spreading from a centre (as in 
the case of an introduced insect) may develop local varieties sufficiently 
marked to be regarded as species by a taxonomist, may be freely acknowledged 
... But 
it is a far cry from these facts to the speculations of the Origin 
and the Victorian concept of evolution. " W. R. Thompson, Introduction to 
The Origin of Species (Everyman Edition, No. 811; 1956) 
2 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 264 & 265 
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The state of the argument, therefore, in relation to Paley stands thus. 
Paley, following the scientific beliefs of his day, regarded all species as 
classified by botanists and biologists as immutable, however small or in- 
significant the differences upon which this classification was based might be. 
He regarded them all as the result of special creation and purposively endowed 
by the Creator with all the special aptitudes and adaptations that they displayed. 
Darwin, on the other hand, observed something which callenged this position. He 
saw that, by domestic selection, variations in plants and animals may be 
produced which amounted to what the naturalists in the eighteenth century and 
early nineteenth century would have regarded as specific differences if they 
had encountered them in nature. This led him to conclude that the term species 
was arbitrary and that it had no necessary connexion with the concept of 
special creation. He believed he could discern a similar principle to that of 
domestic selection at work in nature which would account for many of the species 
recognised by naturalists and regarded as being the result of immediate acts of 
creation by the Deity. What Darwin exposes here is the arbitrary use of the 
term species in the eighteenth century and the artificiality of the system of 
classification, to which we have referred; and that the term so used, and the 
system constructed upon it, did not necessarily reflect a true picture of 
creation as it was at the beginning. Yet to show that there may be variation 
within certain groups or families of plants and animals is not the same as 
demonstrating that all organisms are so connected and owe their origin to this 
process. Darwin was conscious of the enormous gaps in the wider application 
of his theory, which could not be filled either by palaeontolcgy, or 
by the 
small variations directly observed. This led him to adopt an ambivalent 
position in The Origin, where he leaves open the possibility that 
the multitude 
of species we now see may have descended, not from one, but several different form; 
Paley's argument was exposed to criticism because of its identification with 
the extremes of eighteenth century thought on the subject of species and 
special creations. Yet this affects only the periphery of the argument and 
not that which is essential to it. If a few forms or only one exhibit purposive 
design and adaptation that would in Paley's estimation be sufficient. 
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VI 
, '; e now turn to consider the theological implications of the design argument as 
Paley understood them. "Contrivance if established", he wrote, 
appears to me to prove everyti-. ing which we wish to prove. Amongst 
other things, it proves the personality of the Deity, as distinguished 
from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes called a principle; 
which terms in the mouths of those who use them philosophically, seem 
intended to admit and to express an efficacy, but to exclude and to 
deny a personal agent. Now that which can contrive, which can design 
must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they 
imply consciousness and thought. They require that which can perceive 
an end or purpose; as well as the power of providing means, and 
directing means, and of directing them to their end. I 
If contrivance or design in nature be granted then the inference which Paley 
draws must follow. The strength of the argument on this ground has always been 
acknowledged by the most profound thinkers. Kant described it as 
the oldest, the clearest and the most in conformity with the common 
reason of humanity. For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to 
attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. 
The mind, increasingly elevated by these considerations, which although 
empirical, are remarkably and continually adding to their force, will 
not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle 
speculation; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the 
moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty 
of the universe. 2 
It is significant that Hume, while attacking the argument from design in his 
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, yet acknowledges the strength of it. 
It is generally agreed that the theories propounded by Philo are those of Hume 
himself. At the commencement of the dialogues all three participants agree 
that the existence of God must be taken for granted. No reasonable man would 
deny this. He is the cause of the universe whatever that might be. The 
subject of the Dialogues resolves itself more into a question of the character 
of the Deity rather than of his existence. The design argument is regarded 
by philo as pointing fairly conclusively to a Creator, but as leaving his 
nature and attributes in deep obscurity and confusion. This is brought out 
very clearly in a discussion between Philo and Cleanthes on the problem of 
evil and human misery. How can we ascribe to the Deity, argues Philo, both 
perfect benevolence and omnipotence when there is so much evil and misery in 
the world ? 
1 William Paley, Works (1838) 2.1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
154 & 155 (tr. J. M. D. Meikle. john. 19'JL) - ; 
4-7, 
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Here, Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. 
Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical 
subtility to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe and its 
parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes 
strikes us with such irresistible force that a'l objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then ever imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight 
upon them. But there is no view of human life or of the condition of 
mankind from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the 
moral attributes or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith 
alone. It is your turn now to try the labouring oar, and to support 
your philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and 
experience. I 
There is no reason to believe that this is other than a candid confession of 
how Hume saw the strengths and weaknesses of the design argument. It was strong 
on its inference from design in nature and the world to an architect or 
designer of these things, but weak when it came to establishing the nature and 
attributes of that being in conformity with the orthodox Christian understanding 
of them. Here indeed Hume felt it was so seriously inadequate that it under- 
mined and destroyed the value of the former inference. 
At the conclusion of the dialogues Philo reiterates this position. Philo's 
summing up, in which he affirms that "the cause, or causes, of the order in the 
universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence ... " to which 
"the most inquisitive, contemplative and religious man" must give a "plain, 
philosophical consent" believing that "the arguments on which it is established 
exceed the objections which be against it ... "2, is regarded by some as a 
strange reversal of his earlier position, a sudden and uncharacteristic change 
of direction at the end of the dialogues. But, as we have noticed, it is not 
out of keeping with assertions which he has made earlier and while, on the 
whole, Philo argues that obscurity must attend the argument from design 
regarding the character of God, he is prepared to acknowledge its force when 
it is argued that that which manifests order and design must have mind and 
intelligence as its originating cause. 
I D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. Nelson Pike; 1970), 92 
2 D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. Nelson Pike; 1970), 122 
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What, then, are we to make of the character of the Deity ? Is the subject of 
his attributes shrouded in such darkness and obscurity as the argument of Philo 
in The Dialogues suggests ? Even here Paley is reasonably confident that 
natural theology need not be at a loss; that the argument from design can 
furnish us with some understanding of the nature and character of God which is 
not inconsistent with that which has been given by revelation. Revelation 
itself, while it speaks of the omniscience, omnipotence and the eternity of God, 
is an accommodation to our limited apprehension of the meaning of these terms, 
and represents God to us not as he is in himself, but as he stands in relation 
to us. It is his virtual rather than his essential presence, power and wisdom 
that are communicated to us and with which we become acquainted. If, therefore, 
Paley argues, 
we imitate the documents of our religion, by confining our explanations 
to what concerns ourselves, and do not affect more precision in our ideas 
than the subject allows of, the several terms which are applied to denote 
the attributes of the Deity may be made, even in natural religion, to bear 
a sense consistent with truth and reason, and not surpassing our 
comprehension. I 
First, Paley deals with the question of whether the term "infinite" may properly 
be applied to the natural attributes of God when these attributes are regarded 
as the inferences, or conclusions, of natural theology. Hume, for example, 
had stated in the Dialogues that if we argue from the world to God "the cause 
ought only to be proportional to the effect, and the effect so far as it falls 
under our cognisance is not infinite ... " 'What grounds have we, then, to 
ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being ?2 
I William Paley, Works (1838), 161 
2 Hume, op. cit., 50 
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Paley's answer to this is, that, of course, it is quite true that a natural 
theology cannot of itself arrive at the strictly infinite character of God's 
attributes and nature: 
'Omnipotence', 'omniscience', 'infinite' power, 'infinite' know-jedge 
are superlatives; expressing our conception of these attributes in the 
strongest and most elevated terms which language supplies. rte ascribe 
power to the Deity under the name of 'omnipotence', the strict and 
correct conclusion being, that a power which cculd create such a world 
as this is, must be, beyond all comparison, greater than any which we 
experience in ourselves, than any which we observe in other visible 
agents; greater also than any which we can want for our individual 
protection and preservation, in the being upon whom we depend. It is a 
power, likewise, to which we are not authorized, by our observation or 
knowledge to assign any limits of space or duration. I 
Some have felt that by conceding the legitimacy of this philosophical 
criticism of natural theology Paley has involved himself in a serious conflict 
with orthodoxy since a finite God, however great, even superlatively and 
unimaginably great, does not measure up to the standard of Scripture and 
credal definition. Paley, however, is not suggesting that the notion of God 
which we derive from natural theology is adequate in all respects. His view 
of natural theology is that it is the handmaid of revelation. He was not, 
like the Deists, seeking to establish a system of natural or rational theology 
which would dispense with the need for revelation. On the contrary he regarded 
the conclusions of natural theology as a step in the direction of revelation: 
It is a step to have proved, that there must be something in the world 
more than what we see. It is a farther step to know, that amongst the 
invisible things of nature, there must be an intelligent mind, concerned 
in its production, order and support. These points being assured to us 
by Natural Theology, we may well leave to Revelation the disclosure of 
the many particulars, which our researches cannot reach, respecting 
either the nature of this Being as the original cause of all things, or 
his character and designs as a moral governor. 2 
The aim of Paley's Natural Theology was 
to provide a limited confirmation of the Christian religion, which was 
in no way to be confined to the bare conclusions he supposed himself 
able to demonstrate. The concept of God which could emerge from the 
application of Paley's empirical methods would inevitably be a dessicated 
one; but Paley was of the apparently sincere opinion that a proof for 
the existence of even this poor an approximation of the holy God of 
Christianity was a step toward a strengthened confidence in invisible 
reality, consequently in the possibility of divine revelation, hence in 
the truthfulness of the Bible and ultimately in the full Christian God. 3 
1 , oji1liam Paley, Works 
(1838) 
, 164- -52 Ibid., 193 
3 Frederick Ferre, Introduction to Paley's Natural Theology (1963), xxvii 
-4/ 
However, while Paley acknowledges that the conception of God attained in 
natural theology falls short of that of orthodox statements of his character, 
account must also be taken of the different logical function of such language 
when it is used in ordinary religious discourse and worship, and when, on the 
other hand, it is employed for the purpose of theological definition. 'Vat 
Paley is suggesting here is, that religious discourse is essentially practical 
in this matter of infinite attributes. The degree of power and knowledge 
necessary to bring the universe into existence cannot, from our point of view, 
be distinguished from infinite. It would, therefore, appear perfectly proper 
and legitimate for the language of piety to speak of the "infinite" power and 
wisdom of God. If it is recognised that this represents a different realm of 
discourse from that of strict philosophical definition, misunderstanding cannot 
arise. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations 
considers the different uses of the word "exact" and its "family resemblance" 
in different language games. In the laboratory "exact" in terms of measurement 
of time may mean hundredths of a second. But if I say to somebody in a quite 
different, social context, "Meet me at 8.30 p. m. exactly", I do not decide 
whether he is late or early by such standards, and in this "lauguage game", as 
he would describe it, I may quite properly use the word "exact", but it does 
not necessarily carry with it the precision of meaning that attached to it in a 
different logical usage. To say, however, as some have tried to do that it 
must always carry with it one precise meaning, viz., that of the laboratory, 
and that unless it is employed in this sense it cannot be used, is to do 
violence to language and force an arbitrary definition upon it. 
Paley would appear, then, to be making a perfectly valid point when he draws 
our attention to the practical nature of religious language in this respect. 
While "infinite" may quite properly have an exactly defined meaning in the 
context of philosophical or theological discussion, this does not preclude the 
language of piety and worship employing it in a less precise way. The power 
and wisdom that are adequate to the production and superintendence of the 
universe far surpass every idea we have of wisdom and power derived from the 
most intelligent and powerful being with whom we are acquainted, and may, 
therefore, legitimately be described as "infinite". 
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If then it can be established, as Paley believed it could, that there is 
evidence of purposive design in the world, even though the examples of this 
may be few, or just one single instance, then the inference may be drawn from 
this to the existence of God. "Design must have a designer. That designer 
must be a person. That person is God. "1 We have taken some account of the 
arguments that have been employed against Paley, but we have also noted how 
difficult it is to banish completely from the world the notion of design. 
J u: t when it is imagined that a limit has been reached at which teleological 
design is excluded it is found to recur. Design, as Paley says, if it exists, 
must have a designer. "Whatever includes marks of contrivance, whatever in 
its constitution testifies design, necessarily carries us to something beyond 
itself, to some other being, to a designer prior to and out of itself. " 
In this way Paley moves from the existence of the thing which is designed to 
the existence of the Creator who designed it. The universe cannot be God: 
"Nothing can be God which is ordered by a wisdom and a will, which itself is 
void of, which is indebted for any of its properties to contrivance ab extra. " 
Z 
The universe, therefore, points us beyond itself to the existence of its Creator. 
Regarding the natural attributes of God, Paley acknowledges the force of Hume's 
philosophical criticism that the cause cannot be proved to exceed the effect, 
and in view of this the term "infinite" may not strictly be applied in natural 
theology. However, since natural theology does not stand on its own in the 
system of religion which Paley conceived, but simply affords a limited 
confirm tion of the precise and true nature of God's character given by 
revelation, the employment of the term "infinite" in natural theology Paley 
regarded as warranted by the practical nature of religious discourse, and 
because for all ordinary purposes, the power and wisdom necessary in any being 
responsible for the universe could not, from our point of view, be 
distinguished from infinite. 
1 William Paley, Works 
(1838), 1 64 
2 Ibid., 156 
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VII 
o, e must now consider Paley's argument regarding the moral attributes of God. 
Here Hume's objections are specially relevant. 
On this point, as we have already noticed, the sceptical Philo, whom we take 
to represent Hume's own views, is made to triumph over his opponent Cleanthes. 
There is no view of human life, or the condition of mankind, from 
which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral 
attributes [of the Deity), or learn that infinite benevolence, 
crnjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must 
discover by the eye of faith. I 
The ground of this conclusion is found earlier in the argument in a passage 
of reasoning which Hume regards as "short, clear and decisive". Cleanthes 
had argued that on balance "health is more common than sickness, pleasure 
than pain, happiness than misery". 
2 
This, argues Philo, is contrary to all 
human experience and will not stand. But allowing it to be so, 
why is there any misery at all in the world ? Not by chance, surely. 
From some cause then. Is it the intention of the Deity ? But he is 
almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning. 3 
Here Hume believes he has a conclusive argument against a natural theology 
establishing belief in all all-powerful and completely benevolent being who 
is responsible for the universe. If this were the case things would be ordered 
differently, for the conjunction of absolute power and absolute benevolence in 
one person would ensure that there would be no suffering. Animals could, 
for 
example, be made incapable of experiencing pain and their safety and welfare 
preserved and cared for in some other way, perhaps by special 
interventions 
of the Deity when they were in danger. Also, 
instead of the extremes of heat 
and cold and tempest, which we now observe, 
the universe could have been framed 
so as to preserve a medium 
in all these things. In this way, argues Philo, 
much of the misery and suffering of 
the sentient creation might be avoided. 
I D. Hume, The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 
(ed. Nelson Pike; 1970)ß 92 
2 Ibid., 90 
Ibid. , 91 3 
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Even if we allow that our knowledge of the universe and its mechanism is too 
small and partial to enable us to pronounce upon it in this way, yet it must 
still be acknowledged that we cannot argue from the mixed phenomena of the 
universe to an unmixed principle of goodness or benevolence behind it all. 
Hume is prepared to allow that if the goodness of God could be established on 
any other grounds than empirical, then "these phenomena however untoward, would 
not be sufficient to subvert that principle, but might easily1in some unknown 
manner, be reconcilable to it. " 
1 
But in the design argument this is not the 
case. The grounds for belief in the goodness of the Creator are not a priori, 
but empirical. 
This goodness is not antecedently established but must be inferred 
from the phenomena ... 
(and) 
... there can be no grounds for such an inference while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these 
ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding 
can be allowed to judge on such a subject. 2 
While bad appearances may be compatible with absolute goodness their existence 
makes it impossible to prove it. 
There are in effect four hypotheses that can be f ormulated concerning the 
first causes of the universe and Hume expresses them thus ; 
that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect 
malice; that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice; 
that they have neither goodness or malice. 
He then comes to the following conclusion: 
mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles; 
and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose 
the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable. 3 
1 D. Hume, The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. Nelson pike; 1970), 102 
2 Ibid., 103 
3 Ibid. , 101. 
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Such difficulties in the way of establishing in natural religion the goodness 
of God were familiar to Paley, and he attempted to give an answer to them in 
the concluding chapters of his work. He dwells first upon the joyfulness of 
existence. "It is after all a happy world. The air, the earth, the water 
teem with delighted existence. " 
I 
He remarks even upon the pleasures of old 
age, and it is worth remembering that while he was writing these lines he was 
himself suffering considerable pain from the disease that was shortly to end 
his life. It will be objected, he concedes, that these are chosen and favoured 
instances: 
We answer that they are instances, nevertheless, which comprise large 
provinces of sensitive existence, that every case we have described is 
the case of millions. 2 
Paley is of the opinion that a broad and impartial survey of the conditions of 
human and animal existence generally would result in "a preponderancy in favour 
of happiness by a vast excess". Happiness is the rule, misery the exception. 3 
This conclusion iscf course difficult to refute, as it is difficult to establish. 
It certainly stands in marked contrast to David Hume's picture of nature as 
blind and indifferent to the fate of her child--en. 
The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated 
by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap without 
discernment or parental care her maimed and abortive children. 4. 
The conclusion arrived at does depend to some degree upon the nature of the 
person observing life and the world in general. A person of an optimistic frame 
of mind will tend, on the whole, to gain a more favourable impression of 
existence than the pessimist who dwells upon the darker side of life. There 
is simply no means of measuring pain or pleasure in the whole of the sentient 
creation, and proving conclusively a preponderance of the one or the other. 
I William Paley, Works (1838) ,1 
68 
2 dilliam Paley, ,:, orks 
(1838), 170 
3 Ibid. 
4- D. Hume, The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. Nelson pike; 1970), 103 
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Yet there does seem to be much in Paley's general survey to commend his 
conclusion. It is fair to say, as he does, that sickness and calamities are 
the exception rather than the rule, that pain has a subordinate and unintentional 
role (teeth are designed for eating not aching), and that too n. uch is often made 
of the sufferings of the animal kingdom. This latter, as Paley remarks, arises 
from ascribing to animals the fears and apprehensions th; t we ourselves 
expF-rience, but which they do not possess. It was the tendency later of 
evolutionists like T. N. Huxley to present the theory of natural selection with 
the whole emphasis upon the struggle for existence - I'Yature red in tooth and 
claw", the charnel-house of nature. But this, according to C. E. Raven, was 
unnecessary and unjustified. T. N. Huxley in particular, Raven says, took little 
interest in the living species. Had he done so he wculd have found things to be 
quite different. 
A true appreciation of animal life would lay little stress on pain 
and terror and much upon sensitiveness to environment, spontaneity 
of reaction, social adjustments to mates and offspring and at the 
higher levels of life, on the emergence of the rudimentary appreciation 
of value. I 
There was undouttedly a vein of pessimism in Huxley's thought which found final 
expression in the Romanes Lectures. Whether that pessimism was engendered by 
the theory of evolution, or whether the theory itself attracted men of that 
nature we cannot discuss here, but it does suggest that Paley's view of nature 
is quite as permissible as that of the pessimist. Indeed, there is much that 
can be said in its favour, and, allowing for the Victorian preoccupation with 
"nature red in tooth and claw" -a mood and outlook that has carried over to 
the twentieth century and still affects us today - it may reasonably be argued 
that on the whole there is greater happiness than misery in the world. 
However, while Paley contends that happiness is the rule and misery the 
exception, he recognises that account has to be taken of the misery in the 
world when we are seeking to establish the benevolence of God. It is this 
mixed state of things which is the problem for natural theology. Hume had 
argued that mixed phenomena can never establish an unmixed principle, 
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that the mixture of happiness and suffering in the world indicated the moral 
indifference of the Creator to his creation, i. e., that he was without goodness 
or malice. Paley proposes similar considerations about the Deity to those of 
Hume, but comes to a different conclusion. 
When God created the human species either he wished their happiness 
or he wished their misery; or he was indifferent and unconcerned 
about either. 
If he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, 
by forming our senses to be so many sores and pains to us, as they 
are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment, or by placing us 
amidst objects so ill suited tc our perceptions, as to have continually 
offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. 
He might have made for example everything we tasted bitter; everything 
we saw loathsome; everything we touched a sting; every smell a stench; 
every sound a discord. 
If he had been indifferent about our hal piness or misery, ',, re must impute 
to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is excluded) both 
the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of 
external objects fitted to produce it. 
But either of these, and still more both of them, being too much to 
attribute to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, 
that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness, 
and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view and 
for that purpose. I 
The assumption of moral indifference on the part of the Creator leaves too 
much out of account. It makes the congruity between the senses and the objects 
which affect them, as well as the existence of pleasure itself, a mere accident. 
It seemed to Paley that the animal creation and ourselves experienced far 
more pleasure than was necessary simply for the maintenance of life. He 
regarded this as something "superadded" expressly for the purpose of giving 
happiness and therefore pointing to the benevolence of the Creator; e. g., why 
should not the pain of hunger be sufficient for preservation ? Why should 
eating be pleasurable ?2 "Why should the juice of a peach, applied to the 
palate, affect the part, so differently from what it does when rubbed upon 
the palm of the hand? " 3 
1 William Paley, `works (1838), 171 
2 I_., 176 
3 Ibid.., 
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These reflections also raised for Paley the equally significant subject of 
the congruity that exists between the senses and the objects that stimulate 
them pleasurably. This applies not merely to the sense of taste, but hearing 
and seeing and smelling. "The necessary purposes of hearing might be answered 
without harmony; of smell, without fragrance; of vision, without beauty ."I 
The coincidence that is required here between the object and the sense he 
believes to be something which no accident can account for. Even though the 
sense, as we noticed before in the case of appreciation of beauty, is capable 
of variation through habituation to certain stimuli yet the original capacity 
is not itself explained in this way. "It cannot be shown", as Paley put it, 
"to result from any fixed necessity in nature, that what is frequently applied 
to the senses should of course become agreeable to them. " 
2 
Indeed there are 
many things which it is obvious could never become agreeable merely by being 
repeatedly presented to the senses. 
So, then, both the gift of pleasure beyond biological requirement, and the 
remarkable congruity and coincidence of the senses and the objects which 
stimulate them, are opposed to the conclusion that the Deity is indifferent 
to his Creation. The only satisfactory explanation that can be given of them 
is the will of the Creator. 
It may reasonably be asked, why is anything a pleasure ? and I know 
no answer which can be returned to the question, but thct which refers 
it to appointment. 3 
Thus Paley establishes the goodness of God for his system of natural theology. 
It is a strong argument, though it does not and cannot deal completely with 
the objection, that mixed phenomena cannot prove an unmixed principle of 
benevolence. Faley's proof of the goodness of God falls short of the 
absolute benevolence of the Deity in orthodoxy. But this is no different 
from the same difficulty that he faced with regard to the natural attributes 
of God, and his justification of his position would be along similar lines. 
I William Paley, Works (1838), 176 
2 Ibid. 
3 I_. , 177 
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Natural theology is not an end in itself. It is but a stepping stone to 
revelation and "the true theist will be the first to listen to any credible 
communication of divine knowledge". 1 The value of natural theology is that 
it points towards revelation and creates the attitude and frame of mind disposed 
to attend to revelation. It can be argued that the decline in Christian 
religion in the 'est has accompanied, and followed upon, a decline in natural 
theology since the middle of the last century, when such arguments as Paley's 
began to be unfashionable. H. E. Root in his essay in Soundings similarly 
suggests the close interdependence of natural theology and revelation: 
It could be argued that the attrition and death of natural theology 
could not but be a prelude to the death of all theology, and even of 
faith, in so far as faith has any conceptual content and is not simply 
a matter of feelings and postures. It could further be argued that the 
health of Christian belief, in any period, can be measured by the health 
of that natural theology on which it not always visibly depends. 2 
This is a judgement with which Paley would have generally agreed. He claimed 
neither too little nor too much for natural theology. He realized that the 
understanding of God which emerged from it, while it did not measure up to 
the requirements of orthodoxy, nevertheless, provided limited confirmation of 
it, since the inferences drawn pointed with remarkable consistency in the 
direction of the God of orthodox Christian theology. 
Frederick Ferre, in his comment on Paley, has put the matter very well when he said 
He (Paley) is not, nor does he claim to be, building theology from the 
foundations upwards. On the contrary natural theology is a discipline 
which finds itself in a world, which, for centuries, has listened to the 
assertions of revealed theology concerning the nature of God. In such a 
world it is hardly possible to pretend, as Hume does, that theological 
investigations will be carried on as though no one had ever conceived of 
God as infinitely good; natural theology supplies (1) empirical data 
which tend to verify the hypothesis, and (2) theoretical considerations 
which serve to show why other data do not conclusively falsify the 
hypothesis. Hume's criticism at this point not only overlooks the 
methodological role of natural theology as seen by its practitioners, but 
also fails to recognise the legitimate importance of the hypothetical 
movement of thought within empirical methodology in general. He seems to 
presuppose a Baconian approach, long since abandoned by scientists, to the 
process of 'deriving' conclusions from facts. We have noticed that Paley 
on the other hand is aware of the role of intelligent judgement in 
inductive thinking as an indispensable complement to sheer observation. 3 
1 William Paley, Works (1838) , 193 
2 H. E. Root, 'Beginning all over again' an essay in Soundings (ed. A. R. Vidler; 
1962), 6 
3 Frederick Ferre, Introduction to Paley's Natural Theology (1963), xxii & xxiii 
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2 
HUME, KANT, AND 
THEPHIL030PICALCRITIQUE 
During the eighteenth century it was almost universally assumed that religion, 
and in particular belief in the existence of God, had been conclusively 
established by the design argument in conjunction with the advances in science 
since the previous century. Therefore all informed and intelligent men must be 
theists. It could only be as a result of ignorance that unbelief could prevail. 
Locke had earlier expressed the matter in this way. "For the visible marks of 
extraordinary i'iisdom and Power appear in all the ýiorks of Creation that a 
rational Creature, who will but seriously reflect on the-, cannot miss the 
discovery of a Deity. " 1 Newton, that great scientific authority of the age, 
had lent his weight to the certainty of the argument. Colin 1 aclaurin, Newton's 
illustrator, wrote in his book An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical 
Discoveries: 
His [God's] existence and his attributes are, in a sensible and 
satisfactory manner, displayed to us in his works; ... From our 
existence, and th, -t of other contingent beings around us, we conclude 
that there is a first cause, whose existence must be necessary, and 
independent of any other being- but it is only a posteriori that we 
thus infer the necessity of his existence, and not in the same manner 
that we deduce the necessity of an eternal truth in geometry 2 
Thus the design argument while being recognised as a posteriori, and, therefore, 
not carrying with it the finality of deduction, was nevertheless regarded as 
being so conclusive and strong as to be virtually self-evident. 
This encouraged theologians like Samuel Clarke to speak of it in similar terms, 
and to declare that the contemplation of the works of creation, 
the form and 
structure of cur bodies, and the faculties of our mind, could 
be sufficient to 
convince ever; one of the existence of an all-wise, supreme 
Being, who is the 
author of such things: 
1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
(ed. H. Nidditch), 89 
2 C. MacLaurin, An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries 
(174.8) 
386 
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no Man of the meanest Capacity and greatest Disadvantages whatsoever, 
with the slightest and most superficial Observation of the 5 orks of God, 
and the lowest and most obvious attendance to the Reason of Things, can 
be ignorant of Him, but he must be utterly without excuse. I 
Kant himself makes reference to the supposed finality and conclusiveness 
that were ordinarily associated with the Design Argument when he wrote in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, " ... we cannot approve of the claims which this 
argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a reception on its own 
merits, apart from favour or support from other arguments. " 
2 
It is fair to say that Paley did not regard it in this light nor claim that it 
offered demonstrative certainty. He was, as McPherson has pointed out, very 
cautious: "The argument as he sees it has its place against a background of 
faith. It is most unlikely to prove God to someone who does not already believe 
in God. " 
3 
The significance of the argument was for him much more general and 
pervasive than that of a straightforward conclusion inferred from certain 
premises. Its effect might even be described as impressionistic, since he 
devotes a long paragraph in the conclusion of his Natural Theology to the 
"impression" gained from study of the argument. It needs, he remarked, like a 
medicine to get into the system. "It is one thing to assent to a proposition 
of this sort; another, and a very different thing, to have properly imbibed 
its influence. " 
Thus Paley may have much more in common with the conclusions of Kant and Hume 
regarding the logical character of the design argument than is commonly thought 
to be the case. It is clear that one of the main purposes of Hume's attack 
upon the argument in the Dialogues was to destroy the conclusive character it 
enjoyed amongst many theologians, and Kant also ventures to say, when 
criticising the "proof" of the argument, that it cannot 
I S. Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God (fifth 
edition 1719T, 154- 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (tr. J. M. D. Meiklejohn; second ed. 1934), 363 
3 Thomas McPherson, The Argument from Design (1972), 71 
4 William Paley, Works (1838), 192 
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injure the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the 
arrogant sophist and to teach him that modesty and moderation which 
are the properties of a belief that brings calm and content into the 
mind without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I 
In its tone and claims the natural theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries had overreached itself. There are reasons for this; chief amongst 
them being the rapprochement between Newtonian science and religion which led 
to the"overweening confidence of the sophists" to whom Kant refers, and the 
conviction that the existence of God might be regarded as an "hypothesis" capable 
of empirical verification. This in turn led to the belief that he who could 
deny such incontrovertible evidence must be either a fool or a knave. This was 
something which Hume in particular deeply resented, and the main thrust of his 
argument, as indeed that of Kant, is to show that the argument from design has no 
such validity, though Kant treated it with greater respect and less irony than Hume. 
I 
Hume's attack on the design argument may be divided into four main points. 
(1) The weekeness of the analogy between the world and human artifacts. 
Cleanthes in presenting the case for the argument from design speaks of the 
world as one huge machine subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines. 
This curious adaptation of means to end in nature resembles, while greatly 
exceeding, the work of human thought and intelligence. Since, therefore, the 
effects are similar we may conclude that they derive from a similar source 
and that the world is the product of intelligence and design on the part of 
the Deity. 
philo's criticism of this is that the force of analogical reasoning is greatly 
weakened when there is any departure from the cases being compared. We may 
conclude when we see a house that it has an architect, a builder, because the 
case is exactly the same as many others that we have experienced. There is, 
however, a great gulf between ships, houses and machines, on the one hand, 
and the universe on the other. We should require experience of the production 
of a series of universes to have any confidence in the conclusions we might 
draw here from analogy. 
1 Kant, op. cit., 363 
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Cleanthes makes no riposte to this criticism, apart from asserting the self- 
evident nature of design in the universe and drawing attention to the feeling, 
or impression, which is made upon the mind that this is so, from the contem- 
plation of particular examples like the eye. This is not without significance 
in the light of what we have said about Paley's understanding of the total 
effect of the argument and not just its logical standing. 
Replies have, however, been made to Hume's objection. John Hick, for example, 
remarks that this is not an argument conclusive against analogical reasoning, 
though it has weight against probability judgements. If a thing, i. e, the world, 
is seen to be like a clock in its design, etc., then it is perfectly legitimate, 
though unique, to consider that there is an analogy between the latter being 
the product of a purposive designer and the world being the creation of God. 
This counter-argument to Hume's objection is stated more fully by Nelson Pike in 
his commentary on the Dialogues. William Paley describes the eye as "adapted" 
for a function in its different parts as are the parts of a watch. The relation 
of parts, whether in an ear, eye, watch or ship, may be symbolized by (R). 
while eyes and telescopes are very different from ears, circulatory 
systems, watches, houses, ships (which of course are all very different 
from one another as well) all of these objects share at least one common 
feature. Each is an ordered system of parts, that is, each consists of 
a set of parts that are 'adapted' to function as a unit, i. e. each 
consists of a set of parts that are arranged in a certain specifiable 
means-end relation (R). 2 
The universe is, though totally inclusive, such a system demonstrating or 
exhibiting the relation (R) of its parts. It, therefore, is a candidate for 
inclusion in a species of systems (R). 
I John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, 13 
2 D. Huge, Dialogues (ed. Nelson Pike), 150 
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Cleanthes' argument for the existence of God need not rest on an 
empirically established correlation between the class of worlds and 
the class of intelligently contrived objects. It can rest instead 
on an empirically established correlation between the class of ordered 
systems and the class of intelligently contrived objects. I 
Hume's objection, then, that before analogical reasoning in this realm can 
have any force we must have experience of a species of universes and their 
production appears to be arbitrary. It depends for its effect upon the obvious 
dissimilarities of the objects under comparison, while ignoring the points of 
resemblance, which are the real purpose of the analogy. Thus T'elson Pike 
concludes: 
When everything is added together we emerge with a strong empirical 
correlation between the class of ordered systems and the class of 
objects that have been intelligently contrived. Much of our experience 
confirms this correlation; and that part of our experience which does 
not confirm it, at least does not disconfirm it. Given a strong empirical 
correlation between these two classes, we can now construct an 'argument 
from experience' that will yield a conclusion about the origin of any 
ordered system. For any member of the class of ordered systems, it is 
probable that it is also a member of the class of objects th" t have been 
intelligently contrived. But the universe as a whole is an ordered 
system. It follows that the universe as a whole was most probably 
designed and created by an intelligent being. 2 
It is suggested by some critics of Hume that he was not altogether unaware of 
the weakness of the objection that he had put into the mouth of Philo, and that 
when he comes to part XII of the Dialogues he seems to recognise that he has 
earlier made "excessively strict" requirements of analogy. This view is taken 
by Anders Jeffner in his work Butler and Hume on Religion. In Part XII, he 
argues, Hume seems to give the argument from design some justification. 
D. Hume, Dialogues (ed. Nelson Pike), 151 
2 Iß, 151 &152 
McPherson makes the same point succinctly in his discussion of this part 
of Hume's argument. rie may grant that the argument from design argues 
from the universe considered as unique, but the class of the analogy is 
not a series of universes, but machines. The one and only universe seems 
to resemble a watch, etc. It is concluded that it resembles it also in 
having a designer. The preponderance of opinion, therefore, appears to be 
against Hume on this point. 
A second line of reply put forward by McPherson suggests that the universe 
be considered in its separate parts, and not as one and unique. This 
approach would certainly come more closely into line with that of Paley, 
who was more interested in the cumulative effect of particular illustrations 
of design than in the totality of the universe considered as a single entity. 
Indeed, this aspect of the argument plays little part, if any, in his thinkiig, 
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I think it is Hume's view that Cleanthes' argument, which is based upon 
organisms, cannot be rejected out of hand as invalid, in view of the 
disparity between the things compared. 1 
(2) Hume's insistence in the early chapters of the Dialogues upon the supposed 
weakness of the analogy between the world and human artifacts led him to argue 
that there may be many other equally valid ways of accounting for the order that 
we experience in the universe. "In this little corner of the world alone, there 
are four principles, reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar 
to each other and are the causes of similar effects. " 
2 
Any one of these, 
therefore, may be invoked to explain the order and design that we perceive in 
the world. It is "a palpable and egregious partiality", Hume insists, to show 
a preference for reason in view of what he regards as the disparity in the 
analogy between products of human intelligence and the universe. What is this 
little agitation of the brain we call thought, that it should be given priority 
over all else ? It is not less intelligible or conformable to experience to 
attribute the origin of the universe to vegetation, or generation, than to 
design or contrivance. 
A tree bestows order and organization on that tree which springs from it, 
without knowing the order: an animal in the same manner on its offspring: 
a bird on its nest: And instances of this kind are even more frequent in 
the world., than those of order which arise from reason and contrivance. 
To say that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately 
from design is begging the questicn. 3 
it is, therefore, Hume argues, a quite arbitrary choice as to which of these 
principles is taken as the basis of a cosmogony. Generation, however, is 
regarded by him as having this advantage over reason; that it is consistently 
seen to give rise to the latter. 
1 Anders Jeffner, Butler and Hume on Religion, 154 
2 D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. N. K. Smith), 220 
3 Ibid., 221 
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Despite the subtlety and skill with which Hume presents this argument the 
analogy between the world and animal generation is, as McPherson remarks, not 
at all obvious and if one takes into account the solar system it is rather 
more like a watch than anything else. 
I However, the best reply that is made 
to Hume is to be found in the works of Paley himself. The idea of attributing 
order in the world to generation, rather than intelligent and purposive design, 
was a common one in the eighteenth century, and Paley takes account of it in 
his argument. 
"The minds of most men are fond of what they call a irinciple", says Paley, 
"and the appearance of simplicity, in accounting for phenomena. " But, in fact, 
this term, when it is employed, stands for a most complicated operation in which 
all the many parts engaged must function together and in harmony. Generation is 
such an operation, and the simplicity resides in the name only. Yet, "give a 
philosopher this and he can get on. " He does not reflect upon the complexity, 
the delicacy and multiplicity of the parts and actions that must be carried on 
in order to bring the operation to a successful result. The whole is "wrapped 
up in a single term, generation" which is then set down as "an elementary 
principle" and thought capable of sufficiently explaining the origin of things 
without the necessity for an intelligent Creator. 
2 
"The truth is", Paley argues, "generation is not a principle but a process. 113 
I T. McPherson, The Argument from Design, 57 
2 William Paley, works (1838) , 158 
3 "Hume could not demolish the design axiom for want of an alternative 
hypothesis to account for cosmic order. Not quite seriously he suggested 
'generation' as an alternative principle of ordering, revealed in 
experience, and he speculated that the universe might be as well 
compared to an animal, or even a vegetable as to a machine. That would 
notdo, of course, since 'generation' -a process, the mechanisms of 
which were entirely unknown in Hume's day - was precisely the principal fact 
that design was invoked to explain. " 
W. I. Matson, The Existence of God (1965), 100 
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We do not call spinning and weaving and the manufacture of goods principles, and 
thereby dispose of the necessity for thought and intention and design to be 
involved in their production. Yet by dignifying the process of generation with 
the title of a 'principle' it is thought that it is possible to exclude design 
in this case. 
Paley's argument is further strengthened by his insistence upon the fact that 
that which is generated is related to that which is not. Organic animal bodies 
produced by generation bear a relation to the inorganic elements of the world 
which are not the result of generative processes. If it were merely a case 
of one part of a generated body bearing a relationship to another part of the 
same body, or of generated bodies being in relationship to each other as is the 
case with the sexes of the same species, it might be argued that the whole of 
this correspondence is the result of generation. But this is not so, and the 
argument from generation has to account for this relation that the organic hears 
to the inorganic. I 
If in answer to this it is said, as in effect Hume argues, that the whole world 
is the result of generation, then Paley answers that he does not understand the 
proposition; that, indeed, it is without meaning. For if the term generation 
signifies something quite different from what it ordinarily means, then it may, 
by the same latitude, signify anything. 
In which case a word or phrase taken from the language of Otaheite would 
convey as much theory concerning the origin of the universe, as it does 
to talk of it being3enerated. 2+ 
In other words the anabgy for which David Hume shows such a marked preference 
is so remote as to be meaningless. Paley maintains the superiority of the 
analogy based on interligence and design. It is one which is familiar, and 
experimentally justified, yet rejecting this we are invited to resort to 
novelties and absurdities. The only reason for this, in Paley's opinion, is 
the hubris of superior intellects, who cannot rest satisfied with sound, but 
familiar explanations. 
I See further discussion of this in Chapter 7 
2 'illiam Paley, Works (1838) , 159 
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The choice, therefore, of the principle, or rather analogy, upon which one is 
to base one's cosmogony is not such an arbitrary matter as Hume would make out. 
While both Hume and Kant queried to what extent the analogy between products of 
nature and those of human contrivance is a legitimate one, it must be remembered, 
that Kant, himself, while attacking the argument from design in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, goes so far as to say: 
if we are to discuss the subject at all we cannot proceed more securely 
than with the guidance of the analogy, subsisting between nature and such (artificial) products of design - these being the only products whose 
causes and modes of origination are completely known to us. Reason would 
be unable to satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality 
which she does know to obscure and indemonstrable principles of 
explanation which she does not know. 1 
Paley's reasoning is along identical lines, as we have seen. 
Frederick Ferr6 in his introduction to Paley's Natural Theology comments: 
The assertion that the analogy based on intelligence is the only 
experimentally justified one, as against Philo's (Hume's) super- 
fecundity of alternatives (and particularly against the alternative 
of sheer, unconscious 'generation') is stoutly maintained by Paley 
in one of the most thoughtful replies ever given to Hume's attack 
on this point. 2 
"Generation" if used as an explanation of the whole universe requires 
redefinition, otherwise it is rendered quite meaningless. 
(3) Hume's third objection to the design argument occurs in the fourth part 
of the Dialogues where he invokes the argument of infinite regression against 
it, i. e. that the attribution of the order that is in the world to a prior 
plan in the mind of the Creator explains nothing, for we then, in turn, have 
to explain the order or design in the mind of God. If we trace the material 
world into an ideal world have we not 
the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world 
But if we stop and go no further; why go so far ? Why not stop at the 
material world ? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on ad infinitum ? 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 364 
2 Frederick Ferre, Introduction to Faley's Natural Theology Xxv 
3 D. Hume, Dialogues, 199 & 200 
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Hume derived this argument from Strato, through his reading of Bayle. Among 
the Hume manuscripts preserved by the Royal Society of Edinburgh are memoranda, 
consisting mainly of notes on reading and probably written ... prior to 1741. 
They contain keynotes of the Dialogues. One such note runs: 
Strato's atheism the most dangerous of the ancient - holding the origin 
of the world from nature, or a matter endued with activity. Bayle 
thinks there are none but the Cartesians can refute this atheism. 
A Stratonician could retort the arguments of all the sects of philosophy ... 
The same question - why the parts or ideas of God had that particular 
arrangement ?- is as difficult as why the world had. I 
This same argument is employed by Philo in many different ways in the Dialogues, 
and can be taken to represent Hume's own standpoint. To explain order in the 
world by a plan in the mind of God is of no significance to him. 
How could things have been as they are, were there not an original 
inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter ? 'nd 
it is very indifferent to which of these we give the preference. 2 
An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design is 
not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its 
order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter 
supposition than in the former. 3 
Cleanthes makes two replies to these arguments of Philo's, which do not appear 
to be of much importance from the context, since, as it stands, it would seem 
that Philo is intended to triumph. However, the trouble is that he does not, 
for there is more to both the answers that Cleanthes makes than is apparent 
from the account that is given of them in the Dialogues. The first is along 
the lines of the logic of explanations generally. Cleanthes argues, when 
pressed, that one explanation does not require another in order to be 
satisfactory, i. e, we have not to explain everything before we can explain 
anything. Nelson Pike comments on this: 
As Cleanthes said at the outset, the principle working in P. hilo's line 
of thinking is much too 'rigid' to be correct. It is a principle that 
is not in accord with the criteria we use when evaluating explanations -4 
neither everyday explanations, nor explanations occurring in the sciences. 
(1846) 
1 J. H. Burton Life and Correspondence of David Hume, /I, 134 -5 
2 D. Hume, Dialogues, 216 
3 Ibid., 203 
4 D. Hume, Dialogues (ed. Nelson Pike), 162 
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The second answer which Cleanthes makes is probably the more conclusive. 
Having reasoned from the design of the world to God, he is content to stop there, 
for this satisfies him in a way that the unexplained material universe does not. 
There is a great deal more in this apparently unreasoning reply than is at first 
clear, and it contains some of the fundamental grounds for resorting to the 
design argument at all. The first is this: An unexplained universe may be 
difficult to accept, but not an unexplained God, for the very meaning of the name 
'God' 
means a free, untramelled spirit, who is all that he sees it best to be. 
The explanation of what he is lies in himself. To look for an 
explanation behind or above or outside him is useless ... God means the 
most basic, most self-explanatory of beings there is. If we found a good 
reason for supposing that the Maker of the universe was not the basic 
reality should we not deny to him the name of God ?1 
A similar point is made by Ian Ramsey when he argues that the name of 'trod' acts 
as a 'logical stop-card'. It marks the completion of a chain of reasoning from 
cause or design, and to ask, what is the cause of God, or the reason for the 
design in the mind of the Creator, is to fail to understand the logical 
significance of such a statement. It is to require that God be something other 
than he is -a self-sufficient being - which is a contradition in terms. 
2 
Thus, while an unexplained universe is a problem for the mind of man, an 
unexplained God is not. This is to a large extent the answer to Hume's query, 
why go so far ? Why not stop with an unexplained order in the world ? And to 
some degree a vindication of the attitude we find in Cleanthes, who says that 
having found God, he is content to stop. 
But there is even stronger justification for this position, when we consider 
what other philosophers have said of the argument from infinite regress. In 
his Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant deals specifically with the 
objection raised by Hume in these words: 
1 Austin Farrer, A Science of God, 35 
2 I. T. Ramsey, Religious Language, 63 
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In reply to those who feel obliged tc adopt a teleological principle of 
critical judgement, that is, an architectonic understanding in the case 
of all such physical ends, Hume raises the objection that we might ask 
with equal justice how such an understanding is itself possible ... But there is nothing in this point. For the whole difficulty that besets 
the question as to the genesis of a thing that involves ends, and that 
is solely comprehensible by their means, rests upon the demand for unity 
in the source of the synthesis of the multiplicity of externally existing 
elements in this product. For, if this source is laid in the under- 
standing of a productive cause regarded as a simple substance, the above 
question, as a teleological problem is abundantly answered, whereas if 
the cause is merely sought in matter, as an aggregate of many externally 
existing substances, the unity of principle requisite for the intrinsically 
final form of its complex structures is wholly absent. 1 
Here we find Kant making the same point as that which we have already noted; 
which is, that the explanation of purposive design in terms of mind does not 
itself stand in need of further explanation in the same way as evidence of 
purposive design does when it is encountered in physical objects. It is not 
the designing mind that is inexplicable, but the arrangement of matter in a 
reciprocal unity of parts. In the latter the reason or cause of such arrangement 
is wholly lacking, whereas in the former, which is capable both of comprehending 
and creating such order, it is not. Mind or intelligence does not stand in the 
same logical category as matter and does not call for the application of the 
same rules. Therefore, to refer the purposive design that we encounter in the 
world to an intelligent Creator does not require a further explanation of design 
in the mind of God and involves no such infinite regress as Hume envisaged. 
Hume, then, would appear to be wrong in stating that 
a mental world or universe of ideas requires a cause as much as 
does a material world or universe of objects; and, if similar 
in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. 2 
The difference between matter and mind, or spirit, is so profound and 
significant thatthey cannot be treated in the same way. 
I I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment (tr. J. C. Meredith; 1928) 80 & 81 
2 D. Hume, Dialogues (ed. N. K. Smith), 198 
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(14. ) The Epicurean hypothesis. Hume's reason for reviving this and presenting 
it as an alternative to the design argument in the Dialogues is not quite the 
same as the earlier objections he has raised. Those were "serious" objections 
in the sense that, as far as we can judge, he entirely assented to them himself. 
The Epicurean hypothesis does not have the same standing. His purpose in 
introducing it here is simply to show that it is po. -sible to propose other 
systems of cosmogony that bear some faint appearance to truth, and that, since 
all analogies labour under some difficulty or other, the safest course is scepticism. 
The Epicurean hypothesis he acknowledges to be "justly esteemed the most absurd 
system that has yet been proposed", yet with some slight alterations it might 
be put into the field alongside other arguments and made, in some degree, to 
account for the order that is in the world. The terms of the theory are that a 
fixed number of particles are subjected to continual movement and rearrangement. 
Since they are only capable of a finite number of transpositions, in the course 
of time, all possible forms and arrangements will be gone through. Therefore 
the form of the world as we know it now is a possibility under such a system. 
It is also assumed that at some point a certain stability will come over the 
process, and that after "many ages in a continued succession of chaos and 
disorder" it may at last settle to some kind of order in which the activity 
and fluctuation of the atoms is not lost, but a uniform appearance is maintained. 
The forms that will so emerge will be the forms best suited to survive and 
possessing the greatest stability. Therefore, it is pointless to ask about the 
adjustment of parts of organisms and their suitability to their environment, 
for some such adjustment they must have, if they are to exist at all. 
We have already consented upon this theory and Paley's answer to it in Chapter One. 
Hume is conscious that the argument from chance carries little conviction. 
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On this theory the world is accounted for 9s the final result of what must be 
the equivalent of an infinite number of throws of the dice. But the chances 
against this are enormous. It cannot, of course, be said to be literally 
impo: sible, as it is not literally impossible for a font of types to be thrown 
in the air and come down in the form of one of Shakespeare's sonnets; but it 
is next to itpossible. ??. G. Swinburne writes of this part of Hume's argument: 
"An appeal to chance to account for order becomes less and less plausible, the 
greater the order. '; ie would be justified attributing a typewritten version of 
collected works of Shakespeare to the activity of monkeys typing eternally on 
eternal typewriters if we had some evidence of the existence of an infinite 
quantity of paper randomly covered with t3Pe, as well as the collected works. 
In the absence of any evidence that matter behaved irregularly at other temporal 
periods, we are not justified in attributing its present regular behaviour to 
chance. " I 
But even if we accept the Epicurean hypothesis of the emergence of form and 
order in the universe after countless myriads of chaotic combinations of the 
atoms constituting it, we still do not get rid of the proof of 
design. Why was 
it that the atoms failed to combine in a stable and balanced form before the 
final stage was reached ? Was it attributable to something in their structure 
and nature, which prevented this happening, and determined that any one of 
the 
many countless combinations would be productive of such order 
? And if this is 
so what is to prevent the teleologist asserting that they were so 
designed 
originally as to produce the present state of the ordered universe and no other; 
and that the atoms present the same evidence of 
design that the outcome of their 
revolutions presents ? Thus the Epicurean hypothesis instead of removing 
the 
evidence for design simply takes it one stage further back. 
2 
1 R. G. Swinburne, "The Argument from Design", Philosophy, XLIII 
(1968), 211 
2 Bacon says of the Epicurean hypothesis, "that school which is most accused of 
atheism doth most demonstrate religion; that is, the school of 
Leucippus 
and Democritus and Epicurus, For it is a thousand times more credible, 
that 
four immutable elements and one immutable fifth essence, duly and eternally 
placed, need no God, than that an army of infinite small portions or seeds 
unplaced should have produced this order and beauty without a divine 
marshall. " Francis Bacon Essays, XVI Of Atheism, Everyman's Library (1968), 49, 
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Hume's restatement of the Epicurean hypothesis has been regarded as a 
speculative anticipation of the theory of evolution by means of natural 
selection developed by Darwin a century later. It is interesting, therefore, 
to see how someone like T. H. Huxley, the apostle of Darwinsism and himself a 
vigorously deterministic thinker, nevertheless pointed out that 
the teleological and mechanical views of nature are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive for the more firmly the mechanist assumes a 
primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the 
universe are the consequences, the more completely he is thereby at 
the mercy of the teleologist who can always defy him to disprove that 
this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the 
phenomena of the universe. I 
The most the Epicurean theory does is to take the proof of design back a stage, 
but it does not succeed in driving the teleologist from the field. F. R. Tennant's 
reconstruction of the argument from design in the 1920s is evidence of that; 
the second main point that he makes in his complex restatement of the argument 
is that of "plan in the primary collocations". The sting of Darwinism for the 
traditional form of the design argument, he asserts, lay not in the gradualness 
of construction of organic bodies, (for gradualness of construction is in itself 
no proof of absence of design) but in the assignation to secondary causes of 
that which had formerly been attributed to direct divine intervention. 
But the fact of organic evolution, even when the maximum of instrumentality 
is accredited to what is figuratively called natural selection, is not 
incompatible with teleology on the grander scale; as exponents of 
Darwinism were perhaps the first to recognise and to proclaim. 2 
The grander scale of teleology sees design in the evolutionary process itself. 
The survival of the fittest presupposes the arrival of the fit and throws 
no light thereupon. Darwin did not account for the origin of variations: 
their forthcomingness was simply a datum for him ... in the absence 
either of a mechanical or an 'internal' explanation of variation, room is 
left for the possibility that variation is externally predetermined ... 
the discovery of organic evolution has caused the teleologist to shift 
his ground from special design in the products to directivity in the 
process, and plan in the primary collocations. 3 
1 F. Darwin (ed. ), Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, II, 201 & 202 
2 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, II , 
8tß 
3 Ibid., 85 
-71 
How far we wish to endorse Tennant's ideas is not important here; the point 
which he makes is sufficient to show that it is theoretically impossible to 
banish the concept of design from the argument, whichever form the Ei. icurean 
hypothesis takes, whether it be that expounded by Lucretius or Darwin. 
Robert Boyle, in the seventeenth century through his 'corpuscular philosophy', 
had advocated a mechanical theory of the universe. He was hov. ever careful to 
distinguish it from that of the Epicureans. Boyle considered that the basis 
and explanation of all material things was matter and motion. But he did not 
suppose that when "God had put into the whole mass of matter an invariable 
quantity of motion, he needed do no more to make the universe; the material 
parts being able, by their own unguided motions, to throw themselves into a 
regular system". He did not believe in random selection or chance eoncatenation 
of particles, but that in the beginning God "so guided the various motion of the 
parts ... as to contrive 
them into the world he designed they should compose". 
Those rules of motion, which we call 'laws of nature', once being established, 
and upheld by general providence, are capable of producing all the phenomena of 
1 
the physical world. 
Boyle thought that it added to man's notion of God's supremacy to think that 
God had created the world by creating matter and motion and natural law, and 
that it did not require a series of miraculous interventions to keep it going. 
Any agent, whether it be natural or supernatural, which operates upon bodies 
does so, Boyle maintained, according to the natural laws governing physical 
entities. Corn can be ground in a mill by water, horse or hand power, i. e. by 
inanimate, brute or rational agents, but the effect is the same. "And if an 
angel himself should work a real change in the nature of a bogy, 'tis scarce 
conceivable to men how he could do it without the assistance of local motion", 
without working through the process of natural law. 
2 
1 The Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis 
(1674 taken from 
Peter Shaw's abridgement (1725) II, 187 
2 Ibid. 
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Thus Boyle believed that a mechanical theory of the universe embraced all 
other theories and explanations, yet at the same time did not dispense with 
the notion of a Supreme Creator whom he conceived as working with and through 
the laws he himself has created. Both teleology and mechanism have their 
due place in Boyle's theory. 
If, then, after the acceptance of the Epicurean hypothesis, for the sake of 
argument, there remains "plan in the primary collocations"; if the proof of 
design is not removed, but only taken a stage further back, we may turn Hume's 
earlier objection against himself and ask, why it is not possible to admit design 
in the world in the first place ? Why go so far as to trace the world of natural 
objects into the world of atoms and molecules ? If there is design in these, the 
secondary causes which produced them, there is design in the natural objects 
themselves. It is really a matter of indifference which illustrations of design 
you choose to accept. 
These four arguments summarize the main points of Hume's philosophical critique 
of the argument from design in the Dialogues. Before assessing their importance 
and influence, both philosophically and historically, we must consider that other 
great philosopher of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant, and his criticism of 
the design argument. 
II 
We shall consider first Kant's brief treatment of the teleological argument in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, which is simpler than his extended discussion of it 
in the Critique of Teleological Judgement. 
Kant acknowledges his debt generally to David Hume when he remarks that it was 
he who awoke him from his "dogmatic slumbers", but more particularly he derived 
from him the main criticism of the teleological argument. 
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The manuscript of Hamann's translation of the Dialogues brought them to 
Kant's notice in 1780 (i. e. the year following their first appearances), 
on the eve of the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason ... 
he at 
once incorporated (Hume's main criticisms) in his discussion of the 
teleological argument in his final revision of the Critique. They were 
also among the influences leading Kant to a reformulation of the problems 
of teleology in his Critique of Judgement. I 
Kant entertained great respect for the teleological argument not only because 
it was, as he put it, "the oldest, the clearest and that most in conformity 
with the common sense of humanity", but also because it stimulates interest in 
and the study of nature. It brings to nature an awareness and discernment of 
aims and purposes, which would not otherwise be observable, and draws the mind 
on to conclude that there is a principle of unity behind the phenomena of the 
natural world. 
He was also impressed by its remarkable resilience in the face of doubts proposed 
by philosophical speculation. In this situation it renewed its strength by 
contemplating the wonderful forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, by 
fresh consideration of examples of contrivance in the world, which bore in upon 
it with a cumulative force. This was the answer that Cleanthes gave to Philo in 
the Dialogues. Scepticism is met by the citation of more, and yet more wonderful 
examples of design in nature, and while inference and argument are employed, 
appeal is also made to the immediate impression and sensations that these create 
upon the mind. All this, Kant recognised, gave the argument a force which could 
not be denied. 
Yet, and this was the important point he wished to make in common with Hume, it 
did not amount to demonstrative certainty. The way in which the argument had 
been deployed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had, as we have already 
seen, tended to carry with it this assumption. Such a claim was unfounded, and 
it would do the argument itself no harm to expose the falsity of this claim. 
I D. Hume, Dialogues (ed. N. K. Smith), 39 
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Kant brings two objections against the supposed demonstrative certainty of 
the teleological argument in both of which we see the influence of Hume. 
First, he argues that at most it can only demonstrate the existence of an 
architect of the world, but not a creator. Man has no experience of creation 
ex nihilo. Therefore, it is a 'limiting concept'. Analogies of 
human crafts- 
manship, or so-called 'creative' genius, 
do not extend far enough for this. 
To create, in the primal sense in which it is applied to the activity of the 
Deity, requires contingency of matter or substance as well as form, and that 
calls for a 'transcendental argument' which the physico-theological was expressly 
constructed to avoid: ergo, it cannot demonstrate an all-sufficient being. 
I 
Secondly, we may only infer a cause proportionate to the effect. It cannot be 
asserted that the world as are know it could not exist without absolute power, the 
highest wisdom and total unity. Anything less than this is indeterminate. 
Physico-theology is, therefore, incapable of presenting a determinate 
conception of a supreme cause of the world, and is, therefore, insufficient 
as a principle of theology -a theology, which is itself to be the basis of 
religion. 
The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the path 
of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the physico-theological 
argument. 2 
The principle of causality, Kant argues, cannot be extended beyond the empirical 
to an object which can never be an object of possible experience, for then it 
becomes speculative, and is useless and meaningless when diverted from its 
proper destination. 
If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to a supreme Being, 
this Being must belong to the chain of empirical objects - in which 
case it would be, like all phenomena, itself conditioned. 3 
I I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 365 
2 Ibid., 366 
3 Ibid., 370 
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Kant, therefore, concludes that a rational theology cannot be constructed upon 
the application of the principles of reason to nature, for they do not conduct 
us to any theological truth, but it must be founded rather upon the laws of 
morality. If we -: sere to admit the possibility of passing the bounds of 
experience by virtue of the dynamic relation of cause and effect, we should 
still not be confronted with the conception of a Supreme Being, 
because experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible 
effects, and it is only an effect of this character that could witness 
to the existence of a corresponding cause. 1 
If, similarly, we are to admit the right of Reason, as a purely speculative 
enterprise, to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary Being 
it would be as a result of favour rather than demonstration. The value of the 
physico-theological proof, therefore, in Kant's view, lies not in its power to 
establish conclusively the existence of a Creator, for this it has been shown 
not to possess, but rather in the way it "prepares the mind for theological 
cognition and gives it a right and natural direction. " 
2 
It is this last sentence of Kant's in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is the 
clue to his fuller treatment of the design argument and its wider significance 
for natural theology in the Critique of Teleological Judgement, and it is to 
that that we now turn. 
III 
The Critique of Teleolcgical Judgement 
(a) The Analytic: Kant distinguishes, first, between purely formal and material 
teleological judgements. Examples of the former are geometrical figures and the 
principles that underlie their construction. In the unity and compatability of 
the principles involved we discern a sort of teleological relationship, but it 
is, as Kant puts it, 'a purposiveness without purpose'; it is purely formal 
and intellectual, not real. "In other words it is a finality 
(purposiveness) 
which does not imply an underlying end, and which, therefore, does not stand 
in need of a teleology. " 
3 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 370 
2 Ibid. 
3 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 9 
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Thus finding order and regularity in mathematics is different from encountering 
them in the real world, in "external things", "in the trees, flower beds and 
walks of a garden", for instance, which is something "I cannot hope to deduce 
a priori from any delineation I may make of space according to some rule out of 
my own head". 
1 
I may, therefore, legitimately enquire about the "finality" or 
purposiveness of the latter, which is material not formal, and whose teleology 
must in consequence lie outside the confines of "my own a priori representation". 
2 
Into this conception of material purposiveness Kant introduces the distinction 
between ends which are relative and those which are intrinsic. An object in 
nature may be regarded as serving a relative purpose if it is viewed as a means 
which other causes use in the pursuit of ends. This he terms "utility" where 
human beings are concerned, but "adaptability" in the case of other creatures. 
An example he uses is the deposit of alluvial mud at the mouths of rivers, which 
in turn becomes the means for the production of vegetation for the benefit of 
man. Indeed, what we witness throughout nature is a nexus of such relative ends 
and means, "for each intermediate member (of the series) must be regarded as an 
end, though not a final end. "3 The difference between this notion of merely 
relative purposiveness, which is accidental to the thing to which it is 
attributed, and that of intrinsic purposiveness resides in the fact that the 
latter is a purpose unto itself, as it were, "a purpose in nature (Naturzweck) 
without qualification". 
4 
Kant gives us the provisional statement that "a thing 
exists as a physical end if it is (though in a double sense) both cause and 
5 
effect of itself". This is the peculiar character and nature of an organism. 
The illustration which Kant uses is that of a tree. In the first place, a tree 
produces another tree. In the successive generation of trees of the same genus 
we see the individual tree first as the cause and then the effect, or vice versa. 
I I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 9 
2 Ibid. 11 
3 Ibid., 14- 
4. S. Körner, Kant, 
( 955) 202 
5 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 18 
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Secondly a tree produces itself as an individual. Growth, in an organic sense, 
is quite different from increase according to mechanical laws. The plant, by 
taking and bestowing upon the materials of nature a peculiar form and character, 
is both the cause and effect of itself. Thirdly, we see in such products of 
nature a mutual dependence and relationship of the parts. The leaf is dependent 
upon the branch, but so is the branch upon the leaf, for repeated defoliation 
would destroy the tree. 
An organism, then, represents a material, intrinsic purposiveness in nature in 
that it "stands to itself reciprocally in the relation of cause and effect. "1 
It cannot be explained simply in terms of mechanical causation for this is 
invariably progressive and presupposes that the effect always follows the cause. 
The conception of an organism, however, requires th;; t we also invert this order. 
It is "one in which the thing that for the moment is designated effect deserves 
none the less, if we take the series regressively, to be called the cause of the 
thing of which it was said to be the effect". 
2 
Here we must distinguish between two kinds of material intrinsic finality 
(a) that of art and (b) that of nature. An art product is the result of human 
inventiveness and design. 
It is the product, in other words, of an intelligent cause, distinct 
from the matter, or parts, of the thing, and of one whose causality, 
in bringing together and confirming the parts, is determined by its 
idea of a whole made possible through that idea, and consequently, not 
by external nature. 3 
A product of nature, however, differs from an art product in that it is not 
merely an organized, but a self-organized being. The parts are not only 
reciprocally related, but produce each other. "An organized being is, therefore, 
not a mere machine". A machine has only motive power, but an organism has 
formative power, and is capable of organizing matter that is devoid of order. 
It cannot, therefore, be explained by the capacity of movement alone - by 
mere mechanism. 4 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 20 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 20 & 21 4 Ibid. 22 
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This examination of the concept of organism presents us with a new principle 
with which to investigate nature, which is, that "an organized natural product 
is one in which every part is reciprocally both end and means. In such a product 
nothing is in vain, without an end, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of 
nature". 
I 
For all practical purposes this principle stands on the same footing 
as the fundamental principle of all natural science that nothing happens by 
chance, that every event has a cause. From a critical point of view, however, 
as Kant makes clear, there is a profound difference. 
The Category of causal connexion can be schematized; the notion of 
purpose in nature cannot. To schematize a Category is ... to exhibit 
the temporal conditions of its applicability - permanence in the case 
of Substance, existence at a certain time in the case of Reality, etc. 
The schema of causality consists 'in the succession of the manifold in 
so far as it is subject to a rule'. Regular succession, in other words, 
is a perceptual feature in the absence of which there can be no causal 
connexion. Teleological connexion is not similarly linked to a temporal 
condition or, for that matter, to any other definite feature of pure or 
empirical perception. . tie ca-. not indicate any necessary perceptual 
condition for the application of 'purpose in nature'. The notion has no 
schema. 2 
This is the ground for Kant's assertion that the notion of purpose in nature 
is regulative not constitutive. It is only the categories of the Understanding 
which can be constitutive of objects, not the Ideas of Reason. The former are 
expressed by synthetic a priori judgements, the latter by maxims. The maxims 
are rules, the observation of which enables us to systematize our knowledge of 
empirical reality, but are nevertheless subjective. 
The Idea, therefore, of purpose in nature which arises from our conception of 
organisms is expressed in the maxim "An organized product of nature is that in 
which everything is reciprocally both means and end. " "From it there follow 
two corollaries, which as methodological rules are, at least for heuristic reasons, 
observed by biologists, namely, (a) the maxim that 'nothing in such a being 
exists in vain' and (b) the maxim that 'nothing happens merely by accident 
(von ungefähr, without purpose)'. Since maxims are rules of procedure it 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 25 
2 S. Körner, Kant, 204 
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would be more precise to say that they enjoin us to proceed on the assumption 
that, or better still as if, nothing in an organism existed in vain, or 
happened merely by accident. All this does not prejudge the possibility of 
explaining some parts or functions of an organism by merely mechanistic laws". 
1 
Having arrived at the idea of purposiveness in nature from the study of 
organisms Kant now claims that it is permissible to apply this idea to the rest 
of nature, too. The mind is led on from the organism to consider the whole of 
nature as a kingdom of ends. Phenomenal nature may be tested by this idea to 
see whether it may be properly estimated as a system following the rule of ends. 
No violence is done to our objective, empirical knowledge of the world by this 
procedure. The maxim is merely a subjective principle. It is not asserted that 
things in nature are, indeed, designed so to be ends, but that the maxim of 
Reason requires us to adopt this assumption in our approach to nature as a 
whole. "Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing in 
it is in vain, we are entitled, nay, incited, by the example that nature affords 
us in its organic products, to expect nothing from it, and its laws, but what is 
final (purposive) when things are viewed as a Whole". 
2 
(b) The Dialectic. In this part of his argument Kant deals with the problem 
of the relation between a mechanistic explanation of nature and, in particular, 
organic nature, and the teleological estimation of it which he believes he has 
established. Are they mutually exclusive of each other ? If an organized body 
can be explained mechanically does this preclude a teleological explanation, or, 
alternatively, if the two exist alongside each other does the one set a 
limit 
upon the other ?A contradiction, or antinomy, Kant acknowledges, does arise 
if we treat these two as principles for the determinant judgement. They would 
then read thus; "Thesis: All production of material things is possible on 
mere mechanical laws. Antithesis: Some production of such things is not 
possible on mere mechanical laws", and in this way both could not be true. 
I S. Körner, Kant, 205 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 28 
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But if we treat them as maxims, which we are entitled to do, replacing the 
first with "All production of material things and their forms must be considered 
as being possible in accordance with merely mechanistic laws", and the second 
with, "Some products of material nature cannot be consiaered in accordance with 
merely mechanical laws (their consideration requires an altogether different 
law of causality, namely, that of final causes), " then the contradiction 
disappears. 
1 
We may then, upon the basis of the first principle, reflect upon 
nature as resulting from mechanical causes, and push our enquiry in these terms 
as far as possible, without prejudice to the second principle which invites us 
to reflect upon nature from a radically different point of view. These 
different estimations of nature result from the peculiar constitution of man's 
mind, and Kant leaves open the possibility that "in the inner basis of nature 
itself the physico-mechanical and the purposiveness nexus present in the same 
things may cohere in a single principle". 
23 
The explanation of chance, adopted by Epicurus, and that of necessary being 
advocated by Spinoza, Kant rejects as resolving the antinomy in the wrong way 
by denying or destroying the concept of teleology rather than explaining it. 
S. Körner, Kant, 207 & 208 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 38 
3 We may observe here a parity of reasoning between Kant and Francis Bacon on 
the relationship between efficient and final causes. The conclusion to 
which Kant came in the Critique was anticipated by Bacon in The Advancement 
of Learning. Bacon considered that the enquiry into final causes was 
misplaced in natural philosophy so that it prevented the discovery of 
efficient causes. Final causes must be kept within their own proper 
sphere which is metaphysical. If this distinction is not made there is 
a tendency to believe that there is a repugnancy between the final and 
the efficient, the teleological and the mechanical cause. Bacon argues 
that both are true and compatible "the one declaring the intention and 
the other the consequence only". If God chooses to work his final 
purposes in nature through secondary means this does not derogate from 
his glory. Thus we may pursue the investigation of mechanical causation 
without threatening the place of teleology. Francis Bacon, The Advancement 
of Learning. Ed. G. W. Kitchin, 98 
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Once teleological explanation has been adopted as a guide for the study of 
nature, then, as Kant has already pointed out, we must at least try this maxim 
of judgement on nature as a whole. 'ý'4e are impelled to in the case of those 
forms which manifest intrinsic purposiveness, but we are also led to subsume 
under the same rule the relative finality we observe in the natural world. 
In consequence both the popular mind and the philosopher are brought to 
consider the contingency of the universe, and to adopt the assumption that it 
"depends on and has its source in an intelligent being ... which exists outside 
the world: that teleology thus can find no completion of its enquiries except 
in a theology". 
1 
But now Kant poses the crucial question. Suppose teleology is developed to its 
highest pitch; what does it prove ? Does it for example prove that an 
intelligent Being exists ? This he answers with a categorical, No; "it proves 
no more than this, that by the constitution of our cognitive faculties ... we 
are absolutely incapable of forming any conception of the possibility of such 
a world unless : re imagine a highest cause berating designbdly. " ', i`hat we have 
stated is not something about the existence and character of the Deity, but 
something about our own mental constitution and mode of apprehending the world. 
There is something about our make-up which impels us to interpret empirical reality 
in this way. "Strictly speaking we do not observe the ends of nature as designed, 
we only read this conception into the facts as a guide to judgement in its 
reflection upon the products of nature. " 
2 
Were we to express the conclusion of the teleological argument objectively and 
dogmatically it would read - there is a God. But all we are permitted to say 
in the light of the critical philosophy is: We cannot conceive or render 
intelligible to ourselves the purposiveness we find in nature except by 
representing it, and the world in general, as the product of an intelligent 
cause, that is, a God. 3 
I S. Körner, Kant, 206 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 53 
3 Ibid. 
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Kant does not think that much is lost by the transference of the argument and 
its conclusion from objective to subjective grounds. Despite the fact that we 
are unable to pass any judgement, affirmative or negative, upon the question 
of the objective existence of the Deity this much, he contends, is certain 
that "if we ought ... to form our judgement on what our own proper nature 
permits us to see ... we are utterly unable to ascribe the possibility of such 
physical ends to any other source than an intelligent Being. This alone squares 
with the maxim of our reflective judgement, and, therefore, with a subjective 
ground that is ineradicably fixed in the human race". 
IV 
Kant now turns to the method of applying the principle of teleology to our 
investigation of nature. As we have alread;, noted, Kant's justification of 
teleology as a regulative idea does not prejudice the mechanistic explanation 
of natural phenomena. Indeed, he insists that this line of enquiry must be 
pursued as far as possible. In considering the possibility of the origin of 
organic life according to this rule he reveals an almost prophetic insight 
into the theory that Darwin himself was to develop as a mechanistic explanation 
of the origin of species in the next century. To quote Kant's own words, 
When we consider the agreement of so many genera of animals in a certain 
common schema, which apparently underlies not only the structure of the 
bones, but also the disposition of their remaining parts, and when we 
find here the wonderful simplicity of the original. plan, which has been 
able to produce such an immense variety of species by the shortening of 
one member and the lengthening of another, by the involution of this part 
and the evolution of that, there gleams upon the mind a ray of hope, 
however faint, that the principle of the mechanism of nature, apart from 
which there can be no natural science at all, may yet enable us to arrive 
at some explanation in the case of organic life. 2 
Here the natural scientist may, says Kant, go back as far as he can in seeking 
to trace the development of organic life according to the mechanistic principle, 
but when he has done all this he is eventually obliged to attribute to nature 
the constitution of an original organization 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 54 
2 Ibid. , 78 
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with a view to all these forms of life, for unless he does so, the 
possibility of the final form of the products of the animal and 
plant Kingdoms is quite unthinkable. 1 
This is because, in Kant's view, organized matter is qualitatively different 
from inorganic matter and cannot be explained without remainder by the 
mechanistic principle. For this reason he aligns himself with the theory of 
epigenesis as expounded by Blumenbach, because "he makes organic substance the 
starting point for physical explanations of these formations. For to suppose 
that crude matter, obeying mechanical laws, was originally its own architect, 
that life could have sprung up from the nature of what is void of life, and 
matter have adopted the form of a self-maintaining finality, he justly declares 
to be contrary to reason". 
2 
Organisms, which Kant has explained must necessarily be thought of teleologically, 
can therefore only be derived from earlier organisms; and despite the fact that 
a long and inscrutable history of development may have taken place between the 
present organism and its original form, organic substance itself must have been 
the starting point for it. A theory of the gradual change and purposive 
development of organic life from a few original forms, or from one, is, there- 
fore., perfectly compatible with Kant's understanding of teleology. But the 
development he insists must always be purposive, it cannot be accidental, or 
random, for that would result in parts of an organism being vain, or useless, 
and would contradict the fundamental principle of teleology. What Kant envisages 
is a generic development according to a certain inner necessity, or pre- 
determined pattern in the organism itself, yet one which is capable of adapting 
itself to external contingencies. 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 79 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 85 & 86 
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A theory of such development of all organic life may be "a daring venture", 
says Kant, but 
it cannot be said to be absurd, like the generatio aeguivoca, which 
means the generation of an organized being from crude inorganic matter. 
It never ceases to be generatio univoca ... it only implies the generation 
of something organic from something else that is also organic, although, 
within the class of organic beings, differing specifically from it. It 
would be as if we supposed that certain water animals transformed themselves 
by degrees into marsh animals, and from these after some generations into 
land animals. In the judgement of plain reason there is nothing a priori 
self contradictory in this. I 
Thus, because we are compelled to face the organic derivation of all organic 
forms, even if we accept the theory of development stated above, we cannot get 
2 
rid of teleology. For when the "archaeologist of nature", as Kant terms him, 
has attributed the development to the mechanical laws of nature 
he has only pushed the explanation a stage further back. He cannot 
pretend to have made the genesis of those two Kingdoms (the plant and 
animal) intelligible independently of the condition of final causes. 3 
There is, however, one reservation that Kant records regarding the theory of 
development of organic forms. Although it is "not a priori self-contradictory". 
Yet 
experience offers no example of it. On the contrary, as far as experience 
goes, all generation known to us is generatio homonyma. It is not merely 
univoca in contradistinction to generation from an unorganized substance, 
but it brings forth a product which in its very organization is of like 
kind with that which produced it, and a generatio heteronyms is not met 
with anywhere within the range of our experience. 4 
I I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 79. 
2 it first Darwin recognised the limit that this principle set upon his theory. 
He wrote in The Origin that life had been originally "breathed by the Creator 
into a few forms or into one". (Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species 
(Sixth edition), 103). By pushing back the question of 'creation', or origins 
in this way he hoped to get rid of the problem created for his theory by the 
appearance of design in organic nature. For all practical purposes this 
method was effective. Design no longer impinged upon the mind in the way 
that it had formerly done. Only a few critics observed that there must have 
been design in the original organic form or forms, but this passed largely 
unnoticed and unanswered. 
3 Ibid., 80 
4 Ibid. , footnote 
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Kant now comes to consider the whole of nature as a teleological system. This, 
he has already argued, follows from the discovery of the principle of teleological 
judgement in the investigation of organic nature. An organism is seen to possess, 
or rather we are compelled because of the constitution of the human mind to regard 
it as possessing, a certain intrinsic purposiveness in the inter-relatedness of 
its parts and their functions. An organism, as an entity, however, may also be 
regarded as possessing an extrinsic purposiveness in relation to other things 
i. e. it may subserve another as a means to an end. And 
even those things which do not possess any intrinsic finality, and 
whose possibility does not imply any, such as earth, air, water, and 
the like, may nevertheless extrinsically, that is in relation to other 
beings, be very well adapted to ends. I 
When we ask the question for what end a thing exists it may be answered in 
either of two ways. It may be said that the end for which a particular 
being 
exists is inherent in itself, in which case it is not merely an end, 
but also 
a final end; or we may say that the end for which it exists lies outside 
itself 
in other natural beings, in which case it is not itself a final end. 
But if we go through the whole of nature we do not find in it, as 
nature, any being capable of laying claim to the distinction of being 
the final end of creation. 2 
Let us suppose that the vegetable kingdom exists for the sustenance of the 
animal kingdom. :; e must then enquire: For what purpose do plant-eating animals 
exist? To which we may reply: In order to sustain flesh-eating animals. 
'Nhen 
we in turn ask, why all these preceding kingdoms exist, we may conclude 
that it 
is for man, that he is the ultimate end of creation here upon earth, because 
he 
is the only being capable of consciously formulating ends. 
I I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 86 
2 Ibid., 88 Here we need to be aware of the distinction Kant makes between a 
final end and an ultimate end. The former is unconditional, i. e., the purpose 
or end of its existence is, as he has explained, inherent 
in itself. The 
latter is an end which may be regarded as the final link in a chain of ends 
within nature itself, and therefore conditional upon it. 
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There are of course considerations that militate against this conclusion, 
such as the fact that the basal conditions of organic life, the soil, etc., 
would appear to have been produced without design, by the accidental inter- 
action of physical forces. Since these basal conditions are the foundation of 
the system, of which man is viewed as being the crown, this cannot but reflect 
adversely upon such a conclusion. However, here Kant appeals to the principle 
of teleological judgment. Although we may give the utmost scope to explanations - 
on mechanical lines, "we know we can never get home with such an explanation - 
not because there is an inherent inconsistency between the mechanical generation 
and an origin according to ends, but for subjective reasons involved in the 
particular type and limitations of our understanding". I 
Taking this into account, we have then "ample grounds" for regarding man as 
the ultimate end of nature. Not simply a physical end, such as all organized 
beings are, but the end in relation to whom all other natural things constitute 
a system of ends. 
2 
But now we must ask: ';, hat is the end in man himself which 
is intended to be promoted by his connexion with nature ? Two possible answers 
demand our consideration, they are happiness and culture. 
Happiness, Kant considers, cannot be regarded as being this end. Man is incapable 
of framing for himself a notion of what true happiness is, and even 
if he were 
"his own nature is not so constituted as to rest, or be satisfied, in any 
possession or enjoyment whatever". 
3 
But then again external nature is far 
from having made a particular favourite of man in this respect, he is subject 
to all the changes and misfortunes of the rest of the animal world, and 
there 
is the inner discord of natural tendencies that make him unhappy. 
I I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 91 
2 Ibid., 92 
3 Ibid., 93 
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It is culture which, in Kant's view, is to be regarded as the ultimate end of 
nature in respect of the human race. It is culture which affords man a relative 
freedom from the exigencies of nature itself and his own natural inclinations; 
it creates the conditions under which he may develop his humanity and produce 
an aptitude for ends of his own choosing. 
This ultimate end of nature as realized in man is to be distinguished from what 
Kant now goes on to discuss, which is the final end of creation itself. An 
ultimate end is something which is comprehended within nature, and has nature 
as its ground. "A final end is", as Kant himself defines it, "an end that does 
not require any other end as condition of its possibility". 
I 
It is to man 
regarded as noumenon that Kant turns in order to find this final end of creation. 
He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective characterization 
is nevertheless such as to enable us to recognize in him a supersensible 
faculty - his freedom - and to perceive both the law of the causality and 
the object of freedom which that faculty is able to set before itself as 
the highest end - the supreme good in the world. 2 
It is man, considered as moral agent, who is the final end of creation, for he 
alone possesses within himself, in the unconditional legislation of conscience, 
the supreme purpose of his existence. In him, therefore, the whole chain of 
mutually subordinated ends which we discover in nature finds its ultimate point 
of attachment. 
V 
Ph_ysico-Theology: The place and value of the teleological. argument for theology. 
First, Kant makes a point which is similar to that which Paley frequently 
emphasized, viz. that given a single example of design in the world we are 
compelled to go on and attribute its origin to an intelligent Creator. Kant, 
of course, qualifies his argument with the critical principle, which means 
that such a judgment is only valid subjectively. 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 98 
2 Ibid. , 99 
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Given, he says, but a single organized product of nature, then the 
structure of our cognitive faculty is such that the only source which 
we can conceive it to have is one that is a cause of nature itself - 
be it of entire nature or even only of this particular portion of it - 
and that derives from our understanding the requisite causality for 
such a product. I 
Yet although teleology can justify subjectively the conception of an intelligent 
world Cause acting designedly, from the evidence of organic nature, it can never 
become the adequate basis of a theology for two reasons. First, it is incapable 
of establishing a final end of nature, for this, as we have seen, must lie out- 
side nature. "To the last it remains nothing but a physical teleology". 
2 
Secondly, while it sets before us the notion of a supreme Artist or Architect 
of the universe, it is unable to establish anything further about the character 
of such a Cause, which would be essential to a theology. It cannot lift us above 
nature to a definite conception of such an intelligence. Here it would appear 
that Kant and Hume are at one. The teleological argument affords some conception 
of a Supreme Designer, but leaves everything else about Him in obscurity. This 
latter defect serves almost to destroy the value of the positive conclusion. 
Were the problem set in a lower key, it might prove easier to solve. If we 
were willing to rest content with the conception of a finite Deity, or Deities, 
then physical teleology would prove a sufficient basis for such a system of 
divinity; or if assuming much perfection in the attributes of the deity we 
felt entitled to take all possible perfection for granted then it might like- 
wise have important claims to being the ground of a theology. Such an assumption, 
however, can find no justification in theoretical reason, which requires that 
the cause shall not exceed the effect. 'iYhat has led natural theologians to 
espouse such conclusions is not the strict inference of the design argument, 
but the presupposition of a Supreme Being deriving from an a priori source, 
and which serves to make up its deficiencies in this respect. 
I T. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 101 
2 Ibid., 102 
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When we saw this, we should not erroneously imagine that we had 
evolved this idea, and, with it, a theology by means of the 
theoretical employment of reason in the physical cognition of the 
world - much less that we had proved its reality. 1 
Thus while physical teleology urges us to go in search of a theology it can 
never produce one itself, not even when it is helped out by ideas of pure reason, 
for nature alone cannot tell us anything about a final end of creation. 
All the ends in the world are empirically conditioned and can contain 
nothing that is absolutely good but only what is good for this or that 
purpose regarded as contingent. 2 
It is only pure reason that a priori can supply this knowledge of a final end, 
and instruct us in what attributes we are to assign to the supreme cause of 
nature and how we are to conceive its relation to nature as a teleological 
system. If this latter concept of a final end resting upon pure reason is 
removed then the basis of theology is taken away and the whole system collapses. 
Hence the a priori concept of a final end has logical priority over empirical 
arguments in the formation of a theology. This explains Kant's concluding remarks: 
Physicio-theology is a physical teleology misunderstood. It is of no 
use to theology except as a preparation, or propaedeutic, and it is 
only sufficient for this purpose when supplemented by a further 
principle on which it can rely. But it is not, as its name would 
suggest, sufficient, even as a propaedeutic, if taken by itself. 3 
vi 
We have now reviewed in this chapter the two principal philosophical critiques 
of the design argument. What of it, if anything, remains after this searching 
examination ? There are students of the subject who consider that nothing is 
left. Norman Kemp Smith, in his commentary on Hume's Dialogues, considers the 
refutation of the design argument in that work so complete that Hume is now 
seldom challenged. 
4- 
Similarly R. H. Hurlbutt regards Hume's criticism as 
totally destructive of the argument. 
', `; Then the philosophical dust has settled not only the design argument, 
but natural theology in general, is found to be completely disarmed. 5 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgment, 104 
2 Ibid. ,1 06 
3 Ibid., 108 
4 D. Hume, Dialogues, Ed. N. K. Smith, 38 
5 R. H. Hurlbutt, III. Hume. Newton and the Design ß rgument ,f 1965, 
), 
135 
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The consequences of this have taken a long time to work themselves out, but today 
no vital philosophical or theological school makes use of the design 
argument, scientific theism, or natural. theology, in any of their 
traditional senses. No modern theology or philosophy breaches the 
logical wall erected by Hume, which divides science and theology, 
reason and religion. I 
The strange thing is, honever, that despite those proclamations of total 
victory for philosophical criticism the argument from design has persisted and 
still does persist, in some form, both in theology and philosophy. F. R. Tennant 
and A. E. Taylor have both attempted reconstructions of it in the twentieth 
century. Recent criticism and assessment of the argument by Hick, Matson, 
McPherson and ^winburne also indicate that it is still a live issue both in 
theology and philosophy. Each fresh advance in thought, from Hume to Darwin, 
had been thought by some to result in the destruction of the argument, but still 
it survives; and this testifies to its remarkable resilience to which Kant, and 
even Hume who was more discerning than some of his disciples, paid tribute. 
Eighteenth century philosophical criticism of the design argument resulted in 
the destruction of the power of demonstration that was formerly considered to 
attach to it. This we recall was the object of both Kant and Hume in embarking 
upon their criticism, but it is a much more limited objective than the total 
abolition of the argument. 
In order that we might determine in what form the design argument survived the 
philosophical criticism of this period we must first recall the four main 
arguments of Hume against it, and judge their validity in the light of our 
discussion in the earlier part of this chapter; then in the second place we 
must consider and assess the significance of Kant's critique of the argument. 
R. H. Hurlbutt, III, Hume, Newton and the Design Argument, (1965), xiv. 
Another example of the supposed effect of 18th Century philosophical 
criticism of the argument from design is to be found in C. E. R ussett's 
The Reception of Darwin in America, p. 35. "Design had been moribund 
before the Origin was even written. If Darwin slew Paley, surely it 
was a corpse rather than a living, breathing body of thought that was 
delivered up to destruction. Before Paley ever wrote, the fatal blow 
had been dealt to Paley's mode of reasoning by the Philosopher 
David Hume ... Hume did more; he went on to demclish the design analogy 
itself. " 
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Hume's first point was that the analogy between the world or organisms in the 
world, and human artifacts was too weak to bear a conclusion; that if the 
analogy was to count the subject of the comparison must belong to the same 
class of objects as those of whose production by a designer we already have 
experience. But this, as we pointed out, draws the limits of analogical 
reasoning much too narrowly. There seems to be a general consensus amongst 
philosophers that this is so, and Hume himself appeared to acknowledge it. 
We may conclude, then, that analogical reasoning in the design argument is 
permissible and survives this particular attack of Hume's upon it. 
Secondly, Hume argued that to invoke intelligence as the explanation of order 
in the world was to show an unjustifiable partiality for reason when there were 
other principles, such as generation, and instinct which also were capable of 
producing the same effects. Here Hume was answered by Paley, who pointed out 
that generation is a process not a principle, and it was this very process which 
design was invoked in order to explain. 'Generation', if used as an explanation 
of the whole universe, requires redefinition, otherwise it is rendered meaning- 
less. But in any case, to explain intelligence in terms of generation, or 
instinct, is to explain the higher in terms of the lower; to turn away from 
an account of things that is 
familiar and experimentally justified to one that 
is remote. The argument, therefore, survives Hume's second main criticism. 
A. E. Taylor answers this argument by saying that were our powers so 
limited they would be confined within very narrow limits indeed, e. g. 
when we discover an artifact from some ancient civilization we may not 
know the purpose of it, but we can infer that it was constructed for a 
purpose, or better if an explorer discovers on some island an object 
revealing contrivance we may conclude that a human being had made it, 
though all the other evidence of a race of people having been there may 
have vanished. If watches -, ere forgotten about and lost to the human 
race, yet should one turn up at some future date there would be little 
difficulty in future archaeologists concluding thnnt it was a product of 
intelligence and had a designer. Does God exist ? p. 112. Cf. the 
argument that the comparison is not between sets of universes, as Hume 
supposed, but between objects demonstrating prospective contrivance. 
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In the third place, Hume advanced the doctrine of Strato, that if order in the 
material universe is explained by order in the mind of the Creator, then, in 
turn, that order itself requires explanation, and so on ad infinitum. This 
is answered in two ways; first, organization in terms of mind presents no 
problem, but organization in externally existing material, which manifests 
no properties of mind does. Therefore, to attribute the order in the world 
to the mind of a Creator does not involve one in an infinite regress. Secondly, 
the logic of the use of the word 'God' requires that we desist from further 
enquiry and explanation. To ask; tiiho made God ? is a meaningless question; 
so also is the question; 71hence arose the plan in the mind of the Creator ? 
The fourth main point of Hume's criticism was the 'Epicurean hypothesis'. 
Here he was only half in earnest. If the universe is to exist at all, it will 
have some kind of order; it is as possible that this order that obtains has 
been brought about by the chance concatenation of atoms as by a designing mind. 
in the Epicurean hypothesis one explains non-order, and even disorder, in 
exactly the same way as one explains order. Any 'hypothesis' that can be used 
with equal effectiveness to explain both 'A' and 'not-A' can provide nothing 
that one would want to call an explanation of either. It is, as Kant rightly 
pointed out, impossible to consider the teleological phenomena we encounter 
in the world purely in terms of mechanism, and the 'Epicurean hypothesis' is 
a purely mechanistic hypothesis. Such was the state of the argument at the 
time when Hume advanced it. 
our survey of Hume's main criticisms of the design argument enables us to 
adduce the reason for the argument's survival into the nineteenth century, and 
even to the present time, and that is; that the philosophical arguments urged 
against it by Hume did not 
have the force that he himself intended, and were 
not conclusive as many of his disciples have thought them to be. If this were 
not the case it would be 
difficult to explain or understand the persistence of 
the argument during the first half of the nineteenth century, not only in a 
popular form, where ignorance of Hume's critique might excuse it, but also 
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amongst the foremost scientists and theologians of that period. The names 
associated with the Bridgewater Treatises, Chalmers, Kidd, Vvhewell, Bell, 
Roget, Buckland were not those of men who were unaware of the philosophical 
criticism urged, only sixty years before, against the argument they were 
defending and illustrating. The purely philosophical critique of the 
argument had none of the force that Darwinism was to have. Looking back 
generally upon the nineteenth century, it is possible, perhaps, to confuse 
these two things, and, in the light of the subsequent confusion and uncertainty 
into which Darwinism threw the design argument, to attribute much of this to 
earlier philosophical. criticism. 
However, the design argument survived the main thrust of Hume's critique. It is 
possible in principle to argue from the evidence of order that we see in the 
world to the mind of a Creator who may be regarded as responsible for it. The 
analogy will hold even if it is not perfect. It is a reasonable and experiment- 
ally justifiable inference, and even if it does not carry us as far as we might 
wish to go, that is, to the idea of an infinite, omnipotent and omniscient 
Creator who is also perfectly good - i. e. to the God of Christian orthodoxy - 
it takes us scme way towards such a belief. The strongest point of Hume's 
criticism lies here, not in his attempt to disprove the validity of the analogy, 
but in his contention that even if it is allowed it will not take us beyond 
what is finite, and cannot of itself establish the existence of a perfectly 
good Creator. Paley recognised this. He did not regard the design argument 
as complete in itself. But the primary point is that if the validitz, of the 
analogy can be established then much can follow, even though its limitations 
are accepted. 
-94-- 
As a contemporary philosopher has put it: 
if there is a god - and the (design) argument, if it proves anything, 
proves the existence of a rather august deity - then the further 
step to the existence of God is in practice a short one, even though 
one might say that theoretically it is infinite. If there exists an 
intelligence so stupendous as to be the effective source of the whole 
organization and harmony of the universe, it would be overly nice to 
grumble that monotheism remains to be proved. I 
VII 
Ne must now turn to consider how far, and. in ,,; ht form, the design argument 
has survived Kant's critique. 
First, we notice that the important first step of the argument survives, 
i. e. the analogy between artifact and designer, and the world and a Creator. 
It is true that Kant draws attention to a difference between an artifact and 
an organism, but we are dealing with a case of resemblance not of identity, 
and they do resemble each other in that both call for a teleological explanation 
of their existence. An organism, though dissimilar in some respects to an 
artifact, cannot, any more than the latter, be considered simply in terms of 
mechanical causation. A. echanical causation is invariably progressive and 
presupposes that the effect always follows the cause. The conception of an 
organism requires that we invert this order, thr, t that which for the moment we 
designate the effect, deserves also to be called the cause of the thing of 
which it is said to be the effect. 
If it is claimed that the introduction of time into this conception simply 
serves to mystify what is otherwise straight-forward, viz. that final causes 
are no more than efficient causes acting a tergo; 
2 
that an effect in the 
future must not be understood to act upon the present, but rather a present 
idea of something in the future is a causal factor in what is decided or done 
now, it still leaves unaltered the main contention of Kant's argument which is; 
that we are forced back upon mind, upon thought, as the only adequate explanation 
of the purposive order that we discern in the universe. 
1i . I. Matson, 
The Existence of God, 89 
2 See John Laird, Theism and Cosmology, 235 
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Thus, despite the dissimilarity between organism and artifact, which is freely 
acknowledged, the analogy holds. It not merely survives the i'antian critique, 
but can be said to be positively sustained by it. AlthouLh physico-teleology 
is incapable of determining a final end of creation 
it can justify ... the conception of an intelligent world-cause as a 
conception which subjectively - that is, in relation to the nature of 
our cognitive faculty alone - is effective to explain the possibility 
of things that we can render intelligible to ourselves in the light of ends. 
The fact that Kant transposes this conclusion from the objective plane, where 
it traditionally belonged, to the subjective does present a difficulty for 
the argument from design, because now we are asserting nothing about the 
existence and character of God, but only abcut our peculiar mental constitution 
and mode of apprehending the world. There are two possible ways of approaching 
this difficulty. 
First, if, apart fror the apprehension of the phenomenal world by means of the 
categories of the understanding, man is trapped in a circle of subjectivity 
then that subjectivity must become for him 'reality'. If, as Kant argues 
it... we are utterly unable to ascribe the possibility of such physical ends to 
any other source than an intelligent Being, " and this understanding of things 
is "ineradicably fixed in the human race", even though it be 'subjective' it 
becomes the 'truth' by which man has to live, and with which he has to reckon. 
There is no other way of expressing, or making sense of, that part of our 
experience which transcends empirical reality. Such strict alsobism (as-if-ness) 
as this would be sufficient basis for a natural theology, which does not set 
out to prove or demonstrate the existence of God, but merely to point in that 
direction. If the constitution of the human mind is such that it must interpret 
organic nature teleologically, and if this interpretation leads the mind on 
towards belief in an intelligent Creator, then even though this belief is 
technically 'subjective' it nevertheless engenders an attitude of mind which 
is open to revelation and will serve as a powerful and authoritative 
confirmation of what is revealed. 
I I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgme nt, 101 & 102 
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Secondly, there is no reason ultimately why we must remain within the self- 
imposed limitations of Kant's critical philosophy. Empirical or scientific 
knowledge is not the only real knowledge we possess, nor even the paradigm of 
knowledge. This has been the fundamental mistake of the Enlightenment in 
which Kant himself shared and which he was particularly responsible for 
perpetuating. The distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds 
ultimately breaks down. Kant would put the empirical self on the same basis of 
knowledge as the empirical world of nature, yet clearly a profound distinction 
obtains between them. As A. E. Taylor points out in his discussion of this, 
the self and the subjective, i. e., personality, is not something we experience 
as we experience objects in the natural world. I do not, e. g. experience pain, 
pleasure etc., from what I see around me in other people, but only from my own 
subjective states. Yet I do not make acquaintance with these states as objects 
at all, but as attitudes of a self towards objects. Thus we have a whole realm 
of being of a different order about which we know much. 
1 
Yet the two (that is, nature and subjective awareness) are not wholly closed 
to each other;, there is interrelation between them though the one cannot 
become the other; e. g. a small fault on the retina can cause one to see double; 
also events in the physical world are influenced and acted upon by subjective 
desires, wishes, beliefs, etc. Thus it would appear that it is 
at least conceivable without any absurdity that all physical events 
have conditions, which do not themselves belong to the aggregate of 
physical events, and that what look like the res, -Its of 
'design in 
nature' really are results of design ... 
This distinction between awareness of the self and sensations, and objective 
knowledge of physical objects ma.,,. - be illustrated from three different writers. 
Others could be added: 
J. H. Newman discusses the question of memory, experience etc., in 
A Grammar of Assent, and shows that he distinguishes experience of 
consciousness from that of objects, thus: "Our consciousness of self is 
prior to all questions of trust or assent. " p. 1+7. 
Ludwig-4ittgenstein wrote in Philosophical Investigations, "It 
cannot be said that I learn that I have a pain, but that 'I have a pain'. 
I do not know it, or observe it ... pain or sensation generally does not 
belong to that logical type of thing which can be witnessed or unwitnessed 
... it p. 
89 
Richard Taylor states in Meta physics, (1963ý "The only person that can 
become aware of pain or any other state of mind or mental event is that 
person in whose mind it occurs, and his awareness of it is, of course, 
immediate. Even he cannot observe it in the same way that he observes any 
physical object, state, or change, whether in his own body or some other. " 
p. 16. 
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If we find we cannot understand this relationship 
the reason must lie in the insufficiency of the available evidence not 
in the supposed limitation of our knowledge to the establishment of 
relations between one part of nature and another part; this limitation 
is no more than a restriction on the scope of scientific knowledge and 
knowledge extends far beyond the bounds of science. 1 
It is clear that Kant's bifurcation of reality into the phenomenal (empirical) 
which may be known and the noumenal which cannot be known is inadequate, and 
breaks down. Even within his own philosophical system there is an inconsistency 
which ultimately makes it untenable. It cannot, for instance, be maintained 
that the moral self is no part of the empirical self, for I am conscious of 
myself in moral experience in just the same way as I am conscious of myself in 
any other kind of experience. 1oreover, moral experience shades into other kinds 
of experience by imperceptible degrees. To drive a wedge of absolute difference 
between moral experience and other kinds of experience, assigning them to 
different worlds and endowing them with different kinds of reality, is plainly 
incompatible with these obvious facts. 
Since, therefore, we are not bound by Kant's rigid classification of what is 
knowable and which is unknowable we may reasonably argue th. t inferences from the 
realm of the empirical may tell us something about a reality which transcends it 
and lies behind the phenomena we perceive; that what looks like the results of 
design in nature may really be the results of design. 'de are not when we make 
such statements simply saying something about the constitution and limitations 
of the human mind. This discovery should not surprise us, since our belief 
e. g. in the existence of other minds is not the result of direct empirical 
evidence, by which we become assured of the existence of objects in the natural 
world. We have no direct apprehension of a'soul substance', nor even of the 
subjective states and sensations of another person; but we understand and 
explain their actions by the use of teleological categories and by cumulative 
pragmatic verification. 
I A. E. Taylor, Does God :, xist ?, 112 & 113 
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When the negative conditions of Kant's critique are overcome, the positive 
value of it for the design argument are considerable. Its insistence upon a 
teleological as well as a mechanical account of organic nature confronts us 
with a further dimension of reality which cannot be plumbed by physics. His 
conception of nature as a 'Kingdom of ends', which results from the wider 
application of this principle to the world as a whole, and his estimation of 
man, as a moral agent, as the final end and justification of such a system 
all serve to enhance the argument. 
One of the important things which Kant did, and which helped to strengthen 
the argument, was to relate it to the moral nature of man. It is true that 
he regarded the moral proof of the existence of God as capable of a priori 
demonstration, and standing in need of no assistance from any other source. 
However, by bringing the two into conjunction and relating the notion of a 
theoretical teleology in nature to a moral teleology in man, he placed the 
design argument in its proper setting and gave it an additional strength. 
It was the weakness of Hume's discussion of the argument that it was conducted 
on purely empiricist and intellectualist terms, and that no attention was paid 
to other aspects of man's nature. This was repeated in those who attacked Hume, 
and fairly generally in the discussion of 
the subject in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. full and proper 
treatment of the design 
argument must, however, take 
these other sides of man's nature into account. 
It is something to which we shall return when we come later to the reconstruction 
of the argument. 
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The design argument survived the philosophical critique of the eighteenth 
century. But in what form did it survive, and what influence and significance 
did it have in the period preceding the publication of Charles Darwins 
Origin of Species ? 
Churchmen and theologians were content to appeal to the argument from design 
in their sermons and lectures, and employed it confidently in their apologetic 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. The Bridgewater Treatises 
are the most celebrated example of its employment during this period. The 
Right Honourable and Reverend Francis Henry, Earl of Bridgewater, who died in 
1829, left the sum of £8,000 to be held at the disposal of the President of 
the Royal Scoiety, who should appoint certain persons of his choosing to write 
and publish one thousand copies of a work, "On the Power, 'Wisdom, and Goodness 
of God, as manifested in Creation; illustrating such work by all reasonable 
arguments, as, for instance, the variety and formation of God's creatures in 
the animal, vegetable and mineral Kingdoms; the effect of digestion, and thereby 
conversion; the construction of the hand of man, and an infinite variety of 
other arguments; as also by discoveries ancient and modern, in arts, sciences, 
and the whole extent of literature". 
The President of the Royal Scoiety, Davies Gilbert, Esc}, requested the 
assistance of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London in under- 
taking this task and, acting with their advice, he appointed the following 
eight men to write separate treatises as stated below: 
(1) The Rev. Thomas Chalmers, D. D., Professor of Divinity in the University 
of Edinburgh, "On the Power, ', 9isdom and Goodness of God and manifested 
in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual 
Constitution of Man"; 
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(2) John Kidd, M. D., F. R. S., Regius Professor of Medicine in the University 
of Oxford, "On the Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical Condition 
of Man" ; 
(3) The Rev. William Whewell, PJLA., F. R. S., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, 
"Astronomy and General Physics Considered with Reference to Natural Theology"; 
(4) Sir Charles Bell, K. G. H. , P. R. S. ,L fr E. "The Hand: Its Mechanism and 
Vital Endowments as Evincing Design"; 
(5) Peter Mark Roget, M. D., Fellow of, and Secretary to, the Royal Society, 
"On Animal and Vegetable Physiology"; 
(6) The Rev. William Buckland, D. D., F. R. S., Canon of Christ Church, and 
Professor of Geology in the University of Oxford, "On Geology and Mineralogy"; 
(7) The Rev. '; ji11iam Kirby, M. A., F. R. S. "On the History, Habits and Instincts 
of Animals"; 
(8ý wi11iam Prout, M. D., F. R. S., "Chemistry, Meteorology and the Function of 
Digestion, Considered with Reference to Natural Theology". 
The more important and better known of these treatises are those by Chalmers, 
Whewell and Buckland. 
Thomas Chalmers, born in 1780 at Anstruther in Fifeshire and educated at the 
University of St. Andrews, was the foremost Scottish Divine of his time. 
Through reading Wilberforce's Practical View he became a pronounced Evangelical 
preacher. 
1 
His treatise is the most doctrinal and philosophical of the eight. 
The specialists in the different branches of science who, on the whole, 
predominated tended to concentrate more upon instances rather than arguments; 
John Kidd, who wrote 'The Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical 
Condition of Man', declared plainly in the preface that he would only unfold 
a train of facts to illustrate his thesis, but could not attempt any argument. 
1 J. Hunt, Relgious thought in the nineteenth century, 367 
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4'e shall, in view of its importance, consider Chalmers' treatise first. His 
subject is the adaptation of external nature to the moral and intellectual 
condition of man, and. he makes it clear at the outset that he is not going to 
regard external nature as simply the material universe, which would impoverish 
the argument, but as being the material universe plus the moral, intellectual 
and social milieu in which man finds himself. 
While adaptations in the material universe give evidence of the natural 
attributes of God, those of the mental and moral nature of man are best fitted 
to give proof of God's moral attributes. That the sight of distress thould be 
followed by compassion is an obvious provision of benevolence. Then there is 
the supremacy of conscience, which is a felt supremacy in everyone. Conscience 
stands as the regulator of all the other parts of man's moral nature, as 
Bishop Butler has pointed out. From this supremacy of conscience we may infer 
the righteous character of God, for would an unrighteous Being have endowed man 
with so distinct a voice on the side of righteousness ?I 
Alongside the remorse of conscience there is a physical state of disquiet and 
bitterness and a sweetness and relish accompanies virtue. Just as God has 
created a sense of hunger, and also the sweetness and palatableness of food to 
go together, so these two moral states increase the argument for an intelligent 
author of man's nature. To strengthen this argument further Chalmers appeals 
to the power and formation of habits, which serve to strengthen either virtue 
or vice in the individual, and lead finally to a state of blessedness or torment, 
which is inherent in the nature of the virtue or the vice which dominates the 
individual's life. This also points to the righteous character of God. 
Society serves to add a new dimension to what has already been shown to be 
the case with the individual. It magnifies the happiness of benevolence and the 
wretchedness of wickedness; therefore man's moral nature is adapted to society. 
1 T. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatises, 1,85 
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Insomuch, that we have only to imagine a reign of perfect virtue; and 
then, in spite of the physical ills which essentially and inevitably 
attach to our condition, we should feel as if we had approximated very 
near? y to a state of perfect enjoyment among men - or, in other words, 
that the bliss of paradise would be almost fully realized upon earth, 
were but the moral graces and charities of paradise firmly established 
there, and in full operation. 1 
Therefore, "for any aggregate of human beings to be right physically and right 
economically, it is the indispensable, while at the same time the all effectual 
condition, that they should be right morally. " 
2 
We see further remarkable adaptations of man's mental constitution to the 
physical needs of society in anger which restrains violence - sometimes a mere 
glance is sufficient - and shame which restrains licentiousness between the 
sexes. 
3 
Man's moral constitution exists prior to his own wisdom and his own 
will. For things to be so managed would have required far greater wisdom and 
understanding than we possess. 
4 
There are certain inherent principles and 
dispositions which make social and political institutions possible - the bonds 
of affection in the family, of patriotism in the nation, and the natural feeling 
of respect for rank. Those who woull break down these ties have nothing to 
replace them with, though they often enlarge upon the virtues of cosmopolitanism 
or internationalism. ,, here these schemes fail they reveal the wisdom of nature's 
God who devised other means of binding people together. 
The natural sense of property, too, has a definite role and function in society 
and the economic well-being of the nation and mankind. It is best for 
governments to work along with, rather than against, these natural tendencies 
and feelings. 
5 
The sense of property exists before the sense of justice in 
our personal development. The latter regulates it, but does not create it; it 
is my sensitivity to my own body, its pain, etc., which makes me respect that 
of others, and it is the same with property. Thus we have the 'golden rule', 
1 T. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatises, 183 
2 Ibid. , 187-8 
3 Ibid., 220 
4 Ibid. , 221. 
5 Ibid.. 256 
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and also the maxim, that we are to love others as we do ourselves. ;, 'ithout 
the love of self, and the appreciation of property rights, it would be 
impossible to love others, or respect their possessions. Justice simply acts 
upon an original affection. 'Property is theft' is, therefore, subversive 
not only of society, but of man's nature. 
1 
The tendency, specially with the fashion of 'social contract' theories, is to 
regard all these arrangements as stemming from the forethought and prospective 
contrivance of man; whereas, in truth, we must attribute them to the 
disposition of nature, or rather nature's God. 
2 
Chalmers invokes the harmony of free-trade and its resultant beneficial effects 
for the community as a whole by each one pursuing his own labour for his own 
reward, as an indication of how 'the Supreme Agent' has ordered man's motives 
for the good of society. ', i'e cannot attribute this to the organization of human 
3 
foresight and superintendence. 
When we behold the working of a complex inanimate machine and the 
usefulness of its products - we infer, from the unconsciousness of all 
its parts, that there must be a planning and presiding wisdom in the 
construction of it. The conclusion is not the less obvious, we think 
it emphatically more so, when, instead of this, we behold in one of 
the animate machines of human society, the busy world of trade, a 
beneficent result, an optimism of public and economical advantage, 
wrought out by the free movements of vast multitudes of men, not one 
of whom had the advantage of the public in all his thoughts. 1+ 
Evidence of the divine superintendence of the mechanism of trade is seen in the 
fach that wherever sobriety and virtue prevail a healthy impulse is given to 
all its movements, which reveals an inseparable connection between the moral worth 
and economic prosperity of a people. Thus if the working classes were thrifty 
they would be proof against the periods of recession of trade; if they saved 
when wages were high, they would have something for the rainy day. 
5 
1 T. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatises, 277 
2 Ibid., 279 
3 Ibid., 40 
4 Ibid., 41 
5 Ibid., 52 
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Their economic is sure to follow by successive advances in the career 
of their moral elevation; nor do we hold it impossible or even unlikely - 
that gaining, every generation, on the distance which now separates them 
from the upper classes of society, they shall, in respect both of decent 
sufficiency and dignified leisure, make perpetual approximations to the 
fellowships and enjoyments of cultivated life. 1- 
-4e see in the way in which individual and social prosperity are interrelated 
with truthfulness and morality an indication that such could not have been 
established as aspring of society by a malevolent Being. Yet all this stems 
from the concern of the individual with himself, rather than from his desire to 
further the moral purpose of society, and so points to an overall plan and design 
by God for the good of society. 
Soon after Chalmers Karl lv: arx was to propose a dialetical view of society as 
a living developing organism which owed its structure and appearance of design 
to the basic economic forces which determined and guided its formation, the 
division of labour and the emergence of classes all being brought about in 
this way. As Darwin later invoked natural selection to account for the 
appearance of design in the biological organism so Marx argued that there was 
no need to believe in a mind controlling the whole process of history, but 
that its order was attributable to the laws and forces of economic development. 
Marx's theory had the merit of drawing attention to what had been neglected, 
to the powerful influence of economic activity upon the whole of society, 
but it cannot be regarded as an exhaustive explanation of human behaviour or 
the ordering of society. The economic motive itself is not a simple motive 
and when we go behind 
it we find all sorts of complex ideas which are not 
reducible to a simple economic motive. If we consider history we find that 
there are many different motives, e. g., religious, national and lately economic, 
but we cannot say that one is more dominant than the others all the time. The 
complexity of human nature and society 
defies the reductionist theory of Marx. 
1 T. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatises, 56 
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Ideas influence events as much as events influence ideas. Chalmers could 
therefore appeal to the remarkable interaction of religious, moral and 
economic ideas and motives in the ordering and harmony of society. 
Finally, Chalmers turns to the intellectual constitution of man and its 
adaptation to the external world. This must continue to be a source of 
wonder as we ±eflect upon it. Association of ideas may account for one idea 
being followed by another idea, but not one event being followed by another 
event. He argues that expectation of such succession is there before 
experience of it: 
The child who strikes the table with a spoon for the first time, and 
is regaled with the noise, will strike it again with as confident an 
expectation of the same result, as if the succession had been familiar 
to it for years. There is the expectation before the experience of 
Nature's constancy; and still the topic of our wonder and gratitude 
is, that this instinctive and universal faith in the heart, should be 
responded to by objective nature, in one wide and universal fulfilment. 
We have an instinctive certainty of the invariableness of nature from the 
beginning -a constitutional bias coeval with the earliest dawn of the under- 
standing. 
This intuition of the mind serves to underline and establish other intuitions 
and their objective reality; intuitions which some would regard as merely 
arbitrary, but which because of this regularity can be regarded as having 
objective reality. The conformity of man's intellectual nature with external 
nature is the refutation of scepticism. 
2 
The correspondence between nature and the processes of the mind i. e. that 
from premises which rest upon observation, conclusions can be drawn which can 
be found by experiment to be confirmed by further observation, can only be 
regarded as an exquisite adaptation between the subjective and objective, 
between the mental and material systems. 
I T. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatises, 142 
2 Ibid., 1 53 
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In his concluding chapter on 'the Defects and Uses of Natural Theology' 
Chalmers argues that atheism assumes its stance, not upon the proposition 
that there is no God, for that would require evidence that God does not exist, 
and such evidence is not forthcoming, but upon the ground that the case for 
the existence of God is not proven. Atheism is, therefore, a condition of 
ignorance rather than knowledge. But, while there is a clear intellectual 
principle preventing the atheist proceeding in the direction of anti-theism there 
is another moral principle, which should compel him to entertain the question of 
the existence of God. The man who is ignorant of his benefactor should at least 
desire to know something about him. Thus, there is an et: ical consideration 
prior to the pursuit of religion or theology. 
It may be made to appear that there is an ethic connected with theology, 
which may come into play, anterior to a clear view of any of its objects. 
More especially we do not need to be sure of God, ere we ought to h«ve 
certain feelings, or at least certain aspirations towards him. For this 
purpose we do not need, fully and absolutely, to believe that God is. 
It is enough that our minds cannot fully and absolutely acquiesce in the 
position that God is not. I 
Man, therefore, is morally obliged to go in search of "that unseen benefactor, 
who, for ought I know, has ushered me into existence, and spread so glorious a 
panorama around me. 
2 " And there are many things lying on the surface of life 
which should at least give rise to certain presumptions in favour of a God. 
The curious workmanship of our frame may have a designer. The extraordinary 
conjunction of senses and external nature may have been produced b;, a Creator. 
"The prima facie evidence for a God may not be enough to decide the question; 
but it should at least decide man to entertain the question"4 ;. ". an is not to 
blame, if an atheist because of want of proof. But he is to blame, if an atheist 
because he has shut his eyes"? To reject God when he is known, and to remain 
content that he should be unknown, incur the same moral condemnation. If once 
this prior moral obligation which rests upon man, to go in quest of God, is 
recognised and acted upon, the evidence that is available in the design of the 
world is given its proper context, and acquires greater force than if it is 
viewed simply in a cold, detached and objective fashion. Anyway, such a position 
I T. Chalmers, Bridgewa-ýer Treatises, 267 2 Ibid., 3 Ibid., 268 & 269 
L Ibid., 270 5 Ibid., 272 
-107- 
is not open to man as a moral being and is a mere abstraction. 
Natural theology, then, is the response to the quest for God, it is also itself 
a part of that quest. It may not be able to answ r all the questions that it 
raises, but even if it could it does not dispense with that other, supernatural, 
theology which is founded upon the Christian revelation, for the reason that 
while natural theology may tell us of God, it does not solve the problem of 
man's relation with that God. Natural theology speaks of conscience and law 
and human disobedience, but it has no word of reconciliation. 1 
The value of Natural Theology lies in the fact that it raises questions and 
creates an interest which can only be satisfied by a supernatural theology. 
The two branches of theology are like a mould and its counterpart. Natural 
theology prompts enquiry or, if this is absent, condemns the lack of it. 
"This we hold to be the precise office of natural theology". It has been 
ca]led the basis of Christianity. This is a mistake. Christianity rests 
upon its own proper evidence. Natural theology is not the foundation of the 
edifice, "but the taper by which we grope our way to the edifice". If, 
instead of this, Christianity be made to depend upon natural theology in the 
same way as mathematical doctrines rest upon the axioms of the science, she 
becomes "weak throughout, because weak radically". 
2 
"It is not that natural 
religion is the premises and Christianity the conclusion; but it is that 
natural religion creates an appetite which it cannot quell; and he who is 
urged thereby, seeks for a rest and satisfaction which he can only obtain in 
the fulness of the Gospel. " 
3 
rye have spent sometime on Chalmers' contribution to the 3ridgewater Treatises, 
because it gives us a view of how things stood at the beginning of the nine- 
teenth century. The design argument was in good repute, and was strongly 
defended. But Chalmers' exposition of it is not a mere reiteration of Paley's; 
1 T. Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatises, 28L. 
2 Ibid., 290 
3 Ibid. 
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he carries the argument into other fields. He applies it to the moral and 
intellectual constitution of man, and even to man in his economic and political 
arrangements. The principle is the same throughout as that of Paley's natural 
theology, that is, that the arrangement of the parts in the whole is evidence 
of intelligent forethought and purposive contrivance. This, in Chalmers' view, 
is as true of the moral, intellectual and social organization of human beings 
as it is of the physical organisms which Paley studied and which he made the 
ground of his argument. Chalmers does this with remarkable clarity, occasionally 
revealing deep insights into the constitution of human nature and society, such 
as his view of the relationship of individuals to property, and the correspon- 
dence of the mind to external reality. He thus makes, wh<t was generally 
regarded as the most difficult of the subjects assigned to the writers of the 
treatises, an occasion for extending the scope of the design argument in a 
systematic way that had not previously been attempted. 
The note with which he concludes, on the uses of natural theology, is also of 
importance. He distinguishes clearly between this and supernatural theology, 
as he calls it; and also introduces a moral dimension into the argument which 
was largely absent from the debate during the eighteenth century. We have 
already drawn attention to this in our discussion of Hume and Kant. It must 
be clear that if the design argument is to be given its true force, and 
allowed to rise to its proper height, it cannot be viewed simply in intellectual- 
ist terms; it must be related to man in the wholeness of his nature, and as a 
moral agent. The merit of Chalmers' use of the argument is, that he does this, 
and relates the intellect to the will. As we can only see certain physical 
objects properly if we bring our concentration to bear upon them, so the 
significance of the evidence of design is only properly evaluated by the mind 
when there is an effort of the will preceding and accompanying it. Thus it is 
the moral state determines the intellectual. The two are integrally related 
and can only be separated by arbitrary abstraction. To overlook or forget this 
throws the argument from design into a false setting, and displays it in an 
unfavourable ligit. 
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ii 
The nearest approach to Chalmers, for sustained reasoning and original 
employment of the design argument, is made, in this series of treatises, by 
; villiam , 'hewell. ;, hewell had risen from humble origins 
(being a son of a 
carpenter in Lancaster, and intended originally himself for the same trade), 
to become Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, and successively 
Professor of N ineralogy and Moral Philosophy. The subject assigned him for 
his treatise was '.? stronomy and General Physics considered with special 
reference to Natural Theology'. 
He sees it as the task of science to revise from time to time natural, or 
physico-theology, in order to keep it up to date and correct it. Natural 
theology is not a perfect system, but is not to be despised for that reason. 
Our knowledge of nature is really our knowledge of its laws. It is a collection 
of facts governed by laws. If a man were lost in a strange country he would 
s, on be able to determine whether or not it were governed by laws, and if these 
laws were beneficial to its inhabitants. 
1 
Therefore, in the multiplicity of 
laws governing the world of nature and their complexity and interaction, we are 
able likewise to gather some impression "of adaptation, of mutual fitness, of 
preparation and completion of purpose and provision. This impression is 
suggested by the contemplation of every part of nature". However, the impression 
is something which is built up cumulatively. It cannot be conveyed in a few 
words; it calls for many examples and illustrations, and also for a serious 
and reflective mind. Here again we hear the moral note sounded, which was 
present in Chalmers' treatment. -, "le cannot expect the conviction to which the 
design argument leads to be arrived at "by a few steps of reasoning, like the 
conclusion of a geometrical proposition, or the results of an arithmetical 
calculation". 
2 
In this, Whewell has touched upon something that is of great 
importance to a proper understanding of the design argument. The ver;; word 
'argument' can, perhaps, be misleading, in the sense that he describes, so 
that it is assumed that the substance of it can be put in the form of a syllogism. 
I 7i, ; tihewell, Bridgewater Treatise, 5 
2 Ibid. , 13 
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But as Paley has pointed out, the 'argument' is essentially 'impressionistic', 
that is, by the citing of examples and illustrations an impression is made 
upon the mind. _; ven Hume, through the person of Cleanthesjecknowled-es this 
to be the case. It is not, therefore, a question of premises and conclusions, 
but of instances and intuition. 
The central part of 'ýVhewell's treatise is taken up with illustrations of his 
thesis drawn from astronomy and physics, such as the length of the year and the 
periodicity of plants and the arrangement of their internal mechanism to 
coincide with it. If it is argued, he says, that only such plants as are suited 
to this have survived, then it still does not explain the existence of the 
mechanism. "How came the function of the plants to be periodical at all ?" 
Here he develops a general argument, which we have met with before in Paley and 
also in Kant, and that is, that if organic life must be regarded as deriving 
from other organic beings, then to explain the existence of present forms by 
derivetion from earlier ones, even if they are of a different species, does not 
get rid of the question of design, but merely takes it one stage back. "Any 
supposition", he states, "that the universe has gradually approximated to that 
state of harmony among the operations of its different parts ... would make it 
necessary for the objector to assume a previous state of things preparatory to 
this perfect correspondence. , nd in this preparatory condition we should still 
be able to trace the rudiments of that harmony, for w' ich it is proposed to 
accounts so that even the most unbounded licence of hypothesis would not 
enable the opponent to obliterate the traces of an intentional adaptation of 
one part of nature to another". 
1 
ahewell adduces many examples generally of the laws governing inorganic nature - 
the atmosphere, light, heat, water, w-Ach may be regarded, in view of their 
adaptation to the needs of organic nature, as being indicative of "the most 
refined, far-seeing and far ruling contrivance". One example which still 
impresses contemporary physicists may suffice: water expands and becomes 
lighter by heat, and by reason of this law, the water in the lower parts of 
our lakes and seas is cooler than that near the surface. 
I Jý. `hewell, Bridgewater Treatise, 30 & 31 
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If this law operated without exception it would result, with the continued 
progress of cold, in the formation of ice in the bottoms of lakes and seas. 
Thus we would have a bed of ice increasing with every occasion until the whole 
was frozen, and the sun in summer would do no more than melt a small area of the 
surface. But in fact we find this law modified just at the point where its 
continued regularity would be destructive both of water and life which is 
dependent upon it. "Water contracts by the increase of cold, till we come 
near the freezing temperature; but then by a further increase of cold, it 
contracts no more, but expands till the point at which it becomes ice". 
1 
This peculiarity of the laws regulating water thus ensures an environment in 
which life is possible. But why this should be so with regard to the molecules 
of water, when it is not the case with any other fluid, is just one of those 
ultimate facts to which no explanation can be given, other than to say that 
this is the way the world is ordered. 
Whewell relates the physical creation and its maintenance by God to his moral 
governorship of the world; the physico-theological argument is not enough on 
its own. 
2 
What we see is the convergence of the physical creation and the 
moral purpose of life. 
With the material world we cannot stop. If a superior Intelligence 
have ordered and adjusted the succession of the seasons and the 
structure of the plants of the field, we must allow for more than this 
at the first sight would seem to imply. We must admit still greater 
powers, still higher wisdom for the beasts of the forest with their 
faculties; and higher wisdom still and more transcendent attributes 
for the creation of man. Ind when we reach this point, we find that 
it is not knowledge only, not power only, not foresight and beneficence 
alone, which we must attribute to the Maker of the world; but that we 
must consider him as the Author, in us, of a reverence for moral purity 
and rectitude, and if the author of such emotions in us, how can we 
conceive of Him otherwise, than that these qualities are parts of His 
nature; and that He is not only wise and great, and good, incomparably 
beyond our highest conceptions, but also conformed in his purposes to 
the rule which he thus imposes upon us, that is, Holy in the highest 
degree which we can imagine to ourselves as possible. 3 
vv. Whewell, Bridgewater Treatise, 8tß. 
2 Ibid., 253 
3 Ibid., 267 & 268 
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Finally, 'Whewell argues that order implies intelligence, because the 
conception of law is dependent upon mind. 
, 7hat we call a general 
law is, in truth, a form of expression including 
a number of facts of like kind. The facts are separate; the unity of 
view by which we associate them, the character of generalit; and of law, 
resides in those relations which are the object of the intellect. The 
law, once apprehended by us, takes in our minds the place of the facts 
themselves, and is said to govern and determine them, because it determines 
our anticipations of which they will be. But we cannot, it would seem, 
conceive a law, founded on such intelligible relations, to govern and 
determine the facts themselves, any otherwise than by supposing also an 
intelligence by which those relations are contemplated, and these 
consequences realized. eve cannot, then, represent to ourselves the 
universe governed by general laws, otherwise than by conceiving an 
intelligent and conscious Deity, by whom the laws were originally 
contemplated, established and applied. I 
In short, as it requires mind to comprehend law and order in the universe, which 
is something that transcends the facts themselves, so it requires mind to 
originate those laws in the first place. 
He reinforces this argument in an ingenious way, by an appeal to the psychology 
of the experience of discovering the laws of nature. It is akin, he says, 
to 
the experience of discovering the meaning of an unknown language. For a long 
time the letters or characters mean nothing They appear to be arbitrary marks, 
disjoined and meaningless. Then some clue to their arrangement flashes upon 
the mind and the line of letters appears to take on definite shape and 
significance. Out of an apparently meaningless 
jumble of symbols there emerges 
an ordered and intelligible communication. Here we 
have mind discovering mind. 
The step of discovering the laws of nature so much resembles this 
"that we 
cannot be surprised if those persons, 
in whose minds such a process has taken 
place, have been most ready to acknowledge 
the existence and opertion of a 
superintending 
intelligence, whose ordinances it was their employment to study". 
Kepler's outburst of praise and thanksgiving to God on understanding the solar 
system is, in the 
light of this, seen to be a proper and fitting response of 
mind to Mind, of communication of 
intelligence with Intelligence, revealed and 
discovered in the 'language' of the order and laws of nature. 
1 V. ,; hewell, Bridgewater Treatise, 300 & 301 
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Ne may here recall Paley's _; oint, that it belongs to God's omnipotence to 
have made all things, if he had so chosen, without design or contrivance, "but 
it is in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is 
seen". 
Whewell compares the difference, in its effect upon the mind, of discovering 
laws of nature inductively, and deductively working out their consequences. 
He is not surprised that those engaged in the latter branch of science are often 
less conscious of a Creator than the former. An intuition is needed by the 
discoverer to grasp the order and relate it to some model of thought. Even if 
the models are variable, yet they do refer to some objective order of phenomena. 
If it is urged against this argument, as Hume would have argued, that it requires 
a regular conjunction of law and niind in our experience for us to be able to 
arrive at the conclusion that law implies mind, V Newell replies, How do we 
know there is design even in human actions ? How do we know there are other 
minds ? Not because we have compared several causes and effects, because that 
is impossible: we only have acquaintance with our own minds; but because we 
conclude from this, and the words and actions of other people, that they are 
acting rationally, according to a purpose. 
This is not the result of reasoning: we do not infer this from any 
similar case which we have known; since we are now speaking of the 
first conception of a will and purpose different from our own. In 
arriving at such knowledge we are aided only by our own consciousness of 
what thought, purpose, will, are: and possessing this regulative principle, 
we so decypher and interpret the complex appearances which surround us, 
that we receive irresistibly the persuasion of the existence of other men, 
with thought and wi'ýl and purpose like our own. '. nd just in the same 
manner, when we examine attentively the adjustments of the parts of the 
human frame to each other and the elements, the relation and properties 
of the earth to those of its inhabitants, or of the physical and moral 
nature of man, the thought must arise and cling to our perceptions, however 
little it might be encouraged, that this system, everywhere so full of 
wonderful combinations, suited to the preservation and the well-being of 
living creatures, is also the expression of the intention, wisdom and 
goodness of a personal creator and governor. I 
I iJ. Vihewell, Bridgewater Treatise, 345 & 346 
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Tennant employs a similar line of reasoning in his reconstruction of the 
design argument, but does not acknowledge its derivation from', heýýell. He who 
denies the intuition of mind and intelligence to the order he sees in nature, 
must likewise deny it to the evidence of purposive behaviour he sees in human 
action: ergo, the atheist must also be a solipsist. 
Whewell points out how difficult it is for the atheist to avoid language which 
has a teleological significance, when speaking about nature. He shows how 
Laplace could not avoid using such expressions, and says, if 'God' is substituted 
for 'Nature' in his discourse, then we have an account of things which is 
acceptable to the theist. 
III 
The task which ', `Jilliam Buckland undertook was to show that Paley's argument 
from design had not been materially affected by the new discoveries in Geology. 
Buckland, a Canon of Christchurch, was the first Professor of Geology in the 
University of Oxford, and an international figure in this young science. His 
views on the subject might, therefore, be taken as fairly representative of the 
prevailing orthodox opinion, if not of churchmen, then of geologists at that 
time. Charles Lyell had published his first edition of The Principles of Geology 
in 1830, an epoch-making book, in which he advocated uniformitarianism in 
uncompromising terms. But this theory had not at that time gained any real 
acceptance, and it was some time before it succeeded in overthrowing the 
catastrophism to which Buckland held, and which had the seal of authority set 
upon it by Baron Cuvier. 
Paley had dealt, in his natural theology, with existing species of animals and 
plants, showing how they -r. --: re adapted to particular ends, and so demonstrating 
that there was design in their production. Now, however, geology and 
palaeontology brought to light a whole vista of ancient worlds, unknown to 
previous generations, with their strange and wonderful varieties of extinct 
plants and animals. How did the design argument stand now in the light of 
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these new discoveries ? Buckland's contention in his treatise as th t far 
from creating adverse conditions for it, the discoveries of mouern geology 
enhanced the argument. His grounds for this v, ere threefold. 
First, we see in nature the universal reign of law. . ioviever far back we go we 
find that the material substances from which the earth is made are subject to 
the same laws that prevail now. To this extent Buckland was a uniformitarian 
himself. '_-; eligion has nothing to fear from geology, he asserts, any more than 
from astronomy. ýhile geology has already proved that the world has passed 
through successive stages, and has not remained in its present form from all 
eternity, yet 
the ultimate atoms of the material elements, through whatever changes 
they may have passed, are, and ever have been, governed by laws, as 
regular and uniform, as those which hold the planets in their courses. 1 
In the "uniformity of the laws of matter and potion", which have in all ages 
regulated the mechanical and chemical forces, Buckland sees "ultimate proofs 
of method and design. " 
2 
In his penultimate chapter on "Proofs of Design in the Structure and Composition 
of Unorganized 1,: ineral Bodies", he refers again to this point. The laws 
governing the formBetion of the molecules of substances are "severely rigid", 
and the combinations and figures produced by them, f ar from indicating the 
fortuitous result of accident, are "in proportions mathematically exact". 
The atheistical theory advocated by Hume under the name of the Epicurean 
hypothesis, which assumes the eternity of matter and motion, and argues that 
all matter must of necessity have assumed some form, "and therefore, may 
fortuitously have settled into any of those under which it actually appears", 
is overthrown by the facts. For upon this supposition "vie ought to find all 
kinds of substances presented occasionally under an infinite number of external 
forms, and combined in endless varieties of indefinite proportions; 
1 , yilliam Buckland, Bridgewater Treatise, 11 
2 Ibid. , 49 
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but observation has shewn that crystalline mineral bodies occur under a fixed 
and limited number of external forms called secondary, and that these are 
constructed in a series of more simple primary forms, which are demonstrable 
by cleavage and mechanical division without any chemical analysis; the 
integrant molecules of these primar;,, forms ... are made up of ... molecules of 
the first substances obtained by chemical analysis" 
1 
The result of thus tracing back all mineral substances to their original 
condition is the discovery that the;; are regulated in their composition by 
fixed and universal laws, both mechanical and chemical, and these laws reveal 
such "subserviency of means to ends, so much harmony, and order, and methodical 
arrangement, " that we can find no reasonable explanation of it without invoking 
"the Will and Power of a Supreme Creator. " 
2 
Buckland's, first point then, is that though geology extends our conception of 
the world and the changes that have taken place in it, we find in the universal 
and unchanging sway of physical laws a proof of design. 
Secondly, he contends that geology assists the design argument because it 
furnishes a proof of the beginning of the organic world. One way, as old as 
Aristotle, of evading the conclusions of the design argument has been to assert 
that the world and its forms are eternal. He sums up this point in the words of 
his Inaugural Lecture given at Oxford some thirteen years before, in 1820. 
The consideration of the evidence afforded by geological phenomena 
may enable us to lay more securely the verb foundation of natural 
theology, inasmuch as they clearly point out to us a period antecedent 
to the habitable state of the earth, and consequently antecedent to its 
inhabitants. 'dhen our minds become thus familiarized ,; ith the idea of 
a beginning and first creation of the beings we now see around us, the 
proofs of design, which the structure of those beings affords, carry 
with them a more forcible conviction of an intelligent Creator, and 
the hypothesis of an eternal succession of causes is thus at once removed. 
ý`ie argue thus: 
it is demonstrable from geology that there was a period 
when no organic beings had existence; these organic beings must therefore 
have had a beginning subsequently to this period; and where is that 
beginning to be found but in the will and fiat of an intelligent and all- 
wise Creator ?3 
1 William Buckland, Bridgewater Treatise, 576 
2 Ibid., 578 
3ý illiam Buckland, Inaugural Lecture before the University of Oxford (1820) 
58& 59" 
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Buckland's third point i, as that geology poses no threat to the argument from 
design, since it discovers the same evidence of prospective contrivance in 
organic nature in the fossils it unearths, and therefore confirms the argument. 
Such contrivance, :. herever it is found, must be attributed to an intelligent 
Creator. Paley's argument and illustrations embraced only existing species. He 
knew little or nothing of megatheria, plesiosauri, and the multitudes of extinct 
plants and animals which formerly inhabited the world. However if the same 
purposive organizaticn can be demonstrated in the case of extinct species of 
animals, etc., as existing ones the argument remains unaltered. Buckland 
undertakes to do this in considerable detail, and the greater part of the 
Treatise is taken up with this demonstration. "I know not"; he says, "how I 
can better fulfil the object of this Treatise than by attempting to show that 
the extinct species of Animals and Vegetables which have in former Periods 
occupied our Planet afford, in their fossil remains, the same evidences of 
contrivance and design that have been shown by Ray, Derham and Paley, to pervade 
the structure of existing Genera and Species of organized Beings". 
I 
Buckland makes no original contribution to the theory of the design argument. 
He merely accepts the position outlined by Paley in the last century, and adapts 
it to the needs of his subject, showing how the new discoveries in geology do not 
materially affect the argument, but may be used as further illustrations of the 
teleological principle. 
V 
It is worth noticing briefly one other treatise, that of Sir Charles Bell, 
Professor of Surgery in the University of Edinburgh, who was given the subject 
of 'The Hand: Its Mechanism and Vital Endowments as Evincing 
Design'. The 
important point that Bell made is one that had recently arisen from the study of 
comparative anatomy, and, 
in particular, from the researches of Baron Cuvier. 
1 William Buckland, Bridgewater Treatise, 107 
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Cuvier had demonstrated that from the discovery of a single bone, it was 
possible to reconstruct in theory the whole animal, not merely its size, but 
the form and joints of its skeleton, the structure of its jaws and teeth, the 
nature of its food and digestive system. 
1 
This, at the time, was regarded as 
no less than a miracle of science. But it revealed something more, which was 
that the hand or, for that matter, the other limbs and organs of a particular 
animal, were not mere appendages, but were integrally related to the whole 
system of the body. Lamarck had assumed that it was possible for an animal to 
develop and sprout new limbs and organs in response either to internal desire or 
to outward circumstances. Bell pronounced such a theory absurd, since any organ 
or limb, must presuppose the whole arrangement of the frame and body to accomodate 
it. 
Changes, Bell acknowledged, we do observe in the conformation of animals; 
there are the changes in the human foetus during gestation; the change which 
takes place at birth to meet new conditions; but in all this development the 
changes follow a predetermined pattern and anticipate future conditions which 
the organism will meet. The same is true of the metamorphosis of larvae into 
winged insects. "Here is no budding and stretching of the organs, under the 
influence of the surrounding demands; but a change operated on all the economy, 
and prospective, that is, in reference to a condition which the creature has not 
2 
There are also the revolutions that take place in all living yet attained. " 
things during the period of their existence. ,, hat is so remarkable about this, 
is, again, the way in which it is all predetermined. The life and development 
of the plant or animal unfolds according to a particular plan which is inherent 
in the organism itself. Not only is it determined how it shall. attract matter 
and build up the complex structure of an animal body; but even the period of 
the existence of the animal is from its beginning defined. 
3 
During all the 
changes of life, the material of the body is ever new. The poet's description 
of the aged body as a ruin is a misconception. The body is ever decaying and 
ever renewing itself. "The 
difference of the activity with which this change 
I Charles Bell, Bridgewater Treatise, 90 
2 Ibid., 179 
Ibid., 182 
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in the material of the body is wrought, compared with that of a child, may be 
as a week to a day; but here is not the cause of the grey hairs, the faded 
cheek, and the feeble step. This is the stamp which the Creator has intended 
should be deciphered and interpreted. " 
1 
Bell, of course, knew nothing of the 'DNA Code' which is now a matter of 
common knowledge and helps to explain the mystery of growth and development in 
living bodies, but in its absence he had to invent and posit something similar, 
which would account for the ordered and measured progress and development of 
organisms. Therefore, instead of a 'code' he spoke of a 'stamp' impressed 
upon living things to be 'deciphered' and 'interpreted' as the life unfolds. 
The organism is not a mere aggregate of parts, to which, or from which, bits 
may be added or removed at will. 
The possession of an instrument like the hand, implies that there must 
be a great part of the organization, which strictly belongs to it, 
concealed. The hand is not a thing appended, or put on, to the body, 
like an additional movement in a, iatch; but a thousand intricate 
relations must be established throughout the whole frame in connection 
with it; not only must appropriate nerves of motion and nerves of 
sensation be supplied, and an original part in the composition of the 
brain, which shall have relation to them; but even with a_1 this super- 
added organization, the hand would lie inactive, unless a propensity 
were created to put it into operation. 2 
VI 
The Bridgewater Treatises show that the argument from design and the Paleyan 
type of natural theology still held its place, and played a dominant role in 
the theological and scientific thought of the 1830s. The men chosen for the 
production of the treatises were leaders of thought in their particular fields, 
and fully representative of the learning of the age. We may also judge the 
temper of the times from the reviews of the Bridgewater Treatises in the leading 
journals. 
1 Charles Bell, Bridgewater Treatises, 183 
2 Ibid., 254 
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The monthly Review for July 1833 carried a review of Chalmers' Treatise on the 
adaptation of external nature to the moral and intellectual constitution of man. 
The reviewer was of the opinion that Chalmers evaded the task assigned him, 
since he approached the subject from the point of view of what was external to 
the individual mind, and not what was external to the mind as such. He thought, 
too, that arguments about the air and its adaptation to the power of speech 
(which Chalmers did refer to) afford better examples of the adaptation of 
external nature to man's intellectual powers than the moral arguments that 
Chalmers employed. But the criticism is not radical. The principle of adaptation 
and the notion of design are not questioned. It is only a matter of how this may 
most effectively be illustrated and developed. 
Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise was reviewed in 1833 in the August issue of the 
Monthly Review. No adverse criticisms were made of this work. The reviewer 
spoke of the "excellent arrangement and completeness of execution". 
1 
Buckland's treatise on geology and mineralogy appeared much later than the others, 
being delayed by the difficulty of producing the coloured plates which 
illustrated it. The Edinburgh Review of 1837 carried an article on it. The 
reviewer welcomed the rejection of 'Flood geology' by Buckland, which Buckland 
had formerly held, and is amazed to think that "... it was until recently taught 
in universities and accepted by men of sound mind". He himself accepted the 
Huttonian theory of gradual change effected over long periods of time by ordinary 
natural forces such as we now witness in operation. These views had been 
objected to on religious grounds, but on the contrary, such "good and exciting 
views of the alternate decay and renovation of the earth's surface, in place of 
being opposed to any religious principle, or employed to support any sceptical 
i Monthly Review (1833) , 561 
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opinions, were increasingly urged by their author (Hutton) as the strongest 
evidences of benevolent design ... 11 
1 
The reviewer gras anxious to point out that acceptance of the Huttonian notion 
of gradualism, which was coming about as the result of Lyell's publication of 
The Principles of Geology in 1830, in no way compromised the understanding of 
design in creation, but served to enhance it. For just as Newton had shown the 
motion of the heavens to be subject to laws, which he attributed to the Creator, 
so Hutton ascribed the ordered revolutions of the earth to those laws governing 
matter, which had been established by the Creator at the beginning. 
The abandonment, therefore, by Buckland of the Mosaic deluge as the cause of 
fossiliferous strata did not imply a conflict between the scientific views he 
now held and the argument from design in creation, for he "proceeds to point out 
the evidences of design in the inorganic structures of the globe, and in the 
Gradual change in geology effected fossil remains which these strata contain". 
2 
by natural forces did not at this stage carry with it the corollary of gradual 
change by the agency of natural causes in the organic sphere. Immutability of 
species was thought perfectly compatible with the new uniformitarian geology. 
Hence the argument from design was not felt to be threatened by this profound 
change in the approach to geological science, which was taking place in the 
1830s at the time that Buckland wrote. Thus we find even here the reviewer 
upholding the general principle behind Paley's natural theology. 
3 
1 Edinburgh Review, (1837), 7. Unif ormitarian ideas in geology were favoured 
by Hutton and others because they were considered to be more in harmony 
with the concept of an ordered universe and design, than those of the 
catastrophist school, and indeed those who entertained the Biblical 
teaching of the Flood. The dominance of natural. theology and the 
argument from design at this period therefore contributed to the rise 
of the new geology of Lyell and was not absent from Darwin's thinking 
when he in turn sought to supplant creationism with 'biological 
uniformitarianism'. 
2 Ibid., 14 
3 Ibid., 27 
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The Edinburgh Review of 1834 contained a review of 'Jilliam ; vhe, vell's treatise 
on astronomy and general physics, in which the principal criticism appeared to 
be that V'hewell did not regard natural theology as a perfect system. In the 
opinion of the reviewer it was "one of unimpeachable proofs". 
1 
Natural theology, and in particular the argument from design, still enjoyed 
general acceptance at all levels of thought in the second quarter of the nine- 
teenth century and played an important role in Christian apologetic. The 
Bridgewater Treatises were written in a climate of opinion that was disposed 
to concur in their general thesis, while individuals might engage in minor 
criticisms, or adopt different methods of deploying the arguments. 
1 Edinburgh Review (1834), 427 
7 
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THECOPERNICSNR EV CLUT I ON. 
Paley's Natural Theology was based upon the assumption that species were 
immutable and had a real existence in nature, i. e. they were the result of acts 
of special creation by the Deity. The fact that species were capable of producing 
their kind naturally did not detract from the force of the argument. Even if the 
series of natural reproductions were infinite, as long as the species remained 
the same, the arrangement of the parts of an organism furnished an argument for 
prospective contrivance. It is clear that any suggestion that organisms had 
changed gradually over long periods of time so as to assume different forms, 
would if accepted, affect the terms. of the argument. 
The notion of gradual change in organisms leading to the transmutation of species 
did not first occur to Charles Darwin. Ideas of evolution had been discussed by 
Erasmus Darwin in the eighteenth century, and Lamarck and Geoffrey St. Hilaire 
in the early part of the nineteenth century, but their theories had not met with 
general acceptance because they failed to produce convincing explanations of 
how the transmutation of species might have come about. The idea of gradual 
change in the organic sphere, as the corollary of his theory of gradual change 
in the inorganic, had occurred to Charles Lye-11 as early as 1830. There are 
several indications of this in the correspondence between Charles Lyell and 
William :, hewell. 
Lyell was pleased with ? hewell's review of the first volume of The Principlss 
of Geology in the British Critic and was anxious that ghewell should also review 
volume two when it appeared. On December 4th, 1831, he wrote to ., hewell to tell 
him that the first 300 pages of volume two would be published without delay. 
7 
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Volume three was to follow in Yay 1832. He hoped that this part of the work 
would benefit from the lectures and diagrams that he would be giving and using 
at King's College, London, and also from the viva voce comment and reaction there. 
This was important to him since he intended to take up in Volume III the question 
of organic change and the origin and extinction of species which he had touched 
upon in the first volume. Thus he wrote to , 'ohewell, 
You will perceive that I have tried to leave the reader in suspense 
about the whole thing of successive creation. No doubt I have let 
out my opinion, because from having him familiar with all the evidence 
I cannot help having one which I expect to establish. 
But I think it will relieve you of one great difficulty to say that as 
the question of 'whether org beings have come gradually or in batches' 
is confessedly one to be decided on geological evidence it is premature 
to discuss it in a review of the recent epoch phenomena. I have been 
anxious not to father them at first, and for fear of their gibbing I 
wished to keep back the theory which I believe to flow irresistibly 
from the facts now established by the succession of species in the 
fossils of the tertiary strata. Say nothing about this not coming 
out. I shall take a wicked pleasure in surprising some of our geological 
procrastinators. I 
There are several things here which suggest that Lyell as early as 1830 enter- 
tained a theory of the gradual organic change in nature i) He had deliberately 
left the issue unresolved in volumes one and two, but having put his readers in 
possession of all the evidence for gradual change in the inorganic world, it 
will appear that he must have a correlative theory for the living world. 
ii) Any such theory, he stated, must be decided by the geological evidence, 
but would seem to flow irresistibly from the facts relating to the succession 
of species in the fossils of the tertiary strata and their similarity to extant 
organisms. iii) For fear of 'them', possibly the public, but more likely the 
scientific establishment, 'gibbing', he had decided to keep back the theory, 
and enjoined secrecy on , hewell, but clearly intended at a later time to reveal 
his ideas and surprise the geological world. 
I -i hewell Collection of Papers. 
7 
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L. G. tiryi1son in his discussion of Lyellts treatment of this subject in the 
second volume of The Principles states: 
There is a sense of anticlimax The reader has been led to see 
species as a totality of real entities, jostling one another for 
living space on the earth's surface. He has been shown that the 
continued life of a species of plant or animal depends not only on 
the continuance of a certain set of physical conditions, but also on 
the maintenance of a delicate balance in its interactions with 
numerous neighbouring species; that the conditions necessary for any 
one species cannot be maintained for long in the course of geological 
time; and that as a result species are becoming extinct. But, as to 
the source of new species to replace those extinguished or the question 
of the first origin of this extinct species, which must have had a 
beginning, as surely as it now has an end - with these questions the 
reader is left entirely in suspense. 1 
In Volume I of The Principles there are several strong suggestions that changes 
in the animal and vegetable world were conformable to analogy, and preserved 
the chain of induction unbroken as much as change in the inorganic world did. 
For example, under the sub-heading, 'How the facts may be explained by assuming 
a uniform series of changes', he argued, 
The readiest way, perhaps, of persuading the reader that we may dispense 
with great and sudden revolutions in the geological order of events, is 
by showing him how a regular and uninterrupted series of changes in the 
animate and inanimate world, may give rise to such breaks of sequence, 
and such unconformability of stratified rocks, as we usually thought to 
imply convulsions and catastrophes ... the order of events thus assumed 
to occur ... must 
be ... in accordance with the changes observed by mace 
to be going on in the living as well as the inorganic creation. 2 
My italics) 
In conclusion he stated 
It appears that, in going back from the recent to the Eocene period, we 
are carried by many successive steps from the fauna now contemporary with 
man to an assemblage of fossil species wholly different from those now 
living. In this retrospect we have not yet succeeded in tracing back a 
perfect transition from the recent to an extinct fauna; but there are 
usually so many species in common to the groups which stand next in 
succession as to show that there is no great chasm, no signs of a crisis 
when one class of organic beings was annihilated to give place suddenly 
to another. This analogy, therefore, derived from a period of the earth's 
history which can best be compared with the present state of things, and 
more thoroughly investigated than any other, leads to the conclusion that 
the extinction and creation of species, has been and is the result of a 
slow and gradual change in the organic world. 3 
I L. G. JJ, ilson, Chas Lyell, The Years to 1841 , 339 
2 Charles Lyell, The Principles of Geology, Vol. I. , 175 
3 Ibid., 179 &, 180 
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Surprise has beer expressed by a number of people the t Lyell did not trace 
out what appeared to them to be the implications of his theory for the organic 
world. T. N. Huxley wrote in 1887, 
I have recently read afresh the first edition of The Principles of Geology, 
and when I consider that this remarkable boob. had been nearly thirty years in 
everybody's 'r-, ands, and that it brings home to any readers of ord;. r., ry 
intelligence a great principle and a great fact - the principle that i. he 
past must be explained by the present, unless good cause can be shown to 
the contrary; and the fact, that, so far as our knowledge of the rast 
history of life on cur glebe goes, nc such cause can be shown -I cannot 
but believe that Lyell, for others, as for myself, was the chief agent in 
sircothing the path for Darwin. For consistent uniformitarianism ; ostulates 
evolution as much in the organic as in the inorganic i; orld. The origin of 
a new species by other than ordinary. agencies would be a vastly greater 
'catastrophe' than any of those which Lyell successfu; ly eliminated from 
sober geological thought. 1 
H. C. , `, 'eston wrote 
to Charles Darwin on 21 Nov., 1859, shortly after the 
publication of The Origin of Species, 
Now these novel views are brought fairly before the scientific public, 
it seems truly remarkable how so many of them could have failed to see 
the right road sooner. How could Sir C. Lyell, for instance, for thirty 
years read, write and think about the subject of species and their 
succession, and yet constantly look down the wrong road ?2 
A. O. Lovejoy considers it psychologically an "odd fact" that Lyell was honestly 
able to combine "zealous uniformitarianism with an equally zealous anti- 
evolutionism", but this he attributes to Lyell being blind to the implications 
of his own theory. "Lyell in 180 and for t hree decades thereafter was unable 
to recognise any such logical relation between uniformitarianism and the theory 
of organic evolution. The former did not appear to him to lend. any support 
3 
whatever to the latter". 
professor J. ', d. Judd who though a much younger man, was a close friend and 
admirer of Lyell, considers that Lyell had a theory of evolution which he held 
back for fear of the consequences. In his book, The Coming of Evolution 
published in 1910, Judd states that from 1830 on Lyell was "convinced of the 
truth of the evolution of species" and "from the first he had seen that it 
1 Life & Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol II, 190 
2 Ibid. , Vol II , 227 
3 B. Glass (ed) Forerunners of Darwin, 367 
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would be impossible to avoid the conclusion that the principles which he was 
advancing with respect to the inorganic world must be equallýT applicable to 
the organic world. Lt first he only designed to touch lightly on this subject, 
in the concluding chapters of the first volume of The Principles and to devote 
the second volume to the application of his principles to the interpretation of 
the geological record. He, however, found it impossible to include the chapters 
on the changes in the organic world in the first volume, and then decided to 
make them the opening portion of the second volume". Judd adds, "... his intense 
interest in this part of his work is shown by his remark, 'If I have succeeded 
so well with inanimate matter, surely I shall make a lively thing when I have 
chiefly to talk of living things"'. 1 
Judd is of the opinion that Lyell held back his views on organic change because 
hu was anxious not to arouse theological and scientific prejudice. It is clear 
from Lyell's correspondence with Scrope and others that he shows a certain 
innate caution in dealing with these subjects and that in fact he did withhold 
ideas and facts because of their possible impact and repercussions. On June 14, 
1830 he wrote to Scrope, who had reviewed in the Quarterly the first volume of 
The Principles, 
If I have said more then some will like, yet I give you my word that 
full half of my history and comments was cut out, and even many facts; 
because either I or Stokes or Broderip, felt that it was anticipating 
twenty or thirty years of the march of honest feeling to declare it 
undisguisedly". 2 
He also wrote to his father prior to the publication of the first volume of 
The Principles, 
I have gone over my first chapters and I think I have cut out all that 
any Bishop could object to so that if I was ever a candidate for a 
King's College Professorship I might send my book to Joshua , °I; atson. 
But it will be difficult, I think, to state the facts and not endanger 
the popularity of a subject which the world can well do without. 3 
I T. 0ý . Judd, 
The Coming of Evolution, 64- & 65 
2 L. G. V'ilson, Charles Lyell, The Years to 1841 , 277 
3 Ibid., 268 
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Lyell then had something to hide, but Judd's assertion that what he held back 
was a theory of evolution is difficult to reconcile with the fact that Lyell 
did not merely remain silent about this matter but actually argued against 
evolution and for the fixity of species in the third volume of The Principles. 
Professor "ý. Hooykaas, in his book The Principle of Uniformity, argues that Lyel7's 
uniformitarian geology was logically compatible with his position on the 
immutability of species. Huxley and others viere wrong in believing that "consistent 
uniformitarianism postulates evolution as much in the organic as in the inorganic 
world". Hooykaas maintains that "Lyell's conception of a rather monotonous, 
almost a-historic existence of the earth did not favour evolutionary ideas ... 
If changes in the earth, as Lyell conceived them, caused corresponding changes 
in the organic world, the result would not be biological evolution, but random 
fluctuations: the consequences of the reactions of animals to their environment 
could be progressive as ;, eLl as retrograde ... " 
1 
The idea of evolution in terms 
of progressive development from the simple to the more complex, from the lower 
to the higher forms, is not implicit in uniformitarianism. This, Hooykaas 
argues, is the connection between Lyell's geology and his insistence in the 
third volume of The Principles upon the permanence of species. 
chat it would appe". r Lyell had in mind with regard to the organic world was 
the replacement of one animal population by another closely resembling it and 
that these were connected by descent rather than miraculous intervention. It 
was the allusion to the introduction of such populations by natural rather than 
supernatural means which Lyell feared might arouse opposition. He refers to 
this fe,. r some years later in a letter to ": lhewell, "You remember what Herschel 
said in his letter to me, which ; you read. If I had stated as plainly as he had 
done the possibility of the introduction or origination of fresh species being 
a natural in contradistinction to a miraculous process I should have raised a 
host of prejudices against me ... "2 
I R. Hooykaas, The Principle of Uniformity, 94 
2 Whewell Collection of Papers, Add. 1'. s. a 208128 9 
s 
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The actual words of Herschel's letter to Lyell dated Feb 20th, 1836 were: 
Many will doubtless think your speculations too bold, but it is as 
well to face the difficulty at once ... ie are led, by all analogy, 
to suppose that the Creator] operates through a series of inter- 
mediate causes, and that in consequence the origination of fresh 
species, could it ever come under our cognisance, would be found 
to be a natural in contradistinction to a miraculous process - 
although we perceive no indications of any process actually in 
progress which is likely to issue in such a result. I 
Thus Paley's rather rigid view of species as each, with all its particular 
adaptations to its environment, having been created in that form originally 
and having remained the same ever since, was being c-allenged by the new 
climate of thought that was emerging during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. It was not an open or explicit challenge. Lyell's views were not 
evolutionary as Darwin's were later, but there was a , -rowing awareness at this 
period of a chain of induction in the organic as well as the inorganic sphere; 
a growing conviction that animal populations were replaced by natural rather 
than supernatural means, which led to belief in a nexus of living things and in 
a certain plasticity in nature. 
This seems to be what Darwin meant when later he wrote, "I always feel as if my 
books come half out of Lyell's brain ... for I have alvays thought the great 
merit of The Principles was thFt it altered the whole tone of one's mind, and 
therefore that, when seeing a thing never seen by Lye]l, one yet saw it 
partially through his eyes". 2 
II 
The 'Vestiges' 
The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation published anonymously in 1844 
was the catalyst of the period between Paley and Darwin, and focussed opinion 
upon the issues that had been raised b: geology and palaeontology 
in the first 
half of the century. The author possessed none of the scientific spirit with 
which Lyell had approached his task. He was not influenced by the philosophy 
of uniformitarianism in the formation of 
his ideas. His main thesis was 
progressive development, which 
he derived rather from the opposite school of 
I C. Babbage, The Ninth Bridgewater 't'reatise. A Fragment (Second ^d: 1838) , 226-7 
2 More Letters of Charles Darwin, Vol II , 117 
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catastrophism. It was Buckland, Cuvier and Sedgwick who maintained a 
progressive development in geology and palaeontology, though each successive 
period was separated from that which : -; ent before by paroxysms and breaks in the 
sequence. The author of the Vestiges wished to discard the idea of discontinuity, 
but retain the notion of progression in the organic world. 
The idea of the progressive development of the organic world had become 
associated with the catastrophist school early in the century, and it was claimed 
by its exponents to be the result of inductive reasoning, i. e. a devel, pment was 
observed in the fossils of the different strata the higher and more complex forms 
being situated above the lower and simpler. The claim, however, that the theory 
was based upon induction was not left unchallenged. Hugh ? Filler in his paper, 
"The Development Hypothesis in its Embryonic State: older than its alleged 
foundation", argued that in fact in the histor:; of ideas the opposite was true. 
The theory of development of the Vestiges could not be compared, as its author 
would like it to be, with the theory of the solar system discovered by Galileo. 
The latter theory: was the result of inductive reasoning, for it did not exist 
before: the former theory antedated the discovery of the facts of geology and 
palaeontology. "It existed as a v. ild dream ere Geology had any being as a 
science. It was an antecedent, not a consequent -a starting assumption, not a 
result. No one will contend that Maillet was a geologist. Geology had no place 
among the sciences in the age in which he lived, and even no name. r. nd yet there 
is a translation of his Telliamed now lying before me, bearing date 1 7' 0, in 
which I find very nearly the same account given of the origin of animels and 
1 
plants as that in the Vestiges ... " 
The principal criticism of the Vestiges was that it was a web of speculation 
without the support of any true science. 
I Hugh r"i11er, Foot-prints of the Creator, 257-9 
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darn Sedgwick in the Edinburgh Review for July 1845 stated, 
1.11 in the book is shallow and all is at second hand ... we venture to effir: ý th'_t no man ; illo has any name in science, properly so called, 
whether derived from profounc stud;,, or original labour in the field, 
has spoken well of the book, or regarded it ;; pith any feelings but those 
of deep aversion. 'e say this advisedly after exchanging thoughts wn_th 
some of the best informed men in Pritain. The public ti; '^o are not able 
to judge from their own kcnosiledge must therefore be plainly told, the t 
the philosophy of the author is borrowed from a false anc shallow school: 
and that the consequences he draws from it, so far as they are new in idie 
scientific literature of our country, are nothing better than mischievous 
and anti-social nonsense .1 
There is a difference between the rash conclusions and the extravagant analogies 
to which the author of the Vestiges was given, and the sober method of inductive 
reasoning which oroceeds step by step. On most counts, but specially that of 
palaeontology, the author of the Vestiges was accused of rearranging the 
empirical evidence to suit the hypothesis of development. "And in the name of 
common sense, what is this, but to shuffle nature's cards so as to pla with 
them a cheating game ?"2 The whole drift of the Vestiges ran counter to "the 
right principles of physical reasoning, which cannot be too often brought before 
the mind. As a_. 1 our exact knowledge of the 'celestial mechanics' is derived 
from our previous knowledge of the laws of matter studied on the earth, so all 
our exact knowledge of the organic laws of the old world can only be learnt from 
a study of the organic phenomena of living nature. 'ý; ith such phenomena we must 
begin or we have no philosophical starting point. If we desert this' sober 
method, e are only playing among the crazy systems of the philosophers, or men 
who falsely pass under that sacred name. " 3 Chambers left himself open to such 
attack because he shrugged off the difficulty that organisms showed no tendency 
to produce new species in the historical period by saying that development had 
ceased since ancient times. 
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine for April 1845 commends the intention of the 
author "to collect and arrange whatever hints or fragments of knowledge science 
affords, enabling us to bring the successive phenomena of creation under the 
formula of general laws ... But unfortunately what the author has collated as 
I Edinburgh Reviere, (July 181+5), p. 3 
2 Ibid., 41 
3 Ibid., 50 
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the results of science are, in some instances, little else than the wild 
guess-work of speculation ... 11 
1 
The North British Review for 1845 regarded the book as "lacking all scientific 
knowledge and experience" 
2, 
and Hugh Miller accused Chambers in the Sequel to 
the Vestiges of "... appealing from science to the want of it,, 
3 
when Chambers 
argued that although "nearly all the scientific men are opposed to the theory 
of the Vestiges" this in truth counted for very little, since the narrowness of 
each scientists' limited field made it impossible for him to appreciate the 
breadth of his (Chambers') theory. 
The Vestiges was widely considered to be a highly speculative and, at times, 
farcical attempt to put before the public a comprehensive theory of development. 
His reference to the experiments of Mr. Crosse and Mr. weekes in the spontaneous 
generation of acari involved him in patent absurdities. As one reviewer pointed 
out, if this were indeed the case then his theory of development was at an end, 
"... for these were not monads ... but they belonged to the highest tý-pe of 
articulata. If Mr. Crosse did witness the creation of an acarus, then he 
witnessed an act of special creation, and the author's law of organic development 
is at an end". 
4 
The development theory was rejected not primarily on theological, but on 
scientific grounds. It was scientific arguments that were chiefly brought 
against the speculations of Chambers. The book was said to be based upon 
a priori reasoning; it proceeded with an unsupported hypothesis rather than 
step by step inductive argument. The chief scientific arguments urged against 
Chambers were in the fields of palaeontology and embryology. 
I Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, April 1845,449 
2 North British Review, (, '1 81+5,507 
3 Hugh Miller, Footprints, 262 
4 British Quarter Review, (1845), 531 
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Those from palaeontology stressed i) The discontinuity between fossil species, 
and the absence of intermediate or "ambiguous" forms. ii) The lowest forms are 
not necessarily found in the lowest strata, and the more complicated in the 
higher in a naturally ascending scale. Nature, Sedgwick wrote, "refuses to 
work at our dictation. ,, e are 
describing phenomena that we have seen. '. e have 
spent years of active life among these ancient strata, looking for (and we 
might say longing for) some arrangement of the fossils which might fall in with 
our preconceived notions of a natural ascending scale. But we have looked in 
vain ... 
"I 
These arguments were supported by the highest scientific authorities of the age. 
Professor Owen, the great anatomist, was appealed to, "Does the hypothesis of 
the transmutation of species afford any explanation of these surprising phenomena 
Do the speculations of Y aillet, Lamarck and Geoffrey derive any support from 
this department of palaeontology ? He (Owen) answers the question in the 
negative by a rigid appeal to facts and anatomical conditions, and he tells us 
that a slight survey of organic remains might serve to support these views. " 
2 
3 
"Geology offers one firm cumulative argument against the hypothesis of development" 
The argument from embryology which was opposed to that of' Chambers' theory, was 
that true foetal development did not reflect the superficial and ideal 
resemblance which Chambers supposed it to have to the development of all life on 
the planet. First, several important stages in that development which are 
supposed to have taken place are missed out altogether in the development of the 
human embryo. "It does not pass through successive stages of a polygastic 
animalcule, a sponge, a polyp, a mollusk, an insect, and so on - the ova of the 
mammalia are from the beginning vertebrate ova, and they do not pass through 
stages having the characteristics of animals belonging to the invertebrate class" 
1 Edinburgh Review, (1 845), 30 & 31 
2 Ibid. , 
58 
3 Ibid., 62 
4 British Quarterly Review, (1845), 504. 
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In the second place, Chambers' view that the development of the foetus through 
successive stages and its final form are determined by the period of gestation, 
and that prolonged gestation might yet result in higher forms of life were 
contrary to the laws of foetal development. "-, 'fie cannot", says the Edinburgh 
Review "hatch a rat from a goose's egg, because all the organic membranes evolved 
during the process have a prospective reference to the ultimate form of a bird, 
and it is physically impossible, if they be not fatally interrupted, that they 
should be anything'else, for the end is involved by strict anatomical necessity 
in the previous conditions of the organic membrane". 
1 
Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Yfag azine made the same point. "If it is to be a mammal it must be fashioned 
2 
accordingly from the very beginning". This was the position that microscopic 
research upheld. 
These arguments similarly derived from high scientific authority. The greatest 
embryologist of the age had declared himself on this subject. Karl Ernst von laer 
had written in 1828 in the first volume of Uber ý, ntwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere 
"The embryo of the vertebrate animal is from the verb- first a vertebrate animal, 
and at no time agrees with an invertebrate animal. .' permanent animal 
form, 
however, which exhibits the vertebrate type, and yet possesses so slight a 
histological and morphological differentiation as the embryos of the Vertebrata, 
is unknown. Therefore, the embryos of the Vertebrata pass in the course of 
3 
their development through no (known) permanent forms of animals whatsoever". 
It would appear that the main attack upon the Vestiges came from scientific 
rather than theological sources for two reasons. In the first place, 
this was 
considered to be a straight-forward scientific question. Could the development 
hypothesis be supported by sound scientific arguments ? The whole tenor of 
scientific thought at that time seemed to militate against 
it. The best 
scientists and the strongest empirical arguments viere opposed to 
it. 
1 Edinburgh Review, 18451 76 
2 Blackwood's Edinburgh T, lagazine,! 1845', 456 
3 L. Henfre. y and T. 1. Huxley , Scientific h'emoirs - Natural History (1853 , 
210 
Translation by Huxley from von Baer. 
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In the second place, Chambers had himself aale o attack upon natural theology, 
and in particular had not set himself to oppose design in creation, but rather 
uphold it. He made explicit and approving reference to the PridEe,,, ter Treatises 
which, he declared, "... place the subject (of design in so clear a licht that 
the general postulate ma; / be taken for granted". 
I 
It has been one of the most agreeable tasks of modern science to trace 
the wonderfully exact adaptations of the organization of animal:., to the 
physical circtunstances amidst which they are destined to 'ive. From 
the mandibles of insects to the hand of 1-. an, all is seen to be in the 
host harmonious relation to the things of the out-aard world, thus clearly 
proving th-t design presided in the creation of the whole - iiesign again 
implying a designer, another word for a Creator .2 
He thus endorses, cespite the novelty of his theory of development, the main 
argument of Paley's Natural Theology. And in view of the important place natural 
theology held in the scheme of religion at that per'od this no doubt shielded hin, 
from a great deal of criticism. 
But more than this, Chambers sincerely believed th-t by expounding his theory of 
development he could place the concept of design and purpose in nature upon an 
even firmer footing. The development of the organic world, in his view, as 
indeed of the whole creation, was simpl; - the working out of the archetypal plan 
in the mind of the C_'ea. tor, but the implementation of it must be underst-od in 
terms of natura] laws laid down by the Creator at the beginning. This idea about 
how the Deity worked, was more in keeping, he believed, with the true conception 
of the greatness of God, than the anthropomorphism of those who attributed every 
special creation to his personal intervention. His contention was thrt as law 
prevails in the inorganic world and is responsible for the development of the 
material universe, so it must also be regarded as obtaining in the development 
and emergence of species in the organic world. "The Eternal One has arranged 
everything beforehand and trusted all to the operation of the laws of his 
3 
appointment, himself being ever present in all things". This did not rule 
1 The Vestiges of Creation, 18li4h (published anonymously, but later attributed 
to R. Chambers), 325 
2 Ibid., 324 
3 Ibid., 1 83 
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out design, but on the contrary, regarded it as being inherent in the structure 
of the universe and its laws from the beginning; each development of the organic 
and inorganic world having been planned and provided for from the first. 
Chambers rejected Lamarckism, 
I 
Such a regularity in the structure, as we call it, of the classification 
of animals as is shown in their system, is totally irreconcilable with 
the idea of form going on to form merely as needs and wishes in the animals 2 themselves dictated. Had such been the case all would have been irregular. 
But the whole plan of being is as symmetrical es the plan of a house, or the 
laying out of an old fashioned garden ; This must needs have been 
devised and arranged for beforehand. And what a preconception and fore- 
thought have we here 1 Let us only for a moment consider how various are 
the external physical conditions in which animals live - climate, soil, 
temperature, land, water, air - the peculiarities of food and the various 
ways in which it is to be sought, and the peculiar circumstances in which 
the business of reproduction and the care-taking of the young are to be 
attended to - all these required to be taken into account, and thousands 
of animals were to be formed suitable in organization and mental character 
for the concerns they were to have with these various conditions and 
circumstances -I say, only consider these things, and we shall see that 
the decreeing of laws about the whole was an act involving such a degree 
of wisdom and device as we only can attribute adoringly to the Eternal 
and Unchangeable .3 
Thus he thought to enhance our conception of God by attributing all to an 
original decree of the Deity, instead of to special acts of creation. In fact 
the wisdom and forethought of God are no greater, because the whole structure 
of the universe is considered to be contained in one primary decree, rather 
than in successive and specific acts of creation. If the whole is to cohere 
and each part relate to the others in the way that Chambers states, the mode 
of operation is really irrelevant to the degree of wisdom and forethought 
Chambers in the Vestiges is very dependent upon Geoffrey St. Hilaire 
especially in his embryology, which is supposed to reflect the 
chronological development of species. He rejects Lamarck and at first 
attributes organic changes exclusively to external circumstances. Later 
he comes to disavow this, and argues that it must be attributable to 
some organic law itself. He posits an 'inherent impulse of life', not 
realizing that this is the heart of the Lamarckian system. He believes 
that Lamarck's theory is development by 'the wants of the animals' and 
the force of external circumstances. 
See R. Hooykaas The Principle of Uniformity, 91 & 92 
2 , "; illiam Paley put forward exactly the same argument regarding the 
regularity of organic nature to controvert the notion of random evolution. 
(see Ch. I, pZT of this thesis). 
3 The Vestiges of Creation, 232 & 233. 
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necessary to its conception. Therefore, there is in principle no difference 
between the understanding of design in the universe that we find in Paley and 
that of the Vestiges. Chambers was trrubled by the feeling that it was unworthy 
to think of the Deity as soiling his hands, as it were, with specific acts of 
creation. This was altogether unfitting and anthropomorphic. Some way must be 
found by which the Deity may be lifted above such paltry interventions. 
We meet with the same deistic spirit in Darwin and, in fact, it is worth 
comparing the two passages, one from the Vestiges, published in 1841+, and the 
other from Darwin's second sketch of the Origin, written in 1844, in which these 
views are expressed. 
How can we suppose that the august Being who brought all these countless 
worlds into form by the simple establishment of a natural principle 
flowing from his mind was to interfere personally and specially on every 
occasion when a new shell fish or reptile was to e ushered into 
existence on one of these worlds. (The Vestiges) 
And then Darwin's view, 
It accords with that we know of the laws impressed by the Creator on 
matter that the production and extinction of forms should, like the 
birth and death of individuals, be the result of secondary means. It 
is derogatory that the Creator of countless universes should have made 
by individual acts of his will the myriads of creeping parasites and 
worms. (Darwin's Essay 1814) 2 
The argument from design was not overtly threatened by the publication of the 
Vestiges. Design was, according to Chambers, inherent in the principle that 
flowed from the mind of the Creator. He took a Deistic view of the subject, 
as opposed to the theistic view of Paley and the authors of the Bridgewater 
Treatises. But he upheld the notion of prevenient wisdom and prospective 
contrivance in the creation and structure of the world and the vegetable and 
animal life that dwelt upon it. This would appear to account for the fact 
that the attack upon the Vestiges derived more from science than theology. 
I The Vestiges of Creation, 154 
2 The Foundation of the Origin of Species, Ed. Francis Darwin, (1909; 253 & 254 
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There was some uneasiness, however about the tendency to subsume everything 
under natural laws, even if these laws were ultimately attributed to an all-wise 
Creator. It had the effect of making Gcd very remote from the world in the 
minds of people; so remote that ý_t could be said to be a matter of indifference 
whether he was mentioned at all. Thus one reviewer suggested that the Vestiges 
heralded "infidel times", 
I 
and another, conscious of the tension created by 
Chambers' insistence upon a final cause and yet his desire to explain every- 
thing in terms of natural law, says, "that while he tries to set up a system 
which destroys all semblance of any 'final cause"', he also wants to be regarded 
as "a good theist". 
2 
But Chambers' theory of development, in accepting positively the notion of 
design in creation, was very different from the theory of transmutation which 
was to follow in The Origin of Species and must have done something to predispose 
the public to regard the hypothesis as not incompatible with religious 
convictions, though of a deistic kind. The work was very popular with the 
public at large, but not with scientific men. Darwin said later of the 
Vestiges, "In my opinion it has done excellent service in this country in 
calling attention to the subject, in removing prejudice, and in thus preparing 
the way for the reception of analogous views. " 
3 
1 North British Review, (May-August 1845,471 
2 Edinburgh Review, (18145), 11 & 12 
3 J. '? l. Judd, The Coming of Evolution, 94 
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5 
THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF DARWIN'S THEORY OF EVOLUTION 
CCNSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE DESIGN ARGUMENT. 
A. O. Lovejoy in a paper entitled, "The Argument for Organic Evolution before 
the Origin of Species 1830 - 1858, " puts forward the view that all the principal 
arguments that were employed by Darwin and the advocates of evolution after 1859 
were known to, and employed by, the much abused author of the Vestiges in 1845. 
"... both in its defensive and offensive side, the logical status of the argument 
was the same before and after the publication of Darwin's great work. Not only 
were the indisputable relevant facts most favourable to the evolutionist theory 
already sufficiently proved, most of them before 1844; but also the a,, -parent 
gaps or flaws in the evidence, which could be plausibly exhibited by the opponents 
of the theory during the fifteen years preceding the appearance of the 'Origin of 
Species', were not removed in 1859 nor for a number of years thereafter. Whatever 
force the arguments for the transformist conception had after that year, they had 
before it, and whatever weakness they had before it, they still had after it. " 
If this is true, then we must look for reasons, other than purely scientific ones, 
for the success of the Darwinian hypothesis, and its general acceptance after 
1859. T. H. Huxley has himself suggested that there is an air of mystery 
surrounding the subject of the acceptance of evolution. In his essay, On the 
Reception of the Origin of Species, written'some thirty years after the event, 
he asks, 111,7hat then are the causes which led instructed and fair-judging men of 
that day to arrive at a judgment so different from that which seems just and fair 
to those who follow them? That is really one of the most interesting of all 
questions connected with the history of science. " 
2 
An attempt to answer this 
question will give us a clearer conception of the real philosophical character 
of Darwin's argument. 
I B. Glass (ed. 
), Forerunners of Darwin, 380. Cf. Appendix 1. 
2 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Ed. Francis Darwin, Vol. II, p. 187 
Lovejoy is not alone in asserting that all the principal facts relating to the 
theory of the transmutation of species were well known before the advent of 
Darwin's main work. Ernst Krause, biographer of Charles Darwin's grandfather, 
Erasmus Darwin, has written, "One must confess that on the whole the Origin of 
Species hardly adds anything more to what has been expressed before". 
1 
Vany of Darwin's contemporaries also considered that his book added little that 
was new in the way of facts to the speculation about the transmutation of species. 
The Edinburgh Review for April 1860 carried an article by Richard Owen, the 
leading anatomist of the age, which was severely critical of Darwin's work in 
this respect. Darwin attributed this to personal animus against him and 
professional jealousy, and was never rec-nciled to Owen because of it. '. fter 
citing several of Darwin's obs:,, rvations, 
(viz. the folds of the Pedunculated 
Cirripedes, which appear to have changed from respiratory organs into origenous 
organs; the slave-making instincts of ants; the cell making instincts of bees; 
the transportation of molluscs and seeds on the feet of birds; and the 
variations of pigeons under domestication), Owen comments, "These are 
the most 
important original observations recorded in the volume of 1859. The;. - are, in 
our estimation, its real gems - few indeed and far apart, and 
leaving the 
2 
determination of the origin of species very nearly where the author found it. " 
Samuel ; ', 'ilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, 
3 
also complained of the paucity of facts 
in The Origin when he wrote, in the ; uarterly Review for July - October 1860, 
of how Darwin went through the 'plasticity' of nature under domestication, all 
of which was known. This may be of great interest to pigeon 
fanciers and 
pleasant writing 
quoted by Gerhard 7, ichler in Charles Darwin: The Founder of the Theor of 
2 Edinburgh Review, 
(AAril 1860), 4-95 volution and Natural Selection 191p. xiv 
3 Owen Chadwick attacks the mythology that has grown up around the British 
Academy debate in 1861, which has simplified and caricatured the principal 
figures, T. H. Huxley and Samuel 1, ilberforce - "empirical and instructed 
professor versus ignorant, rhetorical and obscurantist bishop... in small 
number of letters from eye-witnesses survives. It is clear that the speech of 
J. D. Hooker, and not the speech of Huxley, made the big impression on the 
audience in countering the bishop's arguments for the perpetuity instead of 
the evolution of species. It is clear that the bishop's arguments (which 
he seems to have learnt from Professor Owen) were genuine and formidable 
arguments. " The Victorian Church Vol. II, 10 
-141- 
... but what step 
do we really gain in it all towards establishing the 
alleged fact that varieties are but species in the act of formation, or 
in establishing Mr. Darwin's position that a well-marked variety may be 
called an incipient species ? ,e affirm positively th, -, t no single fact 
tending even in that direction is brought forward. On the contrary, 
every one points distinctly towards the opposite conclusion; for with 
all the change wrought in the appearance, with all the apparent variation 
in manners, there is not the faintest beginning of any such change in whý-t 
the great cc,:. parative anatomist, Professor Owen, calls, 'the characterisation 
of the skeleton, or the parts of the frame upon which specific differences 
are founded. 1 
"ýiJe think it difficult, " Wilberforce went on, "to find a theory fuller of 
assumptions; and of assumptions not grounded upon a: leged facts of nature, but 
which are absolutely opposed to all the facts we have been able to observe. " 
2 
The links, the ambiguous forms are missing. 'adhere are the examples of favourable 
varieties in nature, living or dead ?3 
The article in the National Review Jan. 1860, on the Origin made a similar 
point, while generally being more favourable to the book. The writer, 
W. B. Carpenter, an eminent physiologist, concluded his article thus, 
The history of every science shows us that the great epochs of its 
progress are those not so much of new discoveries of facts, as those 
of new ideas which have served for the colligation of facts previously 
known into general principles, and which have thenceforvvard given a 
new direction to inquiry. It is on this point of view thet we attach 
the highest value to : s. Darwin's work. 1+ 
Sedgwick in a letter to Livingstone, 16 Y arch 1865, also revealed his conviction 
th,, t Darwin's book had brought to light nothing new in the way of facts relating 
to the argument for the transmutation of species. "Darwin", he wrote, "has 
made the theory popular, but he has not added one single fact that 
helps it 
forward, and I think it appeared 
(about sixty five years since) far better in 
5 
the poetry of the grandfather, than now in the prose of the grandson". 
I quarterly Review, 
(July 
- Oct., 1860), 235 
2 Ibid., 237 
3 Ibid., 239 
4 National Review, (Jan. 1860), 214 
5 Life and Letters of the Reverend Adam Sedgwick, J. Vi. Clark and 
T. R`cl:. Hughes, 1890), Vo. 1,411 
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The reviewer in The Annals and Magazine of Natural History, 1861, wrote, 
That a book having the name of Charles Darwin on its title-page would be extensively read, is a matter of course; but that, without containing 
the smallest tittle of new evidence on the subject of the evolution of one 
species from another, it should have been regarded as establishing that 
theory, may well excite our surprise. I 
It may be argued that some of the reviews and opinions quoted here stemmed from 
people who were hostile to Darwin's theory, and that, of course, is true, and 
some have stated their case more strongly than others. But when we take thr: t 
into account, there still remains the charge, which ultimately is not a matter 
of opinion, that Darwin had adduced virtually no new evidence to substantiate 
his theory. It is interesting that T. H. Huxley, the friend and advocate of 
Darwin's evolutionary views, his 'bulldog' as Darwin called him, corroborated 
this when he later wrote, 
my reflection, when I first made myself master of the central idea of 
the Origin was, 'How extremely stupid not to have thought of that' ... 
The facts of variability, of the struggle for existence, of adaptation 
to conditions, were notorious enough; but none of us had suspected that 
the road to the heart of the species problem lay through them, until 
Darwin and 'oiallace dispelled the darkness, and the beacon fire of the 
Origin guided the benighted .2 
Darwin, therefore, relied almost entirely upon the refinement and rearrangement 
of facts, arguments and ideas which were generally known during the period 
immediately preceding the publication of the Origin. Darwin was sensitive to a 
number of criticisms, particularly the one made by Sedgwick and others, that he 
had departed from the narrow path of inductive argument and embarked upon the 
broad way of hypothesis. Such criticisms he was most anxious to rebut. However, 
he made no reference to the charge of adducing no new facts. Thus the 
contemporary evidence bears out the contention that, both before and after the 
advent of the Origin, the state of the argument regarding the transmutation of 
species remained substantially the same. The arguments used after 1859 to 
establish the theory of evolution were principally those employed before. 
1 The Annals and Magazine of Natural History, Third Series, VII (1861), 399 
2 Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Ed. Francis Darwin, Vol. II , 197 
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Another thing that would appear to support this view is the episode of the 
Linnean Society. Darwin had for long feared that he might be forestalled in 
the publication of his theory. He had written a draft of it in 18z4 with 
instructions that it should be published in the event of his death. On June 15th, 
1858 Darwin received a paper from Alfred Wallace giving in outline the very same 
theory of evolution by means of natural selection which he had himself pondered 
for so many years. Darwin was at a loss what to do. He wrote to Lyell and Hooker 
for advice, and they suggested the expedient of a joint paper from both ;,, `allace 
and Darwin to be read at the Linnean Society. Darwin agreed and left the matter 
in their hands. The joint paper was read at the meeting of the Society on 
July Ist. and later published in the Society's 'Journal' .1 It made little impact 
upon the scientific world. "Cur joint productions", Darwin wrote afterwards in 
his autobiography, "excited very little attention, and the only published notice 
of them which I can remember was by Professor Haughton of Dublin, whose verdict 
2 
was that all that was new in them was false, and what was true was old. " 
Darwin added, "This shows how necessary it is that any new view should be 
explained at considerable length in order to arouse pubic attention. " 
3 
There is another and, perhaps, more important reason why Darwin's argument needed 
fuller exposition in order to make any impact, and we shall return to this later. 
The point now is that there appeared to be very little, factually, that was new 
in this work. The President of the Linnean society was himself unaware that 
this joint paper was the opening salvo in the great evolutionary battle. At the 
general meeting he reported to members that., "The year 1858 has not, indeed, 
been marked by any of those striking discoveries which at once revolutionise, 
4 
so to speak, the department of science on wlich they bear". 
I Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean S oci et y, 1858), Vol. III , 53 
2 In a letter to J. D. Hooker, April or May 1359, Darwin wrote, "... I enclose 
a criticism, a taste of the future - Eev. S. Haughton's address to the 
Geological Society, Dublin, Feb. 9th, 1858 'This speculation of 
Messrs. Darwin and -, Vallace would not be worthy of notice were it not for the 
weight of authority of the names 
(i. e. Lyell's and -, ours), under whose 
auspices it has been brought forward. If it means what it says, it is a 
truism; if it means anything more it is contrary to fact. ' Q. E. D. " 
Life and Letters of Charles. Darwin Vol. 11,157 
3 hutobiographies, C. Darwin and T. H. Huxley, Ed. G. de Beer, (1974), 72 
!f Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society, Vol. IV, viii 
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The first announcement to the world of the theory of evolution by natural 
selection had fallen completely flat. 
I 
The new element introduced by Darwin into the discussion of species , as not so 
much in the realm of fact, but of principle; it was the notion of Natural 
Selecticn, which he had stumbled upon when re, 'iding P"althus for amusement. , "ghat 
he had succeeded in doing as a result of adopting that principle as a vera causa 
of the origin of species was to present already known facts in a new light. 
As A. Ellegaard put it, 
Darwin did not contribute much really new information on the variation 
that occurs in species, or their frequency, extent and inheritance, nor 
on the causes that produced them. In fact, he repeatedly admitted that 
those problems remained almost completely unsolved. But in the Origin 
he was not particularly concerned with such details; his main object 
was to establish a solution of the species problem that would render 
superfluous any reference to supernatural causes in their production ... 
Darwin's 'atural Selection theory, which was the revolutionary and 
radically new element in his doctrine, would achieve this. 2 
Cr, as the same writer put it again more succinctly, "The real issue between 
Darwin and his opponents, therefore, was not a factual cne, but concerned the 
interpretation of the facts. " 
3 
Louis Agassiz, in The Atlantic T`onthly, 
January, 1874, wrote, 
Darwin's works and those of his followers have added nothing new to our 
previous knowledge concerning the origin of man and his associates in 
domestic life, the horse, the cow, the sheep, the dog, or, indeed, of 
any animal. The facts upon which Darwin, iallace, Haeckel, and others 
base their views are in the possession of every well-educated naturalist. 
It is only a question of interpretation, not of discovery of ne;, and 
unlooked-for information. 1+ 
"The 1 st July Linnean Society papers, when published in October 1858, 
only influenced a very few naturalists", To be an Invalid, ^. Colp, N. D. 
1977. It might be added that even those, like J. D. Hooker, who declared 
in their favour, had already been influenced before the actual publication 
by discussion with Darwin, rather than by the publication of these papers. 
2 A. Ellegaard, Darwin and the General Reader, 12 13,13 
3 I_., 120 
4 L. Agassiz, 'Evolution and Permanence of Type', in The Atlantic Monthly 
x III (January-June 1874), 96 . 
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Darwin had succeeded in presenting known facts in a new light. But it was not 
the other way about; it was not that the discovery of new facts had led him 
to adopt a working hypothesis to explain them. The truth of this may be 
illustrated biographically in terms of Darwin's own experience and development. 
In October 1838, very soon after he had begun to reflect seriously upon the 
species question, and had opened his first note-book on the subject, he chanced 
to read Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population. "It at once struck me", 
he wrote later, "that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend 
to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would 
be the formation of new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which 
to work ... " 
1 
Having obtained his theory, he was thereafter principally concerned with 
collecting facts to illustrate it. The following observations on Darwin's fact 
finding methods are interesting. "The casualness of Darwin's fact-collecting 
methods is very endearing. He welcomed information from any source, provided 
it fitted in with his new theory of mutability. His informants could be his 
father, his gardener, his pen-friends or anyone who had something helpful to say. 
'Strong odours of negroes -a point of real repugnance. ' 'The cat had its tail 
cut off in Shrewsbury and its kittens had all short tails; but one a little 
longer than the rest; they all died. She had kittens before and afterwards 
with tails. ' The facts ... do not appear to have been collected or tested with 
any particular care. The vital factor was that they should illustrate his theory. 
In this respect Darwin was contradictory; at times he spoke as the dispassionate 
scientist concerned only with the truth and prepared to jettison his beloved 
theory should the facts disprove it, at other times the theory was for him all 
important and any facts would do, provided the; supported it. In a letter to 
Lyell, shortly after the publication of the 'Origin of Species', he prided 
himself on having invented a theory and then seeing 'how many classes of facts 
the theory would explain"' 
2 
1 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin Vol. I, 83 
2 John Chancellor, Charles Darwin, (1973,160 
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Thus, what we have in the development of Darwin's theory is, first, the 
intuitive discovery of a principle, viz. j natural selection, which afterwards is 
used to illuminate and explain an existing, and already known body of facts, 
together with the steady accumulation of further illustrations from the common 
stock of knowledge on the several subjects relating to it. At this point it 
wculd be difficult not to notice a remarkable similarity between the logical 
structure of Darwin's argument from Natural Selection, and the argument from 
design. This may be illustrated from his note-books and correspondence. 
As early as 1837-8 Darwin's mind was moving strongly in the direction of descent 
of the ' w-, ole organic kingdom' from plants to man. This was before he had read 
Malthus and lighted upon the principle of Natural Selection. Gertrude Himmelfarb 
considers that by the time Darwin was in the process of writing the second of 
his note books, which he commenced about July 1837, he Evas "entirely committed" 
emotionally, if not by the strict canons of scientific enquiry, to evolution. 
The two following extracts frcm his note-book completed between July 1837 and 
February 1838 indicate the strength of this a priori view of evolution which he 
entertained. 
If we choose to let conjecture run wild, then animals our fellow 
brethren in pain, disease, death, suffering and famine - our slaves 
in the most laborious works, our companions in our amusements - they 
may partake 
[of? ] an origin in one common ancestor - we may all be 
melted together. 2 
The different intellects of men and animals not so great as between 
living things without thought (plants) and living things with 
thought (animals). 3 
I G. Himmelfarb, Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution, 127 
2 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 6 
3 Notebook 'C' , 214 
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Sir Gavin de Beer thinks it doubtful whether Darwin actually derived the idea 
of Natural Selection from Malthus, for he argues that there are many indications 
that Darwin himself was already aware of the significance of the struggle for 
existence and its importance for the preservation of favoured races. "Triting to 
Henry Fawcett in about 1876, Darwin stated, "I clearly saw that selection was 
man's chief means. Vthen I had got thus far I strongly suspected that this was 
the key to nature's work. " 
This, de Beer argues, is borne out in the First Notebook 
where he observed that the Southern rhea, not being well adapted, might 
'perish out', while another bird (the mocking bird), being well adapted, 
would increase and flourish. He went on, 'death of a species is a 
consequence of non-adaptation'. Here was clear recognition of the 
importance of favourable variation and efficient adaptation for survival, 
by natural selection of the more numerous parents of successive generations. 
Perhaps the reading of Malthus served to formulate what before was latent, but 
unclear in his mind. It a, -pears, however, that from that time, in the autumn 
of 1838, >, hen he read Malthus, he felt that he was equipped with a principle 
which could explain the derivetion and descent of one species from another. 
'; "; e must here lay emphasis upon two things which are important for this argument. 
First, the emergence of the principle of natural selection at the beginning of 
Darwin's researches rather than the end, and, secondly, that this principle came 
to a mind already strongly inf7-uenced in the direction of descent or evolution 
of all organic beings, both plant and animal, from some one original form. It 
is difficult, therefore, to see in this what Darwin afterwards so strongly insisted 
on, viz., that his method was strictly inductive and that he discovered his theory 
of descent by natural selection only after painstakingly collecting all the facts 
bearing upon the subject and pondering them for many years. There seemed to be 
some confusion in Darwin's mind on this point, which grew as the years . r; ent on. 
I Autobiographies, C. Darwin & T. H. Huxley, Ed. G. de "Beer, x. 
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He wculd frequently mention in his letters to those whom he hoped to convert to 
his views, how many years it had taken him "to come round. " Thus, to Lyell, 
1859, "I am foolishly anxious for your verdict [on the Origin] not that I shall 
be disappointed if you are not converted; for I remember the long years it took 
me to come round ... " 
1 
To Jenyns, 1859, "1 know perfectly well that you will 
not agree with the lengths to which I go. It took long years to convert me ... " 
2 
To V. B. %Carpenter 1859, "I look at it as immaterial whether we go quite the same 
lengths ... I quite agree the principle is everything ... when I reflect how 
very slowly I came round myself, I am in truth astonished at the candour shown 
by Lyel], Hooker, Huxley and yourself. " 
3 
and so on. 
Later, Darwin clearly thought of his conversion to acceptance of the theory of 
evolution by natural selection as a long and painstaking process, coming as the 
conclusion of a train of inductive reasoning. This was no doubt how he wanted 
to think of it, but the truth was otherwise. Francis Darwin himself acknowledged 
that such an opinion is irreconcilable with the evidence of the 1837 note book. 
Darwin was already, at that time, convinced of the truth of the principle of 
natural selection and evolution. . hat happened afterwards, in the years that 
followed, was not `gis conversion to these ideas, but rather his confirmation as 
the steady accumulation of facts, i. e. of favourable illustrations and examples, 
made a deeper and deeper impression upon his mind and their cumulative force 
heightened the vividness of the concepts in his imagination. ;; hat took place in 
Darwin's experience in 1838, and in the subsequent development of his thought can 
be better explained if we regard his theory as the counter part or antithesis of 
the argument from design, (which cannot be put in the category of a scientific 
or strictly inductive argument), and if we thus recognise in it the same logical 
character and structure. 
I Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 167 
2 Ibid. ) 220 
3 Ibid., 240 
4 Ibid., 38 
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The argument from design begins with an a 
_priori 
concept, which is intuitively 
discerned in natural phenomena. This concept is thereafter strengthened and 
elaborated by constantly 'bearing the subject in mind' and piling up successive 
examples and illustrations of its role. This is extended further and further 
by analogy until it becomes all embracing and affords a world view. 
In our stud;. - of the design argument we have noticed the special character and 
form of the argument. It is not like a straight-foxriard conclusion inferred from 
certain premises, its nature and effects are verj much more pervasive an,: general, 
its strength is more psychological than logical or rational. Its full influence 
and force are felt only when the subject is kept constantly before the mind, so 
that the cumulative effect of illustrations and examples of design are allowed 
to make their impression, not merely upon the intellect, but also upon the 
imagination. Paley put the matter well, when he said, it needs like a medicine 
to get into the system. "It is one thing to assent to a proposition of this 
sort, another and very different thing to have properly imbibed its influence". 
1 
The strength of the argument lies in its power to conquer the imagination and 
to see the whole of nature as conforming to the principle of design. But this 
cannot be brought about by mere logical argument. It does not, as Newman would 
say, live in a conclusion. The bare statement of the case, of the premises and 
inference to be shown therefrom, will not effect this dominance of the 
imagination, this capturing of the mind. It will not make the argument real 
to the individual. That can only be accomplished by the power of cumulative 
expression, the assembling of facts and examples in extended Llustration of 
the principle being exemplified. 
Tow we see this pattern emerging in Darwin's understanding of his own work on 
The Origin of Species, and the way in which he and others came to accept the 
argument for descent by Natural Selection. 
1 See this thesis, ch. 2 p. 57 
I 
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First, Darwin insisted that the full effects of the argument of The Origin could 
only be experienced if the subject were kept constantly before the mind. Thus, 
to Charles Lyell, he wrote in 1859, "You will come more and more round the 
longer you keep the subject before your mind. " 
1 
Again to L. Jenyns in 1860 s 
"You will think it presumptuous, but I am convinced if circumstances lead you 
to keep the subject in mind that you will go further". 
2 
To Asa Gray he wrote, 
"I feel pretty sure, from my own experience that if you are led by your studies 
tb keep the subject of the origin of species before your mind you will go 
further and further in your belief. " 
3 
Darwin cites a testimony to the psychological soundness of this advice, given 
by Thwaites from Ceylon, "who was much opposed to me. " "Tie now says, 'I find 
that the more familiar I become with your views in connection with the various 
phenomena of nature, the more they commend themselves to my mind. " 
4 
Six months 
earlier Darwin had written to Thwaites, "You will think it presumptuous, but I am 
well convinced from my own mental experience that if you keep the subject at all 
before your mind you will ultimately go farther". Darwin often suggested that 
his book should be read several times to produce the desired effect of converting 
the mind to evolutionar.,, views. The truth of this, also, was borne out in the 
experience of a number of those who came to embrace Darwinism after being 
initially opposed to it. Thus B. D. ý%'alsh wrote, April 27,1864, "The first 
perusal staggered me, the second convinced me, and the oftener I read it the 
more convinced I am of the general soundness of your theory". 
5 
"I have had an 
enormous letter, " Darwin wrote to J. D. Hooker, "from Leo Lesauereux ... he wrote 
some excellent articles in 'Silliman' against tmy3 Crigin views, but he says now 
after repeated reading of the book, he is a convert. " 
6 
Darwin's argument 
was much too vague to be of the nature of scientific demonstration. 
I Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II 170 
2 I1id., 263 3 Ibid., 273 4 Ibid., 317 
5 Ibid., 21+9 6 Ibid., 260 
F 
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It was not so much inductive as cumulative and illustrative. 
I It was necessary 
for the subject to be "kept before the mind" in order that the imagination might 
be conquered. 
One of the greatest fumbling blocks to the acceptance of Darwin's ideas was the 
difficulty of imagining or conceiving that such organs as the eye could be 
produced by the gradual accumulation of chance variations by natural selection. 
Charles Lyell warned of the difficulty. writing with some advice on The Origin 
he said, 
... The 
first page of this most important summary gives the adversary an 
advantage, by putting forth so abruptly and crudely such a startling 
objection as the formation of 'the eye', not by means analogous to man's 
reason, or rather by some power immeasurably superior to human reason, 
but by super-induced variation like those of which a cattle-breeder 
avails himself. 2 
, Asa Gray 
likewise found this passage difficult, 
... aihat seems 
to me the weakest point in the book is the attempt to 
account for the formations of organs, the making of eyes, etc., by 
natural selection. Some of this reads quite Lamarckian. 3 
Darwin knew what they were talking about. He frequently refers to the great 
difficulty he had himself experienced in this respect, and specially with regard 
to the eye. But because to him the principle of natural selection was invincible, 
and the prospect of the alternative of special creation unthinkable, 
the 
imagination had to be conquered. He wrote in reply to Asa Gray, "About the 
weak points I agree. The eye to this day gives me a cold shudder, but when 
I 
think of the fine Known gradations, my reason (sic) tells me that I ought to 
conquer the cold shudder ... " 
4 
The imagination could be subdued and brought 
under the power of the argument, if only the subject were 
"kept before the mind", 
and examples and illustrations of natural selection at work, particularly 
under 
domestication, were fully contemplated and allowed to govern and control thought 
on the subject. Darwin 
himself had proved that this could be done. 
1 "The reliance upon the senses for evidence, not merely for 
illustration, is 
what constitutes the empirical character peculiar 
to modern science. " 
! R, R, Foster, 'The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the rise of Yodern Natural 
Science' , `'ind 
XL_III , 
(0 934) 
, 
465" There appears to be a strong Greek trait in 
Darwin's thought is T. H. Huxley himself suggested. 
(See chapter 6, F. 194). 
2 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 207 
3 Ibid., 272 
4 Ibid., 273 
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"I remember well the thcught of the eye made me cold all over, but I have got 
over that staEe of the complaint ... " 
1 
If the mind repeatedly entertained examples of organic change by successive 
small variations, the imagination could be made strong enough to leap over, or 
rather fill. in, those gaps where intermediate steps between different types of 
organism had not been found, and where the untutored mind had difficulty in 
conceiving that they had ever existed. "If it could be demonstrated that any 
complex organ exists, which need not possibly have been formed by numerous, 
successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. Bý-, t I 
can find out no such oases, " Darwin optimistically declared. 
2 
The power of 
imagination in analogical thinking is such that, when it is vivified and fashioned 
by successive examples and illustrations, it constrains the mind to think in only 
one direction. 
3 
Darwin acknowledged that in many cases it is most difficult 
even to conjecture by what transitions organs have arrived at their present 
state, yet he is of the opinion that "all intermediate types must exist", and 
"when speaking about the evolution from the most simple eye to that of the highest 
vertebrates, he remarks that it is indispensable that 'reason should conquer the 
imagination. ' The fundamental assumption is 'natura non facit saltum'. We see 
leaps in nature, but according to the doctrine of natural selection they cannot 
exist, consequently they do not exist. " 
1 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 296 
2 Darwin appealed to the imagination in order to fill up these gaps. 
"Geological research, though it has added numerous species to existing and 
extinct genera ..., yet 
has done scarcely anything in breaking down the 
distinction between species, by connecting them together by numerous, fine, 
intermediate varieties; and this not having been effected, is probably the 
gravest and most obvious of all the many objections which may be urged against 
my views. Hence it will be worth while to sum up the foregoing remarks under 
an imaginary illustration ... " Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species 
(First 
edition), 255. 
Thus the discussion of the imperfections of the geological record is ... an 
exercise in hypothetical, 'imaginary' reasoning. 
3 "The human understanding, when it has once adopted an opinion (either as 
being the received opinion or as agreeable to itself) draws all things else 
to support and agree with it". Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, XLVI 
4 R. Hooykaas, The Principle of Uniformity, 102 
-153- 
This power to conquer the imagination, given to the mind by the steady contempla- 
tion of facts, examples and illustrations of organic change by successive small 
steps, explains another feature that appears in Darwin's correspondence and his 
reflections upon this subject, and that is, that it results in a way of viewing 
the whole of nature, which logically cannot stop short of a universal understand- 
ing. In the argument from design, particularly as Kant expounded it, we observed 
that once you have acknowledged the principle of design in. nature it leads on to 
the contemplation of the whole of nature and the universe under the category of 
design. There is no point at which the chain of analogical reasoning can be 
broken. Likewise, we find the same character attaching to the Darwinian argument 
of descent by natural selection. ', Nth Darwin it was all or nothing, and 
ultimately, he insisted, this view must extend to the whole of nature and the 
universe, it is arbitrary to draw a line and say that natural selection operates 
thus far and no farther. As Darwin put it in a letter to Lyell in 1859, "1 am 
deeply convinced that it is absolutely necessary to go the whole vast length, or 
stick to the creation of each separate species. " 
I 
And again to J. D. Hooker, 
,, But if you go any considerable length in the admission of modification, I can 
see no possible means of drawing the line and saying here you must stop. " 
2 
Writing a little later to Lyell, who had asked, "Must you not admit a primeval 
creative power which does not act with uniformity, or how could man supervene ?" 
Darwin replies, "I entirely reject, as in my Judgment quite unnecessary, any 
subsequent addition 'of new powers and attributes and forces', or any 'principle 
of improvement'... If I were convinced that I required such additions to the 
theory of natural selection, I would reject it as rubbish, but I have a firm 
faith in it ... I would give absolutely nothing 
for the theory of Natural 
Selection if it requires miraculous additions at any one stage of descent ... 
I think you will be driven to reject all or admit all". 
3 
1 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 165 (See Appendix II of this thesis) 
2 Ibid. , 174 
3 Ibid. , 211 & 
212 
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This result must, of course, inevitably follow if you extrapolate from fine 
gradations that are known to exist in organic nature to an infinite number of 
such gradations always and everywhere in the past even though they have not 
been found, or proved to have existed. Logically there is no point at which you 
can stop, and ary halting-, lace must necessarily appear arbitrary. 
I "It is 
funny". Darwin wrote to Lyell, "how each man draws his own imaginary line at 
which to halt. It reminds me so vividly what I was told about you when I first 
commenced geology - to believe a little, but on no account to believe all. " 
2 
And again to Thwaites, "I can see with my prejudiced eyes no limit to the 
perfection of the co-adaptations that could be effected by Natural Selection ... 
But I venture to repeat how pleased I am that you go some little way with me. 
I find that a number of naturalists do the same, and as their halting places are 
various, and I think arbitrary, I believe they will all go farther". 
3 
There appeared to be an inevitability about Darwin's theory, which meant that 
once you had conceded the principle, everything else must follow and no part of 
organic nature could be exempted from its rule. Charles Lyell expressed the 
feeling thus, "I have long seen most clearly that if any concession is made, 
all that you claim in your concluding pages of the Origin will follow. It is 
this which has made me so long hesitate, always feeling that the case of man and 
his races, and of other animals, and that of plants, is one and the same, and 
that if a 'vera causa' be admitted for one, instead of a purely unknown and 
imaginative one, such as the word 'creation' 
4 
, all the consequences must follow. " 
1 Lovejoy argues in The Great Chain of Being that the psychological value of 
the principle of continuity was that it made the world predictable, rational 
and secure. Thus below this level of the one perfect being a stoppage in the 
series of gradations of being, at one point rather than another, would be an 
act of caprice. "And the same is true of the continuum formarum; if nature 
'made leaps' they must be groundless leaps; if there were gaps, or really 
missing links, in a sequence of existing forms, such that, for example, one 
kind of animal existed, but was separated from its most nearly similar actual 
species by a blank stretch of unrealized possibilities of intermediate kinds, 
the cosmos must be admitted to be lacking in orderliness, to be characterized 
by a kind of incoherency and whimsicality. " A, O, Lovejoy, The Great Chain of 
Being, 329 
2 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol II, 286 
3v 
ore Letters of Chas. Darwin, Ed. Francis Darwin, Vol. I, 115 
4 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 206 
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There was then, in Darwin's view, no half-way house. 's he wrote to L. Jenyns, 
"People will have to reject all or admit all" .,. 
I 
Once the principle is 
adopted and vivified under the influence of example and illustration the 
psychological constraints which operate to effect a change of view, which 
embraces ultimately the whole of nature, are very powerful indeed. 
2 
This examination of the structure and character of Darwin's argument for 
universal evolution by natural selection provides us with a key which may help 
to explain the success of Darwin's views, despite the fact that he added little 
that was new in the way of factual evidence for the theory of descent. 
II 
we must distinguish here between the strictly scientific role of natural 
selection, where it is observed to operate in the modification of species and 
the production of varieties, and the wider extrapolation of the principle, by 
Darwin and his followers, to argue for, and explain, the descent of all living 
things from one or a few original forms. These different theories are sometimes 
referred to as micro- and macro-evolution respectively. Vitro-evolution is not 
in dispute, it is whet --arwin himself observed in domestic breeding, and what 
scientists have recognised as change and adaptation of creatures in the wild, 
such as melanism in moths. The supposed sufficiency of this same principle of 
natural selection to explain macro-evolution or the development of the whole 
organic world, is something which is now being seriously questioned from within 
science itself. Dr. Colin Patterson, senior biologist at the Natural History 
t°_useum in London, has expressed his misgivings in the fol]owing terms 
1 
2 
3 
There is no doubt at afl that natural selection works - it's been 
repeatedly demonstrated by experiment. But the question of whether 
it produces new species is quite another matter. No one has ever 
produced a new species by means of natural selection, no one has ever 
got near it, and most of the current argument in neo-Darwinism is 
about this question of how species originate. It's there that natural 
selection seems to be fading out end chance events of one sort or 
another are being invoked. That is a very profound attack on neo-Darwinism. 
Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol II, 264 
Of this tendency of the mind on notes: "The human understanding is 
unquiet: it cannot stop or rest and still presses onward, but in vain. 
Therefore we cannot conceive of any end or limit to the world... The 
like subtlety arises touching the infinite divisibility of lines, from 
the same inability of thought to stop. " '. "ovum Crganumt YLVIII 
The Listener, 8 Oct., 1981 
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The structure and force of Darwin's argument in respect of macro-evolution was 
not so much scientific as metaphysical and psychological, evoking a particular 
view of the world which is fundamentally materialistic. It is clear from Darwin's 
early notebooks, which he began in 1837, that he had at that stage adopted a 
materialistic view. Notebooks 'M' and 'N', which were devoted to jottings in 
'the moral sense and metaphysics', provide us with evidence of this. Unlike 
the notebooks B, C, ý, and E on transmutation, they are marked 'private', for 
Darwin was conscious of the generally unacceptable nature of the observations 
they contained. 
Darwin attributes the mental and moral constitution of man to material causes in 
his physical make-up. Thus, "Thought (or desires more properly) being hereditary 
is difficult to imagine it anything but structure of brain, hereditary, analogy 
points to this - love of the deity effect of organisation. Ph you materialist! " 
I 
He considers that man's mind and will can be explained in terms of his development 
from the brutes. If this could be grasped and understood it would afford a new 
approach to the subjects of man's rationality, morality, and religious conscious- 
ness. References to this are contained in a number of aphoristic-remarks. 
"Plato ... says in Phaedo that our 'imagery ideas' arise from the pre-existence 
2 
of the soul, are not derivable from experience - read monkeys for preexistence. " 
Or again, "To study metaphysics, as they have always been studied, appears to me 
to be like puzzling at astronomy within mechanics - Experience shows the problem 
of the mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself - the mind is 
function of the body - we must bring some stable foundation to argue from. " 
3 
The mind of man then, according to Darwin, is an epiphenomenon of the body. 
Our bodily organisation determines how and what we shall think and will. But in 
turn man's body is the product of the brute creation; he is descended from the 
monkey, the baboon, the ourang-outang, and so a true account of man's higher 
nature and reason must be given in terms of his affinity to, and derivation from, 
1 Notebook 'C', 166, Darwin Collection, Cambridge University Library 
2 Notebook IM', 120 
3 Notebook IN', 12 
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these creatures "He who understands baboon", Darwin confided in his notebook, 
"would do more to-;, ards metaphysics than Locke. " I There was something half- 
mocking, derisory and misanthropic about the way in which Darwin used the words 
monkey, baboon and ourang-outang in relation to man, as if he was deliberately 
seeking to topple man's image and took a delight in such iconoclasm. "Man", 
he wrote in another place, "in his arrogance thinks himself a great work, worthy 
of the interposition of a deity - more humble and I believe true to consider him 
created from animals. " 
2 
This reduction of man to the level of the animal creation led Darwin into 
scepticism regarding the validity and objective reality of man's moral experience 
and judgments, as well as his rationality. It made him consider that there was 
no such thing as free will. At the conclusion of a series of notes on the 
relationship between mind and bodily organisation he wrote, "... thinking over 
these things one doubts existence of free-will, every action determined by 
hereditary constitution, example of others, or teaching of others. (N. B. man 
much more affected by other fellow-animals than any other animal and perhaps the 
only one affected by knowledge which is not hereditary and instinctive) and 
therefore perhaps no free will - we may easily fancy there is, as we fancy there 
is such a thing as chance'- chance governs the descent of a farthing, free-will 
determines our throwing it up - equal then the two statements. " 
3 
In Darwin's estimation there was no such thing as chance, because he conceived 
of the whole world as bound ultimately by law. The extent and complexity of 
these laws of nature exceeded the comprehension of the human mind, and in our 
ignorance we spoke of chance events, when in fact all events were rigorously 
determined by the rule of law. As there was no such thing as chance, equally 
there was no such thing as free-will. ',; `hat made a person decide ? Was it not 
the thought that was uppermost at the time. But what caused that thought to be 
uppermost in the mind? . las it not accident, chance ? Thus in the same notebook 
he wrote "I verily believe free-will or chance are synonymous ... Shake ten 
1 Notebook '1 ' , 
85 
2 Notebook 'C' , 196 
3 Notebook 'p' , 27 
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thousand grains of sand together and one will be uppermost - so in thoughts, 
one will rise according to law". 
1 
In just the same way as man's moral judgment and responsibility were a chimera - 
the epiphenomena of his bodily and, ultimately, animal constitution - so also 
were his religious convictions. They could no more be relied upon for objective 
knowledge of the Creator, than could man's moral consciousness for any absolute 
rule of right and wrong. Here again the Notebooks are an invaluable aid for 
this understanding of Darwin's early materialism. 
We have already seen how he ventures to speculate that love of the deity might 
be the consequence of bodily organisation, as in his view everything else was. 
In a further note he takes this idea up and develops it, sketching in what he 
believes might be the origin of the idea of God. 'May not moral sense arise 
from our enlarged capacity for being ... guided on strong instruction sexual, 
parental and social instincts, giving rise 'do unto others as yourself', 'love 
they neighbour as thyself' - analyse this out - bearing in mind many new relations 
for language - the social instinct ... fear for others acting in union ... action 
assistance and so on. May not idea of God arise from our confused idea of 'right' 
joined with necessary action of 'causation' in reference to this 'right' as well 
2 
as the works of the whole world. " 
Thus 'God' is simply the projection, or personification of moral necessity, and 
moral necessity is simply the instinctive constraint which has been bred into 
the individual over thousands of generations. ? oral nature like phenomenal 
nature is subject to law and to posit a personal lawgiver or a personal creator 
is to make the same mistake as the savage who when it thunders says it is the 
will of God. 
1 Notebook '10 , 30 
2 Notebook IM',, 8. 
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But Darwin was not to escape so easily from the idea of a personal God, and the 
question of whether it was in man a priori or could be explained in the natural- 
istic manner he suggested. The problem was to haunt him to the end. In a letter 
written shortly after Darwin's death, by Julia N edgewood, his sister-in-law, to 
Frank Darwin, Charles' son, in 1884, she refers to this ambivalence and uncertaini 
that seemed to characterize Darwin's state of mind on this fundamental question, 
and for which reason he preferred to regard himself as an agnostic rather than 
an atheist. 
The development of Darwin's materialistic philosophy, or world-view, was aided 
by the exercise of a powerful imagination. Imagination is the key to the 
explanation both of the development of Darwin's own ideas, and also the success 
with which he was able to communicate them to other people. "The heart", said 
2 
Newman, " is commonly reached not through the reason, but through the imagination" 
It is clear that from the moment Darwin began to keep his notebooks he had 
adopted the principles of a materialist philosophy. But from that time his 
imagination aided him in bringing everything he witnessed and observed under the 
control of these principles. His imagination enabled him to interpret facts, 
discern affinities, and pursue analogies in terms of the settled principles and 
ideas he had already accepted. It is interesting that not only his son Frank, 
in his personal reminiscence of his father, speaks of the 'richness of his 
imagination' 
3, 
but many of Darwin's reviewers referred also to his powers in 
this direction. F. J. Pictet, whom Darwin regarded as one of the fairest of his 
reviewers, confessed when he read the Origin and had passed beyond the first 
few factual chapters that 
his (Darwin's) imagination advanced more quickly than mine and drew 
conclusions from the accepted facts w'lich seemed incompatible with 
these same facts. There seemed to me to be, as it were, a sort of 
disparity between his premises and his conclusion, the premises being 
so prudent, so just, so limited, and the conclusion on the contrary 
appearing so extremely speculative. if 
1 Darwin Collection, DAR 13912 
2 J. H. Newman, Grammar of Assent, 92 
3 Darwin Collection, DAR 1403 
4. F. J. Pictet, "Sur L'Origine de L'Espece par Charles Darwin", in Bibliothegue 
Universelle, VII (Geneva, 1860) iii, 234. Translation from D. L. Hull, 
Darwin and his Critics, 143 
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In the early notebooks we see the same tendency for Darwin's imagination to leap 
away from the facts and speculate freely over the whole range of phenomena. 
Under the power of this imagination the natural world, to use an expression of 
Darwin's, melts together and becomes one. ', 'hat Darwin was doing by the gradual 
accumulation of illustrations and analogies was impressing upon himself and 
preparing to impress upon others the force of his ideas. 
In his notebcok 'Darwin reflects on the pleasure of imagination. It was a subject 
that greatly interested him, particularly how trains of thought and ideas (he 
calls them 'castles' in his notebooks) arose in different people's minds. An 
agriculturalist, or he a geologist, would view a scene differently and this would 
give rise to different reflections. He saw here a connection with poetry and 
recalled that ti+ordsworth had said something about science being sufficiently 
habitual to become poetical. Specially significant are Darwin's words when he 
wrote, "I am sure I remember my pleasure in Kensington Gardens has often been 
greatly excited by looking at trees as great compound animals united by wonderful 
12 
and mysterious manner. " 
Here we see the power of imagination to present reality under a wholly new and 
unexpected aspect. It would be the orientation of his mind and train of thoughts 
as a naturalist which would enable him to view the scene in Kensington Gardens 
in this way. Here we have a most vivid illustration of the way Darwin's mind 
worked, and the manner in which he was able to see affinities and resemblances 
of an unusual nature thus bringing the phenomena he observed under a quite 
different perspective. This is what modern philosophers have called, using the 
German expression, ein Blick, (a look, glance, glimpse, view, appearance). 
1 Notebook 'M' , 41 
2A parallel example of the power of the imagination under the influence of one 
dominating idea is found in Kilvert's Diary. The editor, ', tii: liam Flomer, 
describes it thus. "His (Kilvert's) susceptibility to all feminine beauty ... 
seems to increase ... In 
his middle thirties he is in a state of almost 
continual bewitchment and emotional upheaval; he endows natural phenomena 
with feminine personalities, seeing flowers for instance as ure penitent 
maidens and a couple of trees as 'twin sisters' who 'kiss each other in the 
dusk' ... "Kilvert's 
Dairy-, Vol II, Ed. by 'Jilliam Flomer, 1939. 
'Continual bewitchment' with the idea of evolution could well describe the 
state of Darwin's mind from 1837 onwards. 
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It is not in the nature of a conclusion drawn from premises, not an induction 
from facts. It is not strictly an inference at all, but a qualitative leap of 
the imagination from a train of thoughts thus evoking a new view of reality. 
This was the character of Darwin's thought from the beginning, and it remained 
so throughout in his non-scientific works such as The Origin and the Descent of 1 an. 
The notebooks reveal the power of Darwin's imagination to blend together the 
minds and bodies of man, animals, plants - the whole organic creation in one all- 
embracing view. A good example of the way in which his mind moved quickly from 
one idea to another, to give the original thought extended and eventually universal 
application, is to be found in Notebook IM', ", aith respect to free will, seeing a 
puppy dog playing cannot doubt that they have free-will, if so all animals, then 
an oyster has, a polype 
(and a plant in some senses, perhaps, though from not 
having pain and pleasure actions unavoidable and only to be changed by habits) 
now free-will of oyster, one can fancy to be such effect of organization by the 
capacities its senses give it of pain or pleasure, if so free-will is to mind 
what chance is to matter. " 
1 
Everywhere, all about him, Darwin was seeing affinities, examples, illustrations, 
which clothed the bare principles of his materialist philosophy and gave it a 
vividness and force which impressed itself more and more upon his mind. Newman, 
in the Grammar of hssent, argues that 'notional assents', that is the formal 
acceptance of bare propositions, become 'real assents' when tiose propositions, 
or principles are given concrete expression and illustration. 
2 
Real assent 
depends upon the intensity of the impression made upon the imagination. He also 
goes on to show how once the imagination is captured in this way 
the strength of 
the impression rules out an alternative way of viewing or explaining things. It 
is a development of this kind that we witness in the notes of Darwin during this 
period 1837-39. 
1 Notebook '1" , 72 
2 J. H. Newman, Grammar of Assent, 81 
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In his walks in the ^cological Gardens he was impressed with the affinities 
between the sexuality of men and baboons. "Hunt, (the intelligent Yeeper) 
remarked thr-: t he had never seen any of the American : -'onkeys show any desire for 
women -a very green monkey (from Senegal he thinks, Callitux gebe ?) he has seen 
place its head downwards to look up women's petticoats, just like Jenny with 
Tommy ourang - very curious. 
The monkeys understand the affinities of gran, 
better than the boasted philosopher himself. " 
I 
Cr again, "We need not feel so much surprise at male nni mnls smelling vagina of 
females - when it is reco'lected that smell of ones own fundament - not 
2 
disagreeable" 
But he aaw remarkable similarities and likenesses in the whole range of animal 
and human behavicur. The difference between children and young pigs noticeably 
diminished as he reflected on the subject: "Children have an uncommon pleasure 
in hiding themselves and skulking about in shrubbery, ýrhen other people are rbout. 
This is analogous to young pigs hiding themselves: hereditary remains of savage 
state". 
3 
So did the difference between tastes of animals and man: "The tastes 
of man same as in the allied Kingdoms - food, smell (ourang-outang) music, 
colours we must suu. pose, Pea-hen admires peacock's tail, c ,s much as -r. e do - touch 
apparently, ourang-outang very fond of soft silk-handkerchief - cats and dogs 
fond of slight tickling sensation - in savages other tastes are few" 
4 
Taking 
this thought a step further he writes: "There is scarcely a faculty in man not 
met with in the lower animals - hence the general aim of fables, and expressions 
are cunningness 
I Notebook 'N', 
2 Notebook 'M', 
3 Notebook 'N-', 
1+ Notebook 'N', 
5 Notebook 'N' , 
of fox, industry of bee, etc. etc. " 
5 
138 Darwin Collection 
85 
66 
64 
69 
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Even the reason of man, his knowledge and his science, present no insuperable 
obstacle to Darwin's agile mind and questing imagination. Was there not after 
all a gradation that could be perceived even here ? "; 1fe see gradation to man's 
mind in Vertebrate Kingdom, in man's 'instincts', in rodents then in other 
animals and again man's mind, in different races being unequally developed ... " 
I 
A little further on he reflects, "the different intellect of man and animals 
not so great as between living thing without thought (plants) and living thing 
with thought (animal)" 
2 
The possession of Science and knowledge by man did not create an unbridgeable 
gulf between the mind of man and the minds of animals, because it could be 
considered that animals already possessed these things in a rudimentary sense. 
He had observed at the zoological gardens how the male Black Swan was very 
fierce when the female was sitting, and the keeper was obliged to go in with a 
stick, "... if he drops it the bird will fly at him - knowledge. " This is 
followed by another note "Sept. 13th. It will be good to give Abercrombie 
definition of 'reason' and 'reasoning' and take instance of dray horse going 
down hill (argue sophism of association Kenyon) and then go on to show that if 
cart horse argued from this into theory of friction and gravity - it would be 
similar 'reason' or reasoning' - only other more steps - dispute about words -" 
3 
"All science", he concludes, " is reason acting systematically on principles, 
which even animals practically know ... "'S Our interest here is not in 
whether Darwin was right or wrong in his speculations, but in seeing the scope 
and intensity of his imagination. 
Notebook 'C' , 196 2 Notebook 'C' , 214 3 Notebook 'M' , 141 4 Notebook 'N' 
5 J. S. Mill, in his Logic, argued that animals are capable of induction. 
111 
But VJiLiam ', hewell thought this a misuse of the term. He considered 
that it should be retained for conscious inference. Only the conscious 
application of a law is induction. If I act upon the law without thinking 
about it, or if, for example, a billiard player produces a. certain result 
without thinking about it, this is not induction at all in the proper sense 
of the term. 
Some may dismiss this as a verbal quibble, but "such questions of definition 
are never questions of definition merely. A proposition is always implied 
along with definition; and the truth of the proposition depends upon the 
settlement of the definition. " Of Induction with Sec-al Reference to 
Mr. J. S. t'ill's System of Logic, t im. d ewe , London, 1649,1 
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Yet despite the confidence with which Darwin, in imagination, related one aspect 
of nature to another, and made man himself an integral part of the whole scheme, 
(so that he could vrite "I agree with Leyll. Man is not an intruder ... Man acts 
and is acted on by the organic and inorganic agents of this earth like every 
other animal"), 
i 
he still recognised and experienced certain difficulties in 
conceiving just how certain developments could have possibly come about. Here 
and there he felt he could shrug such difficulties off, or answer them by posing 
other difficulties. "Having proved mens' and brutes' bodies are one type almost 
superfluous to consider minds - as difference between mind of a dog and a 
porpoise was not thoroughly overwhelming - yet I will not shirk difficulty -I 
have felt some difficulty in conceiving how inhabitant of Tierra del Fuego is 
to be converted into civilized man 
2- 
ask the missionaries about Australian, 
yet slow progress has done so - show savage a dog and ask him how wolf was so 
changed. " 
3 
However, not all the difficulties for his evolutionary view could be answered 
in this way. There were, he was forced to recognise, limits to what even his 
imagination could encompass. For example, how was it possible to conceive of 
the development of such a complex organ as the eye from nothing ? Might it not 
be wise, therefore, to limit the scope of his theory ? "In my speculations must 
not go back to first stock of all animals, but merely to classes where types 
exist for if so it will be necessary to show how the first eye is formed - how 
one nerve became sensitive to light. " 
4 
I Notebook 'El, 65 
2 It would appear that Victorian sensibility was sometimes more shocked by 
the suggestion of an affinity between European man and the primitive savage 
than between man and the brute creation. Thus Archbishop Ahately wrote to 
Adam Sedgwick reg. rding The Origin, "I felt alarm at the apparent high favour 
and wide celebrity of Darwin's theory (wh. I suppose is 'amarck's cooked up 
afresh) because it was likely to establish our descent from M oll. uscs or 
Insects ... But my proper position 
is, the improbability of the last step of 
all - the advance of the savage-man into the civilized, without external help. 
I doubt the conversion of oats into Rye: their conversion into a . pile-trees 
I disbelieve: but what I have undertaken to disprove is the conversion of 
the unaided savage into civilized man". 'rchbishop , hately to 
Professor L. Sedgwick, 13 Feb. 1860, Samuel Butler Papers, British Library 
EG. 3020. L 
3 Notebook 'E', 47 4 Notebook 'D', 21 
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Again there were times when the whole theory seemed to appear in a rather unreal 
light. Such moments of doubt could never be completely excluded and there were 
times, even in his later life after he had fuUy developed his theory with the 
aid of the principle of Natural Selection, when he felt uncertainty and 
experienced flashes of unbelief. Vhile the imagination can bring about a new 
orientation of the mind towards reality, there are times when concentration lapses 
and the altern, tive view of nature, as deliberately designed and created, 
obtrudes into the picture. He described one such experience at the end of note- 
book 'E'. "It seems absurd proposition, that ever, budding tree and every 
buzzing in; ect and grazing animal owes its form to that form being the one alone 
out of innumerable other ones which has been preserved. " But then he immediately 
counters this faltering of the mind with an a)peal to analogy with generation. 
"But he it remembered how little part of the grand mystery is this - the law of 
growth, that which changes the acorn into the oak - In s'--ort all which, nutrition, 
growth and reproduction, is common to all living beings. " 
I 
This last note is important in two respects. First, it shows us the strength of 
the alternative 'explanation' or understanding of the universe in terms of design. 
Though that understanding may be suj, pressed by the power of the imagination 
evoking a different view of the world, yet there are still times when it comes 
back with a primitive force and compelling power. To take just one example of 
this in Darwin's later experience tov; ards the end of his life: The Duke of Argyll 
is supposed to have said to Darwin, (in the course of a conversation about 
Darwin's works on the 'Fertilization of Orchids', 'Earthworms' and various other 
observations he had made of the wonderful contrivances for certain purposes in 
nature) that it was impossible to look at these without seeing that they were 
the effect and expression of mind. "I shall never forget Y r. Darwin's answer, " 
the Duke afterwards related. "Tie looked at me very hard and said, ';? ell, that 
often comes over me with overwhelming force; but at other times, ' and he shock 
his head, vaguely adding, 'it seems to go away"' 
2 
1 Notebook '=. ' , 145 
2 Life and Letters of Chas. D,: rwin, Vol I, 316 
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Secondly, it reveals that the 'Blick', or 'world view' that is evoked by the 
kind of argument that Darwin had employed must be sustained, especially when 
it is threatened or challenged, by the reinforcement of the imagination with 
further examples and analogies in just the wahr that Darwin does it in this note. 
This shows that it is not an inference drawn from premises, for in order to 
sustain the inference one would not need to be continually chec: ing the logic 
of the argument. That, if done correctly in the first instance, is inviolable. 
But here if the 'conclusion' is threatened it has to be revivified and strengthened 
by analogies and instances which do not bear the relation of premises to an 
inference, but have a quite different, cumulative effect upon the imagination. 
However, despite occasional doubts and misgivings Darwin was sufficiently 
persuaded of the validity and impressed with the scope of the world-view which 
he had illustrated so prolifically in the notebooks. He thought the traditional 
view of creation very poor and inadequate in comparison. "Khat a magnificent 
view one can take of the world", he wrote. "Astronomical causes, modified by 
unknown ones cause changes in geography and changes in climate, and climate 
super-added to change of climate from physical causes - then super-added changes 
of form in the organic world, as adaptation and those changes affect each other 
and their bodies by certain laws of harmony keep perfect in this themselves - 
instincts alter, reason is formed and the world peopled with myriads of distinct 
forms. This is a period short of eternity to the present time, to the future - 
How far grander this idea from cramped imagination that God created (warring 
against those very laws he stablished in all organic nature) the Rhinoceros of 
Java and Sumatra ... he has made a long succession of vile mollusca animals. 
How beneath the dignity of him who is supposed to have said let there be light 
1 
and there was light. " 
1 Notebook 'D', 36 
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Darwin had arrived at a 'world-view', basically materialistic, 
1 
which he 
regarded as superior in its scope and application to the traditional view of 
creation, which was much too circumscribed for him, ("Has the Creator since the 
Cambrian formation gone on creating animals with the same general structure - 
miserable, limited view -"). 
2 
He had convinced himself of this, but would he be 
able to convince others ? What was there to make his evolutionary speculations, 
his affinities and analogies between the animal world and man differ from the 
speculations of Lamarck and the author of the Vestiges, neither of which had 
done much previously to convince the scientific world of the superiority of this 
understanding of organic nature ? Nothing, it would appear, except the principle 
of natural selection, the discovery of which he chanced upon in October 1838 
while in the middle of his speculations in his notebooks. Natural selection or 
the survival of the fittest which, as Darwin himself agreed is the more accurate 
and less misleading term, is in any case a truism. "No amount of argument will 
alter the fact, " says H. G. Cannon, "that the survival of the fittest by means of 
natural selection is a truism. The expression 'survival of the fittest' is 
tautological ... and moreover the whole idea is not the property of Darwin ... 
(he) has no more right to claim the idea of the survival of the fittest as (his) 
own than any particular mathematician can lay claim to the elementary problems 
of Euclid - or to the idea that the shortest distance between two points is a 
straight line! " 
3 
H. F. Osborne has pointed to the obvious appreciation of the 
power of Natural Selection which Tennyson shows in his In L; emoriam, 
Dean Farrar, in Darwin's funeral service in ,; estminster Abbey, said, "This 
man, on whom for years bigotry and ignorance poured out their scorn, has 
been called a materialist. I do not see in a: 11 his writings one trace of 
materialism. I read in every line the healthy, noble, well-balanced wonder 
of a Tirit profoundly reverent, kindled into deepe tbýadmiration for the 
works of God. " Quoted by R. Y. Young in 'The Impac ýon'`ýonventional Thought', 
in The Victorian Crisis of Faith, Ed. Anthony Symondson, 26. 
2 Notebook ' C' , 216 
j H. Graham Cannon, Lamarck and Modern Genetics, 71 & 72 
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the dedication of which precedes the Origin by ten years. 'When taxed about 
this the aged Tennyson replied, "The fact is that long before Darwin's work 
appeared these ideas were known and talked about. " 
1'2 
But more than this, 
when in the late 1860's the principle of Natural Selection as the sole means 
of evolution was widely discredited, we find, paradoxically, that the general 
theory of evolution survived nevertheless. This is something that calls for 
explanation. Our next section will be an attempt to show how this was possible. 
III 
Darwin considered that his theory was distinguished by, and differentiated from, 
the theories of his predecessors, particularly the speculations of the author of 
the Vestiges, and what he called 'the nonsense of Lamarck', by the principle of 
natural selection. He believed that in this he had discovered the vera causa of 
the change of one species into another. The weakness of all earlier theories of 
evolution, it was assumed, and the reason for their failure to enlist the support 
of scientific men, was that they gave no reasonable, or convincing account of how 
the transmutation of species might have come abcut. They were altogether too 
speculative. Lamarck had postulated a 'sentiment Interieur' which responde. to 
the changed needs and conditions of the organism, and so effected a transformation 
of it to fit its new environment. This was popularly misunderstood to mean 
evolution according to the wish, or whim, of the animal and was consequently 
ridiculed. Darwin himself dismissed it as nonsense, but without realizing that he 
had already adopted some of the ideas of Lamarck, and later, as he revised the 
origin, carne to adopt even more. The author of the Vestiges supposed that 
I H. F. Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin, 1894 
2 Thirty years earlier'illiam Buckland had amused his students in his 
lectures at Oxford by asserting that the stomach dominates everything in 
nature, and that the law of nature is "Eat or be eaten". Hannah Gordon, 
The Life and Correspondence of ; tilliam Buckland (1894), 31 
Even earlier Lamarck had outlined the struggle for survival thus: "Animals 
except those which are herbivorous, prey upon one another; and the 
herbivorous are exposed to the attacks of the flesh eating races. The 
stronger and best armed for attack eat the weaker, and the greater kinds 
eat the smaller. " 
Phil. Zool. tom. i, 113" Wuoted 
by Samuel Butler, Evolution, Old and New, 282 
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evolution came about through 'saltation', by the generation of the organism 
producing prodigious leaps between itself, its own structure and that of its 
offspring. This, too, was unacceptable, because there wý, s no proof of such 
leaps and the theory seemed too speculative and lacking in inductive foundation. 
The appeal and the success of Darwinism lay in its appearing to fill this gap, 
and provide a mechanism for change which was at once both plausible and 
ostensibly possessing an inductive character. Darwin insisted that the basis of 
change was slight variation in the organism. The evidence for this gras to be 
found in domestic animals. The means of change was the selection of animals 
possessing variations that iere profitable and their accumulation in successive 
generations. In domestic breeding the selection was done by man; in nature it 
was done by competition with other animals for food and the struggle with the 
elements which ensured that only the fittest and the best adapted to the 
conditions of life survived. It v. ias this new element in Darwin's theory that 
commended it to scientific men, though not all scientific men, and enabled the 
notion of evolution to gain general acceptance where formally it had failed for 
lack of cogency. Yet when the argument which Darwin had employed became arguably 
both incoherent and contradictory, the conclusion lived on in the public mind. 
When natural selecticn, as Darwin had first put it forward in The Origin, became 
discredited as the sole means of transmutation of organisms, and Darwin himself 
had to retract his earlier statements about it, nevertheless the general theory 
of evolution itself did not suffer. 
I 
There are three strands in the argument which reveals this development. 
First there are the attacks of Darwin's critics upon the principle of natural 
selection. The doctrine of natural selection came under sustained attack from 
the time The Origin appeared until the early 1870's when Darwin eventually 
withdrew from controversy into purely scientific observation and writing. 
I "I have always frankly admitted ... the inestimable benefit which he 
(Darwin) 
has conferred upon us by teaching us to believe in evolution - though main- 
taining that he has led us to believe in it on grounds which I for r. y own 
part cannot accept ... As for 'natural selection' frankly to me it now seems 
a rope of sand as in any way accounting for the 'origin of species. '" 
Samuel butler to Francis Darwin, Nov. 25,1877, Darwin Correspondence, (68) 
British Library. 
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When Darwin's work on Insectivorous Plants appeared in 1875 , 7allace wrote to 
to him in some surprise, 
"You do not make any remarks on the origin of these extraordinary 
contrivances for capturing insects. Did you think they were too 
obvious ?I daresay there is no difficulty, but I feel sure they 
will be seized on as inexplicable by Natural Selection, and your 
silence on the point will be held to show that you consider them so; " 
Darwin's retirement from controversy about natural selecticn followed hard upon 
the energetic attack of St. George ; 'ivart, which he conducted both in his book 
Genesis of Species (1871) and also in his review of the Descent of 
-Van 
in the 
^uarterly Review(1871). In the latter Yivart draws attention to several places 
in the Descent of Man where Darwin contradicts his earlier statements about 
natural selection. Darwin admits that he "probably attributed too much to the 
action of natural selection ... ", that he had not sufficiently taken into account 
structures which are neither injurious nor beneficial and which cannot, therefore, 
be explained by any form of selection. Such admissions, if true, Yivart main- 
tained, are fatal to Darwin's theory, for "the assignment of the law of 'natural 
selection' to a subordinate position is virtually an abandonment of the 
Darwinian theory: for the one distinguishing feature of that theory was the all 
sufficiency of 'natural selection"' 
2 
But the criticism and pressure upon Darwin to change his theory and qualify 
his position on natural selection had been there all along, ever since the 
publication of The Origin, and the formidable attack of W. ivart, which Darwin 
felt himself incapable of answering, was only the coup de gräce. Earlier, in 
1868, Darwin wrote to J. D. Hooker "I am glad you are going to touch on the 
statement that belief in natural selection is passing away. I do not suppose 
that even the ':. thenaeum' would pretend that the belief on the common descent 
of species is passing away, and this is the more important point. This now 
almost universal belief in evolution 
(somehow) of species, I think may be 
3 
fairly attributed in a large part to the Origin... 
1 Peter Vorzimmer, Chas. Darwin, The Years of Controversy, 254 
2 , uarterly Review, Vol. 131(July & Oct. 1871), 48 
3 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 3011. 
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This letter reveals how the conclusion may be detached from the argument, and 
yet be considered to survive. It illustrates the paradox that the theory of 
evolution, which required the principle of natural selection to make it appear 
cogent &nd viable to the scientific community, and to bring about its public 
acceptance, could nevertheless live on when the basis of its recognition had 
been destroyed. -,, volution is now, in Darwin's own words, brought about "somehow". 
But that was how things stood in relation to the theory of evolution before 
Darwin came on the scene. And such a position was then regarded as unsatisfactory 
by most naturalists, including Darwin himself. The justification for the Origin 
had been that it was supposed to have shown how evolution had come about. 
Such a conclusion that evolution had taken place] even if well 
founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how 
the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified, 
so as to acquire that perfection. 1 
What then was the real role of the principle of natural selection if it could 
be dispensed with in this way ? chat was the service it performed for the 
theory of evolution ? The answer to this is provided in a chance remark of 
Francis Darwin's in his introduction to Yore Letters of Chas. Darwin. There 
he stated that it was impossible to read the 1837 notebooks without feeling 
that Darwin was convinced of the mutability of species. However, 'he had not 
yet attained to a clear idea of natural selection, and therefore his views may 
not have had, even to himself, the irresistible convincing power they afterwards 
gained. " 
2 
The service natural selection performed was to aid Darwin's 
imagination and give it an even greater compelling power both for himself and 
others, than it already possessed. An illustration may help to bring out this 
point. In the notebooks Darwin considers that this theory must stop short of 
the descent of all species from one common stock, otherwise he would have to 
explain the origin of the eye. This seemed too great a leap for his imagination 
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth Edition), 2 
2 yore Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 38 
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at that stage. But in due course he overcame it; and he achieved this with 
the aid of the principle of natural selection, which helped him to imagine whF-t 
was before unimaginable, 
I i. e. the building up of a primitive eye spot into the 
complex organ of the eye by small favourable variations accumulated over millions 
of years. The latter argument seems to be no less speculative than the former, 
but the difference was that it was more amenable to the imagination and therefore 
easier to accept. The tenability of Darwin's theory seemed to be governed by 
what could be imagined as true or possible. 
2 
Thus in answer to `, ',. H. Harvey 
who asked him whether his four or five original forms were created as eggs or 
seed, or as full grown ? He wrote, "You hit me hard and fairly ... yet I still 
have an illogical sort of feeling that there is less difficulty in imagining 
the creation of an asexual cell, increasing by simple division. " 
3 
Natural selection was employed as an instrument for converting improbabilities 
into facts. It was this that -,, Uilliam dhewell objected to in The Origin. 
"First, it is assumed, that the mere possibility of imagining a series of 
steps of transition from one condition of organs to another, is to be 
accepted as a reason for believing that such transition has taken place: 
And next, that such a possibility being thus imagined, we may assume an 
unlimited number of generetions for the transition to take place in, and 
that this indefinite time may extinguish all doubt that the transitions 
really have taken place". ;. 'dhewell, Astronomy and General Physics , 
pp. xvii-xviii. 
"The demonstration Cof specific transformation by the accumulation of small 
changes in structure] can be modified without difficulty to fit any 
conceivable case. It is without scientific value, since it cannot be 
verified; but since the imagination has free rein, it is easy to convey 
the impression that a concrete example of real transmutation has been given. " 
Prof. 7i. R. Thompson. Introduction to The Origin of Species, Everyman Edition 
1956, T; o. 811. 
2 It would appear that Darwin attached such importance to the imagination 
that he considered the mere possibility of imagining circumstances under 
which a belief or theory might be regerded as true, as tending to confirm 
or establish those views. Thus there is the strange reference in his 
Autobiography to the truth of Christianity considered in this way. He says 
that he disliked giving up his belief (in Christianity) and tried to imagine 
evidence which would convince him again of the truth of the Gospels as, for 
example, the discovery of new manuscripts at Pompeii or elsewhere. "But I 
found it more and more difficult with free scope liven to my imagination, 
to invent evidence which would suffice to convince me. " Life of Darwin, 
Vol. 1,309- 
3 ?: ore Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 163 
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Secondly, Vorzimmer has argued, in a wel. 1 documented book, that the successive 
revisions of the Origin brought about its decline into incoherence and contra- 
diction. He concludes, 
None of the many modifications which Darwin had ... made in the Origin 
gave it the internal consistency it so sorely needed. Rather than 
changes, he saw his replies to criticism as clarifications and expansions 
upon his original views. Yet, in almost every case, his finding support 
for one weakened argument had, in effect, entailed his removing part of 
the support from another. 
By confusing the causes of variation with the causes of specie. tion; by 
totally rejecting saltative changes thereby committing himself completely 
to individual differences; by committing himself to speciation without 
(apparent) isolation; by tacitly and (often) credulously assumint the 
heritability of certain forms of variation; in all by a gradual and 
cumulative series of changes without full. awareness of their implications,, 
Darwin made the later Origin a mass of 'doubts, shifts of opinion, confused 
words, hedging, self-contradictions, endless shufflings with words, 
indecisiveness, hesitancies, inconsistencies'. 1 
Yet despite all this, the conclusion outlived the argument. But if we rightly 
understand the nature of Darwin's argument we can see how this came about. It 
was not in its wider scope a scientific argument. Had it been, the theory, or 
hypothesis of evolution, could not have survived the disasters that overtook it. 
It was rather an imaginative whole; it resembled in fact, the form and 
structure of the design argument, and was indeed its antithesis. By a series of 
analogies and illustrations it acquired a cumulative force the impetus of which 
was capable of effecting 'ein Blick', -a wholly new orientation of the mind 
upon reality. The psychological effect of such an argument may be likened to 
the pressure exerted gradually upon a large uneven stone lying upon the ground.. 
The stone is moved gradually by the force exerted upon it, until it reaches a 
point at which it suddenly rolls over to rest upon a new surface, and there it 
remains even when the pressure is removed ... So the steady, cumulative effect 
of this type of argument eventually effects a new orientation - and there it 
remains, like the stone on its new facet - the conclusion is capable of living 
on even when the 'argument' which brought it about has last its cogency. In this 
respect Darwin v. rote with some foresight and perspicacity about his argument to 
: iugh Falconer, Oct. Ist, 1 862 "... far from being surprised, I look at it as 
absolutely certain that very much in the Origin will be proved rubbish; but I 
expect and hope that the framework will stand. " 2 
I Peter Vorzimmer, Chas. Darwin, The Years of Controversy, 225 & : 26 
2 More Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 209 
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e- . F. Cannon, writing 
in the foreword to Vorzimmer's book states, 
The original Origin was not very logical, not all rigorous. Darwin was 
writing to convince, not to prove. He was trying to get across his own 
complex vision of how the world operates; and he seized upon any metaphors, 
any analogies, any line of argument that he had on hand ... his vision was an imaginative whole, tampering with it only made it more prosaic. 1 
This helps to explain why Darwin's theory of evolution could survive detailed 
criticism, and the inept attempts which he made to revise the argument for it. 
It could not have survived had it been strictly a scientific argument. 
The third strand in our argument also casts some further light on the matter. 
Ear-ier in this chapter we noted A. O. Lovejoy's contention that Darwin had largely 
left the theory of evolution where he had found it, that is, that all the principal 
arguments that were employed by Darwin and Huxley after 1859 to commend the theory 
had been known and employed at least fifteen years earlier by the author of the 
Vestiges. 
Lovejoy, however, having stated his case, leaves us with a riddle. How could the 
theory of evolution, so firmly rejected by the world in 181+5, under those 
circumstances receive recognition and acceptance after 1859 ? If the logical 
status of the argument had not changed what accounted for its later success ? 
The only explanation would appear to be in terms of the imaginative appeal and 
cumulative force of Darwin's argument. The crudities and baldness of the Vestiges 
position were overcome by the 'new element', natural selection, which presupposed 
all the steps to be infinitesimally small. Such gradualism, as we have already 
seen, greatly aided the imagination in conquering the difficulties of the stages 
of evolution, and conceiving the possibility of what before was unimaginable. It 
helped to overcome the residual resistance to the notion, and when this had been 
accomplished in the popular imagination, even though the principle of natura]. 
selection as the sole means of transmutation of species fell into disrepute, and 
became unintelligible in the face of criticism, the conclusion lived on. 
Peter Vorzininer, Chas. Darwin, The Years of Controversy, xiv 
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The arguments from palaeontology, morphology, etc., which before had been 
rejected, now appeared to have a place in the popular advocacy of evolution, 
and a cogency which they had formerly lacked. Huxley, who twenty years before 
could not accept them, employed them with great zeal and energy. 
Chauncey ;. right, the American mathematician, who came to Darwin's defence against 
r,, ivart, nevertheless had to admit the odd appearance of Darwin's argument and what 
had subsequently happened to it. 
It is, at first sight, a paradox that the views most peculiar to the 
eminent naturalist, whose work has been chiefly instrumental in effecting 
this change of opinion, should still be rejected, or regarded with 
suspicion, by those who have nevertheless been led by him to adopt the 
general hypothesis, - an hypothesis which his explanations have done so 
much to render credible. It would seem at first sight that Yr. Larwin 
has won a victory, not for himself, but for Lamarck. Transmutation, it 
would seem, has been accepted, but natural selection, its explanation, 
is still rejected by many converts to the general theory, both on 
religious and scientific grounds. I 
"Opinions, " he concluded, "are contagious, even where their reasons are resisted. " 
He might also have added, 'conclusions' survive even when the 'arguments' that 
led up to them are rejected, forgotten, or misunderstood. It is the special 
character of those mental processes that lead to this position that we are 
concerned with, and we have noted that the general theory of evolution, Darwin's 
'conclusion', outlived the demise of the principle of natural selection, the 
growing incoherence of Darwin's argument, and the extraordinary fact 
that the 
logical status of the argument for evolution was in principle the same before 
as after Darwin. 
N 
Here we must notice something else which throws light upon the character of 
Darwin's argument, and that is its closeness to, and affinity with, ideological 
thought. An ideology is a means of coping intellectually with reality, with life 
and the world. It 
is a wad of making sense of things, a way of interpreting 
reality, and an attitude towards 
it which is internally and subjectively coherent 
but does not necessarily have any objective validity, and indeed in principle can 
never be shown to possess it because it can never be satisfactorily proved or 
checked against 
the facts it purports to interpret. 
Chauncey 'bright, North American Review, 
July 1871 
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There are two things that must be noted about ideological thought. First, there 
is a lack of logical precision in the terms that are used. This was true of 
Darwin's use of the term 'natural selection'. He maintained that 'survival of 
the fittest' ;: as more accurate and meant the same thing, yet insisted on using 
the former to the confusion of himself and his readers. He acknowledged that it 
was not a cause of modification, but only a means, yet continued to speak of 
it 
as if it were an efficient cause. He considers in one place that the conditions 
of life include tatural selection, and in another that natural selection 
fully 
embraces the conditions of existence. He frequently makes natural selection 
synonymous with evolution, or descent with modification. 
I 
Secondly, there is a consequent re-interpretation of the facts to fit the theory. 
In ideological thinking no fact is allowed to count against the theory. The 
facts are 'redefined', as it were, to agree with it. One who thinks ideologically 
cannot lose because his answer, his interpretation, and his attitude have been 
derived from the ideology and are not subject to the facts. There is no possible 
argument, observation, or experiment that could disprove a firm ideological 
belief. If we take, for example, the classical Liberal economist, how do you 
prove to him that his laissez faire equations do not always hold ? No matter how 
many exceptions you may point to he will always explain that there has been an 
'interference' from a monopoly, a government, a physical accident, or a trade 
union coercion. 
There is a parallel between this kind of ideological thinking and Darwin's 
argument for evolution by means of natural selection. Fleeming Jenkin, in the 
North British Review of 1867 drew attention to the elusive nature of the 
evolutionary theory presented by Darwin. 
Even A. R. -:, allace, in a letter to Darwin, dated 2 July 1866 complains 
about the misunderstanding that the term 'natural selection' gives rise 
to, especially because of the imprecision with which Darwin uses it, and 
suggests that he drop it altogether, and use 'the survival of the fittest' 
instead. This Darwin refused to do. More Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol I, 
267 & 268. 
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Another argument against the efficiency of natural selection is, that 
animals possess many pecularities the special advantage of which it is 
almost impossible to conceive; such for instance, as the colour of 
plumage never displayed; and the argument may be extended by pointing 
out how impossible it is to conceive that the wonderful minutiae of say, 
a peacock's tail, with every little frond of every feather differently 
barred, could have been elaborated by the minute and careful inspection 
of rival gallants, or admiring Wives (sexual selection); but although 
arguments of this kind are probably correct, they admit of less absolute 
demonstration than the points already put. A true believer in natural 
selection can always reply, 'You do not know how closely frs Peahen 
inspects her husband's toilet, or you cannot be absolutely certain that 
under some unknown circumstances that insignificant feather was really 
important, ' or finally, he may take refuge in the word correlation, and 
say, other parts were useful which by the law of correlation could not 
exist without these parts; and although he may not have one single reason 
to allege in favour of any of these statements, he may safely defy us to 
prove the negative, that they are not true. The very same difficulty arises 
when a disbeliever tries to point out the difficulty of believing that some 
odd habit or complicated organ can have been useful before fully developed. 
The believer who is at liberty to invent any imaginary circumstances, will 
very generally be able to conceive some series of transmutations answering 
his wants. I 
Jenkin was right to use the terms 'believer' and 'unbeliever', for they are 
more appropriate to this case than any other. 
2 
;: n attitude towards reality has 
been taken up in advance; no fact or observation is allowed to count against it; 
and when apparent discrepancies are raised the process of reinterpretation and 
accommodation is invoked endlessly. Jenkin goes on, 
"He [the believer in evolution by natural selection) can invent trains 
of ancestors of whose existence there is no evidence; he can marshall 
hosts of equally imaginary foes; he can call up continents, floods, 
and peculiar atmospheres, he can dry up oceans, split islands and parcel 
out eternity at will; surely with these advantages he must be a dull 
fellow if he cannot scheme some series of animals and circumstances 
explaining our assumed difficulty quite naturally. Feeling the difficulty 
of coaling with adversaries who command so huge a domain of fancy, we will 
abandon these arguments; and trust to those which at least cannot be assailed 
by mere efforts of imagination. " 3 
North British Review Vol. Y. LVI, (1867> 293 
2 dilliam Hopkins wrote of The Origin, "Our author makes very little use 
of the verb 'to prove' in any of its inflexions. His formula is, 'I am 
convinced, ' 'I believe', and not 'I have proved'. 7e are not finding 
fault with these more modest forms of expression; but we may be a-Alowed, 
perhaps, to remark, that they are the formula of a creed and not of a 
scientific theory. " 
Frazer's Magazine, Vol. LXII, July 1860,80 & 87 (my italics). 
3 North British Review, Vol. XLVI, (867), 293. 
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The whole argument, however, had the same character. There was no point at 
which it could be firmly held down to factual or logical criticism. It partook 
of the same character as ideological thinking. J enkin imagined that in raising 
the question of a limit to the action of natural selection he was appealing to 
observation and experience. Darwin himself acknowledged that there appeared to 
be a limit to what could be accomplished by domestic selection and breeding, but 
his answer to Jenkin's criticism was characteristic. How do we know that when 
this limit has been reached the organism does not remain at that stage for a 
very long time before fresh variations appear which take it beyond the limit ? 
Can we affirm absolutely a limit, and if not what objection can we make to 
imagining that it might be surpassed ? 
An ideology has the quality of being practically shock-proof. Its usefulness 
is determined not by its conformity to fact, but by its facility in making 
reality amenable and tractable to the mental and moral condition of that section 
of humanity who adopt it. An ideology is discarded not when it ceases to 
conform to the facts, for such a situation can never arise - the possibilities 
of its accommodation and reinterpretation can never be exhausted - but when it 
ceases to be useful, and is replaced by some other interpretation of the world. 
In other words, when it ceases to meet an inner psychic need of mankind rather 
than when it is shown to be inconsistent with the facts of the case. 
V 
Darwin regarded his concluding remarks of the second volume of "Variation in 
Animals and Plants under Domestication" as the best account and summary of his 
position on the question of teleology, and he thought, on the whole, unanswered. 
It is worth, therefore, quoting it here in extenso. 
If an architect were to rear a noble and commodious edifice, without 
the use of cut stone, by selecting from the fragments at the base of a 
precipice wedge-formed stones for his arches, elongated stones for his 
lintels, and flat stones for his roof, we should regard him as the 
paramount power. Now the fragments of stone, though indispensable to 
the architect, bear to the edifice built by him the same relation which 
the fluctuating variations of organic beings bear to the varied and 
admirable structures ultimately acquired by their modified descendents. 
°'1 
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Some authors have declared that natural selection (the architect) explains 
nothing, unless the precise cause of each slight individual difference be 
made clear. If it were explained to a savage utterly ignorant of the art 
of building, how the edifice had been raised stone upon stone, and why 
wedge-formed fragments were used for the arches, flat stones for the roof 
s-c.; and if the use of each part and of the whole building r; e, "e pointed 
out, it would be unreasonable if he declared that nothing had been made 
clear to him, because the precise cause of the shape of each fragment could 
not be told. But this is a nearly parallel case with the objection that 
selection explains nothing, because we know not the cause of each individual 
difference to the structure of each being. 
The shape of the fragments of stone at the base of a precipice may be called 
accidental, but this is not strictly correct; for the shape of each depends 
on a long sequence of events, all obeying natural laws; on the nature of 
the rock, on Sines of deposition or cleavage, on the form of the mountain, 
which depends on its upheaval and subsequent denudation, and last on the 
storm or earthquake which throws down the fragments. But in regard to the 
use to w^ich the fragments may be put, their shape may be strictly said to 
be accidental. r. nd here we are led to face a great difficulty, in alluding 
to which I am aware that I ein travelling beyond my proper province. An 
omniscient Creator must have foreseen every consequence which results from 
the laws imposed by Him. But can it reasonably be maintained that the 
Creator intentionally ordered, if we use the words in the ordinary sense, 
that certain fragments of rock should assume certain shapes so that the 
builder might erect his edifice ? If the various laws which have determined 
the shape of each fragment were not predetermined for the builder's sake, 
can it be maintained with any greater probability th t He specially ordained 
for the sake of the breeder each of the innumerable variations in any 
domestic animals and plants; - many of these variations being of no service 
to man, and not beneficial, far more often injurious to the creatures them- 
selves ? Did He ordain that the crop and tail feathers of the pigeon should 
vary in order that the fancier might make his grotesque pouter and fantail 
breeds ? Did he cause the frame and mental qualities of the dog to vary in 
order that a breed might be formed of indomitable ferocity, with jaws fitted 
to pin down the bull for man's brutal sport ? But if we give up the 
principle in one case - if we do not admit that variations of the primeval 
dog were intentionally guided in order that the greyhound, for instance, 
that perfect image of symmetry and vigour, might be formed, - no shadow 
of reason can be assigned for the belief that variations alike in nature 
and the result of the same grand laws, which have been the groundwork 
through natural selection of the formation of the most perfectly adapted 
animals in the world, man included, were intentionally and specially guided. 
However much we may wish it, we can hardly follow Professor Asa Gray in his 
belief "that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines", like a 
stream "along definite and useful lines of irrigation". If we assume that 
each particular variation was from the beginning of all time pre-ordained, 
then that plasticit of organisation, which leads to many in. urious 
deviations of structure, as "ell es the redundant power of reproduction 
which inevitably leads to a struggle for existence, and, as a consequence, 
to the natural selection in the survival of the fittest, must appear as 
superfluous laws of nature. On the other hand, an omnipotent and omniscient 
Creator ordains everything and foresees everything. Thus we are brought 
face to face with a difficulty as insoluble as is that of free will and 
predestination. I 
1 Charles Darwin, Variation in Animals and Plants under Domestication, 524 -526 
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It is clear from this passage that in Darwin's view, even if there . ere a 
Deity capable of foreseeing all events, yet He could not be regarded as 
intentionally ordering them for that would make natural selection superfluous. 
In other words, what ire have here is a fundamental clash between Darwin's system 
and a teleological interpretation of the world. These consitute two mutually 
exclusive attitudes to reality which cannot be reconciled at the metaphysical 
level, and that was why Darwin could never concede any place at all to design in 
his system. The notion of chance or random variation was basic to his belief. 
R. Hooykaas has written, "In spite of his waverings and hesitations and 
agnosticism there is some kind of metaphysics behind his dislike of design and 
miracle, a dislike which goes deeper than would bevarranted by mere methodology. "1 
Many of Darwin's contemporaries, including those who adopted the role of apologists 
for his views assumed that evolution by natural selection could be reconciled with 
some understanding of Providential guidance, or at least was not exclusive of a 
teleological account of creation. T. H. Huxley was amongst those who adopted this 
position. In his essay on the 'Reception of the Origin' in Life and Letters of 
Charles Darwin, he argued against those who asserted that Darwin had reinstated 3 
chance and banished teleology from the world. Darwin, he said, did not appeal 
to chance but to an unknown cause, yet cause there is, as the fundamental 
assumption of science is that every event has a cause; the universe is governed 
by law. Therefore the present state of the world can be attributed to the 
working out of natural laws, and an omniscient being could have predicted from 
the nebulous, primeval cosmic vapour, what shape and form the fauna of Britain 
would have in 1869. Darwin he maintained had not banished teleology, but only 
driven it further back to the molecular structure of the universe. The teleological, 
and mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. 
2 
I R. Hooykaas, The Principle of Uniformity, 174 
2 T. H. Huxley, in Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, p. 202 
(appeared first in 'The Genealogy of Animals', The Academy, 1869 
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But this is precisely the view that Darwin considered and rejected. An 
omniscient being may foresee, but does not necessarily foreordain; if he does 
foreordain then the principle of the Darwinian system is rendered superfluous. 
Thus the deity in Darwin's account is no more than a passive spectator of that 
for which he is not himself responsible -a sort of universalisation and 
deification of the helplessness and impotency of the individual in face of the 
enigma of the universe. Huxley's apology ma, "" have been evoked by the desire to 
make iarwin's philosophy respectable to the mid-Victorian mind, and to appeal to 
the desire prevalent in the late 'sixties, to have a doctrine of evolution which 
was planned or directed, 
1'2 
but it did nothing, in fact, to reconcile teleology 
with natural selection. 
Lyell and Lsa Gray both tried in their different ways to find a place for 
teleology within the Darwinian doctrine of evolution. Asa Gray, a naturalist 
and practising American Presbyterian, was reluctant to think that Darwin's theory 
entailed a rejection of design. In his articles in the 'atlantic Monthly in which 
he reviewed the Origin, he canvassed the possibility that Darwin was, after all, 
a theist, and that his theory was not incompatible with a teleological inter- 
pretation of organic nature. Here he employed the metaphor to which Darwin 
referred in his final chapter of Animals and Plants. 
... we should advise 
Mr. Darwin to assume, in the philosophy of his 
hypothesis, that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines. 
Streams flowing over a sloping plain by gravitation (here the counter- 
part of natural selection) may have worn their actual channels as they 
flowed; yet their particular causes may have been assigned; and where 
we see them forming definite lines of irrigation, after a manner 
unaccountable in the laws of gravitation and dynamics we should believe 
that the distribution was designed. 3 
1 A. Nllegaard, Darwin and the General Reader, 32 & 123 ff. 
2 For example, F. T. 1Hutton wanted directed evolution and failed to understand 
Darwin's antagonism to it. "The greatest objection, it seems to us, which 
can be brought against the theory 
[Darwin's] is its reliance on natural 
causes and chance in effecting the changes. ;, e should be more inclined to 
refer the modifications which species of animals or plants have undergone 
to the direct wi: 1 of God ... " The Geologist 
(1860), 3: 471 
3 Asa Gray, Darwiniana, 122 
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Though Darwin had a great respect for Gray, and had had a correspondence with 
him from before the publication of The Orijin, he found this interpretation of 
his position quite unacceptable. He confessed himself to be in a muddle, but 
not sufficiently muddled to see that Gray's account of evolution end design 
would not agree with his own. He urrote to Gray, Nov., 26th, 1860 
I grieve to say that I cannot honestly go as far as you do about design 
. To take a crucial example, you lead me to infer (p. 44) that you believe 
that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines. I cannot 
believe this; and I think you would have to believe that the tail of the 
Fantail was led to vary in the number and direction of its feathers in 
order to gratify the caprice of a few men. Yet if the Fantail had been a 
wild bird, and had used its abnormal tail for some specific end, as to 
sail before the wind, unlike other birds, every one would have said, '. ihat 
a beautiful and designed adaptation'. ', gain, I say I an, and shall ever 
remain, in a hopeless muddle. 1 
When later Gray asked Darwin what would convince him of design, he answered, 
If I saw an angel come down to teach us good, and I was convinced from 
others seeing him that I wrýs not mad, I should believe in design. If 
I could be convinced thoroughly that life and mind was in an unknown 
way a function of other imponderable force, I should be convinced. If 
man was made of brass or iron and no ;; ay connected with any other organism 
which had ever lived I should perhaps be convinced. But this is childish 
writing. 2 
It is interesting to notice that Darwin concedes that in principle he would be 
convinced by a miracle or discontinuity in the chain of events. Only such a 
divine interposition he consiaered could evidence design. Yet as ve have seen 
the rationale of Darwin's whole system was to exclude a priori the , ossibility 
of such an interposition. The rules were so constructed as to preclude it by 
definition. Analogy with contemporary experience is the ground for judging all 
that has happened in the past. The extremely small gradations witnessed in 
domestic selection, and selected in nature by the survival of the fittest, are 
extrapolated to explain the existence of every living thing, and where gaps exist, 
according to this principle, they can and must be filled in by the imagination. 
3 
I Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol II, 353-354+ 
2 Ibid., 377 
3 "If you agree with me in thinking such an interposition of the Deity uncalled 
for, I can see no reason whatever for believing in such interposition in the 
case of natural beings, in which strange and admirable peculiarities have been 
naturally selected for the creature's own benefit... For the life of me I 
cannot see any difficulty in natural selection producing the most exquisite 
structure, if such structure can be arrived at by gradation, and I know from 
experience how hard it is to name any structure towards which at least some 
gradations are not known. " Darwin to Lyell,, 1860, Life and Letters of C as T) f, rmnn TT n 
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But this only serves to point up again the difference between Darwin and his 
apologists. k teleological explanation was impossible for Darwin because it 
was irreconcilable with his world view, which was metaphysical rather than 
scientific. 
It is certain that Darwin viewed design as a threat to his theory. :, single 
instance, if proved, would "annihilate my theory", "It would be absolutely fatal 
to my theory. " 
1 
That was because the distinguishing feature of his system, 
which commended the notion of organic evolution where his predecessors Lamarck 
and Chambers had failed, was 'natural selection'. Natural selection must have 
not only small, but also random variations upon which to work. If the variations 
were not in all directions, good and bad, so that the struggle for existence 
could 'select' those that were favourable, Darwin's theory would have nothing to 
distinguish it from directed evolution or saltative evolution, where the adapta- 
tion of the organism to its environment must ultimately be attributed to a 
supreme intelligence, and not to the mere accidental operation of the laws of 
nature. Anything, therefore, which threatened the basic principle of natural 
selection, threatened the whole ideological view of the world which rested upon 
it. It is not surprising that Darwin was extremely sensitive on this point and 
wound not accept the efforts of hip friends and well-wishers to effect a reconcili- 
ation between teleology and his theory. The notion of chance was essential to his 
system. Von Baer, the German embryologist, saw the centrality of this concept to 
Darwinism, when he wrote 
Apparently Darwinism has triumphed precisely because it denies purposes 
in nature and because it insists on explaining the appearance of purposiveness 
in nature by blind forces producing a host of life forms and the elimination 
of the less fit by natural selection. 2 
I Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 150 
2 From Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung (1873), no. 130,1986 - 1988 
Translation by D. L. Hull. 
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Any attempt, therefore, to remove chance from the system and replace it with 
purpose was hostile to the whole rationale of Darwin's theory. Darwin's 
response to all these attempts to wean him away from his position was to return 
to his belief that variations are random. Perhaps one of the clearest expressions 
of this and his rejection of such an overture is in a letter to Lyell about the 
time of his correspondence with Gray. 
... I 
believe you think, with Asa Gray, that I have not allowed enough 
for the stream of variation having been guided by a higher power. I 
have lately had a good deal of correspondence on this head. Herschel 
in his Physical Geography has a sentence with respect to the Origin, 
something to the effect that the higher law of Providential arrangement 
should always be stated. But astronomers do not state that God directs 
the course of each comet and planet. The view that each variation has 
been providentially arranged seems to me to make Natural Se: ection 
entirely superfluous, and indeed takes the whole case of the appearance 
of new species out of the range of science. But what makes me most 
object to Asa Gray's view is the study of the extreme variability of 
domestic animals. He who does not suppose that each variation in the 
pigeon wt; s providentially caused, by accumulating which variations, man 
made a Fantail, cannot, I think, logica-ily- argue that the tail of the 
woodpecker was formed by variz: tions providentially ordained. It seers 
to me that variýtions in the domestic and wild conditions are due to 
unknown causes, and are without purpose and in so far accidental; and 
that they become purposeful only when they are selected by man for his 
pleasure, or by what we call Natural Selection in the struggle for life, 
and under changing conditions. I do not wish to say that God did. not 
foresee everything which would ensue; but here comes very nearly the 
same sought of wretched imbroglio as between free will and preordained 
necessity. I doubt whether I have made what I think clear; but certainly 
A. Gray's notion of the course of variation having been led like a stream 
of water by gravity seems to me to smash the whole affair ... 1 
The rejection of design was not, then, arbitrary or incidental to Darwin's theory. 
It was essential to it, and to the view of the world which he was seeking to 
evoke by his argument. Design represented the totality of the opposing view 
and could not at any point be admitted. Few of Darwin's contempories seemed to 
appreciate his concern about this, and thereby failed to grasp his true position. 
The attempt to conflate the two positions, by affirming that ultimately every- 
thing that happened was caused, was in Darwin's view "mere verbiage". 
T. V. ', ', `ollaston cýnnsidered that Darwin preferred to run the risk of being ship- 
wrecked bodily on the rocks of Scylla 
[chance] 
, than run the slightest risk 
from the opposite Charybdis 
[design] 2 
1 More Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol I, 191 & 192 
2 D. L. Hull, Darwin c: His Critics, 131+ 
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VI 
Ne have still to give some account of Darwin's muddled state of mind, to which 
he frequently confessed, and this would appear to be best explained in terms of 
the conflict between the two world views. Darwin's advocacy of the naturalistic 
world view had in his own mind effectivel; ' conquered the other concept of 
creation by design but had not totally eliminated it. Evidence for this is to 
be seen in the way in which he often referred in his letters to an 'inner 
consciousness' which points in the direction of a supreme intelligence responsible 
for the fashion of the world and the adaptation of organic life to it. In the 
midst of his correspondence with Gray, when he has been firmly rejecting any 
notion of design, or providentially guided variation, he ývrote, 
If anything is designed, certainly man must be; one's 'inner consciousness' 
(though a false guide) tells one so. I cannot believe that man's 
rudimentary mammae ... were designed. If I was to say I believed this, 
T should believe it in the same incredible manner as the orthodox believe 
in the Trinity in Unity ... 1 
; ie have seen how in the early notebooks, in the materialistic philosophy 
developed there, Darwin tended to reject the notion that the innate idea of God 
in the human consciousness was something directly implanted. He considered that 
it had grown up in the human mind as it had developed from an animal state. But 
the idea continued to haunt him and he seemed incapable of expunging it entirely 
from his consciousness. Throughout his life he remained unsure how much weight 
to give it, over against the picture of the world and human life that he had 
developed. Thus, we find him writing to F. E. Lbbot, the editor of a freethinking 
paper in Boston, who had greatly admired Darwin's work, and enlisted him as a 
patron, 
My views 
Ion 
religion] are far from clear, as you will readily perceive, 
if you read the last page in my Variation of Animals and Plants under 
Domestication. And I can never make up m m; nd how far our this 
important word is unclear in the original) an 
inward conviction that there must be some Creator or First Cause is 
really trustworthy evidence. 2 
I Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 382 
2 Darwin Collection 139112 (written September 6th, 1871 
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This fits exactly with the testimony of Julia ;, edgewood regarding the religious 
views of Darwin, which she wrote down for Francis rarwin when he was preparing a 
life of his father. She states that from his books one would conclude a complete 
neutrality on religious questions. 
This is what everybody would say. But what I feel is that in looking 
back at the impression left on me by intercourse, it is rather different. 
very one, I suppose, who feels Religion infinitely the most important 
subject of human a. tention would be ar. are of a certain hostility towards 
it in his attitude, so far as it was revealed in private life. : nd that is to me very remarkable; I should say that it was a growing hostility 
while a_l the apparent reasons for it were vanishing qualities. [. e. Churchmen were tending to adopt an evolutionary view' .I think I 
partly see why this was the case. I remember, of course dimly in some sense, 
but ver,; vividly in others, a conversation more than 30 years ago, 
certainly long before the publication of the Origin in which he first told 
me a little of the scope of the book, (this would be in the early 1850's) 
so far as that it was a scheme of what is now called Evolution - so far at 
least as thEt it eras an alternative to the ideas we then all held of the 
beginning of this world by an act of Creation. And I recall my own 
expression of extreme repugnance to this idea and the sense of loss in 
giving up the belief in Creation. I hardly remember a single distinct 
word in the conversation, but just his last words, 'I cannot conceive any 
wish about the matter one wa; or another' , are so clear to me as if they 
had been spoken yesterday, at least both the meaning and the tone of voice 
and the look comes back to me now though perhaps the words may not be 
exactly literal. He felt he was confronting some influence that adulterated 
the evidence of fact. And I think he felt this all the more because he was 
not so entirely without it himself as he thought. When he sat down to write 
he was entirely without it. But perhaps all the More a little of it -I 
mean of the spirit that mingles wish with belief - crept into his attitude 
to other things, and it became something he recognised as a disturbing 
influence, or at least that he was insensibly aware of in that light. And 
it seems to me that as Religion came nearer to him he aaw this more clearly. 
I am sure there was nothing in his mind hostile to the idea of a creative 
will. Indeed almost the last words he said to me were what I took to be 
such an expression of this belief, at least of a tendency towards it. It 
was one da;, - when I was standing in the dining room, and he came up quite 
abruptly and began without any preface, in a way as if the subject had 
been much in his mind - 'The reason that I can never give in to the belief 
that we are all naturally inclined to, of a first cause, ' he did not say a 
personal first cause, but he gave me the impression of meaning that, 'is 
that I look upon all human feeling as traceable to some germ in the animals', 
and then he went on to tell me why this seemed to hint to conflict with the 
other. 1 
This throws some light upon the inner conflict that Darwin experienced which 
accounts for his state of mind on this fundamental question, and the consequent 
shifts and uncertainties. The naturalistic position he had taken up dictated 
that he exclude the notion of design in the universe, and the concommitant of 
a supreme creative intelligence. But while his mind and his imagination moved 
I Darwin Collection 139/12 
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in that direction, his 'inner consciousness' still asserted the possibility 
of a first cause -a personal first cause - responsible for the order and 
design of the world and man himself. But the horns of the dilemnia upon which 
he ,; as impaled were: What significance could he attach to such 'inner 
consciousness' when the mind and nature of man had derived by mere chance, as 
it were, from the mind and nature of animals ?1 The very nature of this 
spiritual conflict, however, and the lateness of its manifestation, are proof 
of the persistence and strength of this a priori conception of God and the 
opposing view of nature which it represented. All Darwin's energies and the 
persistent bent of his mind and imagination had been directed to establishing 
an alien view of the world. Yet the notion of God and design refused to be 
totally obliterated. 
1 "... I cannot put much or any faith in the so-called intuitions of the 
human mind, which have been developed, as I cannot doubt, from such a 
mind as animals possess; and what would their convictions or intuitions 
be worth ... ?" 
Darwin to Lord Farrer, "ugust 1881 , More Letters of Chas. Larwin, Vol. I, 395 
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I 
The success of the theory of evolution, as advocated by Darwin in The Origin, 
represented a profound trauma for Natural Theology and, in particular, the 
Argument from Design. The history of the argument from that time has been one 
of attempts to come to terms with the problems posed by natural selection and 
the theory of descent, and it has never enjoyed the same prominence and popularity 
that it enjoyed in the pre-Darwinian era. Then it was an effective weapon in the 
armoury of Christian apologetic, but since that time it has been regarded as 
something which itself needs defending. The process of readjustment and the 
attempts to reconcile design and evolution have taken many different forms. The 
force of Darwin's argument, as we have seen, was to exclude teleology, for if the 
path of evolution had been directed by some supreme intelligence then the necessity 
for natural selection would disappear. Yet it was natural selection which was the 
new element which Darwin had introduced into his argument to make evolution 
creditable. On this point Darwin refused to give way, for he saw that he was 
dealing with two mutually exclusive principles. 
There were, however, those, like Asa Gray, who were unwilling to believe that 
this was the case, and cherished the belief that Darwin did not really reject 
design, and that his theory was not ultimately exclusive of it. 
Gray considered that there are two ways of bringing about a reconciliation 
between Darwin and design. In the first place he considered that intellectual, 
or teleological, and mechanical views of nature were not repugnant. The 
traditional. way of regarding organisms was as ultimate facts, to be interpreted 
theologically and viewed in relation to the Divine mind. It tended to be 
assumed that what was unexplained scientifically was also inexplicable. 
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The Darwinian approach was to consider organic phenomena as resolvable under 
investigation and to seek to explain them as attributable to natural causes. 
"But does the one, " Gray asks, "really exclude the other ? Does the investiga- 
tion of physical causes stand opposed to the theological view, and the study of 
the harmonies between mind and nature? More than this, is it not most 
presumable that an intellectual conception realized in Nature would be realized 
through natural agencies ?"1 The ultimate why of natural creation, which 
naturalists have tended to attribute to the Divine mind, is not necessarily in 
conflict with the proximate how. It is the latter that Darwin had undertaken 
to investigate. "He conceives of a physical connection between allied species; 
but we suppose he does not deny their intellectual connection as related to a 
supreme intelligence. Certainly we see no reason why he should, and many reasons 
why he should not ?"2 
Within the evolutionary process itself, assuming the hypothesis to be true, there 
are evidences which would appear to point to design. Some account has to be 
given of the emergence of sterility, between species. Darwin had not been able 
to explain this fact. But whether it is original or derived, Gray argued, an 
arrangement of this nature, 
to keep apart those forms which have, or have acquired (as the case 
may be), a certain moderate amount of difference, looks to us as 
much designed for the purpose, as does a ratchet to prevent reverse 
motion in a wheel. If species have originated by divergence this 
keeps them apart. 3 
A most formidable difficulty for the Darwinian theory, Gray considered, was 
the necessity of explaining the production and specialization of organs. Wherever 
Darwin attempted to do this he reminded Gray of Lamarck, and showed how little 
advance had been made in this subject in the course of a century. 
Here purely natural explanations fail. The organs being given, natural 
selection may account for some improvement; if given a variety of sorts 
or grades, natural selection might determine which should survive and 
where it should prevail. 4 
1 Asa Gray, Essays and Reviews pertaining to Darwinism,, p. 17 
2 Ibid., p. 18 
3 Ibid., p. 41 
4 Ibid., p. 42 
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The best the theory of evolution can do here is to make the most of gradation 
and adherence to type, as suggestive of derivation, and unaccountable on any 
other scientific view, but the attempt to explain how such a development might 
come about is altogether too conjectural and unsatisfactory. "As to why it is 
so, the philosophy of efficient cause, and even the whole argument from design, 
would stand, upon the admission of such a theory of derivation, precisely where 
they stood without it, " and Gray concludes with the pious hope that "lyr. Darwin, 
in proposing a theory which suggests a how that harmonizes these facts into a 
system, we trust implies that all was done wisely, in the highest sense designedly,; 
and by an intelligent first cause. " 
The second way in which Gray sought to reconcile Darwin and teleology was by 
availing himself of the loophole which Darwin had left in The Origin when he had 
referred to the commencement of life on this planet. There he left open the 
possibility that the Creator had breathed life into a few forms or one. 
2 
If this were the case then we are confronted with design in the original organic 
form, whatever that might have been. What, therefore, was to hinder Paley's 
argument being given a further a fortiori extension. Paley had himself allowed 
that generation did nothing to invalidate his argument, but rather enhanced it. 
Watches which were so constructed that they could produce other watches like 
themselves were even greater marvels of design than non-productive watches. Let 
us suppose then that the watches are made in such a way as to produce "better 
watches, and contrivances adapted to successive conditions, and so at length 
turns out a chronometer, a town clock, or a series of organisms of the same type"3 
God can take account of all contingencies from the beginning and make allowance 
for them. The whole developing plan of evolution is before him and contemporan- 
eous with the Divine mind. 
1 Asa Gray, Essays and Reviews pertaining to Darwinism, p. 43 
2 Darwin's actual words at the close of The Origin were, "There is a grandeur 
in this view of life, with its several powers having been originally breathed 
by the Creator into a few forms or into one ... " Origin 
(Sixth ed. ) The 
difference between this and the first ed. is that 'by the Creator' has been 
added. ( p. 403) 
3 Asa Gray, Essays and Reviews, etc., 4.6 
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Gray, however, recognised that it was not sufficient to reconcile design with 
evolution. The nettle of natural selection had to be grasped if the public 
were to be convinced that Darwinism was not incompatible with theism and teleology. 
Hence Gray's ingenious attempt to compare descent by natural selection with the 
course of a river which follows the natural terrain but may be considered as 
directed by the contours along which it flows. The Creator may, therefore, be 
thought of as providing the clue for evolution to find its way through the 
labyrinth of natural selection from its earliest beginning to its final outcome 
in man. 1 
The attempts of Gray and other theistic evolutionists to find room for design 
alongside the Darwinian theory highlights the difference between their position 
and that of pre-Darwinian teleologists. The latter had appealed confidently 
to design in nature as evidence for the existence of a supreme creative 
intelligence. The latter could do no more than appeal for a hearing for 'design 
as a possible interpretation of a theory that was at best indifferent and at 
worst inhospitable to such a view. 
II 
It is significant that not merely theists like Gray were concerned about the 
reinstatement of teleology after Darwin. Samuel Butler was of the opinion that 
Darwin, with his theory of natural selection, had banished design from nature. 
This, he thought, was unwarrantable and mounted a strong attack upon Darwin in 
Evolution, Old and New. He considered that the frivolities of learned commentators 
on Paley, in the decades prior to Darwin, had done harm and set up a reaction 
against teleology. But the concept of design was fundamental to our understanding 
of nature and could not easily be dismissed. 
The idea of design - or perception by an intelligent living being, of 
ends to be obtained and of the means of obtaining them - and the idea 
of the tendons of the foot and the ligament which binds them down, 
come together so forcibly, that no matter how strongly Professors Haeckel 
and Clifford and Mr. Darwin may try to separate them, they are no sooner 
pulled asunder that they straightway fly together again of themselves. 2 
1A writer in MacMillan's Magazine put it picturesquely, "The infinitude of 
small deviations from the parent type ... may be regarded as a labyrinth 
laid out by the hand of the Creator, through which he furnishes a clue to 
a higher state of being, in the principle which rewards every step in the 
right direction. " (1861), 241 The metaphor of the labyrinth is 
reminiscent of Asa Gray's illustration. 
2 Samuel Butler, Evolution. Old and new_ 2'4 
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Darwin and his followers had denied design, as having any appreciable share in 
the formation of organisms at all. Paley and the theologians insisted on design, 
but upon a designer outside the universe and the organism. The third view, 
which Butler advocated, was that which he believed was held by Buff on, improved 
by Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and borrowed from him by Lamarck, that is, that the 
designer which has designed organisms, resided within, and has been embodied in 
the organisms themselves. 
1 
Life, according to Butler, is its own designer 
it... it is more consistent with reason and the common use of words to see the 
designer of each living form in the living form itself, than to look for its 
designer in some other place or person. " 
2 
In a letter dated November 25,1877 to Francis Darwin Butler says that, while 
he had at first accepted Darwin's arguments about natural selection, when he 
came to read Mivart's criticisms he at once felt something more was needed to 
give an aim to variations. This led him to adopt a Lamarckian position, 
because Lamarck's theory of evolution was not incompatible "with a teleological 
point of view, " and was "only different from Paley's in so far as the designer 
with Paley is from without, and with Lamarck from within. " 
3 
This Lamarckian 
idea of evolution being directed from within the organism, has been revived in 
recent years by Sir Alistair Hardy who has argued that animal consciousness may 
be regarded as a factor which operates in natural selection and the evolutionary 
process. Consciousness modifies the behaviour of the animal and motivates 
exploratory actions. If these are successful they lead to an advantage of that 
animal over its competitors and to increased survival. Such a view, Hardy argues, 
affects our understanding of Darwinian evolution. If mind and consciousness are 
a factor in the direction of evolution it is no longer the materialist creed it 
was formerly considered to be. These views are in many respects similar to 
Butler's. 
1 Samuel Butler, Evolution, Old and New, 31 
2 Ibid., 30 & 31 
3 Darwin Correspondence, British Library, 68. 
Z See Sir Alistair Hardy, The Biology of God, 53 ff. 
-193- 
Thus we see that the loss of a teleological view, which the Darwinian position 
appeared to entail, was felt not only by traditional and orthodox theists who 
had a particular apologetic axe to grind, but by others too, who nevertheless 
felt the need for an aim and purpose behind evolution. 
As Ellegaard points out, in Darwin and the General Reader, while the public at 
this time were prepared to accept a doctrine of evolution, they were not prepared 
to accept one which excluded teleology. 
I 
The most popular position was that of 
directed selection and derivation, a position which paid homage to both science 
and religion. The Duke of Argyll based his argument for design in nature upon 
three interrelated points; the universal intuitive perception by men of the 
working of mind in nature which he termed Ianthropopsychism; the difficulty even 
sceptical scientists found in avoiding teleological language in describing nature; 
and the testimony in common language itself to a purpose in nature revealed by 
unconscious metaphors and expressions which spoke of design. From this he 
argued for a view of evolution as directed. He inclined to a position not 
dissimilar to that of the Vestiges which he described as 'development' and in 
which he saw the whole of nature unfolding according to a predetermined plan. 
The view of evolution for which people hankered was, paradoxically, that of 
the Vestiges. 
The general public was preparing to assimilate evolutionism, but it 
was a pre-Darwinian evolutionism, where Design figured as if Darwin 
had never propounded the Natural Selection theory. 2 
Even on the part of Darwin's supporters there seemed a reluctance to accept that 
his theory was incompatible with design in the wider sense, or at least there 
appeared to be a willingness to concede to those who wished for a teleological 
interpretation of nature, that such a view was not irreconcilable with the 
doctrine of The Origin. We have noted, in passing, Huxley's apologia in this 
respect. He saw Darwin as reviving the thought and philosophy of Greece, 
I A. Ellegaard, Darwin and the General Reader, 32 
2 Ibid., 126 
J 
,z K 
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and enthroning evolution in place of the credulity and superstition that had 
held sway for seventy generations, that is, the Christian era. 
I He deals with 
certain theological and philosophical difficulties that this entails. Darwin, 
he says, did not appeal to chance variation but to spontaneous variation, the 
cause of which we are ignorant of, but the basic belief of the scientist is 
that all is governed by law and order not chance. Teleology is, therefore, 
simply placed further back in the molecular structure of the world instead of 
in its organic forms. 
The teleology which supposes that the eye, such as we see it in man, 
or one of the higher vertebrata, was made with the precise structure 
it exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal which possesses 
it to see, has undoubtedly received its death blow. Nevertheless, 
it is necessary to remember that there is a wider teleology which is 
not touched by the doctrine of Evolution. 
This wider teleology lies in the original molecular structure of the universe 
and the definite laws governing it. This basic, primitive plan contains every- 
thing living and not living that has developed from it in the course of time. Thus; 
The telological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the 
speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular 
arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe are the 
consequences, and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the 
teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial 
molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the 
universe. 2 
There is no reason to think that Huxley was not sincere in his attempt to 
salvage teleology at this point, and that this represented his personal point of 
view on the subject, but attending it may also have been the desire to make 
evolution palatable to a public which was reluctant to accept such a theory, 
divorced from the concept of design. Huxley even went on to appeal to Paley, 
whose influence even then was not dead. That "acute champion of Teleology ... 
1 Huxley claimed that Darwin was returning, after 2000 years, to classical 
Greek thought in introducing the notion of evolution rather than the 
Hebrew concept of creation. 
2 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, p. 201; 201 -202 
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saw no difficulty in admitting that the 'production of things' may be the 
result of trains of mechanical dispositions fixed beforehand by intelligent 
appointment and kept in action by a power at the centre ... that is to say, 
he proleptically accepted the modern doctrine of Evolution; and his successors 
might do well to follow their leader, or at any rate to attend to his weighty 
reasonings, before rushing into an antagonism which has no reasonable foundation. "1 
It is not, however, possible to accept the bona fide of all those who at this 
period expressed a desire to bring together the new evolutionism and teleology. 
J. D. Hooker declared at a meeting of the British Association in 1866 that he saw 
evidence for design in variation itself: "By a wise ordinance it is ruled, that 
amongst living beings like shall never produce its exact like ... A wise 
ordinance it is, that ensures the succession of being, not by multiplying 
absolutely identical forms, but by varying these. " However, he soon afterwards 
assured Darwin that he had not really meant it. 
The only thing I do not like ... was the passage about a wise Providence 
ordering &c., &c., or something of that sort (I forget the words, it 
matters little). It is bosh and unscientific, but I could not resist 
the opportunity of turning the tables of Providence over those who will 
have a Providence in the affair, that yours is the God one and theirs 
the Devil's. 2 
III 
Darwin's own position with regard to the wider teleology was ambivalent. While 
he set his face against design in the organism, there are many expressions in 
The Origin which suggest that he entertained some notion of a purpose for life 
and the world which was subserved by evolution. The chapter on the struggle 
for existence is softened by the opinion that it makes ultimately for the 
happiness of the many: "when we reflect on this struggle, we may console our- 
selves with the full belief, that the war of nature is not incessant, that no 
fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, 
1 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, p 202 
2 Life and Letters of LD. Hooker, Vol. II , 106 
k 
yp 
Y 
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and the happy survive and multiply". 
I 
There is the suggestion that the 
development of life on this planet has been, and is, watched over and super- 
intended by some power that seeks its continual improvement: "We must suppose 
that there is a power, represented by natural selection, or the survival of the 
fittest, always intently watching each slight alteration ... and carefully 
preserving each ... Natural selection will pick out with unerring skill each 
improvement. " 
2 
He closes The Origin on a note of optimism, which sums up the 
drift of many such isolated passages in the book. As Darwin looks back at the 
development of living things on the earth from earliest times, and from, perhaps, 
one or a few forms he writes, "We may feel certain that the ordinary succession 
by generation has never once been broken, and that no cataclysm has desolated 
the whole world. Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of 
great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each 
being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards ' 
perfection. " 
3 
Why should Darwin have chosen to sum up his theory in this way, 
and embody so fully in these words the doctrine of the inevitable progress of the 
human race as the crown of evolutionary development ? There was nothing in his 
theory per se to compel him to think in this way. Natural selection meant that the, 
organism fitted into its environment, nothing more and nothing less, not that 
life must give rise to more complex and higher forms, judged to be so from an " 
anthropocentric point of view. Perfection, if it is to be considered in this 
context, can only mean the fit of the organism with its conditions of life, not 
its place in the scale of human evaluation of such an attribute. Natural 
selection could mean stagnation or retrogression. It was not necessarily true 
that evolution in Darwin's sense had any purpose at all. It is, therefore, 
surprising to find him concluding The Origin with this strongly optimistic note 
that is reminiscent of a wider teleology. 
4 Did he take this line because 
1 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 57.2 Ibid., 146 3 Ibid., 402 
4 In The Descent of Man, the note of optimism about man's future is even more 
pronounced. "Man", Darwin said, "may be excused for feeling some pride at 
having risen, though not through his own exertions, to the very summit of the 
organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen may give him hopes for 
a still higher destiny in the distant future. " The Descent of Man, Vol Ii, 1+05 
Natural selection, in fact, offered the prospect of man being superseded by 
some superior species. 
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he felt it would commend his theory to a public who would otherwise reject it ? 
Was he unconsciously influenced by the ethos of Victorian thought generally, and 
the teleological evolution of the Vestiges and Lamarck, indeed, of Hegel and 
Spencer ? Or was he himself persuaded that life, and in particular human life, 
and the world, must have some ultimate purpose, and cannot finally be interpreted 
apart from such a goal ? 
It is probable that all these motives were present, either consciously or 
unconsciously, in the presentation of his theory. He was jealous of his 
reputation as a scientist, and was anxious about how his theory would be received 
both by fellow scientists and by the public. Fear of the outcome and of offending 
religious susceptibilities were, it would seem, the principal reasons for the 
inordinate delay in the publication of his views. He was most sensitive to 
praise or blame, and, as his granddaughter Nora Barlow states, he 'craved for 
approbation', A note of optimism and purpose, such as he sounded in The Origin, 
and which chimed in with the prevailing mood of mid-Victorian spirituality, was 
not therefore without its value in commending the doctrine of evolution by 
natural selection to the public, despite the fact that natural selection itself 
was no basis for such conjecture. 
It is also probable that Darwin was unconsciously influenced by the evolutionary 
optimism that was in the air. The conviction had been growing in the nineteenth 
century that progress, and in particular the progressive development of mankind, 
was guaranteed by the laws of nature. Lyell as early as 1827, in his first 
defence of uniformitarian geology, had spoken of man's 'capability of progressive 
improvement' and affirmed that this 'progressive power is infinitely enhanced by 
perceiving what an unlimited field of future observations is unfolded to us by 
geology, and by its various kindred sciences". 
I 
1 Quoted by R. M. Young, The Impact of Darwin on Conventional Thought, 27 
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Such views were considerably reinforced by the time Spencer published his essay 
in Progress: Its Law and Cause, in 1857, two years before the appearance of 
The Origin. In his essay Spencer argued that the progress which he observed 
in nature was "not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent 
necessity". 
1 It would be surprising if Darwin were untouched by such ideas which 
had gained wide acceptance. His own theory of natural selection did not give 
rise directly to this sort of speculation, but since it was a theory of evolution 
it was capable of benefitting from the evolutionary optimism that prevailed. 
Behind all this there may also have been a residual Deism. Darwin was brought 
up in Unitarianism. When he speaks, as he often did in his notebooks and 
The 0 rigin, of a view of nature which is worthy of the Deity, he clearly has in 
mind a God who is remote and detached from the world, certainly not the God of 
the Old or New Testaments. Darwin had been amused at his grandfather's jibe 
that Unitarianism was a feather-bed to catch a falling Christian. 
2 
It is 
doubtful in later life whether he consciously subscribed even to this tenuous 
creed, but there would have been sufficient of the purposiveness attaching to 
such a belief remaining from his early years to influence his thoughts about 
evolution in The Origin, and give them the colour of a wider teleology and 
optimism than could be found solely in the doctrine of natural selection. 
Here Darwin found himself on the horns of a dilemma. He could not easily throw 
over a belief in purpose for man and the universe, yet he could not regard them 
except as the products of chance. Sometimes he wanted to affirm a purpose for 
the whole cosmos, but the particular grounds for this inference were lacking, or 
rather denied, by the theory of natural selection. He expressed his difficulty 
thus to Asa Gray, "I see no necessity in the belief that the eye was expressly 
designed. On the other hand, I cannot anyhow be contented to view this wonderful 
universe, and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that everything is 
the result of brute force. " 
3 
Or again to Asa Gray, November 26th, 1860 
1 Quoted by R. M. Young, The Impact of Darwin on Conventional Thought, 28 
2 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 158 
3 Ibid., 312; Letter of May 22nd, 1860. 
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"I cannot think that the world, as we see it, is the result of chance; and yet 
I cannot look at each separate thing as the result of Design. " 
I And, finally, 
in a letter to Lord Farrer, August 1881, "I entirely agree with what you say 
about 'chance' 
Ei. 
e. that the universe as a whole is not the result of chance] 
except in relation to the variation of organic beings having been designed ... 
On the other hand, if we consider the whole universe, the mind refuses to look 
at it as the outcome of chance - that is, without design or purpose ... 
2 
Despite the personal difficulty Darwin experienced on the question of design 
he had Asa Gray's articles published as a pamphlet, at his own expense, and 
spread them about. They were entitled, "Natural Selection not inconsistent with 
Natural Theology" and did much to overcome opposition to the doctrine of descent. 
Lyell recommended it to the Bishop of London. Darwin, says his son Francis, who 
gives us this account, seemed more concerned with getting acceptance of descent, 
rather than with natural selection. 
3 
N 
The dilemma that Darwin experienced was to haunt the attempts of those who came 
after him to reconcile his theory with a teleological view; and its persistence 
was to nullify every supposed synthesis. Thus Henry Drummond, the Scottish 
Presbyterian, who achieved popularity with his books in which he claimed to 
have taken up the evolutionary ideas of Darwin in the service of the Christian 
religion and evangelism, revealed that in fact he had only interpreted the 
evolutionary theory in a one-sided and optimistic fashion. "It is difficult to 
say how far Drummond had accepted, or even understood, the idea of natural 
selection". 
4 
Frederick Temple, who in his Bampton Lectures (188! +) accepted 
evolution as axiomatic, could not accept the full implications of natural 
selection and was not content to regard man as simply the product of a natural 
process. 
5 Aubrey Moore, who was enthusiastic about evolution and its 
1 Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. II, 353 
2 More Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 395 
3 Ibid., 371 
4 John Kent, From Darwin to Blatchford, 22 
5 Frederick Temple, The Relations between Science and Religion, 
Bampton Lectures , 
(1881. 
-200- 
possibilities, as he understood them, for Christian apologetic, discerned a 
flaw in the Darwinian position in this respect, that the overt teleology of 
evolutionism did not rest upon the foundation of natural selection. "The new 
view of nature", he wrote, "which the remarkable progress in biological 
investigation has fostered and spread, if not avowedly teleological, is at least 
implicitly so". 
i 
But the implicit teleology resided in an evolutionary theory 
that was independent of Darwin's hypothesis. "The Church's so-called 'acceptance 
of evolution' often amounted to little more than the adoption of pre-Darwinian, 
Hegelian belief that history, now including the biological history of man and 
other creatures, revealed a process of development in which the Spirit progress- 
ively dominated Matter. " 
2 
But this represented no real synthesis between the 
philosophy of Darwin and teleology. 
In 1909 P. N. W aggett, contributing an article to a collection of essays to mark 
the jubilee of the publication of The Origin, made the same distinction between 
evolution and natural selection. His essay was entitled "The Influence of 
Darwin upon Religious Thought". The Design Argument, he contended, in its pre- 
Darwinian form was too narrow and circumscribed. Darwin set us free from this, 
and taught us to see purpose not in the "under jaw of the swine that works under 
the ground", or in any of the particular adaptations that Paley collected, but in 
"a purpose transcending, though resembling our own purposes", and "everywhere 
manifest". 
3 
But such a view is not to be inferred from the premises that 
Darwinism affords. If it is maintained in association with Darwinism it must 
be seen as emanating from another source, indeed, from the general idea of 
progress and purpose attaching to evolution in the nineteenth century. The 
reason why Waggett maintained this notion here, becomes clear in the earlier 
part of his paper, where he distinguished between natural selection and evolution, 
and showed that he adhered, and would adhere, to the idea of evolution even if 
natural selection were shown to be mistaken, or had in the future to be discarded; ' 
1 Aubrey Moore, Science and Faith, 98 
2 John Bent, From Darwin to Blatchford, 28 
3 P. N. V aggett, 'The Influence of Darwin upon Religious Thought' in 
Darwin and Modern Science, Ed. A. C. Seward, 1+92 
14. Ibid., 484- 
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In America the main body of religious thought gradually embraced some scheme 
of reconciliation with science in the years after 1870 "This reconciliation 
commonly took the form of discriminating ... between evolution and Darwinism; 
that is, between some notion of developmental change (often quite vague) and 
the particular hypothesis of natural selection". 
I 
The apparent incompatibility of evolution by natural selection and teleology is 
illustrated especially clearly in the case of the co-discoverer of the theory - 
Alfred Russell Wallace. Wallace, a short time after the publication of 
The Origin, began to lose interest in scientific matters, and became more 
concerned with social questions. His belief in progress increased as his 
conviction about the centrality of natural selection declined. As early as 1861 
he was ceasing to believe in the all-sufficiency of the mechanism of natural 
selection where man was concerned. He wrote in 1864 that progress was slow, 
tý... but it still seems to be progress ... there is undoubtedly an advance - 
on the whole a steady and permanent one ... ; and as I cannot impute this in 
any way to the 'survival of the fittest', I am forced to conclude that it is 
due to the inherent progressive power of those glorious qualities which raise us 
so immeasurably above our fellow animals, and at the same time afford us the 
surest proof that there are other and higher existences than ourselves, from 
whom these qualities may have been derived, and towards whom we may ever be 
2 
tending. " 
Wallace was not a religious man, yet the difficulty of maintaining any sense 
of purpose or destiny for the human race alongside a consistent theory of 
natural selection was clearly apparent. And there were many others like him, 
who, quite apart from the doctrines of orthodox theism, felt that they could 
not live in a world that was a-moral and purposeless, in which there was no 
ultimate affirmation of meaning for human existence. Huxley, who as we have seen, 
I C. E. Russett, Darwin in America, pp 27 & 28 
2 A. R. Wallace, The Development of Human Races under the Law of Natural 
Selection, 1861, Reprinted in Natural Selection and Tropical Nature: 
Essays on Descriptive Biolog , 
(1891 
, 185. Quoted by John Kent, 
From Darwin to Blatc or , 30 
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in his earlier years, professed to be able to reconcile teleology and Darwinism, 
later came to experience and embody the conflict that these engendered. The 
"struggle for existence" which had appeared to lead man upwards was, in fact, 
at variance with his moral and social progress. 
Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step 
and the substitution of it for another, which may be called the ethical 
process; the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen 
to be the fittest ... but of those who are ethically the best ... The 
ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, 
still less in running away from it, but on combating it. I 
The notion of progress and purpose in human life was found, on more mature 
reflection, not to be based on the Darwinian picture of nature at all, but had 
to be derived from some other source. Nature, as seen through the eyes of Darwin 
was, Huxley acknowledged, neither conspicuously benevolent nor necessarily 
progressive. The Darwinian doctrine did not entail that necessary progression 
from lower to higher forms which might justify suffering. Retrogression was as 
likely a phase of evolution as progression. 
2 
Thus both Wallace and Huxley, with no religious axe to grind, were compelled 
ultimately to base their hopes for mankind upon premises other than those of 
Darwinism. Both serve to illustrate the irreconcilability of Darwin's theory 
and teleology even in the wider sense on which Huxley wished to affirm it. 
Others, too, testified to the picture of nature and the universe which 
Darwinianism evoked. G. J. Romanes was a young graduate when he read Darwin's 
book. It made an extraordinary impression upon him. He had been a devout 
Evangelical, but he felt compelled to renounce his faith and embrace the 
desolating picture of the world that the doctrine of the 'new faith' conjured 
before him. 
1 T. H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, 81 & 83 
2 A. E. Taylor argues in The Existence of God, that the idea of progress 
associated with evolution in the last century by literary men has no 
grounds for support in Darwinism. Evolution could work in the opposite 
direction, i. e. from the complex to the simple. It has, in fact, no 
direction except compatibility with the environment. 62 & 63. 
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"I am not ashamed to confess", he wrote in A Candid Examination of Theism, "that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its 
soul of loveliness; ... when at times I think, as think at times I must, 
of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which 
once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it, - at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang 
of which my nature is susceptible. " 1 
Bradford read The Origin at the age of sixteen and cursed "the rigorous logic 
that wrecked the universe for me and for millions of others", that gave them 
a feeling of utter insignificance in the face of the unapprehended 
processes of nature ... a sense of being aimlessly adrift in the vast 
universe of consciousness, among an infinity of other atoms, all 
struggling desperately to assert their own existence at the expense of 
all the others. 2 
Where the import of Darwin's doctrine was properly understood and accepted the 
view of nature and the universe which it evoked was irreconcilable with teleology 
whether in the narrower or wider form. 
The general acceptance of The Origin, and the ccmpaign that followed on its 
behalf by Huxley and other disciples of Darwin, led very largely to the virtual 
disappearance of the design argument as z:. serious apologetic force for theism. 
It meant its banishment from the centre, for no particular thing could be 
regarded as the result of design on the part of the Deity. Thus the cumulative 
force of the design argument, upon which Paley had placed so much emphasis, was 
destroyed at a stroke. This was hailed by some leaders of religious thought 
who accepted Darwin's theory as a gain rather than a loss, for it w:, s considered 
to introduce a wider teleology -a teleology of the molecular structure, of the 
general laws of nature, of purposive development and progress. But those who 
took Darwin's premises seriously discovered this was not so, that the pioneer 
led them not to the promised land, but into a trackless desert, and the picture 
of the universe which it created was the very antithesis of design and purpose. 
To continue to believe, despite all this, in design in nature and in a purpose 
for humanity was to do so by a mere arbitrary act of will, for the grounds for 
so believing were entirely wanting. 
1 Physicus =G. J. Romanes A Candid Examination of Theism, 111+ 
2 G. Bradford, Darwin, 245 -7 Quoted by G. Himmelfarb Darwin and the 
Darwinian Revolution, 321 
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There were those who saw the fundamental incompatibility of Darwin's theory 
and design and stated plainly what it meant. Canon J. Mozley, in The Times 
review of the Duke of Argyll's book The Reign of Law, January, 31,1867, wrote, 
"Natural selection, to which Mr. Darwin assigns the origin of species, is 
adaptation by chance, and, therefore, not by design: for a result obtained by 
chance is one emptied of design. If chance means anything, it is the negation 
of purpose. Natural selection is adaptation without purpose. It is, moreover, 
a theory of waste ... and in that it does violence to nature, of which economy 
is a fundamental law. " 
1 Charles Hodge, the Professor of Systematic Theology 
at Princeton, considered that the distinguishing feature of Darwinism was the 
rejection of "teleology, or the doctrine of final causes", and "the denial of 
design in nature is virtually the denial of God. " 
2 
But those who were prepared 
to make this assertion of a basic contradiction between Darwin's theory and 
design were few. 
J. R. Moore in his book The Post-Darwinian Controversies 1870-1900 divides 
advocates of evolution in the period after 1870 into Darwinists and 
Darwinisticists. Darwinists maintained the theory of evolution by natural 
selection in the manner in which Darwin had himself advocated it. 
Darwinisticists introduced some elements which neutralized the character of 
natural selection and gave to evolution a teleological nature - things which 
Darwin would have rejected as destructive of his theory. The rationale of 
Darwinisticism was that it presupposed some directing force. Evolution was 
made universal and taken beyond the biological limits by these followers of 
Darwin, especially many Christians who embraced the theory. Otto Pfleiderer in 
Germany and Nard Beecher in America provided a metaphysic that overruled natural 
selection, a metaphysic they considered worthy of a universal and omnipotent 
Creator. 
I The Times, January 31,1867, p. 5, col. 6 
2 C. E. Russett, Darwin in America, 26 
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Moore argues that the liberal theologians did not accept Darwinism, but only 
Darwinisticism, thus they were mistaken in thinking that they had accepted 
Darwin and natural selection. The only Christians, he contends, who could accept 
Darwin and natural selection were the orthodox theologians of whom he cites 
principally G. F. Wright and Asa Gray. 
Gray felt the difficulty of Darwin's analogy at the end of Plants and Animals 
under Domestication. He based his case upon the design or purpose of variations. 
That was the raw material upon which natural selection worked and without which 
natural selection by itself would probably achieve nothing. 
In 1882 Romanes argued against Gray that natural selection dispensed with design, 
unless it could be shown that the selected variations always take place "in the 
directions required for the operation of the physical cause in question". Here 
the burden of proof lay with the natural theologian. Gray replied that natural 
selection was no substitute for intelligence since it cannot account for the 
favourable variations that arise. But Romanes insisted that a proper under- 
standing of natural selection presupposes the existence of promiscuous variations 
which only seem to occur in special and advantageous ways on account of all other 
variations being eliminated. Gray could not accept this. "Omnifarious 
variation is no fact of observation, nor a demonstrable or, in my opinion, even 
a warrantable inference from observed facts. It is merely a hypothesis, to be 
tried by observation and experiment". He did, however, concede the point that 
"if variation in animals and plants is lawless, of all kinds and in all directions, 
then no doubt the theory of natural selection may be 'the substitute of the theory 
1 
of special design"'. 
Romanes maintained that Darwin's authority was unchallengeable on this point and 
clinched the argument by quoting the 'stone-house' analogy in full, and so the 
exchange ended. Gray had long ago admitted that he had found it unanswerable. 
1 J. R. Moore, The Post-Darwinian'Controversies, 277 
-206- 
Wright defended Darwinism and deemed it compatible with Christianity. His 
defence, however, turned upon the same point which had been in dispute between 
Gray and Romanes, viz., was there a direction or purpose in variations themselves 
prior to the operation of natural selection. "Large numbers of individuals", 
he argued, "do not vary at the sane time and in the same direction, by chance". 
The tendency to variation itself "remains among the mysteries of creation". 
Moore himself acknowledges that this was the heart of Wright's position and "an 
idea to which he, like Gray, inevitably recurred: the ultimate causes of 
variation are inscrutable and thus, by implication, divine". 
I 
By appealing in this manner to a superintending power which directed the course 
of variations in nature it is doubtful whether Gray or Wright fulfilled their 
claim to have accepted Darwin and natural selection. It is arguable that they 
were themselves advocates of a subtle version of Darwinisticism. 
Baden Powell, Savilian Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford, 
embraced without reservation Darwin's theory immediately it was published. He 
wrote in Essays and Reviews (1860), "A work has now appeared by a naturalist 
of the most acknowledged authority, Mr. Darwin's masterly volume on The Origin 
of Species by the law of 'natural selection', - which now substantiates on 
undeniable grounds the very principle so long denounced by the first naturalists, 
the origination of new species by natural causes: a work which must soon bring 
about an entire revolution of opinion in favour of the grand principle of the 
self-evolving powers of nature". 
2 
Powell had for a long time before Darwin's book appeared been a staunch advocate 
of the rule of law throughout the universe, and he considered this to be a 
sounder premise for natural theology and belief in a Supreme Intelligence behind 
the world than the traditional teleological argument which appealed to design in 
its particular parts. He argued that there could be no interruptions of natural 
1 J. R. Moore, The Post-Darwinian Controversies, 289 
2 On the Study of Christian Evidences, in Essays and Reviews, 139 
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law which comprehended everything physical. Revelation lay outside this field 
and religious experience had nothing to do with matters of fact or indeed with 
the physical world at all. "The more knowledge advances, the more it has been 
and will be acknowledged that Christianity, as a real religion, must be viewed 
apart from connexion with physical things". 
I 
The realm of physical phenomena 
was purely the domain of science. 
It is against this rather unorthodox separation of fact and faith, of the 
natural and religious realms, that we must set Powell's enthusiastic acceptance 
of Darwinism. The dichotomy is so sharp and so absolute as to bring into 
question the soundness of the conclusions which he drew from it. Faith, because 
it was thus confined to the realm of the mystical and the subjective, was he 
believed unaffected by anything that might take place in the realm of science 
and history. Theories relating to the physical world could have no real 
bearing or influence upon faith and religion. This was reflected in his eager- 
ness to accept hypotheses which seemed to mark the progress of science. 
Lamarck, the Vestiges and Darwin all seemed alike to him in this respect. 
But there was, no doubt, something else at work which contributed to Powell's 
acceptance of Darwin: he saw Darwin's book as being illustrative of, and 
confirming, the view he already held of the "grand principle of the self- 
evolving powers of nature". It is doubtful whether he was in fact listening to 
what Darwin was really saying about natural selection and random variation in 
The Origin. Darwin did not himself subscribe to any 'principle' of the self- 
evolving powers of nature. It was just such a view of evolution that his book 
was intended to supersede. 
Morse Peckham in his paper Darwin and Darwinisticism draws"a distinction between 
the ideas of metaphysical evolution which were current in 1859 and the actual 
ideas that Darwin expounded. 
1 On the Study of Christian Evidences, in Essays and Reviews, 128 
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In 1859 a metaphysic of goal-directed organic growth was dominant in 
the higher levels of 'western culture. Canon Raven has pointed out 
that the agitation produced by Darwin cannot be understood without 
reference to the Essays andReviews which appeared only a few months 
after, or to Colenso's work which appeared in 1862. The academic 
difficulties of Max Müller and Benjamin Jowett are equally inseparable 
from the total situation. 
Today it is somewhat difficult to understand why all these books and 
events should have been interconnected in the covert culture of the day. 
But a reading of Essays and Reviews shows the deep penetration of 
metaphysical evolutionism into the minds of its authors. 
... The biologic world that Darwin revealed, if you did not read him 
with the assumptions of metaphysical evolutionism, is a world totally 
lacking in the organised or teleological process characteristic of 
evolutionary metaphysics. I 
Charles Kingsley also showed an enthusiastic willingness to accept Darwin. 
But again the question must be asked, was he in fact accepting Darwinism or 
Darwinisticism ? Did he really accept natural selection with all its implications 
for the teleological argument or was he embracing directed evolutionism ? In his 
paper The Natural Theology of the Future he states that he was pleased to find 
on reading St. George Mivart's book The Genesis of Species that he was in agree- 
ment with the views he found there, views which he himself had long held. 
2 
Mivart had written his book as an attack on Darwin's doctrine of natural 
selection, and in order to establish the position that variations are directed, 
a view which was quite unacceptable to Darwin. In the course of the paper, 
Kingsley answers those who say that they see no marks of design in the world, 
and that what used to be considered as marks of design can better be explained 
as the results of evolution according to necessary laws, by strongly affirming 
that design is self-evident in nature and where there is design there must be 
a designer. "We might accept", he contends, "all that Mr. Darwin, and all that 
Professor Huxley, have so learnedly and so acutely written on physical science, 
and yet preserve a natural theology on exactly the same basis as that on which 
Butler and Paley left it". Yet he does not say explicitly how this reconcilia- 
tion is to be achieved. The force of his argument seems to be that God can 
work in the most extraordinary ways, that nothing is too hard for him, 
I Darwin and Darwinisticism by Morse Peckham, Victorian Studies, 389 
2 Charles Kingsley, Scientific Lectures and Essays (1885), 313 
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that if everything has evolved from some original form by the laws of nature 
then there is nothing in this that contradicts the supreme wisdom and power 
of a Creator who so ordered things that this should happen. "We know of old 
that God was so wise that he could make all things; but behold, he is much 
wiser than even that, that he can make all things make themselves". 
1 
Such 
a view is indeed, perfectly compatible with D? ivart and directed evolutionism, 
but would appear to have much less in common with the rationale of Darwinism. 
1 Charles Kingsley, Scientific Lectures and Essays (1885), 332 
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The strength of Darwinism lay in its appeal to the imagination, in the way in 
which the gaps in the supposed evolution of an organism could be filled up 
insensibly by the small steps - the 'infinitesimally small steps', as Darwin 
put it in the first edition of The Origin - that were considered to have taken 
place in its development. He felt that such a notion presented less difficulty 
to the imagination. The mind was capable of connecting the phenomena of nature 
which displayed resemblances by the interposition of an imaginary series. 
But what of those things in nature which could not be resolved by the imagination 
in this way ? When Darwin was presenting his argument he was confident there 
were no such phenomena, but at other times he was uncertain. At times the 
argument that he laboured to establish took on a strange appearance. Could it 
possibly be that all the beautiful adaptations of organisms, and their relation- 
ships to each other and the inanimate world, had come about by chance variations 
and the blind forces of natural selection ? There were facts that seemed to 
deny this and which the imagination found hard to conquer. Vihen they are 
considered they have the force of breaking the spell of Darwinism upon the 
imagination, of interrupting the cumulative effect of the argument from natural 
selection and gradual change, for they appear to exemplify an order and purpose 
in nature which the invoking of such a random process seems inadequate to explain. 
It is some of these facts that we must now review in order to assess their 
significance for the ateleological position of Darwinism, and for the tenability 
of the design argument. 
First, the fit between the organism and the external world. 
The remarkable complexity of living organisms and the nature of their relations 
with their environment give rise in the unsophisticated mind to a sense of 
wonder and surprise that the world is so eminently suited to the support of life, 
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and not merely animal life, but intelligent, human life. When the matter is 
pursued beyond the elementary stages, the conviction that the rise and 
persistence of living organisms implies intelligent pre-adaptation is not 
weakened, but conceivably strengthened by increasing knowledge of the details of 
adaptation. 
Modern cosmology has come to show that the universe is basically far 
bore appropriate for the emergence of life than was previously suspected. 
The essential nature and development of the universe must have been 
determined (perhaps 'programmed' is not too strong a word) during the 
first micro-seconds of this cataclysmic event. 
The balance of probability against life existing on this planet is so high, and 
the complexity of factors making it possible so great, that even the slightest 
re-arrangement would have fore-closed the issue. This circumstance impresses 
the mind with the idea that the order that we observe in the world and its 
suitability for life and human development is not merely a chance emergence from 
random forces, but is something which has been present in the universe from the 
beginning. 
If (1) the universe were not expanding, if (2) there were no stars, 
if (3) the proton - proton forces were slightly different without 
(4) a certain ratio between the basic forces of interaction and 
(5) a certain relationship between the fundamental constants - with- 
out all the space and time in the cosmos the universe would be 'dead'. 
For even an apparently trivial difference in any of these five factors 
would result in the 'evolution' and diversity of the cosmos being 
impossible to conceive. 
In the light of this W. H. Thorpe states, "Indeed, we can say that the 'Argument 
from Design' has been brought back to a central position in our thought from 
which it was banished by the theory of 'evolution by natural selection' more 
than a century ago. " 
1 
1 V. H. Thorpe, Purpose in a Yyorld of Chance, 10 & 11 
The essence of our presence in the Universe today is that we require 
the Universe to have certain properties. Long before we reach the 
problem of biological evolution on Earth ... we face this more fundamental question. -'. t -east one essential condition of our 
existence is that the Universe must expand at almost precisely the 
same rate at which we measure it to be expanding. If that rate had 
been less by an almost insignificant amount in the first second, 
then the Universe would have collapsed long before biological 
evolution would have taken place ... Sir Bernard Lovell, In the Centre 
of Immensities, (1979), 123 
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The idea of evolution was pressed into service in the nineteenth century to 
explain almost everything. It was certainly pushed far beyond the biological 
limits that Darwin originally conceived for it in The Origin. There he simply 
intended to use it to describe what he saw, or rather imagined he saw, happening 
in organic nature. But soon the idea was employed to explain the origin and 
existence of the universe itself. For this, of course, there was no justification. 
We cannot, as Tennant points out, speak of or conceive "a struggle for existence 
between rival worlds out of which ours has survived as the fittest" for the 
purpose of supporting life. "Natural selection cannot here be invoked, and if 
the term 'evolution' be applicable at all to the whole world process, it must 
have a different meaning from that which it bears in Darwinian biology. 
Presumably the world is comparable with a single throw of dice. And common 
sense is not foolish in supposing the dice to be loaded. " 
The conspiration of factors in the inorganic world to support and minister to 
life remains a problem for atheistic and ateleological theories of the origin 
of the world. The adaptation of inorganic nature to the needs of organic life 
cannot be explained in the same way as the adaptation of non-intelligent 
organisms, for the formative principle is lacking. 
Unique assemblages of unique properties on so vast a scale being thus 
essential to the maintenance of life, their forth-comingness makes the 
inorganic world seem in some respects ccmparable to an organism. It is 
suggestive of a formative principle. But if there be such a principle 
it is not conceivable after analogy with the life and mind of organisms, 
and cannot be said to be intrinsic or internal: because the inorganic 
... is devoid of life, and - at any level of explanation - is devoid of 
intelligence and foresight. 2 
This complexity of the cosmos which makes life possible, and its paver to 
sustain it once life is brought into existence, was presupposed in the classical 
Darwinian argument which offered no explanation of the origin of such an 
arrangement. Evolution by natural selection was illicitly extended from its 
limited role to become an omnibus explanation by Darwin's contemporaries, 
1 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, 87 
2 Ibid., 86 & 87 
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but in the process of their doing this the concept of evolution was subtly 
changed and emptied of its precise meaning, while at the same time carrying the 
authority and prestige that had come to attach to it in its original role. Thus 
it was considered that somehow the world had 'evolved', and the mere invocation 
of the term 'evolution' was in some way regarded as accounting for the remarkable 
adaptation and fitness of the inorganic world to the existence and maintenance of 
organic life. The more, however, we penetrate beneath the surface of this 
explanation, and the more fully science reveals the complexity cf both phenomena, 
the less convincing this account seems to be, and the closer a teleological 
explanation seems to press upon the mind. As Thorpe has put it; "There seems 
now to be justification for assuming that from its first moment the universe was 
'ordered' or programmed - was in fact cosmos not chaos. " 
1 
II 
One of the facts of nature which appears to bear out this reasoning is found 
in the way in which the adaptiveness of the organism seems to presuppose the 
environment. The whole idea of organisms being programmed to develop in a 
particular way is post-Darwinian. The discovery of the DNA code has revealed 
how the unfolding of the life of the organism is predetermined from conception, 
how the successive stages of its development will take place according to a pre- 
arranged pattern. 
That environmental information should be reflected in the molecular 
structure of DNA, without having been causally 'imprinted' on it by 
direct environmental impact, is the most nearly Leibnizian discovery 
of modern science ... 2 
What Darwin puzzled over, viz, the emergence of certain characteristics in 
the later development of the animal, which were not manifest in the initial 
stages, is now understood on this principle. This remarkable correspondence 
between the pre-determined pattern of life of the organism in the womb, the 
seed, and the egg, and the exigencies of the environment into which it will 
eventually be thrown, is a phenomenon which the theory of evolution by natural 
selection does not appear wholly to explain. 
1 W. H. Thorpe, Purpose in a World of Chance, 12 
2 R. Spilsbury, Providence Lost, 16 
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For many characters the eye for exaripleD , the possibility of a fit between organism and environment is pre-established developmentally 
(however much the fit may be improved by subsequent interaction and 
learning). Such characters develop from within, yet match the without; 
their inner development reflects the conditions and exigencies of life 
in-the-open. Vision germinates in the dark. How is it possible that 
the developing organisms should reflect in this way the environment 
into which they will be thrown, seeing that the latter has no specific 
influence on the structures that mediate the relationship ?I 
This problem is greatly magnified when we come to consider such complex inner 
'programmes' as the navigational aids and migratory habits of birds. "How can 
the long arm of coincidence stretch so far as to equip migratory birds with 
innate 'maps' of their routes and star-charts ?"2 To attempt to explain such 
phenomena on the basis of natural selection is to overlook the fact that 
selection is "the principle of the post-established hý. rmony". It can only 
operate on the basis of variants offered, and presupposes a supply of the right 
variations. As Tennant has pointed out elsewhere, "The survival of the fittest 
presupposes the arrival of the fit, and throws no light thereupon". 
3 
The 
Darwinian hypothesis leans ever more heavily upon a coincidence of lucky 
accidents. Not only has it to presuppose the emergence originally of an external 
world suitable for, and propitious to, organic life, but it must now also 
presuppose the nature of that life to be such that it anticipates the external 
conditions in which it will be placed. Given the facts of life and the world, 
the DarwiniFf hypothesis may account for the modification of the forms of life 
found within the world, though the extent of such change may be challenged. 
But the fundamental question is, Where did that life, environment, and organiza- 
tion come from in the first place ? How was it thus ? The instincts of birds, 
like the cells of their bodies are highly complex phenomena, and are not lightly 
to be assumed, if thereby it is proposed to dispense with the necessity to 
account for design. It may be recalled that Paley also urged this question 
with regard to the instinct of birds to build nests. He acknowledged that it 
may be modified and adapted according to the conditions and circumstances with 
which the animal meets ... "but still the propensity is instinctive, " and 
"the question returns, when the propensity to build at all ?"4 
I R. Spilsbury, Providence Lost, 9 
2 Ibid. , 10 
3 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, p. 85 
4 Chapter 1 this esis, p.? -8 
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Always and everywhere the theory of natural selection, rightly understood, 
comes up against this question in one form or another. T. H. Morgan, in 
Evolution and Genetics puts it thus, 
The man of science believes that the organism responds today as it 
does because at present it has a chemical and physical constitution 
that gives this response. We find a specific chemical ctmposition, 
and generally a specific physical structure, already existing. 'ire 
have no reason to suppose that such particular reactions would take 
place until a specific chemical configuration had been acquired. 
'Where did this constitution come from ? This is the question that 
the scientist asks himself. 1 
The organization of life, both physical and mental, seems to presuppose in a 
remarkable way the environment of the external world in which it will be placed. 
The Darwinian hypothesis does not really set out to answer the question of how 
this is the case. It is, wrote A. E. Taylor, 
not a theory about the origin of organisms, or of life; it takes 
organisms as already known to be in existence and professes only 
to explain how they are modified by the action of their environment 
upon them. It presupposes as already existing the antithesis between 
the living organism and the environment upon which, and against which, 
it maintains, or fails to maintain, itself. 2 
Consequently it does nothing to dispel. the mystery of the harmony and relation- 
ship of these two worlds, the inner world of the organism and the outer world 
of the environment for which it is being prepared by the implementation of 
its 
genetic code. It might seem that these two developments, the inner and the 
outer, were taking place on two different planes - or planets ! "How is it 
comprehensible that intra-cellular molecular changes should correspond 
'code-wise' 
to the exigencies of life under sun and stars, when these are used as reference 
points in the migration of birds ?"3 Before this mystery the theory of 
natural selection is compelled to remain silent. Any explanation in terms of 
it, which might be attempted, would be more amazing than the phenomena itself. 
If the argument is persisted in beyond this point it can only be from a blind 
conviction that time, chance and selection can 'explain' everything, and 
from 
a concomitant horror of non-materialistic ways of thinking. 
1 T. H. Morgan, Evolution and Genetics, 10 
2 A. E. Taylor, Loes God Exist ?, 61 
3 R. Spilsbury, Providence Lost, 13 
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A further illustration of how the organic and inorganic worlds are peculiarly 
fitted and related to each other may be seen in the special way in which chemical 
elements minister to the support of organic life. 
1 
Pathology is peculiar to 
organisms. Only in the realm of biology have we the concept of disease. 
Astronomy, dynamics and hydraulics, etc., which study the movements of inert 
matter have no branches corresponding to pathology as it is related to physiology. 
This is because where inert forces are concerned we have no conception of what 
they ought to do but only of what they in fact do. In the conception of an 
organism disease implies a normal state of health in which all the parts and 
organs of the body work together to preserve its well-being and to fulfil one 
end. Now there would appear to be no direct relationship between the structure 
of the organism and the chemical elements of the inorganic world. Here it would 
seem there is a separation at least as real as that between the inner genetic 
code of an organism and the environment into which it is thrown, yet we find that 
the chemical compositions of the inorganic world relate to the bio-chemistry of 
the organism and supply its deficiencies and correct its faults when the organism 
degenerates in disease. The same holds for relations within the organic world, 
where we find that a multiplicity of herbs and animal secretions can be used in 
medicines to restore health to the organism that is affected by disease. `Jere 
it the case that but a few substances in either case were useful the relationship 
might be dismissed as a coincidence, but where we find such an extensive range of 
natural products capable of meeting the special circumstances and conditions 
created by disease the correspondence is suggestive of pre-adaptation. 
2 
1 See Chapter II of this thesis for this argument in Paley. 
2 Here the analogy between a machine, designed to serve a particular purpose, 
and an organism is particularly marked, for the breakdown or failure of the 
machine corresponds to the pathological condition of the organism. If we 
can therefore imagine a machine not merely designed to perform a particular 
function, but also equipped with the means by which breakdowns in its 
operation may be corrected and repaired we shall see how the suggestion, 
or impression, of purposive design is further heightened and accentuated. 
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Few of those who have considered the relations of the organism to its 
environment have failed to remark upon the peculiar properties of water. 
On many counts water is the uniquely suitable liquid ... essential for life. It is particularly fortunate that it is so abundant on 
earth. It has been shown (Henderson 1913, Firsoff 1962) that 
conceivable alternative living systems could be based on liquid 
ammonia, or on other liquids, but all are inferior to water in most 
respects, in their liquid states. None are serious alternatives 
under terrestrial conditions. It is not enough to have suitable 
physical and chemical properties; the liquid must be abundant and 
distributed all over the surface of the globe ... if ice were heavier than water and settled to the bottom of lakes and of the polar oceans, 
it would thaw extremely slowly, and would long ago have locked up 
most of the water of the planet and denied its further use to living 
organisms. 1 
Taken together with all the other 'lucky accidents' which establish a 
rapproachement and harmony between the organic and inorganic world, this 
cannot fail to impress the mind with at least the possibility that the cosmos 
was planned, and that without intelligent forethought might easily have been 
a chaos. 
Yet another instance of 'adaptation' in this respect which serves to strengthen 
the impression, is the complementary function of animals and plants as regards 
the atmosphere. Nearly all animals require to breathe in or absorb oxygen from 
the air. This combines with the carbon existing in the animal tissues, and is 
breathed out as carbon dioxide. On the other hand the plants absorb the carbon 
dioxide from the air, and under the influence of sunlight break up the carbon 
dioxide, fix the carbon, and return the oxygen to the air. In this way the 
constancy and composition of the atmosphere is preserved. 
There is a conspiration of factors at work which preserve the cosmos, and which 
relate to, and appear to presuppose the existence of life. There is the inter- 
action not only of the different parts of the organism, but of one part of 
organic nature with another, and between the organic and the inorganic worlds. 
The complexity and extent of these relations far transcend the limits of the 
theory of natural selection, even if it is regarded as offering an explanation 
of some developments within the organic sphere. 
i 11 
I A. E. Needham, The Uniqueness of Biological Materials (1965), 10 
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Lawrence J. Henderson, the biologist, addressed himself in his book The Fitness 
of the Environment to the question of how the world could prove to be so 
hospitable to life. The environment exists prior to the organism, yet there is 
a reciprocity between them which is not accounted for in terms of the Darwinian 
hypothesis. Natural selection does no more than mold the organism and can change 
the environment only secondarily, without really altering the primary quality of 
environmental fitness. 
There is, in truth, not one chance in countless millions of millions 
that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, and 
especially of their stable compounds water and carbonic acid ... 
should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than 
through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them 
together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties 
should be without due cause uniquely favourable to the organic mechanism. 
These are no mere accidents: an explanation is to seek. I 
When this wider picture is viewed even the evolutionist acknowledges that the 
ateleological explanation appears in a strange light. "When we consider", wrote 
T. H. Morgan, "the immeasurable physiological adjustments of any organism, and 
the structural adjustments of the parts of the body, to each other, and to the 
2 
environment, an appeal to evolution though chance variation may seem preposterous. " 
Was it not just such a thought as this which must have struck Darwin when he 
wrote, "It seems an absurd proposition, that every budding tree, and every 
buzzing insect and grazing animal owes its form to that form being the one alone 
out of innumerable other ones which has been preserved" ?3 
"The basic objection", writes Richard Spilsbury, "to Neo-Darwinism is not that 
it is speculative, but that it confers miraculous posers on inappropriate agents. 
In essence, it is an attempt to supernaturalizenature, to endow unthinking 
processes with more-than-human powers - including the power of creating thinkers. 
I find it impossible to share this faith that supra-human achievements can be 
encompassed by sub-human means, and sub-rational mechanisms" .4 
Thus, we see 
how quickly the picture can be changed from an ateleological one, in which appeal 
is made to a vague evolutionary concept, in which chance and selection can 
I I,. J. Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment (1913), 276 
2 T. H. 14organ, Evolution and Genetics, 144 
3 Notebook 'E' , 145 
4 R. Spilsbury, Providence Lost, 19 
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explain all, to one in which there is a growing impression that the cosmos has 
been intelligently planned. The reason for this is, that Darwin's appeal was 
to the imagination. The evocation of suggestive illustrations, of the ways in 
which organisms might have been built up by the accumulation of successive small 
random changes, serves to focus the imagination upon the possibility of such a 
development, and the cumulative effect is to hold it there. But when illustrations 
of purpose and pre-adaptive design in nature are adduced in support of a 
teleological explanation of the cosmos, it has the effect of interrupting and 
breaking the sway of such ideas upon the imagination and of inducing a different 
and contradictory view of nature. 
III 
So far we have only considered those ideas which suggest a preadaptive fit between { 
the physical organism and the physical conditions of the world in which it is 
placed. VV"e have also to consider the remarkable relation between thought and 
thing, between mind and nature, which is also suggestive of 'prospective 
contrivance'. 
We see the evidence first for this interaction between mind and the external 
world in the way which the perceptions of the mind, which are in themselves 
mental phenomena, ake nevertheless accompanied by a conviction of the objective 
reality of the objects which are thus perceived; that is, there is, as it were, 11 
an underlying natural guarantee of the reality of the external world which the 
mind perceives, which passes unquestioned, until we begin to reflect upon our 
experience. Then the philosophical question is raised of how the two can possibly 
{ 
be related, and what justification there is for inferring the one from the other. 
In an unreflective state there is a natural rapport, or fit, between the 
perceptions of the mind and external reality; but once it is questioned the 
constituent parts of experience, body, mind and the external world, fall apart, 
and reason c-nnot put them together again. Van Peursen has expressed the 
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problem thus, 
Antecedent to the whole business of theoretical study and research, 
which arranges objects in due order and so forth, is the pre-objective 
field where man and reality, inner and outer worlds, mental and 
material, still defy distinction. It is only afterwards that they 
get separated. I 
This 'fit between experience and the external world, so that we naturally move 
about without reflection and calculation, and have our being in the world, is 
strangely suggestive of some remarkable designedness. If we think of them as 
separate entities, mind, body and external world, as in the philosophy of 
Descartes, or Berkeley, the rapport between them becomes either an improbable 
accident, or coincidence, or only accountable in terms of the intervention of 
the deity who guarantees the relationship. 
It would appear that man is 'dovetailed' into the world in terms of his 
experience; that from his earliest moments he is familiar with the external 
world in such a way as to presuppose its reality and his relationship to it. 
This, upon reflection, cannot but strike one as an extraordinary thing, as also 
does the thought that if this complex relationship depended purely upon learning 
and accumulated experience, it would take a very long time to acquire, and would 
rather resemble the groping of one who is blind in an unfamiliar situation. 
Sir Charles Bell remarked upon this association of mind and the world in his 
Bridgewater Treatise in the following words, 
Nothing affords a more perfect proof of power and design, than the 
correspondence that exists between the perception or ideas that arise 
in the mind, through the exercise of the organs of the senses, and 
the qualities of external matters: and although the manner in which 
the object presented to the outward sense and the idea of it are connected, 
must ever be beyond our comprehension, they are, nevertheless, indissolubly 
united, so that the knowledge of the object, obtained by this means, is 
attended with an absolute conviction of its real existence -a conviction 
independent of reason, and to be regarded as a first law of our nature. 2 
Nothing has happened to dispel the mystery of this union, or to destory its 
force as another illustration of what may be regarded as the purposive character 
of nature and man's experience of it. 
1 C. A. Van Peursen, Body, Soul, Spirit, 138 
2 Sir Charles Bell, Bridgewater Treatise, On the Hand of man, 211 
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Perhaps an even more striking example of the relation between mind and reality 
which is suggestive of pre-adaptation is to be found in the way in which mind 
seems to anticipate the reaction and response of the phenomena of nature. The 
empiricist has, of course, always maintained that our knowledge of nature is 
essentially and only inductive and experimental. Kant, however, maintained 
that there was a built-in rapport between the mind and nature, the mind making 
its own contribution to our experience of reality, while depending upon the 
perceptions of the senses for the application and exercise of its categories. 
The question is not a purely speculative one. There are observations which 
appear to indicate innate qualities and capacities of the mind which anticipate 
the order of nature and the character of the world. Chomsky remarks, in his 
essay 'On Interpreting the World' 
There seems no reason at all to believe that the child's concept of 
enduring and recurring physical objects derives from his reflection 
on the use of language, or on higher-level generalizations that are 
built on insights into language use, or that b`ill's canons have anything 
to do with the interpretation of the world of experience in terms of 
permanent persons or things. Such slight experimental work as exists on 
this matter suggests that the concept of permanent and enduring objects 
is operative long before the use of language. Thus it appears that a 
child only a few months old interprets the world in terms of perceptual 
constancies, and shows surprise if stimuli do not manifest the expected 
behaviour of 'enduring and recurring physical objects'. If our 
conjectures are to be made sense of in terms of observation, it would 
seem that such observations support the conjecture that the 'scheme of 
enduring and recurring individual objects' is primitive, rather than 
acquired in the course of language learning. I 
Chalmers, in his discussion of the intellectual constitution of man and its 
relation to external nature had remarked upon the very same fact, in almost 
2 
the same words. 
Chomsky is, of course, arguing that man's mind is programmed for language 
learning, that without such an innate structure and capacity it would be 
inconceivable that a three year old child would be able to master the complexities 
and difficulties of sentence structure, or learn the appropriate use of words. 
I IT. Chomsky, On Interpreting the World, 19 
2 Thomas Chalmers, Bridgewater Treatise, The Ldaptation of External Nature 
to the oral and Intellectual Constitution of Tan, Vol. II, p. 142 
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The universality of language amongst human beings and the facility and ease 
with which it is learned in childhood make us, quite often, unaware of what a 
sophisticated and highly complex process and acquirement it really is. As 
Chomsky himself puts it, 
Consider a Martian scientist, investigating humans, who observed that 
some individual knows both English and modern physics. From his point 
of view, there would be little reason to expect, on general grounds, 
that the learning of physics was an intellectual achievement of an 
incomparably higher order which required generations of genius, while 
the normal child discovers the structure of English with no difficulty. 
Observing this, he would conclude that the system is fitted to the 
human mind in a way that the other is not. I 
This argument for innate grammaticality, which enables human beings to learn and 
master the use of language which would otherwise be impossible in a life-time, 
might seem to take us be;: ond the scope of our present discussion which is the 
relation and correspondence of the human mind to the external world. But our 
fellow human beings are a part of the external world, and the apparent pre- 
adaptation of the mind for social-intercourse with other human beings, is no less 
significant and worthy of attention in this context than the correspondence of 
the mind to the impersonal phenomena of nature, its material forces and objects. 
Chomsky has strongly argued his case for universal grammatical principles and 
categories which have an innate basis. As to how this state of things came 
about he considers it useless to speculate. Human language, he contends, differs 
in principle from any system of communication amongst animals, and is ultimately 
attributable to "a specific type of mental organisation, not simply a higher 
degree of intelligence". 
2 
If we choose to assign this development to "natural 
selection" we may, as long as we recognise that to do so "amounts to nothing 
more than a belief that there is some materialistic explanation of these 
phenomena ... +'lith no knowledge of the laws that determine the organization and 
structure of complex biological systems, it is senseless to ask what the 
probability is for the human mind to have reached its present state ... "3 
1 N. Chomsky, On Interpreting the World, 1i4 
2 N% Chomsky, Language and Mind, 62 
3 Ibid., 83 
-223- 
Thus, in Chomsky's view, talk about the origins and probable evolution by 
natural selection of the special and unique organization of the human mind which 
makes speech and language possible, is little more than speculation, and 
ultimately the symbol of a blind commitment to a naturalistic explanation. 
Once again we are confronted with a purposive arrangement in nature, a complex 
of relationships and correspondences between the human mind and the external 
world, which includes the existence of other human minds. There appears to be 
no satisfactory way of explaining how, or why, such an arrangement should obtain 
if we exclude a teleological account. 
However, to return to the relation of the mind to the external world, conceived 
of as impersonal forces and inert matter, there are observations, like those we 
have already referred to, which suggest a remarkable agreement, and which are 
yet hardly attributable to a learning process. Recent experiments show that 
animals are capable of classifying objects and relations according to abstract 
categories, especially geometric categories such as 'triangle' and 'circle'. 
Experimental work has even identified the neural basis br such analysis. This 
work suggests that there is a primitive neurologically given analytic system which 
may degenerate if not stimulated at an appropriate critical period, but which 
otherwise provides a specific interpretation of experience, varying to some } 
extent with the organism. These modern discoveries seem to lend support, in a 
new way, to Descartes and Kant, contrary to the radical empiricism that has 
dominated science for two centuries, and which has thrown suspicion on any 
hypothesis that postulates the "innateness" of forms of knowledge. It also 
gives new and added strength to the Design Argument, since attempts to account 
for such remarkable correspondence between mind and the external world by 
invoking some vague concept of random evolutionary development appear, in the light 
of the complex issues raised, little more than an expression of the will to 
believe in a naturalistic explanation - in the power of mindless, impersonal 
forces to produce not only order in the natural world, but in the mind of man 
himself, in such a way that he is capable of comprehending and engaging with the 
order he finds in the universe. "If we decline", wrote Tennant, "to explain 
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things 
[in terms of design] it would seem that the only alternative is to 
regard the self-subsistent entities, of which the world is constituted, as 
comparable with the letters of type which have shuffled themselves not only 
into a book, or a literature, but also into a reader commanding the particular 
tongue in which the book utters its unintentional meaning. " 
I 
N 
So far as we can tell animals learn according to a genetically determined 
pr: bgramme. There is no reason to doubt that this is true also of the fundamental 
categories of human knowledge, and also, perhaps, other aspects of human 
behaviour, less fundamental, but of great significance for the individual and 
society. Sir John Eccles has written of recent research on the brain 
It has to be remembered that there are at least three hundred millions 
of neurones in the human visual cortex ... and only a few hundreds have been experimentally investigated in mammals ... 
[there are) neurones 
that respond to synthetic information - lines or slits of determinate 
length and width, lines or slits bent at angles, and so on ... Doubtless 
cells responding to more and more complex patterns will be discovered 
and it might be postulated that eventually cells will be discovered that 
selectively respond to abstract forms - for example to triangularity, 2, 
and that this will explain our ability in the recognition of abstract forms. 
Thus scientific evidence seems to be emerging on a wider scale for the existence 
of 'innate ideas' and an inherent structure of the mind which is capable of 
entering into rapport with the order that exists in the material world. Darwin 
was, as a thorough-going empiricist, contemptuous of the theory of innate ideas. 
It will be recalled that in his notebooks he had written, "Plato ... says in 
Phaedo that 'imagery ideas' arise from the pre-existence of the soul, are not 
derivable from experience - read monkeys for pre-existence. " 
3 
But now it 
seems, he would also have to account for the 'innate ideas' of the monkey. 
The question returns, whence this order, this propensity in the first place ? 
V4hat meaning can be given to the proposition which states that through random 
variation and natural selection three hundred million brain cells in the visual 
cortex alone have shuffled themselves into a mental organization that is 
capable of rapport with the molecular structure and organization of the external 
1 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, 111 
2 John C. Eccles, Facing Reality, (1970), 160 
3 Notebook '1M' , 120 
-225- 
world ? As the sufficiency of the theory of natural selection began to break 
down under the weight that it was made to bear, Darwin fell back upon what he 
had earlier called 'Lamarck's nonsense', the theory of inherited characteristics. 
In fact he went even further than Lamarck in attempting to explain by means of 
his hypothesis of pangenesis how changes in the body might be transmitted to 
the reproductive cells and reappear in the offspring. But there is no scientific 
evidence for acquired characters. Research into development and inheritance has 
established that, "the properties of the reproductive cells which are responsible 
for the characters of the body (and the brain) are inherent in these cells; and 
that transmission of these properties is independent of the body-cells, and calls 
for no interference from them. This is summed up in the phrase, 'the isolation 
of the germ-plasm' ... The egg reproduces the body, not the body the egg" 
I 
The correspondence of nature to the processes of the mind has always made a 
deep impression upon reflective minds, except where a radical empiricism has 
held sway, the defects of which, however, have sooner or later made themselves 
felt, and have called for some such corrective as that which Kant surplied for 
Hume's philosophy. Both Chalmers in his Bridgewater Treatise and 
Sir John Herschel in his book Natural Philosophy, drew attention to this 
adaptation of abstract ideas to concrete realities, and the way in which 
discoveries made in the region of pure thought relate to the facts and phenomena 
of actual nature - as when for example the properties of conic sections, 
demonstrated by patient analysis, remained inapplicable till they came to be 
embodied in the real masses and movements of astronomy. "These marvellous 
computation&', Herschel remarked, "might almost seem to have been devised on 
purpose to show how closely the extremes of speculative refinement and practical 
utility can be brought to approximate". 
2 
Thus, the purely theoretical mathe- 
matics of the Greeks found application to the material world in the astronomy 
of Copernicus 1500 years after its first discovery. "It seems quite clear today, " 
1 T. H. Morgan, Evolution and Genetics, 155,163 
2 Sir J. F. W. Herschel, Natural Philosophy, (1831), 28 
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wrote D. S. Cairns in The Riddle of the Universe, "that mathematics enters deeply 
into the constitution of the universe, and that mathematical theory is certainly 
something a great deal more than a mere imitation, a reflex of observed natural 
processes". Sir James Jeans took the view that the universe was ultimately 
mathematical, while Einstein contended that mathematics :: ere the product of 
'imagination' not of observation and memory, 'creative' of thought and shooting 
far ahead of what has been merely observed. 
I 
Karl Popper conceives of the interaction of the mind and the world, not merely 
in subjective terms, but in the inter-relationships of objective 'worlds' of 
thought and things. In fact he formulates a theory of three worlds: 'World I' 
consisting of all material things - biological and human, artifacts as well as 
inorganic material; '9orld 2' including emotions, feelings, cognition and memory, 
that is, all subjective states, including perception; and 'World 3' embracing 
objective knowledge, and culture, stored in books and libraries. P'opper's 
discussion of worlds 2 and 3 suggests that 
a subjective mental world of personal experience exists (a thesis denied 
by the behaviourists) ... and that it is one of the main functions of the 
'second world' to grasp the objects of the 'third world'. This is some- 
thing we all do: it is part of being human to learn a language and this 
means, essentially, to learn to grasp objective thought contents ... so 
that one day we will have to revolutionize psychology by looking at the 
human mind as primarily an organ for interacting with the objects of the 
'third world'; for understanding them; and for bringing them to bear 
on the 'first world'. 2 
On this W. H. Thorpe comments, 
Since the objects of 'World it - the natural world, the world of physical 
objects and states - can, as is obvious, be interpreted, understood and 
if you like 'translated' by the activities of organized science, then does 
it not follow that the physical world, which can be so understood and 
translated is in a sense on a par with Popper's ": iorld 3' ? It is a world 
which has been understood, to a very, very small extent by the proved 
experience of scientific men during the last ten thousand years, and 
therefore this understanding is, of course, in 'N orld Y. Can it not be 
plausibly argued that what man is understanding is in fact a 'pre-existing' 
knowledge of nature, a plan, which ties the whole universe together in a 
creative unity; and further, that it is this, which by such laborious and 
painful processes, we may partly come to understand ?3 
I D. S. Cairns, The Riddle of the Universe, 135 
2 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, 156 
3 W. H. Thorpe, Purpose in a" orld of Chance, 100 
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Popper's 'third world' represents man's universal, objective cognition of the 
natural world, and without this body of ideas, of thought and culture, the 
realm of nature as such could have no significance. The two belong essentially 
together and are a unity, an organic whole. A similar thought has been expressed 
recently by the physicist J. Wheeler, 
No theory of physics that deals only with physics will ever explain 
physics. I believe that as we go on trying to understand the universe 
we are at the same time trying to understand man ... Only as we 
recognise that tie will we be able to make headway into some of the 
more difficult issues that confront us ... Aran, the start of the analysis, 
man the end of the analysis - because the physical world is in some deep 
sense tied to the human being. I 
Now this understanding of mind and its relationship to the external world brings 
man into close conjunction with nature as far as the teleological view is 
concerned. Indeed without man occupying this relation with reality, it is 
difficult to see how the design argument can be sustained. This was one of the 
weaknesses of the classical presentation of it in the eighteenth century, that 
it concentrated upon specific examples of contrivance in nature, but failed to 
embrace a wider teleology to which later some of the writers of the Bridgewater 
Treatises appealed, and which was part of Tennant's understanding of the design 
argument in the early part of this century. "fle must allow" he wrote, "to 
ontal nature an intrinsic constitution such that minds can make ... nomic order 
out of it" 
2 
At the same time minds need to be appropriately structured in 
order to be able to do this. It seems that some such account of the inherent 
rationality of both mind and the world is necessary in order to escape from a 
position of total scepticism. C. S. Lewis put the matter very succinctly when he 
wrote, "Every theory of the universe which makes the human mind a result of 
irrational causes is inadmissible, for it would be a proof that there is no such 
thing as proofs, which is nonsense". If the mind is no more than the chance 
concatanation of atoms then the "finest piece of scientific reasoning is caused 
in just the same irrational way as the thoughts a man has because a piece of bone 
is pressing on his brain. If we apply our rule both are equally valueless". 
3 
I A. R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, 66 
2 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, 90 
3 C. S. Lewis, Miracles, 28 
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The shortest form of this argument is given by Professor J. B. S. Haldane. 
"If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motion of atoms in my brain, 
I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true ... and, hence, have no 
reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms. " Darwin, it will be 
recalled, faced this dilemma since it was the inevitable consequence of his theory. 
We have noted how he felt he could not give much weight, or evidence, to the 
"inward conviction" of the mind on religious matters, because of its derivation 
from an animal state. But what applied to convictions and reasoning about 
religion applied equally to any convictions, or conclusions, of the human mind. 
2 
What significance could be attached to them where the mind had been derived, not 
merely from an animal state, but by a process, allegedly, of random variation and 
natural selection ? This reduced all theories and ideas alike, including Darwin's 
own about our evolutionary origins, to the same level of meaninglessness and 
unreliability. The mind could not be trusted to arrive at truth regarding the 
world and man. 
If man's thinking powers derive at source from random molecular events, 
how is it possible to place any confidence in their cognitive claims and 
aims ? If ... 'pure chance, absolutely blind' is at the evolutionary root 
of our mental equipment, how is it conceivable that true insight about our 
evolutionary past is achievable ? By what process of 'angelization' could 
men have become cognisant of their random origins, and spectators of all 
time and existence as though from some superior and independent vantage 
point ? Do the Neo-Darwinians, like many other system builders, desert 
the system of which they are the authors, claiming special cognitive 
privileges that cannot be justified within the system ? Or alternatively, 
do they commit cognitive suicide. If our mental equipment has been formed 
and developed by non-rational processes, what possible grounds have we for 
trusting it when it infers, for example, that the chance hypothesis is the 
sole conceivable hypothesis ? Reason totters and everything becomes 
logically permissible. There anarchy is loosed upon the world. 3 
Richard Taylor argues in his book, Metaphysics, that we cannot both believe in 
the theory of the random emergence of man with his faculties for apprehending 
the world, and at the same time maintain that the information they convey to us 
about the world and ourselves is meaningful and reliable. He uses an illustra- 
tion of a sign on a Welsh hillside, composed of stones, arranged so as to read: 
I C. S. Lewis, Miracles, 29 
2 "But then arises the doubt,. can the mind of man which has, as I fully believe, 
been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, 
be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions ?"C. Darwin, Autobio raphy 
(1876) in The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, ed. F. Darwin, (1887) 
Vol. I, 313 
3 R. Spilsbury, Providence Lost, 116 
; ý1 
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'British Railways welcomes you to V ales. ' If those words are understood to 
convey a message, or a truth, they cannot be understood to have arranged them- 
selves in that order by accident. On the other hand, if they have so arranged 
themselves then they cannot be taken to be meaningful. 
John Hick regards this argument as fallacious because "we do not treat our sense 
organs, or our sense experience, as we treat a set of words, and therefore 
consistency does not require us to think of them, as we think of words in a 
sentence, as having been formed by deliberate intent. We know that sentences 
are normally expressions of human intelligence, because we ourselves so use them.. 
But we have no parallel reason to believe that our sense organs are products of 
an intelligent purpose". 
1 
Although Hick rejects the analogy between our sense experience and language, 
there is reason to believe that there is a resemblance between the two. What we 
are primarily concerned with are not the sense organs themselves, but the 
information and experience they convey to us about the external world. The 
organs of sense cannot, in this context, be separated from the mind which sifts, 
orders and interprets the data it receives by their means. In this respect 
interpreting the world is similar to learning and interpreting a language. As 
order and meaning emerge from the apparently arbitrary jumble of letters, in a 
sentence, so also man discovers order in the manifold data of the phenomenal 
world. The inconsistency. of the ateleological view is that it accepts this 
information as significant and meaningful, and yet in the final analysis 
attributes all, the mind and the world alike, to the production of irrational 
forces. 
The conception of order - of cosmos - attaches not merely to the external world, 
but also to the nature and capacity of the human mind to grasp that order, and to 
1 John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God, 25 
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the underlying rapport between mind and nature which makes this possible. 
I 
As P. R. Tennant put it, 
If the world 'made itself', so to say, or is the self-subsistent 
Absolute, its adaptiveness to understanding has simply happened, 
and is part and parcel of the pluralist's last irrationality. It 
gives him more to explain or to refuse to explain: for why should 
the many arrange themselves to form an organic or intelligible whole ? 
If, on the other hand, this be due to an intelligent Creator designing 
the world to be a theatre for rational life, mystery is minimized and 
a possible and sufficient reason assigned. 2 
V 
There are three other areas which demand our consideration with regard to man's 
rapport with his environment. The first is the existence of beauty, the second, 
man's moral nature, and the third his religious consciousness. 
First, the existence of beauty. The presence of beauty in the world, and man's 
peculiar capacity to appreciate it, presents a difficulty for the Darwinian 
theory of evolution. Darwin was himself very conscious of this and sought to 
anticipate any objection to his theory from this quarter. "Natural selection", 
he wrote, "cannot possibly produce any modification in a species exclusively for 
the good of another species ... If tLis were so it would annihilate my theory. " 
3 
The production of beauty in organisms for man's aesthetic appreciation, and not 
serving primarily the advantage of the organism itself, would be just such a case. 
Darwin, of course, could not deny a plenitude of beaut,, in the natural world. 
1 In a letter to Y ax Born, Einstein wrote, "You believe in a dice-platting God, 
and I in the perfect rule of law within a world of some objective reality 
which I try to catch in a wildly speculative way". 
On this Karl Popper comments. "... Einstein's wildly speculative attempts 
to 'catch' reality are attempts to understand it ... 
(i) As we understand 
other people owing to a shared humanity, we may understand nature because 
we are part of it. 
(2) As we understand men in virtue of some rationality 
of their thoughts and actions, so we may understand the laws of nature 
because of some kind of rationality or understandable necessity inherent 
in them. " K. Popper, Objective Knowledge, 184 
2 F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. II, 105 
3 Charles Darwin, Origin of Species, 152 
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His task was to account for it in utilitarian terms, as existing not for the 
benefit of man's aesthetic tastes, but for the survival of the species in which 
it was found. He sought to do this in two ways. First, he suggested that the 
primary purpose of beauty was for sexual selection. The beautiful and multi- 
farious fronds of the peacocks tail had been fashioned over many generations 
by the inspection acid choice of the peahen. Secondly, if beautiful arrangements 
and forms exist which can at present be shown to serve no useful purpose either 
in natural or sexual selection, we must assume that they did so at sometime in 
the past. 
Regarding sexual selection, observation does not appear to confirm Darwin's view. 
No bird has more than the crudest visual aesthetic. Some birds, not songsters, 
do have a decided preference for bright objects, but their taste is vulgar. The 
magpie steals jewels, the bower bird decorates her bower with feathers dropped 
by other species, but works haphazardly, without any sense of pattern. It seems 
a pity that the most beautiful birds are thus unable to appreciate their own 
beauty, or rather each others' beauty. 
I But even if birds are credited with 
refined aesthetical taste it would appear that the theory of sexual selection as 
the means by which beautiful arrangement, pattern and colour are produced in a 
species rests upon an assumption. "An actual proof of the theory", wrote 
August `, Waismann, "is out of the question, if only because we cannot tell when a 
variation attains to selection-value ... we can only assume that slight intensi- 
fications of sexual characteristics give any advantage, and we must assume this 
2 
otherwise secondary sexual characters remain inexplicable". 
The problem, however, for Darwinism resides in the superfluity of beauty that 
is present in organic nature. A mere blob of colour might be sufficient in a 
flower to attract an insect, but its beauty does not consist merely of that, 
but of the delicate arrangement and pattern of its petals. The intricacy and 
delicacy of the beauty that is found in organic nature seems to be far in excess 
of what is required merely for the purposes Darwin and others have assigned to it. 
I -ü. Viney, The Animal Kingdom, 60 
2 1.. iaismann, 'The Sexual Selection Theory', a contribution to Darwin and 
yodern Science, Ed. A. C. Seward, Cambridge, (1909), 49 
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Even if it were granted that every expression and detail of beauty in organic 
nature had been produced by the action of sexual selection, this Woula still 
not explain beauty away. It would simply mean that there v; as a greater affinity 
between man and the rest of the animal creation in this respect, that both have 
an innate appreciation of beauty and a consequent in-built rapport with nature. 
I 
However, in the case of man the whole subject is much more extensive, and is 
not confined to the appreciation of beauty in particular organisms, but is 
experienced in the whole panorama of nature, both organic and inorganic. This 
fact transcends the limitations of Darwin's utilitarian argument, 
2 
even if its 
truth and validity were granted. Man experiences beauty on a cosmic scale - in 
the splendour of the night sky, in the glory of a fine sunset, in the grandeur 
of mountains, rivers, lakes, and plains. Landscapes seen under snow, forests in 
autumn or spring, all minister to man's aesthetic apprleciation of the world in 
which he is placed. None of these phenomena is attributable in their total End 
combined effect to the action of selection - natural or sexual. The utilitarian 
argument here has no relevance. It is true that the sole purpose of such 
phenomena is not beauty, but it is a dimension of nature that is so omnipresent 
as to raise in our minds the possibility that its presence in the word is not 
accidental. When this is coupled with the fact that man is equipped with the 
capacity for appreciating beauty and responding to what he finds in nature, the 
impression of purpose is strengthened. 
Dr. Robin Baker of Liverpool University has recently put forward an 
alternative theory to that of sexual selection as an explanation of 
colouration in birds. He has termed it the 'unprofitable prey theory'. 
The flash of bright colour in a bird's plumage, he argues, is a warning 
to predators not to continue their pursuit. Bright colours, therefore, 
indicate prey which are difficult to catch, the more difficult to catch 
the more brightly coloured. 
Nature Programme, B. B. C. Radio 4., March 1980. 
2 Darwin acknowledges this rapport between man and nature. In the fragment 
of a note in "Old and Useless notes about the b'oral Sense and some 
Metaphysical points written about the year 1837 and earlier, " he states; 
"I grant that the thrill, which runs through every fibre, when one 
beholds the last rays of sun and etc. etc., or grand chorus are utterly 
inexplicable -I cannot admit reason sufficient to give up any theory. " (91/7 Darwin Collection, Cambridge University Library). 
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This argument from nature as a whole has the force of reflecting back upon, 
and reinstating, the place and significance of beauty in particular organisms, 
for if it is conceivable that the world has been made a beautiful place for man 
to dwell in, it is also conceivable that particular organisms have been made 
beautiful in order thEt he should take a delight in them. 
1 
This is not to 
suggest that either nature as a whole, or the particular organism, are so solely 
for the sake of man, but it is to suggest that beauty is not merely accidental 
to nature, but has a significant part in it because man himself has a 
significant part in it. 
Bird-song is one of those areas where nature comes closest to human culture and 
art. In her study of the Blackbird between 1962 and 1972 Joan Hall Craggs 
revealed that the bird had to work at its song to improve it, and make it more 
aesthetically attractive to the human ear, i. e., conformable to human aesthetic 
ideals of balance and movement. 
If one records the song of a particular blackbird daily, throughout the 
singing season, changes of apparently aesthetic significance are detected. 
First, in the early part of the reproductive period, the song may appear 
highly functional; but later in the season, when the functional needs 
have been fulfilled, the song becomes organized more closely, and in a 
manner so nearly resembling our own ideas of musical form that it is 
difficult to deny that it is musically improved. So we appear to be 
moving towards the type which we call 'art music', where our experience 
of musical scores enables us to guess what kind of change is about to 
happen next. This sense of form seems to fit a number of bird songs in 
a most remarkable way. 2 
There are many indications that bird song has more than 'survival value', and 
" 
its approximation to human art, and conformity to aesthetic ideals, suggest a 
rapport between man and nature which is truly astonishing to anyone who has 
been taught to think of nature in ateleological and utilitarian terms. 
Paley argues thus, "It being once allowed that such a purpose existed 
with respect to any of the productions of nature, we may refer, with 
a considerable probability other particulars to the same intention; 
such as the tints of flowers, the plumage of birds, the furs of beasts, 
the bright scales of fishes, the painted wings of butterflies, the rich 
colours and spotted lustre of many tribes of insects. " 
Natural Theology, 88 
2 -, '/. H. Thorpe, Purpose in a World of Chance, 51 
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It wculd seem, then, just as impossible to account for the presence of beauty 
in the world, and man's appreciation of it, solely in terms of the Darwinian 
ultimates of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, as it 
was to do the same thing with the rapport between man's rationality and nature, 
or, for that matter, the organism and its inorganic environment. Vie have here 
another form of the same kinship between the environment and the human mind, 
which we have witnessed before in this argument. 
Secondly, the argument from man's moral nature. Darwin considered that man's 
moral sense had evolved, as the instincts had evolved, in the struggle for 
survival. The 'good' is that which conduces to survival of the family or tribe. 
Thus as early as 1838 he was speculating in his notebooks, 
May not moral sense arise from an enlarged capacity for being ... guided 
on strong instruction sexual, parental and social instincts, giving rise 
to 'do unto others as yourself', 'love they neighbour as thyself' ... 
the social instinct more than mere love - fear for others acting in 
union ... action, assistance and so on. Fay not idea of God arise from 
this confused idea of 'right' joined with necessary action of 'causation'... 
Darwin's ideas of moral sense developed very little after that time. His views 
in The Descent of Ilan, first published in 1 871 , were taken directly from the 
2 
early notebooks. His ethical theory was utilitarian and naturalistic. 
I am tempted to say that those actions which have been found necessary 
for long generations (as friendship to fellow animals in social animals) 
are those which are good and consequently gave pleasure, not as Paley's 
rule is, those that in the long run will do good - alter will in all 
such cases to have and origin as well as rule will be given. 3 
1 Chas. Darwin, Note Book 'M' commenced July 15th, 1838, finished October 2nd. 
1838, Darwin Collection, Cambridge University Library. 
2 'then writing The Origin and The Descent Darwin went through his early 
notebooks and extracted everything he thought relevant and useful, 
even to the point of cutting out the pages he felt he could transcribe. 
Quite a few pages relating to 'moral sense' have thus been removed from 
the notebooks for The Descent of I! an. 
3 Chas. Darwin, Pfote Book 'M' , 132, Darwin Collection. 
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This theory, however, seems to lead Darwin into what G. E. Moore defined as 
the 'naturalistic fallacy' i. e. the idea th:: t what is good can be explained 
wholly in terms of natural constituents, such as, pleasure, conduciveness to 
survival, and so forth. The concept of 'goodness'; Moore contended is a simple, 
unanalysable quality and cannot be defined without remainder in terms other than 
itself. If this could be done then the resulting statement would be a tautology, 
for 'pleasure is good' would really be 'pleasure is pleasure'. However, when 
Darwin and those who followed him affirmed that what was conducive to survival 
was 'good' they did not consider themselves to be uttering a tautology, but 
making a significant and synthetic statement. The notion of good, therefore, 
transcends the reductionist argument of Darwin on moral sense. 
Darwin's argument in The Descent of Man is that the individual's social instinct 
(which is synonymous with conscience) and sympathy identify him with the tribe 
or group. Their approbation of his conduct is most important to him therefore 
the social instinct becomes highly developed. Because of man's powers of 
reflection this need for acceptance by the group becomes stronger than other, 
competing instincts, such as hunger and sexual desire, and creates a sense of 
unease and dissatisfaction if it is not followed. Thus, we have the emergence of 
remorse and repentance when another instinct is followed which conflicts with 
the social instinct. However, this description and analysis of warring instincts 
does not explain the origin of a sense of duty or obligation to obey a moral 
imperative, no more than an account of conflicting forces in nature would give 
rise to a sense of what 'ought to be the case', or what 'ought to be done', 
except as a derivative from the concept of 'duty' and 'oughtness', which stand 
in their own right as unique to the moral consciousness of man. 
The concept of 'oughtness' cannot be deduced from indicative statements of 
what is the case. That a course of action is necessary for this or that result 
to follow does not carry with it the moral sanction that I ought to do it. 
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A sense of duty cannot arise from any merely factual description of the world 
or human nature, or man's place in the world. A sense of goodness, rightness 
and obligation belong to a different order of things and are apprehended by 
the moral nature of man, and defy definition in, and reduction to, naturalistic 
1 terms. 
Kant, Bishop Butler, the Cambridge Platonists, have all in their different ways 
affirmed the irreducible character of man's moral nature, and of morality itself. 
In his apprehension of moral values man transcends nature, and it was this 
transcendence of man over nature that precipitated the conflict for some of 
Darwin's followers between his theory and their understanding of man's moral 
nature and destiny. 
The problem for Huxley, as we noted in the previous chapter, was that man's 
moral nature, his ideals and aspirations, were so much higher and better than 
the process of natural selection and the law of the jungle which had, according 
to Darwin, given rise to mankind, that a fundamental conflict was created between 
the two. Darwin himself acknowledged that the obedience of civilized man to 
the dictates of conscience resulted in the preservation of the weak, the sick 
and the maimed members of society, and the propagation of their kind, something 
quite contrary to the laws of natural selection. "Excepting in the case of man 
2 
himself, hardly anyone is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed. " 
Huxley appears to be rebelling against a paradox which is inherent in the 
Darwinian theory, and that is the idea that the purposive is dependent upon the 
non-purposive, the rational is the product of the non-rational, and man's moral 
nature is explicable in terms of the amoral. Here it would seem, to borrow a 
phrase from Rudolph Otto to whom we shall later refer, that darkness is invoked 
to illuminate light. 
"The conclusion of most philosophers of ethics that it - the evolutionary 1 
process) cannot generate ethical norms being guilty of e 'naturalistic 
fallacy' of deducing what ought to be the case from what is, has not deterred 
a succession of biologists, such asJulian Huxley and C. H. ', Addington fror 
urging not merely the relevance of, but the decisiveness of biology for 
ethics. " A. R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science, 1979,176 
2 Chas. Darwin, The Descent of Man, 206 
-237- 
The a priori and autonomous character of man's moral consciousness is used in 
the theistic argument to point to the existence of God. As Butler put it, 
"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man ... 
which magisterially exerts itself ... and which, if not forcibly stopped, 
naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more efi'ectual 
sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm its own". 
1 
Such evidence as 
conscience affords can, as A. E. Taylor has pointed out, because of its factual 
character - because it is a felt authority - convert belief in God from a "mere 
hypothesis" into living faith. But we are not ourselves concerned here with 
that aspect of the argument from man's moral nature. vve are simply concerned 
to invoke it as yet another example of conspiration, of the adaptedness of man's 
nature in its totality to the world in which he is placed. Just as man has an 
innate capacity for language and aesthetic appreciation, so he also has within 
him, in a way that is not explicable in naturalistic terms, a faculty for 
discerning what is good and right, and an awareness of what he ought to be and do. 
Of course, it is subject to education and instruction, and is informed by the 
empirical facts of the world in which we are placed, but it would appear that 
it is itself an ultimate and irreducible fact of man's nature, only properly 
intelligible within a teleological interpretation of man and the world. 
Thirdly, the argument from man's religious consciousness. A further point of 
rapport between man and nature may be found in man's religious consciousness. 
Not only does nature evoke in man a response to its beauty, but there is also 
that in nature which evokes in him a sense of the numinous. Darwin confessed 
that he had been most acutely aware of such a religious feeling when he was in 
the great rain forests of South America. Perhaps the fullest exposition of the 
argument for such an a priori religious sense is to be found in Rudolph Otto's 
Idea of the Holy. There Otto argues that the category of the holy is not to be 
confused with any of the empirical circumstances which occasion its manifestation 
in experience, and which serve to give it content. 
I T. A. Roberts (ed. ) Butler's Fifteen Sermons, 31 
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The facts of the numinous consciousness point therefore - as likewise 
do also the 'pure concepts of the understanding' of Kant, and. the ideas 
and value-judgments of ethics and aesthetics - to a hidden substantive 
source fron which the religious ideas and feelings are formed, which 
lies in the mind independently of sense experience. 
Furthermore, Otto contends, the religious sense is ultimately irreducible to 
naturalistic terms, the evolutionary argument is incapable of explaining its 
presence in man's make up and experience. Out of nothing nothing can come. 
If we propose to explain nature in terms of its ultimate forces and laws, how 
can we then go further and explain the laws themselves ? In what terms shall 
we explain them ? Likewise, when we investigate man's nature and experience 
we must presuppose the spirit, "the reasonable spirit of man with its predis- 
positions, capacities, and its own inherent laws. " 
I 
This cannot itself be 
explained. '+e cannot say how mind and spirit are made. 
The history of humanity begins with man, and we have to gesuppose man, 
to take him for granted as he is, in order that from him . °: e may under- 
stand his history. That is, we must presuppose man as a being analogous 
to ourselves in actual propensities and capacities. " 
The business of trying to explain man's present consciousness in terms of some 
sub-human original, Otto regards as a hopeless enterprise and, even if it were 
not, we should still need to start with man as he is, since anything else is 
an attempt to interpret animal behaviour in terms of clumsy analogies with the 
human mind. 
To try to understand and deduce the human fron the sub-human, or brute 
mind is to try to fit the lock to the key instead of vice versa, it is 
to seek to illuminate light by darkness. " 2 
Thus, in Otto's view, we are faced with the ultimate fact of man's religious 
consciousness, which must be evaluated in its own right. This religious 
consciousness is found to be in rapport with nature. Nature ouickens and 
evokes from the soul of man an awareness of that which transcends nature. 
The empirical circumstances - the mountains, the forest glade, the vastness of 
the open prairie - call forth the numinous in man's experience. But these are 
only the occasion of the manifestation in his consciousness of that which is 
qualitatively different from anything that 'natural' sense perception is capable 
I R. Otto, Idea of the Holy, 131 
2 Ibid. 
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of giving. Yet natural objects are themselves of such a character that they 
are capable of evoking this experience. The world becomes the vehicle of a 
glory which touches and glances from it when it is brought into relationship 
with the soul of man. The Biblical expression of this is "For the invisible 
things of him (God) from the creation of the world are clearly seen in the things 
which are made even his eternal power and Godhead. " 
1 The empirical world 
becomes, in relation to man, the bearer of values, and the occasion of a 
revelation of power and glory which it seems designed to produce. an appears 
strangely dovetailed into a world which by a remarkable conspiration of 
circumstances, ministers not merely to his physical needs, in common with all 
other living things, but also seems to be adapted to his intellectual, moral 
and religious nature in such a way as to excite wonder at the affinity and 
rapport that exists between him and nature. 
To argue thus is not to maintain a crude anthropocentrism, wich has sometimes 
disfigured the design argument in the past, when every detail of nature and the 
universe was often considered to be created solely for the needs and convenience 
of mankind, as for example Buckland argued in his Bridgewater Treatise, when he 
stated that the course of the rivers and the deposition of coal and ore had 
been conveniently arranged for the development of towns and cities. It is 
possible to consider that man has a place, and an important place in nature, 
without arguing that everything has been brought into existence solely for him. 
Sir Charles Bell, in another of the Bridgewater Treatises, expressed the matter 
in a more balanced and judicious way. We presume too much when we say that 
light has been created for the purpose of vision. '; 1e are not entitled to pass 
over its properties as a chemical agent, its influence on the gases and, in 
all probability, upon the atmosphere, its importance for vegetation, animals, 
and its function in the universe as a whole. 
1 Romans, 1: 20. 
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Instead of supposing light created for the eye, and to give us a 
sense of vision, would it not be more conformable to a just manner 
of considering this subject to dwell with admiration on the fact, 
that this small organ, the eye, should be formed with relation to 
a creation of such vast extent and grandeur, and more especially 
that the ideas arising in the mind through the influence of that 
matter and this organ, should be constituted a part of one vast whole 
It is, indeed, this which excites man's wonder and admiration. We do not 
contend that everything was made solely for the benefit and convenience of man. 
As A. E. Taylor has said, 
To accept the principle of the 'argument from design' commits us neither 
to holding that man is the one end of all the purposes of God, nor 
imagining that we know fully what God's purposes for man are. 2 
There is no need to confuse and prejudice the design argument by that caricature 
of itself. \'ihat, however, we do recognise is a remarkable affinity, or kinship, 
between this infinitely complex physical, rational, moral and spiritual being 
which is man, and the equally complex and mysterious universe in which he is 
placed. 
Charles Bell, 'Bridgewater Treatise' , The Hand: Its Vechanism and Vital 
Endowments as Evincing Design, 6&7 
2 A. E. Taylor, Does God Exist ? 75 
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THESTRUCTUREANDCHARACTER0FTHE 
DESIGNARGUMENTANDITSR0LEIN 
C0NTEMP0RARYAP0L0GETIC 
I 
THE STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, we must notice two basic principles underlying the argument which give 
it a special character. 
(i) The argument from design presupposes an intuition - the recognition of 
purpose and design in artifacts or organisms. The Darwinian argument does 
not deny that organisms resemble artifacts in having the appearance of design, 
but it attributes the appearance of design to chance. Thus the human mind which 
is itself capable of making tools and machines which exhibit design and. purpose 
has the power of recognising the appearance of design in natural objects. 
Indeed, it is found to be impossible to get along without this concept of design 
when dealing with organisms. In theory it may be excluded, as it has been by 
Darwin and his followers, but in practice the idea reasserts itself. It does 
so, as we noticed, in the terminology of Darwin, when speaking about nature. 
Much of what he said about the powers of natural selection, if transposed into 
the idiom of theism would sound an orthodox note. However carefully and 
deliberately it is resolved to exclude the concept of design from our reckoning 
when dealing with nature, it seems to have the power of reasserting itself 
almost immediately. 
Jacques Monod, in his recent book Chance and Necessity, discusses this paradox. 
Speaking of what appear to be compelling indications of design in the molecular 
structure and function of organisms he states, 
-242- 
It is the very existence of this purpose, at once both pursued and 
fulfilled by the teleonomic apparatus that is the 'miracle'. Wiracle ? 
No, the real problem lies at another, deeper level than that of 
physical laws; it lies in our understanding, in our intuition of 
the phenomena. There is really no paradox or miracle, but a flagrant 
epistemological contradiction. I 
According to Monod the apprehension of organisms under the principle of design 
is illusory and meaningless. However, it has a remarkably tenacious hold upon 
the mind, for he goes on, 
Objectivity nevertheless obliges us to recognise the teleonomic 
character of living organisms, to admit that in their structure 
and performance they decide on (sic) and pursue a purpose. Here, 
therefore, at least in appearance, lies a profound epistemological 
contradiction which, if it is only apparent, must be resolved, or 
else proved to be radically insoluble, if that should turn out 
indeed to be the case. 2 
Mond wishes to resolve the paradox by denying one side of it - the attribution 
of purpose, or design, to organisms. But as he himself has shown the determin- 
ation to do this does not necessarily ensure its success. Perhaps it is 
insoluble. Kant considered it to be incapable of resolution. He posed precisely 
the same problem. How can a mechanical and teleological explanation, or account, 
of organisms be given without contradiction, and he concluded that they must be 
held together in tension. We must live with the antinomy or paradox. The idea 
of design is regulative of our thought about nature, the mind of man is so 
constituted that he cannot but think of organic nature in this way and conceive 
it under these terms. Kant rejected the notion that design can be excluded 
from our thinking about nature, experience shows that it cannot. The resolution 
of the paradox by the assertion of chance Kant regarded as unsatisfactory, since 
it denies or destroys the concept of teleology without explaining it. Thus it 
would appear that design remains a fundamental idea or intuition of the human mind.; 
It is from this recognition, this basic intuition, of design that the design 
argument takes its beginning. Paley assumed that aspect of the argument to. 
begin with. The foot striking first against the stone and then the watch on 
the heath and the consequent examination of both, presupposes the intuitive 
1 J. b: onod, Chance and Necessity, 29 
2 Ibid. , 31 
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recognition of the difference between an object that manifests design and one 
which does not. "We perceive in the watch", says Paley, "what we could not 
discover in the stone, that its several parts are framed and put together for 
a purpose". 
1 But this 'perception' of design is not deduced from the object 
by reasoning. It is assumed as the only condition under which we can reason 
on such subjects at all. The object is the occasion not the cause of our 
thinking in terms of design. Had we never seen such a thing as a watch before, 
it would be possible to discern in it the evidence of design. 
Unsolicited testimony to the intuitive character of our recognition of design 
is given by Hume, "... the idea immediately flows in upon the mind with a 
force like that of a sensation" 
2 (Cleanthes in The Dialogues). And Darwin, 
,, It often strikes one with an overwhelming force" 
3, (in conversation with the 
Duke of Argyll). However far we may go in the direction of a mechanistic account 
of nature we can, it seems, never exclude the concept of teleology. The 
constitution of the human mind is such that it views nature in this way, through 
the primitive and basal perception, or intuition, of design. 
(ii) The idea of design is sharpened and vivified when the mind entertains 
examples and illustrations of design in nature. This is where we see the role 
of the argument in creating a cumulative impression by the citation of instances 
of organisms in which design is exemplified. Paley's argument consisted 
principally of such examples once the simple exposition of it had been given 
in 
the first few pages. Both Kant and Hume recognised that this intuitive aware- 
ness of the mind is strengthened and refined when it rests upon particular 
examples. Thus Kant put it, "The mind tears itself out of depression and doubt 
about design, suggested by scepticism, the moment it casts a look upon the 
wondrous forms of nature and the mystery of the universe. " 
4 Hume, through the 
person of Cleanthes, concedes that the beauty and fitness of final causes 
1 11. Paley, Natural Theology, Works, 25 
2 D. Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, (Ed. ) N. K. Smith, 191 
3 F. Darwin, (Ed. ) Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 316 
4 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, to J. M. D. Meiklejohn, (1934ý 363 
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strikes us with overwhelming force, and this self-evident impression of design 
is deepened and strengthened when the mind contemplates specific examples, 
such as the eye. 
I 
Paley himself was not satisfied with the bare statement of the argument, with 
the mere logical inference. The force of the argument, he insisted, lies 
essentially in its impressionistic character. It must be felt and imbibed into 
the system, like a medicine, before its true efficacy is experienced. 
2 
Thus 
the argument had to be clothed with specific examples of design to produce the 
desired effect upon the mind and imagination. By the cumulative influence of 
examples and illustrations a merely notional assent becomes a real assent. Real 
assent depends upon the intensity of the impression made upon the imagination. 
Thus the exposition of the argument is essential if its bare propositions and 
inferences are to be transformed into concrete expression and have their proper 
influence upon the mind. Its effect is not produced "by a few steps of reasoning; 
like the demonstration of a geometrical theorem, the impression is suggested by 
the contemplation of every part of nature. All this is fundamental to our under- 
standing of the nature of the argument from design. In this respect the term 
argument is itself somewhat misleading since it may be assumed that its essence 
can be captured in a syllogism. It is not, however, so much a questicn of premises 
and conclusion, but more of instances and intuition. 
Any one type of illustration, or example, of design is not essential to the 
argument, and may be changed according to the taste and scientific predilection 
of the age. Thus Paley drew his instances of design from the macrocosm of 
organic nature. Today it is expedient to draw them from the microcosm, from 
the molecular and genetic structure of the organism, for it is to that area 
scientific thinking has moved and popular interest has followed. 
1 li. Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, 191 
2 Yl. Paley, Natural Theology, Works, 192 
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Next we need to recognise the resemblance between the nature and character of 
the design argument and that of Darwin. This basic affinity is fundamental for 
any understanding of the antithesis that Darwin presents to the argument from 
design, and the opposition that exists between them. Evolution itself starts 
with an intuitive principle, which is the unity and derivation of all organic 
forms traced by uniformity, or analogy. The mind is constantly synthesizing 
the phenomena it perceives, and comprehending the world of natural and artificial 
objects according to the principles of analogy and uniformity. This was true of 
the study of nature long before Darwin. A chain of being of all living things 
was conceived as linking the organic creation together and impressing the mind 
with a series -a gradation from one state of being to another. 
1 The only 
difference between this conception of nature and Darwin's was that he introduced 
movement and the dimension of time into this understanding of organic nature. 
He also appealed, in consequence, to an imaginary series in the past which filled 
the ostensible gaps in the chain of living beings. This was his conception of 
the 'tree of life' in which the basesof the branches are now dead or missing - 
the coral reef with the base of the coral branches hidden beneath the sea. 
Darwin's thought was greatly influenced by Lyell and the concept of gradualism, 
or uniformitarianism. The result of Darwin's reading of Lyell was that he saw 
that the concept of gradualism could be used to unify and bring together the 
whole organic realm in one unbroken chain of induction and descent. +ihen 
he 
lighted on the principle of natural selection by reading Malthus, he had 
obtained the means by which the imagination could be assisted 
in filling in the 
gaps which existed. Darwin's testimony to Lyell's work was that it altered the 
whole tone of one's mind and way of seeing things, and he added, "I always 
feel 
as if my books come half out of Lyell's brain". Thus the intuitive power of 
the mind to grasp things as a whole, and the concept of uniformity, were given 
a new impetus by Lyell and subsequently 
by Darwin. 
1 See Appendix II. 
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But while the mind has this natural tendency to group things together and to 
comprehend them under a plan of unity, it is not in this respect an infallible 
guide to be followed blindly. Francis Bacon warned that 
the human intellect, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater 
uniformity and equality in things than it really finds. And though there 
are many things in nature unique and full of inequality, yet it feigns 
parallels and correspondents and relations which do not exist. Hence 
the figment that in the heavens all things be moved through perfect circles. 
The intellectual bent of the mind to synthesize and integrate phenomena is 
undeniable, but the empirical facts must be respected, the discontinuities and 
singularities of the world cannot be ignored. While in pure speculation the 
tendency of the mind to comprehend reality in an infinite series of gradations 
and relations is theoretically possible, in fact and in practice, in its 
application to the natural world, the proclivity may be indulged only so far as 
the facts permit, i. e., only so far as it can be ascertained that the uniformity 
and homogeneity prevail. 
Darwin, as we have shown, could acknowledge no limit, and once the mind and 
imagination had been set in motion he could find no stopping place. 
If the two arguments viz. design and descent through natural selection, so 
resemble each other are they simply different metaphysical views of the world ? 
Does it matter ultimately whether one chooses a teleological or an ateleological 
view of reality ? Has one view more to commend it than the other ?A 
teleological account of the world may be regarded as superior for the following 
reasons. 
(i) The mechanistic view cannot exclude design. Darwin attempted to do so. 
He was against evolution by saltation, the view of the Vestiges, because the 
adaptation of the organism to 
its environment would then not be explicable on 
I F. Bacon, Novum Organunm, 145, tr. G. W. Kitchin, 21 
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mechanical or naturalistic grounds, and the correspondence could only be 
explained by a miracle. He was against any intervention of the Deity, or 
directed evolution in any form, for this would destroy the significance and 
role of natural selection. As Darwin saw it design was fundamentally incompatible 
with his theory. But in the long run, it was impossible of him to exclude design 
altogether. Unless he undertook to explain the origin of life, something that 
the theory of natural selection was not equipped to do, he had to posit the 
existence of one or a few forms from which all other organic forms had derived. 
Those critics who confronted Darwin with this problem should have enabled him to 
see that design cannot be wholly excluded and that if it is admitted at all there 
is no difficulty, in principle, in admitting it at any point at which it affords 
a coherent and elegant explanation of a particular phenomenon. When Harvey 
raised the question whether Darwin's original few forms were created as eggs or 
full grown, Darwin replied with what he considered to be the most amenable 
solution for the imagination. "I find ... less difficulty in imagining the 
creation (sic) of an asexual cell increasing by simple division". 
I 
The modern 
scientist tells us that the complexity of the simplest cell is such as to 
stagger the imagination. "All the cells that we know are of fantastic complexity. 
I believe that no biologist or physicist has yet been able to propose even the 
outlines of a theory as to how such a cell might have been 'evolved'. " 
2 
The 
avenue of regress to ultimate simples seems to be closed with greater finality 
now than for Darwin. The mere assertion that the complex machinery of a 'simple' 
cell must have emerged tells us nothing. Jacques )4onod writes, "The simplest 
cells available to us for study have nothing simple about them". How they could 
have come about he finds almost impossible to speculate. 
The development of the metabolic system which, as the primordial soup 
thinned, must have 'learned' to mobilize chemical potential and to 
synthesize the cellular components, poses Herculean problems. So does 
the emergence of the selectively permeable membrane without which there 
can be no viable cell. But the major problem is the origin of the genetic 
code and its translation mechanism. Indeed, it is not so much a 'problem' 
as a veritable enigma. The code is meaningless unless translated. The 
modern cell's translating machinery consists of at least fifty macro- 
molecular components which are themselves coded in DNA: the code cannot 
be translated except by products of translation. It is the modern 
expression of anne vivum ex ovo. When and how did this circle become 
closed ? It is exceedingly difficult to imagine. 
3 
F. Darwin (Ed. ) More Letters of Chas. Darwin, Vol. I, 163 pp. 134 & 135. 
2 N. H. Thorpe, Purpose in a'horld of Chance, 21.3 J. Monod, Chance & Necessity. 
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As Monod himself recognises, without the help of fossils we shall never know. 
Such fossil evidence does not exist and presumably will never come to light. 
In the face of this impasse we have no alternative but to choose between a 
naturalistic, mechanistic explanation, or a teleological one. The naturalistic 
exylanation cannot, at the boundary of organic life, appeal to the principle of 
natural selection, since that only operates within it. Therefore to assert a 
mechanistic explanation here is to do so only because a teleological explanation 
is unthinkable, and it is unthinkable not on scientific but metaphysical grounds. 
Yet the teleological explanation of such organized complexity and purposive 
arrangement as we are confronted with in a 'primitive' cell, would appear to be 
more cogent, fitting and reasonable than a purely naturalistic explanation. 
The regress argument was thought to get rid of design but it does not work. It 
merely pus". es the problem a stage further back, it removes it from the macrocosm 
to the microcosm. In the former it was a palpable problem for Darwin which he 
believed he had resolved but he had, in fact, only succeeded in sweeping it out 
of sight. Now it returns with our more detailed knowledge of the micro-organism. 
1 
Kant's judgement would, despite all the changes of the past two hundred years, 
appear in principle to be sound: organized matter is qualitatively different 
from inorganic matter and cannot be explained without remainder by mechanistic 
principles. Organic substance must, according to Kant, be the starting point 
for physical explanations of their formations. To suppose that crude matter 
obeying mechanical laws was originally its own architect, that life could have 
sprung up from the nature of what is void of life, and matter have adopted the 
form of a self-maintaining purpose, was in his view contrary to reason. 
2 
Bacon argued that "a little or superficial acquaintance with Philosophy 
(science) may incline the mind of man to Atheism, but the farther proceeding 
therein doth bring the mind back again to religion: for in the entrance of 
Philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer 
themselves unto the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce 
some oblivion to the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and 
seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence; then according 
to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link 
of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. 
(F. Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 8) 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 85 & 86 
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(ii) A naturalistic theory cannot surmount its inherent limitations and adopt 
those principles that belong logically to a teleological explanation. '4e hrve 
pointed out that the purely mechanistic hypothesis contains an inherent paradox, 
viz., the dependance of the purposive upon the non-purposive, the rational upon 
the non-rational, and the endowment of unthinking processes with the power of 
producing thinkers. Darwin himself slipped into the use of teleological 
language to describe the working of natural selection. This did much to soften 
the paradox and to disguise the character of the acnievements he attributed to it. 
The amalgam of teleological language and mechanistic views cushions from the 
mind the shock of explanations which are more extraordinary than the phenomena 
themselves. 
At times it struck iýarwin himself as strange and untoward that such blind processes 
as he had described should be capable of such amazing results, that the world of 
animals, insects, and vegetation as we know it, should be the result of the 
"struggle for survival". But that is only part of the mystery. The greater 
part is that man's mind should also be supposed to be the product of such 
processes. Monod has recently written, 
When one thinks about the tremendous journey of evolution over the past 
three thousand million years or so, the prodigious wealth of the 
structures it has engendered, and the extraordinarily effective 
teleonomic performances of living beings, from bacteria to man, ve may 
well wonder whether all this might not be the product of a vast lottery, 
in which natural selection has blindly picked the rare winners from 
among numbers drawn at utter random ... As Francois Maurice wrote, 
'Jvhat this professor says is far more incredible than we poor Christians 
believe'. I 
A teleological explanation contains no such paradox. If we believe in an act 
of creation - in the bringing into being of a complex entity manifesting design - 
the power that is associated with such an act, the power of an intelligent 
Creator, is appropriate to the result. Here we may employ the other side of 
Hume's argument: Not only is the cause inferred not to exceed the effect, 
but also it must not be less than is regaired to produce the effect. 
I J. Monod, Chance and Necessity, 131 
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The fundamental phenomenon of design in the universe requires that we infer a 
cause sufficient to it. A teleological explanation in terms of an intelligent 
Creator is both reasonable and commensurable with the result, as the case demands. 
(iii) One example of design is, in principle, sufficient for the design 
argument but presents difficulties to the Darwinian argument. The existence of 
disorder cannot overthrow, or detract from, the significance of order where it 
is found. It still points to the existence of intelligence and personality 
which must give rise to it. If, for example, one and only one artifact eiere 
found on the surface of Mars, the entire absence of any other would not destroy 
the evidence for the existence of an intelligence which was responsible for it. 
Kant argued in a similar vein when he wrote, 
Given but a single organized product of nature then the structure of 
our cognitive faculty is such that the only source which we can conceive 
it to have is one that is the cause of nature itself - be it of entire 
nature or even only of this particular portion of it - and that derives 
from our understanding the requisite cause for such a product. 1 
Thus the teleological explanation can be said to occupy a stronger position than 
the mechanistic one. An ateleological view of the world cannot be established 
until it has been shown conclusively that no examples of design exist, and as 
M onod rightly says, "It is obviously impossible to imagine an experiment proving 
the non-existence anywhere in nature of a purpose, of a pursued end. " 
2A 
mechanistic hypothesis may be adopted for limited areas, but not for the whole. 
A single example of design in nature, such as the complex structure of the 
'simplest' cell, is, on the other hand, sufficient to establish in principle the 
argument from design. 
(iv) It would appear that a mechanistic hypothesis, such as Darwinism, is not 
equipped to be an alternative metaphysic or world view, since not only can it 
not exclude the teleological view of nature, as we have seen, but also it does 
not take account of the tendency of the human mind to view nature in purposive 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 101 
2 J. Monod, Chance and Necessity, 31 
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terms. As Kant has put it, "We cannot get home without it. " The conception of 
organic nature in teleological terms is an indispensable component of human 
thought about the world. 
1 
Monod considers, like many others before him, that the teleological view must be 
excluded if the integrity of science is to be preserved. We discover in nature 
a high degree of teleonomic efficiency and adaptation. The apparatus and 
organization of the biochemistry of organisms is "entirely logical, wonderfully 
rational and adapted to its purpose, to preserve and reproduce the standard norm 
It is the very existence of this purpose at once both pursued and fulfilled by 
the teleonomic apparatus that is the 'miracle"'. But, in fact, Monod argues, 
there is no miracle. The problem of teleology lies not in the phenomena and the 
physical laws, but in the mind - "in our intuition of the phenomena there is 
really no paradox, or miracle, but a flagrant epistemological contradiction. " 
2 
The corner-stone of science, Monod insists, is objectivity, that is, the 
"systematic denial that 'true' knowledge can be reached by interpreting phenomena 
in terms of final causes, that is to say, of 'purpose"'. This postulate of 
objectivity is inseparable from science. Its whole development over three 
centuries presupposes it. It is impossible to escape from it without departing 
from science itself. Hence, he concludes the contradiction must be resolved by 
the exclusion of teleology, modern man must accept not only the fruits of 
science in technology and mastery of nature, but he must accept the metaphysical 
implications of science, too, in recognizing that he lives in a world of chance 
and necessity -a universe that is devoid ultimately of purpose and in which he 
must create his own destiny instead of accepting one he finds in it. 
There are two mistakes which it appears Monod makes here which involve him in his 
epistemological contradiction and require him to resolve it in the way he does. 
1 I. Kant, Critique of Teleological Judgement, 91 
2 J. 1onod, Chance and Necessity, 29 
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1. He elevates the methodology of science into a metaphysic. There is no 
reason why he should do this except out of personal predilection and choice of 
such a metaphysic. Science itself does not require the kind of justification 
he considers it demands. Kant would have argued that the mechanistic hypothesis 
must be pursued to the limit, but this would not have necessitated the ousting of 
the teleological principle from our consideration of nature. It is the pre- 
supposition of objectivity that Monod rightly says science needs, but there is 
no reason why this should become a metaphysic except by choice. 
2. He assumes that the only true knowledge is empirical knowledge. However, 
this legacy of the Enlightenment confuses our appraisal of the world and our- 
selves, and circumscribes man's real potential. Knowledge extends beyond these 
narrow confines and life would be impossible if it did not. My knowledge of my 
own states of mind, and of other minds, does not fall into this category. 
I 
On these grounds the teleological principle cannot be excluded. The denial of 
this principle, in the way that Monod advocates, can only result in the impairment 
of man's ability to interpret reality, and the impoverishment of his appreciation 
of it. The adoption of the explanation of chance whether by Epicurus or the 
modern Darwinist is, as Kant would have maintained, the resolution of the antinomy 
in the wrong way, by destroying the concept of teleology rather than explaining it, 
In dealing with mind we are aware that we are encountering something that is 
fundamentally different in principle from matter, even organic matter. Likewise 
in dealing with organized matter we are aware that we are dealing with something 
that is qualitatively different from inorganic matter. Neither of these two can 
be explained without remainder by the mechanistic principle and, therefore, any 
attempt to interpret reality solely in terms of such a principle must ultimately 
fail. 
1 See discussion Chapter II. 
'A 
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(v) Wherever the teleological principle is denied it tends to reassert itself. 
Because man and organic nature cannot be understood adequately without teleological 
categories this leads to the conviction that the whole of nature must ultimately 
be purposive. The necessity of viewing particular parts of nature as purposive 
reflects back upon nature as a whole, and it becomes impossible to conceive of 
the world as having no purpose at all. Kant argued that the mind is led on, not 
only to recognise intrinsic purposiveness in the forms which manifest it, but to 
see relative purpose in the natural world as a whole, and finally to adopt the 
assumption that the universe depends on, and has its source in, an intelligent 
being which exists outside the world (that is, in logical not spatial terms) and 
that teleology thus can find no completion of its enquiries except in a theology. 
Those who have denied the teleological principle have found it difficult to main- 
tain that position consistently. Even Darwin could not rest in a purely 
mechanistic interpretation. While he advocated the operation of chance and 
natural selection in the production of organisms, he admitted that he was 
reluctant to believe that the whole world was without purpose. 
Likewise, we have noticed how both Wallace and Huxley, despite their espousal of 
the mechanistic view, found it impossible to remain in that position to the 
complete exclusion of the teleological view. hallace went on to affirm a 
purpose for man that was independent of the principle of the 'survival of the 
fittest'. In other words the purely objective, scientific, appraisal of man was 
found inadequate to comprehend his whole nature. And similarly Huxley retreated 
from the full implications of the doctrine of natural selection when it came to 
the consideration of man's moral nature. 
As Monod has pointed out, man has never, in fact, really accepted the full 
implications of the mechanistic hypothesis - he has never wholly embraced the 
view that the world is amoral and purposeless. The Darwinian theory of 
evolution was accepted, but without its essential constituent - natural selection. 
r 
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People wanted evolution - directed evolution - but not natural selection with its 
attendant metaphysical implications of chance and the denial of purpose. The 
reason for this was, one suspects, not just a distaste for a theory which presents 
the world as cold and inhospitable to man. There is surely a deeper reason, 
which is that the mechanistic hypothesis is ultimately inadequate to the task 
assigned to it. It was never meant to provide us with a rival view of the 
universe, but was, in the first instance, a tool of science, a methodology, but 
not a Weltanschauung. When exalted to a metaphysic it proved incapable of meeting 
the deeper needs and comprehending the subtle nuances of the natural world and 
human existence. Hence its ultimate inability to take permanent hold of the 
human mind. 
II 
The Role of the Argument 
In considering the role of the argument from design in contemporary apologetic 
we must first refer to the negative side. 
(i) It is not a demonstration of the existence of God. It is not an incontrover- 
tible proof of ash all-powerful, all-wise and benevolent Deity. That was the 
significance of the philosophical criticism. The analogy holds between artifact 
and designer, and evidence of design in the natural world and creative 
intelligence, but it does not take us all the way to the infinite Creator of 
Christian orthodoxy. A man is not a knave or a fool because he cannot accept 
its conclusion, as Clarke would have said he is. But there is nothing unreason- 
able about the nature of the argument. Its strength does not lie in its power 
to demonstrate or prove, indeed, were that the case it would be unsuited for its 
purpose, which is to appeal to the whole man - to his will and emotions as well 
as to his mind. 
There is something else about the argument from design which Kant implicitly 
recognised, that is, the intuitive element which is quickened by its rapport 
with the world of nature. Its cumulative effect upon the imagination serves to 
create upon the mind the impression that the world and man are designed, and 
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to draw the will and emotions to embrace this conviction. This effect could not 
be produced if the argument were purely ratiocinative. The heart and will would. 
not be moved, nor the imagination kindled, by the demonstration of a mathematical 
theorem. Philosophical criticism in revealing the limitations of the argument, 
also revealed its true and proper nature. Or rather, one should perhaps say 
that philosophical criticism rescues us from misunderstanding of the nature of 
the argument, setting it forth in its real character, and freeing it for its 
proper role. In depriving the argument of its supposed powers of demonstration, 
which serve no real purpose, it at the same time enables us to discern the means 
b- which the argument can become truly efficacious. Thus philosophical 
criticism performs a real service in enabling us to understand the role of the 
argument. 
(ii) The design argument is a preparation for revealed religion, but not the 
foundation of it. The contemplation of nature, and human nature, under the 
intuitive principle of design, creates in man an appetite which natural religion 
itself cannot satisfy; a spirit of enquiry is evoked which impels him to go in 
search of a Creator, to look for, and expect a communication between himself and 
God which will answer the quest that has been awakened within him. Thus 
Christianity as a revealed religion must stand in close relationship to natural 
theology while not resting upon it as a foundation. 
Kant saw the role of the argument for design as a propaedeutic for theology 
proper, "physical teleology urges us to go in search of a theology". In Kant's 
case it was a theology based upon man's moral nature, not a revelation. Ho-,,, ever,, 
his remarks are of interest in this respect, that a natural theology is not an 
end in itself. The value of a physico-theology, he maintained, lies not in its 
power to establish conclusively the existence of God, for this it has been shown 
not to possess, but rather in the way in which it prepares the mind for theologi- 
cal cognition. It gives a bent and direction to the mind which is then open to 
revelation, and will in consequence serve as a powerful confirmation and 
corroboration of revelation when it is given. 
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Paley, himself, was aware of this limited role of natural theology and of its 
proper function in relation to revelation. His aim in his Natural Theology 
was "to provide a limited confirmation of the Christian religion. " "A true 
theist, " said Paley, "will be the first to listen to any credible communication 
of divine knowledge". 
1 Conversely, without the theistic direction which 
natural theology gives we may expect a general lack of interest in revealed 
religion. 
Dennis Nineham has posed the modern theological problem thus, 
No one will deny that it is at the level of the imagination that 
contemporary Christianity is most weak. ken find it hard to believe 
in God because they do not have available to them any lively imaginative 
picture of the way God and the world as they know it are related. 2 
It is at this level, the level of the imagination - the picture of the relation 
between God and the world - that the design argument operates, and it would 
therefore seem that a revival of religious interest generally would be greatly 
assisted by a renewed interest in natural theology, and particularly by the 
refurbishing of the argument from design, that "oldest, clearest, and best suited 
to human understanding" of all the arguments for the existence of God. 
(iii) The argument from design, rightly understood, creates not only an 
intellectual quest for a Creator, but it also puts man under a moral obligation 
to seek him. At the purely logical level the design argument is insufficient. 
The tendency in the eighteenth century was to regard the exposition of the 
argument simply as an intellectual pursuit. But man is more than mind, and the 
relationship presupposed by this argument is between man and his Creator. This 
calls forth another dimension - the moral. 
The man who is ignorant of someone who does him good, should at least desire to 
know something about him. A man who received many gifts from an unknown source 
would show a lack of conscience if he did not show some <<esire to know something 
1 WTm. Paley, Natural Theology, Works, 193 
2 Dennis Nineham in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick, 201 
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of the person responsible for the gifts and a wish to thank him. Thus there 
is a prior moral obligation on the part of man to seek God, even though he is 
not sure of God's existence. 
Once this obligation is recognised and acted upon, the evidence that is available 
in organic nature, and the world as a whole, is given its proper context and 
acquires greater force than if the argument is regarded simply as an intellectual 
exercise. Anyway such a position of detachment is not really open to man as a 
moral being, and is a mere abstraction. As we can only see certain physical 
objects properly if we bring our concentration to bear upon them, so the 
significance of the evidence of design is only properly evaluated by the mind 
when there is an effort of the will preceding and accompanying it. Thus it is 
the moral state determines the intellectual. To neglect this throws the argument 
into a false setting, and deprives it of its true force. 
(iv) The immediacy of design in nature is the means of general revelation. 
Darwinian evolution by natural selection excluded God from the picture of the 
natural world altogether. If he came into the reckoning at all it was only in 
the Deistic sense of the one who gave the initial impetus to the movement of 
evolution. "The Creator who breathed into a few forms or one the breath of life". 
Even those who advocated directed evolution as a theistic alternative neverthe- 
less increased the sense of remoteness of the Deity from his creation from that 
which obtained before, for despite the fact that many who argued thus sought to 
express the idea that God was immanent in his creation and superintended each 
innovation and variation leading to the emergence of new forms of life, yet the 
psychological import of the term 'evolution' carried with it the notion of life 
developing from within the organism and free from external interference. Again, 
God was confined to the circumference of the universe and the sense of remoteness 
was not mitigated despite asseverations to the contrary. Similarly, while design 
was considered compatible with directed evolution, and the adoption of directed 
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evolution by some men of religious convictions was made in order to try to effect 
a reconciliation between evolution and design, yet the immediacy and force of 
design was undoubtedly weakened, and it ceased to play a serious apologetic role. 
The chief interest seemed merely in retaining a foothold for design within an 
evolutionary theory and affirming that there was a purpose in nature and human 
existence. But the design argument can only flourish upon the actual and 
immediate instances and examples of design which impress the mind, and appeal to, 
and reinforce, our intuitive awareness of it. The mere assertion of design or 
purpose in nature generally does nothing. 
The immediacy of design in this sense and its apprehension by the intuition of 
the mind form the basis for our understanding of general revelation, because it 
is through this that man is made aware of an intelligence outside nature and 
which is responsible for the prospective order he sees within it. This agrees 
with the psychological experience of many who have studied nature on the 
inductive level and have confessed to the belief that they were tracing the 
thoughts of God after him, the conviction that they were in communication with 
an infinite mind which had established the order of the universe that they 
themselves were now discerning. Kepler and Einstein both confessed to this 
experience. 
Here we have Mind discovering mind, Intelligence in communication with 
intelligence. Thus to the intuitive apprehension of the mind, which is itself 
organized upon teleological principles, the universe becomes the medium of a 
general revelation. It is the immediacy of actual instances of purpose and 
design in nature which have this revelatory effect, and not the mere conviction 
that God is in the process somewhere. 
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The Nature and Character of God shown by the Design Argument 
The natural attributes of God. The argument falls short of orthodox doctrinal 
statements. : chile we may infer creative intelligence from the phenomena of the 
universe, we cannot affirm infinite wisdom. This is for the reason that both 
Kant and Hume advanced, that the cause must be proportioned to the effect; we 
cannot infer a totally omnipotent and omniscient God from the finite phenomena 
of the universe. R. G. Swinburne argues that this is not strictly correct and that 
The universal adoption of this celebrated principle would lead to 
the abandonment of science. Any scientist who told us only that 
the cause of E had E producing characteristics would not add one 
iota to our knowledge. Ebcplanation of matters of fact consists in 
postulating on reasonable grounds that the cause of an effect has 
certain characteristics other than those sufficient to produce the effect. 
However, even when this is granted, it still does not entitle us to conclude 
that the Creator of the world is infinitely powerful and wise. Nevertheless, 
this 'falling short' of the argument from design does not seriously impair its 
value in affording some understanding of a creative power behind the universe. 
Indeed, if we rightly understand the limitations of natural theology in this 
respect we need not even regard it as a defect at all. It is only a lack, a 
deficiency, if to begin with we expect it to furnish us with a complete and 
orthodox picture of God's nature. Revelation itself when speaking of the 
omniscience, omnipotence and eternity of God is an accommodation to our limited 
apprehension of the meaning of these terms, and represents God to us not as he 
is in himself but as he stands in relation to us. 
If it is conceded that design in nature points to a designer of nature, an 
architect or creator of the universe, then the power which could create such 
a world as this must be greater than any which we can experience in ourselves; 
than any which we observe in other visible agents and a power to which we 
cannot, from our observation or knowledge, assign any limits of space or 
duration. 
I R. G. Swinburne, 'The Argument from Design' in Philosophy, July, 1968. 
Vol. XLIII No. 161+, 207 
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Thus, for all practical purposes it would not seem inappropriate to refer to 
this power as 'infinite'. The degree of po': er and knowledge necessary to bring 
the universe into existence cannot from our point of view be distinguished from 
infinite. The complaint that the design argument does not prove :, onotheism is 
therefore only of academic interest. 
But what of the moral attributes of God ? Hume argued thrt we cannot infer from 
the mixed phenomena of the world - its pain and pleasure, its suffering and joy, 
its good and evil - an unmixed principle of benevolence, an infinitely good God 
as responsible for its creation. By the same argument is also excluded the 
conclusion that the Being responsible for the world is wholly malevolent. 
That leaves us with two other possibilities. That the Being that created the 
world is both good and bad, or neither. Hume considered that the regularity of 
the laws of nature, and the ordered character of the world generally, seem to be 
opposed to the first alternative. There remains only moral indifference. He 
recognised, however, that the existence of evil in the world is not incompatible 
with a perfectly good creator, but his perfect goodness would have to be proved 
by other means than the argument from design, which must start from the facts 
of the world as they are. 
Paley, on the other hand, argued that if the Creator were indifferent to our 
happiness then we must impute to our good fortune (as design is excluded upon 
this assumption) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure and the 
supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But since either and, still 
more, both of these are too much to atribute to accident, nothing remains but 
to assume that he who created mankind wished their happiness and made provision 
for them with that end in view. 
I 
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A limited doctrine of the benevolence of the Creator may be deduced from the 
data as it exists. Misery and suffering there are in the world, but generally 
Paley considered they have a secondary and accidental role. Teeth were made 
for eating not for aching. Often too much is made of the suffering of the animal 
kingdom, which arises from ascribing to the animals the fears and apprehensions 
that we ourselves experience, but which they do not possess. Darwin was 
influenced in his thinking, and particularly in his thinking about design and 
purpose in nature, by his reflections upon the sufferings of animals. Cruelty 
and suffering of any kind deeply affected him, but he could also be as optimistic 
as Paley when he chose to be. Ahen, for example, he was seeking to commend the 
acceptance of his doctrine of natural selection, or the 'survival of the fittest', 
to his more sensitive readers, he argued, 
When we reflect on this struggle we may console ourselves with the full 
belief that this war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, 
that death is generally prompt and that the vigorous, the healthy and 
the happy survive and multiply. I 
The spectre which haunted the Victorian imagination - 'nature red in tooth and 
claw', 'the great charnel house of nature' - was unnecessary and unjustified. 
We are dealing with a mixed state of things, but the mixture is not such as to 
suggest the indifference of the Creator to the happiness or suffering, the misery 
or joy, of his creation. There would appear to be a preponderance on the side 
of what is pleasurable in the sentient creation -a conjunction of pleasurable 
objects and the capacity to enjoy them, which is too great to attribute to 
accident or good fortune; a preponderance which should lead us toward the 
conclusion that the Creator wished the happiness of his creation. 
A very large proportion of the suffering and misery inflicted upon mankind is 
brought about by man's sin and wickedness. If that were removed, who can doubt 
that a great burden would be lifted, and its removal would contribute 
immeasurably to the sum of human happiness. This would not affect the suffering 
caused by natural disasters, but the argument serves to strengthen our belief 
1 Chas. Darwin, The Origin of Species (Sixth edition), 57 
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that happiness was meant to predominate over suffering. Even such natural 
calamities as famine and disease are sometimes caused or aggravated by the 
incompetence, foolishness or wickedness of men. 
But in so arguing for a belief in the benevolence of a Creator we do not wish 
to be taken to imply that the pursuit of happiness is the chief end of existence, 
especially human existence. Man's experience exposes the fallaciousness of 
that view; his nature, as Kant pointed out, is not so constituted as to rest 
or be satisfied in any possession or enjoyment whatever. It was a weakness 
sometimes of the Deistic form of the argument from design, that it emphasised 
too much the order of nature and its supposed perfection. The corollary of 
that was that there must be universal happiness in the sentient creation. But 
evil and disorder are very real. The evidence for design does not ignore evil; 
it is presented in spite of evil. While, therefore, from the evidence before us 
it may be claimed that there are indications of the benevolence of a Creator 
towards his creatures, it would be a mistake to maintain that happiness is the 
chief end of animal or human existence. 
We have seen how Kant argued that we must seek a higher end than this, which he 
found in man's moral nature. It has been argued in this thesis that there is a 
rapport between the world and man's moral and spiritual nature. Man belongs to 
nature and is an essential part of it so that the world cannot be explained or 
described without taking him and his moral nature into account. This reflects 
back upon nature and humanizes it; it makes nature the threshold of spirit. 
The naturalists have judged the tree by its roots, but it could be the other way 
about. The world can be seen as coming to its fulfilment in man, and in his 
moral and spiritual nature which is related to, but nevertheless transcends, the 
natural world. 
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Thus we may consider morality and righteousness, which include preeminently a 
right relationship with the Creator, as the supreme end of man's existence, not 
happiness. We are sent into the world, as Charles Kingsley once put it, not 
to be happy but to be right. 
1 That is not a wholly correct statement of the 
matter, but at least it puts in right order the priorities and serves to correct 
the imbalance and proccupation with happiness that is found in some statements 
of the argument from design. Man's moral and spiritual nature point to a higher 
purpose for human existence in which happiness plays an important, though 
subsidiary, role. 
This understanding of the goal of human existence would also appear to be in 
keeping with the character and role of the argument from design itself. As 
Bacon and others have pointed out the mind has a cäpacity for drawing things 
together along particular paths of thought and reflection. 'We are not without 
control in these matters and can choose the path in which our thoughts 
habitually run. 
It has been the purpose of this thesis to show that the di; 'ficulties and 
objections to the design argument can be overcome so that, in principle, there 
is nothing to prevent us cultivating that direction of thought and reflection 
upon the relation of the universe to its Creator which will facilitate a new 
(and yet at the same time old) orientation upon human life and the world. This 
will not be without a morally beneficial effect for, since the thoughts of men 
are the springs of their actions, this view of life and the world as designed 
and purposive, and ultimately attributable to a wise, powerful, good and 
righteous Creator, must do something to elevate mankind, whereas the opposite 
view only serves to engender a sense of hopelessness and despair. 
I Charles Kingsley, Scientific Lectures and Essays, (1885), 173 
FINIS 
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AVID . WMT)Tii I 
THE LOGICAL STATUS OF THE ARGUrENT FOR EVOLUTION BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
PUBLICRTION OF DARWIN'S 'ORIGIN OF SPECIES' 
A. O. Lovejoy reviews six arguments for the evolutionary hypothesis in the period 
1830-1858 in order to establish the thesis that, the logical status of the 
argument was the same after as before the publication of The Origin. 
(i) The argument from the sequence of types in palaeontology 
There was evidence of progression of forms before 1859. Sedgwick and others took 
account of this and explained it as the "gradual evolution of creative power 
manifested by a gradual ascent towards a higher type of being ... " Sedgwick, 
of course, added that "the elevation of the fauna of successive periods was 
not made by transmutation, but by creative additions". 
1 
This progression of forms was suggestive of evolution and after 1859 was employed 
as an impressive corroboration of the doctrine of descent by Huxley and others. 
Yet Chambers had pointed this out in 1841+. But the argument was not a 'proof'. 
It was too sketchy and general. The principal objections urged against it 
during the period 1845-59 were: - 
(a) The general and undeniable fact of 'missing-links' in the chain of past 
organisms. 
(b) The fact of the apparently sudden appearance of groups of allied and by 
no means absolutely primordial species in the lowest fossiliferous strata 
then known. 
(c) The sudden disappearance of whole grcups of species at the end of certain 
geological periods and then the sudden replacement in the next period by 
species different in type from the former and closely allied to one another. 
1 A. O. Lovejoy, 'The Argument for Organic Evolution before The Origin of Species 
1830-1858, in Forerunners of Darwin, (ed. B. Glass; 1959), 380 
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(d) Within the limits of single great geological formations, the arrangement 
of fossils in the strata did not exhibit the required order of progression 
from the lower to the higher types, but sometimes even reversed that order. 
This was Sedgwick's principal point in the Edinburgh Review article on the 
Vestiges, as it was that of Hugh Miller in his Footprints of the Creator, 
(1849) the most-widely circulated of all the replies to the Vestiges. 
(e) "Superposition", as Miller put it, "does not mean parental relation". 
Descent, may be assumed, but cannot be proved from the relative position of 
organic remains in the earth's crust. 
All these objections were still valid in 1859 and until a number of years there- 
after. Darwin's answer to all these was, that the fossil record was incomplete 
and, therefore, they did not contribute a disproof of descent. 
I 
(ii) Argument from Persistent Types 
This was directed against the belief in the fixity of species and special 
creation, since the persistence of types was considered to be a witness to the 
fact that there had been no such complete and simultaneous extinctions of fauna 
and radical alterations in the terrestrial conditions as the Cuverian theory 
supposed. 
Chambers in 181+5 cites specific examples of persistency in his Explanations. 
But such an argument did nothing to help transformationism. It only served to 
discomfit extreme special creationists. "Palaeontology, then, down to and 
beyond 1859, could offer no cogent proof of the transformation of species; and 
though it also could offer no cogent disproof, it did seem to exhibit some facts 
which, as we have seen Darwin himself admitting, could be truly urged as a valid 
argument against his theory. " (394) 
1 A. O. Lovejoy, 'The Argument for Organic Evolution before The Origin of Species 
r 
1830-1858, in Forerunners of Darwin, (ed. B. Glass; 1959), 385-8 
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(iii) Argument concerning the sterility of hybrids: rejection of Buff on's 
definition of species. 
Buffon defined species as, "those kinds of organisms which cannot by mating with 
one another produce fertile offspring. Those which can do so were called 'races' 
or varieties"'. From this definition he deduced (illicitly) two factual 
propositions, (a) "that organisms not of the same 'species' in the sense defined, 
can have no ancestors in common, and, (b) that the so-called 'specific' characters 
of a species are immutable, e. g. that all the descendants of the gill-breathing 
marine animals are still marine animals, that no extant quadrapeds having solid 
hoofs can be among the posterity of any animals having toes or cloven hoofs. " 
This, says Lovejoy, bedevilled 18th Century biology, and continued right into 
the 1860's. "Thus Huxley, in his lectures of 1862, warned his audience of the 
one missing-link in the chain of evidence - the fact that selective breeding has 
not yet produced species that are sterile to one another. " 
I 
Huxley disposed of the difficulty by an act of faith - it will be proved later. 
Darwin devoted a whole chapter to casting doubt upon the assumption or fact of 
sterility between species. (a) Not all hybrids have been shown experimentally 
to be sterile. (b) Some hybrids are not sterile. He refers to various experiment; 
notably with plants, "Considering all the ascertained facts on the inter- 
crossing of plants and animals, it may be concluded that some 
degree of 
sterility both in first crosses and hybrids, is an extremely general result, but 
it cannot, under our present state of knowledge, be considered absolutely 
2 
universal. " (Origin) 
The point that Lovejoy makes is that Darwin was drawing upon knowledge that was 
and had been available during the last two decades and more. 
1 A. O. Lovejoy, 'The Argument for Organic Evolution before The Origin of Species 
1830-1858', in Forerunners of Darwin, (ed. B. Glass; 1959).. 395 
2 Ibid., 398 
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(iv) Argument from rudimentary and abortive organs. 
Special creationists had been obliged to devise 'explanations' of these; 
"symmetry", "in order to complete the scheme of nature, " etc. But Darwin looked 
upon them as evidence of heredity; they had no function; they could not have 
any survival value. Thus they formed part of an argument for evolution and a 
decisive argument against all would-be explanations of the characteristics of 
organisms as resulting from 'first-causes', or purposive 'pre-arrangements' of 
the Creator. I 
Chambers had noted and commented upon this fact also in the 1 &+0's as evidence 
of descent, but "since he liked to give an edifying turn to his presentation of 
scientific facts, rudimentary organs seem to have been a little troublesome 
for him. 
2 
(v) Argument from the homologies in the internal structures of organisms of 
different species or orders: the 'unity of type'. 
The wing, the hand, the paddle, all have the same structure ".. species (or orders) 
which seem to the superficial observer too unlike one another to be descended from 
common ancestors prove, when their inward parts are investigated, to show such 
similarity that community of descent seems the obvious explanation". 
3 
Darwin 
made great use of this argument in The Origin. But Chambers had anticipated him 
in the 1840's. He, too, observed the 'unity of plan' and speculated upon its 
significance for organic evolution, though he w,. s not propounding a universal 
theory of the nature or modus operandi of its causes. He conceived the plan to 
be present in the first germ of life, as it were, and unfolding in successive 
generations. 
1 A. 0. Lovejoy, 'The Argument for Organic Evolution before The Origin of Species 
1830-1858, in Forerunners of Darwin, (ed. B. Glass; 1959), 400 
2 Ibid., 101 
3 Ibid., 1+03 
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(vi) Argument from comparative embryology; the theory of recapitulation. 
Darwin considered the argument from embryology to be the strongest 'second to 
none', in support of his evolutionary theory. "Community of structure reveals 
community of descent ... as the embryo often shows, more or less plainly, the 
structure of the less modified and ancient progenitor of the group, we can see 
why ancient and extinct forms so often resemble in their adult state embryos of 
existing species of the same class. " (Origin) 
Chambers had anticipated this too, but had been reproached for "baseless 
speculation". In the third edition of the Vestiges he wrote, "... embr3 otic 
development is now a science. Its primary positions are ... that the embryos 
of all animals pass through a series of phases of development each of which is 
the type or analogue of the permanent configuration of tribes inferior to it in 
the scale ... " In 1855 Baden Powell included the same phenomena of embryonic 
recapitulation in his review of 'the evidence derived from physiology' for the 
probability of the idea of the transmutation of species'. 
1 
All these arguments are only 'circumstantial evidence'. The special creation 
hypothesis was still 'conceivable', in Huxley's words, and the state of the 
argument was basically the same after 1859 as before. There was very little 
that was new in Darwin's book. Lovejoy concludes with a quotation from A. 'ir". Burn's' 
Modern England (1878). "Hardly any advance has since been made on Chambers' 
general atguments, which at the time they appeared would have been accepted as 
convincing, but for theological truculence and scientific timidity. And Chambers 
himself only gave unity to thoughts already in wide circulation ... Chambers was 
not a scientific expert, nor altogether an original thinker, but he had studied 
scientific literature to better purpose than any professor ... The considerations 
that now recommend evolution to popular audiences are no other than those urged 
in the Vestiges ... "2 
II oid. , 409 
2 Ibid., 1411+ 
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APPENDIX II 
DARWIN AND THE A PRIORI CONCEPTS CF PLENITUDE AND CONTINUITY. 
In view of the importance Darwin attached to the principle that nature does not 
proceed by leaps, and his belief that the law of natural selection exemplified 
this principle, (showing how every change in species was brought about by the 
accumulation of innumerable small steps, which, he argued, must have taken place, 
even if it cannot now be demonstrated that they, in fact, took place), it is 
worth relating this concept, which was basic to Darwin's thinking, to the ideas 
of plenitude and continuity, which A. O. Lovejoy discusses in his book, The Great 
Chain of Being. The universality and persistence of those ideas in European 
thought from Plato onwards, right up to the time of Darwin, would appear to h., --ve 
some bearing upon the development of Darwin's ideas and the central place which 
the principle of continuity occupies in his theory. 
Lovejoy argues that, not only does Platonic thought lead to the awareness of 
Ideas that are the essence of the phenomena of the material world, but that, 
in fact, a reverse process is also initiated, which requires the realization of 
Ideal forms in the empirical world. This leads to the principle of plenitude, 
i. e. that all and every Idea should find concrete expression in nature - the 
pore the better. The principle of plenitude requires that every gap should be 
filled, i. e. everything that is possible should exist in actuality. 
I 
While Aristotle did not subscribe to the principle of plenitude, since his God 
generates nothing, we find emerging in his thought another conception which was 
destined to fuse with the Platonic doctrine, viz. that of continuity, thrnt is, 
2 
that everything in the organic world shows siGns of shading off into a series. 
From the Platonic principle of plenitude the principle of continuity 
could be directly deduced. If there is between two given natural species 
a theoretically possible intermediate type, that type must be realized - 
and so on, ad infinitum; otherwise, there would be gaps in the universe, 
the creation would not be as 'full' as it might be, and this would imply 
the inadmissible consequence that its source, or author, was not 'good', 
in the sense which that adjective has in the Timaeus. 3 
I A. ''-. Love joy, The Great Chain of Being, 54 
2 Ibid., 56 
3 Ibid. , 58 
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In the Middle Ages -j: e find the principles of plenitude and continuity equally 
prominent in man's contemplation of organic nature. 
Albert Magnus writing De Animalibus had already laid it down that 
'nature does not make animal kinds separate without making something 
intermediate between them; for nature does not pass from extreme to 
extreme nisi per medium'. Thomas Aquinas accordingly dwells upon the 
'wonderful linkage of beings (connexio rerum)' which nature 'reveals 
to our view. The lowest member of the highest forms is always found 
to border upon (contigere) the highest member of the lower genus. ' 
The principles referred to were used not merely to argue that a continuous series 
of organisms existed in the natural world, shading off one into another, but also 
that an infinite number of spiritual beings existed between God &nd man. Thus, 
a priori their existence could be proved apart from revelation. Lovejoy further 
argues, that it was not primErily the discoveries of Copernicus and Kepler that 
led to the view of an infinitely populous universe, but the principle of plenitude 
entertained in Medieval thought which found expression at that time in the 
seventeenth century. 
Leibniz continued the exemplification of the principle with his horror vacui 
which he vas sure nature shared. "In its internal structure the universe is a 
plenum and the law of continuity, the assumption that 'nature makes no leaps', 
can with absolute confidence be applied to all the sciences, from geometry to 
biology and psychology. 'If we denied it, the world would contain hiatuses, 
which would overthrow the great principle of sufficient reason and compel us to 
have recourse to miracles and pure chance in the explanation of phenomena. "' 
I 
The universality and ubiquity of these principles in European thought have 
significance for Darwin's view of nature, and suggest that his doctrine of an 
'infinite series of small steps', b;, which organisms are connected, and by 
means of which they a: "e transformed from one species into another, is not with- 
out a priori origins. 
1 A. 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 181 
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We find a close approximation to this view without, of course, the concept of 
generation, or descent, in the eighteenth century in the writing of Soames Jenyns. 
though the chain of being] itself is sufficiently visible, the links, 
which compose it, are so minute, and so finely wrought, that they are 
quite imperceptible to our eyes. The various qualities with which 
these various beings are endowed, v. e perceive without difficulty, but 
the boundaries of those qualities which form this chain of subordination, 
are so mixed, that where one ends, and the next begins, .: e are unable to 
discover ... 
Animal life rises from this low beginning in the shell-fish, to the 
confines of reason, where, in the dog, the monkey, and chimpanze, it 
it unites so closely with the lowest degree of that quality in man, 
that they cannot easily be distinguished from each other ... 1 
The conviction generated in many minds in the eighteenth century by the 
principles of plenitude and continuity, was that the 'missing links' in the chain 
of being actually existed in the present time somewhere, but had yet to be found. 
Man's knowledge of the world was limited, many parts had not yet been explored. 
It was confidently expected that the gaps would progressively be filled up as 
man's knowledge advances. 
It was in the eyes of the eighteenth century, a great moment in the 
history of science when Trembley, in 1739, rediscovered fresh-water 
polyp Hydra ... this creature being at once hailed as the long sought 
missing link between plants and animals - for which Aristotle's vague 
zoophytes were no longer considered quite sufficient. This and similar 
discoveries in turn served to strengthen the faith in plenitude and 
continuity as a priori rational laws of nature. 2 
The view that the gaps that existed in the chain might, in fact, be real was not 
one that was on the whole seriously entertained. "Nature", Bonnet remarked 
. "seems to make a great leap in passing from the vegetable to the fossil (i. e. the 
rock); there are no bonds, no links known to us, which unite the vegetable and 
the mineral kingdoms. But shall we judge of the chain of beings by our present 
knowledge ? Because 'we discover some interruptions, some gaps in it here and 
there, shall we conclude that these gaps are real ? ... The gap that we find 
between the vegetable and the mineral will apparently some day be filled up. 
I A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 197 
2 Ibid., 233 
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There was a similar gap between the animal and vegetable; the polyp has come 
to fill it and to demonstrate the admirable gradation there is between all 
beings. " 1 Thus the eighteenth century scientist proceeded upon the assumption 
that somewhere in the world there existed the organic and non-organic beings 
that would supply all the infinitely small links in the chain of being that were 
now missing. 
From this to Darwin's view of the world is but itself a small step, except that 
for him the organic links were not to be found somewhere in the contemporary 
world, nor were they necessarily intermediate between existing species. They 
were to be presumed to have existed in the past, and may have been the common 
progenitor of what are now diverse species. Except for this difference, however, 
the rest remained the sane: where gaps existed they were not to be regarded as 
real. The rational law of the natural world was still natura non saltum facit, 
and as Darwin put it, "... Differences blend into each other by an insensible 
series; and a series impresses the mind with the idea of an actual passage. " 
2 
The search for missing links in the chain of being before Darwin had not always 
been confined to this world. 4hen the acute difficult;, of the subject was felt 
Leibnitz at times resorted to the idea that they might be found on other planets, 
and "Maupertius, who ranked as a great man of science in his time, proposed 
another equally far-fetched conjecture to save the doctrine of the completeness 
and continuity of forms. Many species once existing must, he suggested, have 
been eliminated by some accident, such as the approach of a comet. Nature as 
we now see it is like a once regular edifice after it has been struck by 
lightning: 'it presents to our eyes only ruins in which we can no longer discern 
the symmetry of the parts nor the design of the architect. "' 
3 
1 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 232 & 233 
2 Chas. Darwin, The Origin of Sp ecies, (sixth edition), 38 
3 A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 255 
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Darwin, in order to rescue his own doctrine of the continuity of forms from the 
incompleteness of the geological record, employed an illustration strikingly 
similar. 
For my part ... I look at the geological record as a history of the 
world imperfectly kept and written in a changing dialect; of this 
history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three 
countries. Cf this volume only here and there a short chapter has been 
preserved and of each page only here and there a few lines ... I 
The apparent affinity between Darwin's view of the continuity of organic forms 
in nature and the development of this idea in philosophical thought and its 
application, prior to Darwin, to nature, suggests the possible a priori origin 
and role of the concept in the formulation of Darwin's evolutionary theory. 
I Chas. Darwin, The Origin of Species, 271 
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APPENDIX III 
CHANCE, INDETERMINACY AND DIESIGN 
Jacques Monod argues, in his book Chance and Necessity, that man is an accident, 
the product of the chance processes which bring about mutations in the genetic 
material of an organism, and the necessity of the consequences of the well- 
ordered, replicative, interlocking mechanisms which constitute that organism's 
continuity as a living form. The DNA code reveals the necessity in the 
replicative process, which is unvarying, except where changes are introduced by 
chance, due to the basic uncertainty principle underlying all nature. ', Vhen a 
chance variation is introduced the system faithfully reproduces it. This is the 
scientific basis of evolution and natural selection. Selection is brought about 
not simply by the pressures from outside the organism, but also from the pressures 
of the organism's teleonomy. Gnly those variations which fit the teleonomy of 
the organism, and which take it in the direction in which it is going for 
superiority and survival, are accepted. Thus Monod concludes: 
Iive say that these events are accidental, due to chance. And since they 
contribute the only possible source of modification on the genetic text, 
itself the sole repository of the organisms hereditary structures, it 
necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, 
of all crE: ation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free, but blind 
at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central 
concept of modern biology is no longer one among other possible, or even 
conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, 
the only one compatible with observed and tested fact. And nothing 
warrants the supposition (or hope) that conceptions about this should, 
or ever could, be revised. I 
In answer to this thesis, which would appear to exclude the concept of design 
altogether from organic nature, it might be argued that, 
First, Monod's position presupposes an ordered system into which chance variations 
are introduced. That the ordered system itself is the product of chance 
is an 
assumption that underlies the argument, but is not proved. The simplest cells 
which are known to us, and which are available for investigation 
have, as Monod 
himself has put it, "nothing simple about them". They "utilize about fifty 
1 J. Monod, Chance and Necessity, 110 
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different proteins as well as DNA and RNA of various kinds. Such a structure 
is far too complicated to have come into existence all at once by chance. " 
I 
Furthermore the reciprocity between the living cell's proteins which Pot as 
catalysts, and the nucleic acid which acts as a stable self-copying information 
carrier creates an extra difficulty to the chance emergence of the cell, for 
both seem equally indispensable. "khich, then, came first: nucleic acid or 
proteins ? This is the riddle of the chicken and the egg reduced to a scienti- 
fically intelligible question, but hardly easier to answer". 
2 
So then, as far as our present knowledge and experience go, the simplest cell, 
the basic unit of life, displays a complexity and character which, it is 
generally agreed, could not all at once have come into existence by chance. 
If because of this it is assumed that the living cell we know must have been 
preceded by simpler arrangements of molecules which led up to it by a gradual 
series, Y, e ought at least to acknowledge that at this point we are embarking 
upon speculation. 
3 Any imaginary examples of such arrangements which might be 
supposed to have constituted the evolutionary series should be understood as 
hypotheses introduced to support a hypothesis. 
We return then to the fact that at the foundation of organic life we encounter 
order which is not self-explanatory. 
4 
To regard such order as the product of 
chance rather than design and intelligence is a choice which can be made, but 
the nature of the grounds on which it rests should be fully recognised. 
1 Oliver Lillie, The Living Cell, 19 
2 Ibid. ) 20 
3 "The macromolecule to cell transition is a jump of fantastic dimensions 
which lies beyond the range of testable hypothesis. In thissrea all is 
conjecture. D. E. Greene and R. E. Goldberger, ; Molecular Insights into Living 
Process, (1967), 407. 
4M onod himself seems implicitly to recognise that the ordered system is 
dominant, and has logical priority over accident, or chance, in the organism. 
Thus he states, "... modern biology recognises ... that all the properties of 
living beings are based on a fundamental mechanism of molecular invariance. 
For modern theory evolution is not a property of living beings, since it 
stems from the very imperfections of the conserving mechanism, which, indeed, 
constitutes their unique privilege ... " 
(p. 113). On this understanding the 'noise' in the system is incidental to the system itself. 
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Secondly, with regard to Monod's argument that, at the molecular level, chance 
operates in the changes that are produced in the genes which are then transmitted 
in the ordered, replicative system of the DNA code, these questions, (together 
with those relating to the extent to which such changes influence the life and 
development of the organisms), are clearly matters to be determined by the 
scientist. But assuming then that an already ordered system is modified in 
this way, apparently by chance variations introduced into the system, what 
significance does this have for the design argument ? 
A. R. Peacocke argues that it "does not really add anything new in principle to 
the debates of the last hundred years". "The essential crux in these debates", 
he continues, "was, and is, that the mechanism of variation was causally entirely 
independent of the processes of selection, so that mutations were regarded as 
purely random with respect to the selective needs of the organism long before 
the molecular mechanisms of transmission, and alteration, of genetic information 
were unravelled in the last two decades". 
However, if there is indeterminacy at the molecular level does it affect my 
understanding of design in nature ? Here our understanding of scale is of great 
importance. Regularities of matter on a larger scale, which have been raised to 
the level of being describable as 'laws', arise from the combined effect of 
apparently random microscopic events which constitute the macroscopic. Never- 
theless, we consider ourselves perfectly entitled to speak of these regularities 
as laws despite the indeterminacy of their origins on the smaller scale. Or to 
take another example, my knowledge of the fact that, scientifically speaking, 
my desk is a mass of whirling atoms does not invalidate my experience, at 
another level, and on a different scale, of its solidity, continuity and 
identity. By the same taken, my awareness of indeterminacy in the microcosm 
does not invalidate my experience and recognition of design in the macrocosm, 
nor the inference that the cause of such design is a creative intelligence. 
I A. R. Peacocke, Creation and the Nor1d of Science, Bampton Lectures, (1978), 93 
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To take an illustration. An artist may make a number of random strokes in the 
painting of a picture, a close examination of the brush marks will reveal this 
to be the case, but when I stand back from the canvass, the overall impression 
is one of design and purpose and meaning, and I have no difficulty in attributing 
the 'picture' to an artist, a designing intelligence. So with the composition 
of the natural world, it is the scale on which the impression is received that 
is important. If we , Nere equipped with faculties capable only of receiving 
impressions on a microscopic level it is probable we should discern no purpose, 
or design, in nature at all. But this is not the case. Man is equipped so as 
to discern purposive arrangements, or design, in natural organisms, as he is 
equipped to discern continuity and identity in natural objects. In this way, 
as in other respects, man seems strangely dovetailed into the world in which he 
findshimself, and his knowledge of nature on the larger scale cannot be explained 
away by that which derives from the smaller scale without severe impoverishment 
and distortion of his understanding and appreciation of himself and his world. 
Thus there seems to be no reason why randomness, or chance, at the molecular 
level should determine ultimately how we understand and interpret the universe. 
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